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The article focuses on the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Office of Intelligence and Analysis, highlighting its efforts to prioritize threats, gather input from partners, and guide intelligence production. Topics include privacy oversight, performance measures misalignment and the use of data for customer interests assessment.

The article discusses the government's leading practices to enhance interagency collaboration and address crosscutting challenges. It emphasizes the importance of collaboration between federal entities to achieve meaningful results in areas like infectious diseases, climate change, and cybersecurity. The report validates and updates previous collaboration practices, provides examples, and highlights the role of performance management in facilitating collaboration.

The article focuses on the Office of Science and Technology Policy's (OSTP) implementation of recommendations from the Government Accountability Office (GAO). It highlights the number of open recommendations and emphasizes priority areas for the OSTP, including strengthening interagency collaboration, managing climate risks and tracking progress toward national goals.

The article focuses on the U.S. Agency for International Development's (USAID) implementation of recommendations and highlights the importance of establishing performance goals and targets. It reports vulnerabilities in government operations and the need for transformation to address challenges in areas such as , human capital management, real property management, cyber security, and personnel security clearance processes.

The article discusses the study by the US Government Accountability Office (GAO) regarding the restoration efforts in the Lake Pontchartrain Basin in Louisiana, which examines the US Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA's) implementation of grants management requirements for its restoration program. GAO has recommended EPA make key grant program information publicly available in a central location and update the program's conservation and management plan to include performance measures.

The article presents a report from the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) on government performance management and actions needed to improve transparency of cross-agency priority (CAP) goals. The report identified CAP areas including strengthening of federal workforce, improving federal customer experience, federal financial management and procurement, while CAP goals are required in the areas of financial management, human capital management, procurement and acquisition management.

The article discusses the U.S. Government Accountability Office report which examines employee's views of Securities and Exchange Commission's personnel management. It mentions that the quality of personnel management at the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) include issues related to human capital programs, workforce planning, performance management, and communication.

The article discusses the U.S. Government Accountability Office report which examines employee's views of Securities and Exchange Commission's personnel management. It mentions that the quality of personnel management at the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) include issues related to human capital programs, workforce planning, performance management, and communication.

The article discusses the U.S. Government Accountability Office report which examines employee's views of Securities and Exchange Commission's personnel management. It mentions that the employees expressed positive views on the support provided to employees during pandemic-related telework and the agency's diversity and inclusion efforts, among other issues, however, many employees continue to have unfavorable views on some issues related to performance management.

The article presents the discussion on Government Performance and Results Act of 1993 (GPRA) and GPRA Modernization Act of 2010 (GPRAMA) establishing a framework for performance management and accountability within the federal government. Topics include highlighting different types of evaluations for answering questions about program performance; and agency officials understanding fundamental concepts related to evaluation and enhancing evidence-building capacity.

The article looks at a study by the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) which examines personnel management of employees of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). It mentions one-third of employees expressed concerns in areas such as performance management and favoritism. It also mentions performance management system in place at the time of GAO's review created meaningful distinctions in performance.

The article offers information on the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration's (NHTSA) performance management framework and the number of serious injury targets states achieved during this period is unclear. It mentions that over 37,000 people were killed and an estimated 2.7 million were injured in traffic crashes in the U.S. in 2017; and also mentions NHTSA indicated an intent for performance management frameworks to help states select projects to reach their long-term safety goals.

The article presents the study of the government agency the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) on the long-standing issue of employee performance of the Office of Personnel Management. The topics discussed include the risk of losing top performing talents due to the absence of effectual employee performance management on government agencies, the survey carried out by GAO on government employees from 2010 to 2017, the its recommendations to improve the performance of employees.

A report from the U.S. Government Accountability Office on the assessment of fiscal risks and workforce management is presented. Topics discussed include the costs of the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority's workforce, its performance management system, and the metrobus ridership and service levels.

The article discusses the report of the U.S. Government Accountability Office which assesses the implementation of the Government Performance and Results Act of 2010 and its impact on the performance management of federal agencies. Topics include the characteristics of the existing performance partnership initiatives, the review of the Performance Partnership Pilots for Disconnected Youth and the benefits and challenges of the partnership initiatives.

The article focuses on the various improvements of the implementation of Human Resources Information Technology (HRIT) investment in the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) as of 2015. Topics include the various areas of improvement including data sharing and management, employee action processing, and learning and performance management, the assessment of effective implementation management, and the various factors of implementation such as life-cycle, cost tracking, and schedule.

The article looks at the aspects of the implementation of Human Resources Information Technology (HRIT) investment by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS). Topics discussed include the justification of its investment in Performance and Learning Management System (PALMS), the several factors considered in its implementation including cost tracking, life-cycle ad schedule, and the evaluation of the program's impact on learning and performance management capabilities.

The article focuses on a report by the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) on the reliance of General Services Administration (GSA) on lease extensions. Topics discussed include lease extensions and holdovers being common in the portfolio of GSA in the fiscal years 2012-2014, efforts of GSA in organization management and value of information from GSA to stakeholders.

The article discusses a study by the U.S. Government Accountability office (GAO) regarding key areas related to human capital management where the U.S. government has taken some actions. Topics include recommendation by GAO to the U.S. Office of Personnel Management (OPM) regarding skills gaps in occupations; guidance by OPM for improving performance management; and decline in employee engagement levels in government agencies.

The article presents a study conducted by the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) to review the efforts of the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) in improving the reliability and reporting of cost, schedule, and scope performance information. It mentions about the services provided by IRS by helping American tax payers understand and meet their tax responsibilities. It focuses on the recommendations of GAO to improve the reliability and reporting of investment performance information.

The article presents a report on performance management of federal employees by the U.S. Government Accountability Office. It analyzes the way Goals-Engagement-Accountability-Results (GEAR) framework addresses key practices for effective performance management. It describes the status of GEAR implementation at pilot agencies including the Departments of Energy, Coast Guard, and Housing and Urban Development. It identifies opportunities to improve GEAR implementation.

The article discusses a study conducted by the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) that examined the organizational culture of the U.S. Securities & Exchange Commission (SEC) and its personnel management challenges and efforts to improve agency's effectiveness. As mentioned, GAO explored SEC's personnel management systems against the guidelines of the U.S. Office of Personnel Management (OPM) and other criteria related to workforce planning and performance management.

An appendix is presented on the objectives and goals of the Government Performance and Results Act Modernization Act of 2010 (GPRAMA), and the implementation of the law by the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) for performance management leadership roles.

The article focuses on the Government Performance and Results Act Modernization Act of 2010 (GPRAMA) implemented in the U.S. federal agencies for effectiveness of performance management roles in agency. The officials were given specific tasks under this Act which increased accountability in senior leadership positions of the agency for results.

The article focuses on the U.S. federal agencies which require competency in staff performance and training after getting increased performance management roles. Under the implementation of Government Performance and Results Act Modernization Act of 2010 (GPRAMA), senior-level officials were assigned in management positions like chief operating officer (COO) and goal leader. It increased accountability in agency.

The article reports on the need for additional action on the improvements made by the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) to its Strategic Management Plan (SMP). It states that the 2012-2013 SMP fiscal year still demands to incorporate some details that are useful for DOD decision makers as a guide for applying business transformation efforts and for progress evaluation. It also adds that DOD has widely outlined an approach in performance management for supervising business transformation efforts.

The article contains Enclosures 1 and 2 of the briefing materials on performance information transmitted by the U.S. Government Accounting Office (GAO) to U.S. Senate Committees on government management and performance on December 9, 2011. Enclosure 1 presents briefing materials on the updated federal performance management framework and three case studies. Appendix I includes government performance planning and reporting requirements. Enclosure II provides objectives, scope and methodology.

The article reports on the study by the U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO) that identifies key operating principles the Commerce Departmental and Census Bureau Working Capital Funds (WCF) should follow to ensure appropriate tracking and use of federal funds. It identifies factors including managerial cost accounting, internals controls, and performance management. It recommends updating and consolidating WCF guidance and establishing a process to measure WCF performance.

The article outlines the performance management framework of the Department of Defense (DOD) which provides the oversight and guidance of logistics efforts in the U.S. The primary goal of DOD is to improve the supply chain management of the country including an effective program to monitor and validate the corrective actions' effectiveness and sustainability. It notes the extent of DOD in demonstrating the progress of supply chain management.

The article presents a report from the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) on the termination of the U.S. Department of Defense's (DOD) National Security Personnel System (NSPS). The GAO investigated the transtition of NSPS employees to the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) pay and personnel system, how the DOD documented the costs of the termination, and the DOD's approach to launching an enterprise performance management system.

The article presents a speech by U.S. Comptroller General Gene L. Dodaro, delivered at the U.S. Senate Committee on the Budget, in which he discussed how the provisions set by the Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA) Modernization Act of 2010 (GPRAMA) could help handle fiscal, performance, and management troubles facing the U.S. government.

The article discusses the conflicting similarities of the performance management processes of the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) and the supervisory patent examiners (SPE). It mentions that the patent examiners' primary responsibility which is to review applications to determine if a patent is warranted. It also notes the performance appraisal processes of the SPEs which include performance planning, progress review and recognition.

The U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) examines the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Program to improve hiring and performance management. The GAO report examines the process for hiring ALJs and selected agencies' observation of the process, ALJs retirement eligibility and performance management. It also notes that GAO conducted relevant statutes, regulations, office of personnel management (OPM) retirement-related data and other program-related documents to solve the mentioned issues.

The article focuses on a study by the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) on the assessment of the extent to which the Department of Defense (DOD) implements safeguards of the National Security Personnel System (NSPS) and how DOD civilian personnel perceives NSPS. DOD is advised to ensure that its performance management system has internal safeguards. DOD is recommended to evaluate its training, revise its guidance for analyzing ratings and monitor the implementation of NSPS safeguards.

The article discusses the findings of the study conducted by the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) on the Veterans Affairs (VA) claims processors in compliance with acceptable training practices. It includes a review of VA's training programs for its claims processors and VA's performance management of these processors. GAO recommends that VA solicit feedback from staff regarding the training provided in the regional offices to improve the training standards.

The article presents a study on the implementation on management controls of IT to Global Combat Support System Marine Corps program by the Department of Navy. For the fulfillment of the study, program's implementation were analyzed in several factors. Findings reveal of a negative result related to the implementation on the IT management controls.

The article reports on a study conducted by the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) on the needs of the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) in improving their performance management and strengthen the oversight of high-cost program. It is stated that FCC modified and expanded the high-cost program in order to implement the Telecommunications Act of 1996. It reveals that the program provides, to some telecommunications carriers, facilitating lower telephone rates in rural areas.

With a workforce of about 35,000, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (the Corps) provides engineering services for civil works and military programs in the United States and overseas. Recently, the Corps' focus has shifted to also support contingency operations, such as responding to natural disasters. To meet its mission and emerging priorities, the Corps must have effective human capital planning processes to ensure that it can maintain its workforce. In this context, GAO was asked to examine the (1) extent to which the Corps has aligned its human capital plan with its strategic plan, (2) extent to which the Corps has the information necessary to identify and meet current and future workforce needs, and (3) challenges the Corps faces in meeting its workforce needs. To address these issues, GAO reviewed agency human capital and strategic planning documents, conducted structured interviews with eight Corps divisions and a purposeful sample of 14 of its districts, and interviewed other Corps officials. The Corps' strategic human capital plan is outdated; is not aligned with the agency's most recent strategic plan, which was developed in 2005; and is inconsistently used across the agency. Specifically, the human capital plan has not been revised since it was developed in 2002, and it is therefore not aligned with the Corps' current strategic plan. Headquarters officials told GAO they "abandoned" the use of the plan and replaced it with the human capital updates required under a presidential initiative. While these updates list the Corps' human capital activities and milestones for completing them, they do not contain key components of an effective human capital plan, such as goals, strategies, and a system for measuring performance. Moreover, the outdated human capital plan is being used inconsistently across the agency. Some divisions and districts are still using the 2002 plan to guide their human capital efforts, while others are relying on guidance from headquarters or the Office of Personnel Management or developing their own guidance. Without a current, consistently implemented human capital plan that is aligned with its strategic plan, the Corps' ability to effectively manage its workforce is limited. The Corps lacks the necessary agencywide information on critical skills to identify and assess current and future workforce needs and therefore cannot effectively perform its workforce planning activities. Effective workforce planning depends on consistent agencywide data on the critical skills needed to achieve the agency's mission. However, the Corps does not have a process for collecting consistent agencywide data, and headquarters has not provided guidance to the divisions and districts on how to gather this information systematically. Without guidance, some divisions and districts have collected this information independently, using varying methods, leaving the Corps with inconsistent and incomplete data with which to assess... [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Funded at $8 billion to nearly $10 billion per year, the Missile Defense Agency's (MDA) effort to develop and field a Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS) is the largest research and development program in the Department of Defense (DOD). The program has been managed in 2-year increments, known as blocks. Block 2006, the second BMDS block, was completed in December 2007. By law, GAO annually assesses MDA's progress. This testimony is based on GAO's March 2008 report that addressed MDA's progress in (1) meeting Block 2006 goals for fielding assets, completing work within estimated cost, conducting tests, and demonstrating the performance of the overall system in the field, and (2) making managerial improvements to transparency, accountability, and oversight. GAO reviewed the assets fielded; contractor cost, schedule, and performance; and tests completed during 2007. GAO also reviewed pertinent sections of the U.S. Code, acquisition policy, and the charter of a new missile defense board. In the past year, MDA has fielded additional and new assets, enhanced the capability of some existing assets, and achieved most test objectives. MDA did not meet the goals it originally set for the block. Ultimately, MDA fielded fewer assets, increased costs by about $1 billion and conducted fewer tests. Even with the cost increase, MDA deferred work to keep costs from increasing further, as some contractors overran their fiscal year 2007 budgets. Deferring work obscures the cost of the block because such work is no longer counted as part of Block 2006. The cost of the block may have been further obscured by a way of planning work used by several contractors that could underestimate the actual work completed. If more work has to be done, MDA could incur additional costs that are not yet recognized. MDA also sets goals for determining the overall performance of the BMDS. Similar to other DOD programs, MDA uses models and simulations to predict BMDS performance. GAO was unable to assess whether MDA met its overall performance goal because there have not been enough flight tests to provide a high confidence that the models and simulations accurately predict BMDS performance. Moreover, the tests that have been done do not provide enough information for DOD's independent test organization to fully assess the BMDS' suitability and effectiveness. GAO has previously reported that MDA has been given unprecedented funding and decision-making flexibility. While this flexibility has expedited BMDS fielding, it has also made MDA less accountable and transparent in its decisions than other major programs, making oversight more challenging. MDA, with some direction from Congress, has taken significant steps to address these concerns. MDA implemented a new way of defining blocks--its construct for developing and fielding BMDS increments--that should make costs more transparent. For example, under the newly-defined blocks, MDA will no longer defer work from one... [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Native Hawaiian Education Act (NHEA) seeks to develop innovative educational programs to assist Native Hawaiians. The Department of Education (Education) administers NHEA and has provided grants for a wide range of activities. Education is authorized to establish a Native Hawaiian Education Council and seven island councils to help implement NHEA. To inform reauthorization, GAO was asked to analyze (1) what is known about NHEA's impact on Native Hawaiian education, (2) Education's efforts to oversee NHEA grants, and (3) the extent to which Education and the Native Hawaiian councils have fulfilled their roles and responsibilities. To do this, GAO reviewed federal laws and regulations and departmental documents, and interviewed Education officials, council members, grantees, and experts in Native Hawaiian education. Little is known about the NHEA's impact on Native Hawaiian education. Education has not evaluated NHEA due to its relatively small funding level, about $30 million annually, and academic research that shows educational improvements for Native Hawaiians does not indicate whether NHEA was a contributor to reported gains, such as in preschool enrollment and high school and college graduation rates. Some grantees have reported positive outcomes in education and other areas for Native Hawaiians served by NHEA grants. However, the extent to which NHEA has contributed to these outcomes has not been determined. Education has made efforts in recent years to improve NHEA grant management and oversight, and plans to address other weaknesses in the future. Education has established three performance measures that grantees are expected to use to assess their activities, conducted community outreach, and improved reporting requirements for grantees. However, these performance measures are not applicable to some of the educational outcomes that could result from NHEA's many activities. Moreover, Education has yet to establish a method to track grantee activities, such as how funds have been distributed across activities or islands, and some grantees said that in the past they have received little direction or guidance from Education. Education officials said they plan to address these weaknesses. They plan to reexamine the performance measures and provide additional guidance and technical assistance to grantees this year. Officials also stated that they would like to develop a tracking system to better manage grants funded by NHEA, but could not say specifically when this would occur. The parties responsible for administering NHEA--Education, the Education Council, and the island councils--have not fulfilled many of their respective roles and responsibilities under the act. Education has not provided sufficient oversight to ensure that the Education Council carries out many of its responsibilities under the law, or provided guidance to the Education Council on how to assist island councils represent local interests. The Education... [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

By law, GAO annually assesses the Missile Defense Agency's (MDA) progress in developing and fielding a Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS). Funded at $8 billion to nearly $10 billion per year, it is the largest research and development program in the Department of Defense (DOD). The program has been managed in 2-year increments, known as blocks. Block 2006, the second BMDS block, was completed in December 2007. GAO assessed MDA's progress in (1) meeting Block 2006 goals for fielding assets, completing work within estimated cost, conducting tests, and demonstrating the performance of the overall system in the field, and (2) making managerial improvements to transparency, accountability, and oversight. In conducting the assessment, GAO reviewed the assets fielded; contractor cost, schedule, and performance; and tests completed during 2007. GAO also reviewed pertinent sections of the U.S. Code, acquisition policy, and the charter of a new missile defense board. MDA made progress in developing and fielding the BMDS during Block 2006 but fell short of meeting its original goals. Specifically, it fielded additional assets such as land-based interceptors and sea-based missiles and upgraded other assets, including Aegis BMD-equipped ships. It also met most test objectives, with a number of successful tests conducted. As a result, fielded capability has increased. On the other hand, it is difficult to assess how well BMDS is progressing relative to the funds it has received because fewer assets were fielded than originally planned, the cost of the block increased by at least $1 billion, some flight tests were deferred, and the performance of the fielded system remains unverified. In particular, GAO could not determine the full cost of Block 2006 because MDA continued to defer budgeted work into the future, where it is no longer counted as a Block 2006 cost. Also making cost difficult to assess is a work planning method--referred to as level of effort--used by contractors that does not link time and money with what is produced. When not appropriately used, level-of-effort planning can obscure work accomplished, portending additional cost in the future. MDA is working to minimize the use of this planning method--a needed step as contractors overran their fiscal year 2007 budgets. Performance of the fielded system is as yet not verifiable because too few tests have been conducted to validate the models and simulations that predict BMDS performance. Moreover, the tests that are done do not provide enough information for DOD's independent test organization to fully assess the BMDS' suitability and effectiveness. GAO has previously reported that MDA has been given unprecedented funding and decision-making flexibility. While this flexibility has expedited BMDS fielding, it has also made MDA less accountable and transparent in its decisions than other major programs, making oversight more challenging. MDA, with direction from Congress, has... [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In response to long-standing problems with student academic performance, the condition of school facilities, and the overall management of the D.C. public school system, the D.C. Council approved the Public Education Reform Amendment Act of 2007 (Reform Act). The Reform Act made major changes to the operations and governance of the D.C. public school system, including giving the Mayor authority over public schools, including curricula, personnel, and school facilities. While other large urban school districts have transferred governance of schools to their mayors, D.C. is unique because it functions as both local and state offices for many education responsibilities. GAO's testimony focuses on (1) the status of the District's efforts to reform its public school system, and (2) what the District has done to establish accountability for these efforts. To address these issues GAO reviewed documents, interviewed District education officials and interviewed principals from nine D.C. public schools. The early efforts to improve D.C. public schools have focused largely on broad management reforms and other activities that lay the foundation for long-term improvements to the D.C. public school system. The broad management reforms included the transfer of many functions from D.C. public schools (DCPS) into the new office of the state superintendent, which could allow for more effective oversight of the District's education programs. Prior to the Reform Act, there was no clear separation of funding, reporting, and staffing between local and state functions. A new facilities office was also created to improve the conditions of DCPS school facilities. Moving state-level education and facilities functions out of DCPS is intended to give the head of DCPS, called the Chancellor, more time to focus on issues that directly affect student achievement. The management reforms also included specific human capital initiatives such as new DCPS central office personnel rules and new systems for evaluating central office and state-level employee performance. In addition, both the State Superintendent and the Chancellor are working to improve their data systems to better track and monitor the performance of students, teachers, and schools. DCPS also completed its school consolidation plan that identified over 20 schools for closure over the next several years. In addition, the school facilities office is working to address the backlog of repairs. The director of the facilities office told us that he found that school heating and plumbing systems were inoperable, roofs leaked, and floors needed replacing. In addition, he said many schools were in violation of District fire codes. To address the backlog and ongoing facilities needs, the new office undertook several repair programs this summer and early fall. The D.C. Mayor and education officials have introduced a performance-based process designed to establish accountability for their school reform... [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Army's Future Combat System (FCS) requires a software-based advanced information network to meld people, sensors, and weapons into a cohesive fighting force. As software controls 95 percent of FCS's functionality, it determines the success or failure of the program. The Army contracted with the Boeing Company as a lead systems integrator (LSI) to define, develop and integrate FCS, including software development. GAO must by law report annually on FCS. This is one of two reports to meet this requirement. It addresses risks facing the development of network and software, the practices being used to manage software, and the timing of key network demonstrations. In conducting our work, GAO has contacted numerous DOD, Army, and contractor offices; reviewed technical documents on software and network development and plans; attended meetings; and spoken to Army and other officials on various aspects of FCS network and software development. GAO also performed detailed work at five FCS software developers. Almost 5 years into the program, it is not yet clear if or when the information network that is at the heart of the FCS concept can be developed, built, and demonstrated by the Army and LSI. Significant management and technical challenges have placed development of the network and software at risk. These risks include, among others, network performance and scalability, immature network architecture, and synchronization of FCS with Joint Tactical Radio System and Warfighter Information Network Tactical programs that have significant technical challenges of their own. Software being developed for the network and platforms is projected to total 95.1 million lines of computer code, almost triple the size since the program began in 2003. FCS's software is about four times larger than the next two largest software-intensive defense programs. Although several disciplined practices are being used to develop FCS's network and software, the program's immaturity and aggressive pace during development have delayed requirements development at the software developer level. For example, software developers for 5 major software packages that GAO reviewed report that high-level requirements provided to them were poorly defined, late, or omitted in the development process. This caused the software developers to do rework or defer functionality out to future builds. In turn, these poor or late requirements had a cascading effect that caused other software development efforts to be delayed. It is unclear when or how it can be demonstrated that the FCS network will work as needed, especially at key program junctures. For example, in 2009, network requirements, including software, may not be adequately defined nor designs completed at the preliminary design review; and at the FCS milestone review later that year, network demonstration is expected to be very limited. The first major FCS network demonstration--the limited user test in 2012--will take place... [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The U.S. Coast Guard, a multi-mission maritime military service within the Department of Homeland Security, has requested more than $9 billion for fiscal year 2009 to address its responsibilities for homeland security missions (such as undocumented migrant interdiction) and non-homeland security missions (such as environmental protection). Integral to conducting its missions, is the Deepwater program--a 25-year, $24 billion effort to upgrade or replace vessels and aircraft. This testimony discusses: budget request and trends, and performance statistics, challenges in balancing operations across multiple missions, and Deepwater affordability, management, and its impact on operations. GAO's comments are based on products issued from 1997 to 2008. This testimony also discusses on-going work related to patrol boat operations. To conduct its work, GAO analyzed documentation and interviewed relevant officials. The Coast Guard's fiscal year 2009 budget request is approximately 7 percent higher than its fiscal year 2008 enacted budget, generally because of proposed increases in both operating expenses and acquisition, construction, and improvements funding. The Coast Guard expects to meet its performance goals for 6 of its 11 mission areas for fiscal year 2007, similar to the performance it reported for fiscal year 2006. The Coast Guard also continues to develop additional measures to better understand the links between resources expended and results achieved. The Coast Guard continues to face challenges balancing its various missions with its finite resources and has had difficulties funding and executing both its homeland security and non-homeland security missions. GAO's work has shown that the Coast Guard's homeland security requirements continue to increase and that it has been unable to keep up with these rising security demands. For example, the Coast Guard is not meeting its requirements for providing vessel escorts and conducting security patrols. The Coast Guard is also facing additional requirements to conduct more inspections of maritime facilities and provide security at a growing number of facilities that import hazardous cargos. The Deepwater acquisition program continues to be a source of challenges and progress for the Coast Guard. In terms of affordability, the magnitude of Deepwater funding--representing about 11 percent of the agency's proposed fiscal year 2009 budget--presents a long-term challenge. In terms of management, the Coast Guard has made changes to improve program management by moving away from reliance on a system integrator, increasing government monitoring of program outcomes and competitively purchasing selected assets. In terms of operations, delays in the procurement of new patrol boats have increased resource requirements to maintain older legacy patrol boats and keep them operating. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Under the Medicare Part D program, prescription drug coverage is provided through plans sponsored by private companies. Beneficiaries, their appointed representatives, or physicians can ask sponsors to cover prescriptions restricted under their plan--a process known as a coverage determination--and can appeal denials to the sponsor and the independent review entity (IRE). GAO was asked to review (1) the processes for sponsors' coverage determination decisions and the approval rates, (2) the processes for appealing coverage denials and the approval rates at the sponsor and IRE levels, and (3) the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services' (CMS) efforts to inform the public about sponsors' performance and oversee sponsors' processes. GAO visited seven sponsors that account for over half of Part D enrollment. GAO also interviewed and obtained data from CMS and IRE officials. Sponsors in our study address coverage requests for drugs with restrictions using processes that allow for prompt decisions, apply a range of criteria, and have resulted in approvals of most cases. To minimize the amount of time needed to make a determination, study sponsors use automated systems to compare the patient information they receive from prescribing physicians against preset coverage criteria. The coverage criteria for specific drugs incorporate Medicare requirements--such as whether the drug use is excluded from coverage under Medicare Part D--and discretionary components--such as whether a less expensive alternative drug has been tried and failed. Some study sponsors indicated they feel pressure to make decisions within the CMS-required time frames even when all pertinent patient information from physicians is not at hand. In reviewing a sample of 421 case files, GAO found that overall, study sponsors approved about 67 percent of the coverage determination requests, ranging from 57 percent to 76 percent. The process for conducting appeals allows staff not involved in the previous case review to make better-informed decisions by considering additional supporting evidence. At the first level of appeal, sponsor staff evaluate any corrected or augmented evidence to see if coverage criteria have been met. At the second level of appeal, IRE staff consider the information the sponsor reviewed, along with any additional support that may be available. In many cases, appeals result in new interpretations of whether the requested drug should be covered. CMS appeals data show that, from July 2006 through December 2006, the median approval rate across all Part D sponsors was 40 percent; from July 2006 through June 2007, appeals to the IRE received full or partial approval in 28 percent of cases. For some standard appeals, missing appointment of representative (AOR) documentation contributed to delays in sponsor-level appeals decisions and dismissals of IRE appeals cases. Some study sponsors have developed "workarounds" to eliminate the need for the completed AOR... [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Congress mandated in 2000 that the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) conduct the Physician Group Practice (PGP) Demonstration to test a hybrid payment methodology for physician groups that combines Medicare fee-for-service payments with new incentive payments. The 10 participants, with 200 or more physicians each, may earn annual bonus incentive payments by achieving cost savings and meeting quality targets set by CMS in the demonstration that began in April 2005. In July 2007, CMS reported that in the first performance year (PY1), 2 participants earned combined bonuses of approximately $7.4 million, and all 10 achieved most of the quality targets. Congress mandated that GAO evaluate the demonstration. GAO examined, for PY1, the programs used, whether the design was reasonable, and the potential challenges in broadening the payment approach used in the demonstration to other physician groups. To do so, GAO reviewed CMS documents, surveyed all 10 groups, and conducted interviews and site visits. All 10 participating physician groups implemented care coordination programs to generate cost savings for patients with certain conditions, such as congestive heart failure, and initiated processes to better identify and manage diabetes patients in PY1. However, only 2 of the 10 participants earned a bonus payment in PY1 for achieving cost savings and meeting diabetes quality-of-care targets. The remaining 8 participants met most of the quality targets, but did not achieve the required level of cost savings to earn a bonus. Many of the participants' care coordination programs were not in place for all of PY1. CMS's design for the PGP Demonstration was generally a reasonable approach for rewarding participating physician groups for achieving cost-savings and quality-of-care targets, but created challenges. CMS's decision to use comparison groups, adjust for Medicare beneficiaries' health status, and include a quality component in the design helped ensure that bonus payments were attributable to demonstration-specific programs and that cost-savings were not achieved at the expense of quality. However, the design created challenges. For example, neither bonuses nor performance feedback for PY1 were given to participants until after the third performance year had begun. CMS provides participants with quarterly claims data sets, but most participants report they do not have the resources to analyze these data sets and generate summary reports on their progress and areas for improvement. The large relative size of the 10 participating physician groups (all had 200 or more physicians) compared with most U.S. physician practices (less than 1 percent had more than 150 physicians) gave the participants certain size-related advantages that may make broadening the payment approach used in the demonstration to other physician groups and non-group practices challenging. Their larger size provided the participants with three unique... [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This report presents the Government Accountability Office's (GAO) Performance Plans for Fiscal Year 2009. In the spirit of the Government Performance and Results Act, this annual plan informs the Congress and the American people about what we expect to accomplish on their behalf in the coming fiscal year. It sets forth our plan to make progress toward achieving our strategic goals for serving the Congress and the American people. This framework not only shows the relationship between our strategic goals and strategic objectives, but also show major themes that could potentially affect our work. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Congress mandated in 2000 that the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) conduct the Physician Group Practice (PGP) Demonstration to test a hybrid payment methodology for physician groups that combines Medicare fee-for-service payments with new incentive payments. The 10 participants, with 200 or more physicians each, may earn annual bonus incentive payments by achieving cost savings and meeting quality targets set by CMS in the demonstration that began in April 2005. In July 2007, CMS reported that in the first performance year (PY1), 2 participants earned combined bonuses of approximately $7.4 million, and all 10 achieved most of the quality targets. Congress mandated that GAO evaluate the demonstration. GAO examined, for PY1, the programs used, whether the design was reasonable, and the potential challenges in broadening the payment approach used in the demonstration to other physician groups. To do so, GAO reviewed CMS documents, surveyed all 10 groups, and conducted interviews and site visits. All 10 participating physician groups implemented care coordination programs to generate cost savings for patients with certain conditions, such as congestive heart failure, and initiated processes to better identify and manage diabetes patients in PY1. However, only 2 of the 10 participants earned a bonus payment in PY1 for achieving cost savings and meeting diabetes quality-of-care targets. The remaining 8 participants met most of the quality targets, but did not achieve the required level of cost savings to earn a bonus. Many of the participants' care coordination programs were not in place for all of PY1. CMS's design for the PGP Demonstration was generally a reasonable approach for rewarding participating physician groups for achieving cost-savings and quality-of-care targets, but created challenges. CMS's decision to use comparison groups, adjust for Medicare beneficiaries' health status, and include a quality component in the design helped ensure that bonus payments were attributable to demonstration-specific programs and that cost-savings were not achieved at the expense of quality. However, the design created challenges. For example, neither bonuses nor performance feedback for PY1 were given to participants until after the third performance year had begun. CMS provides participants with quarterly claims data sets, but most participants report they do not have the resources to analyze these data sets and generate summary reports on their progress and areas for improvement. The large relative size of the 10 participating physician groups (all had 200 or more physicians) compared with most U.S. physician practices (less than 1 percent had more than 150 physicians) gave the participants certain size-related advantages that may make broadening the payment approach used in the demonstration to other physician groups and non-group practices challenging. Their larger size provided the participants with three unique... [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on the need of the U.S. Army to have an effective management controls in supervising its modular force, expansion initiatives and improving accountability for results as reported by Government Accountability Office. It examines Army plans, funding requests, planning documents, performance metrics and testing plans. It recommends that the Army must develop a detailed strategy and funding plan to improve accountability for staffing and equipping the modular force.

The article provides information on the plan to contract for professional and management support services, the risks associated with contractors and the assessment to manage the risks by the U.S. Department of Homeland and Security (DHS). The department depended on contractors to perform mission-related services that support the performance of governmental functions. It relies more on contractors to fulfill its mission with less focus on measuring the risk and ensuring management control.