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The difficulties in placing Newman in a philosophical school or in putting some sort of shape on Newman the philosopher stem in part from Newman's (understandable) near failure to guide the reader as to his overt philosophical method. On the other hand, in the many discussions and controversies that occupied Newman throughout his life—whether conducted through letters or more formal writings—there is gathering witness to a consistent philosophical way in Newman. This paper seeks to put some shape on Newman the philosopher by two principal methods. First, by considering some inaccurate or wholly misleading philosophical labels which have been attached to Newman both in his day and in contemporary times. These help, as it were, to shape Newman the philosopher from without. Second, by examining those elements of his writing that have a philosophical cast, and teasing out hints and clues to Newman the philosopher. The paper argues that while Newman can most certainly be thought of as a philosopher, his subtle philosophical way situates him only problematically in any particular philosophical school, though there can in his work be traced connections to particular philosophical programmes, such as, for example, British empiricism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract: Six decades after his death, there is still no scholarly consensus regarding whether C.S. Lewis should be considered an important theologian of the twentieth century. This paper investigates where the belief that Lewis was not a theological writer worth taking seriously originated. Then it evaluates two approaches that have been introduced in recent scholarship, by P.H. Brazier and Alister McGrath, that seek to affirm Lewis as a modern theologian of distinction. The final and central part of this paper nuances McGrath's argument by surveying seven reasons Lewis had for not doing theology the way academics did – reasons that have often been overlooked in the relevant literature. I argue that Lewis's decision to remain 'outside the inner ring' of academic theologians was based on a set of risks he perceived were involved in doing theology professionally. In so doing, I suggest that Lewis's writings about religious topics deserve to be taken seriously by professional theologians and other readers. Besides Lewis scholarship in particular, this discussion matters for Christian theology in general because it explores what it means to be a theologian in an era of professionalisation and the conditions under which religious writers like Lewis can become theologians, both of which cast light on how we understand the nature of theology. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper explores a tension between Francis's openness to 'liminality' and certain papal statements condemning transness that reproduce the ways in which people are marginalised as trans. It seeks to make sense of these tensions, reading them back through Francis's theology of history, and suggesting a place for trans people to locate ourselves within the Church in spite of them. It argues that Francis's failings around transness can be viewed as 'limitations' to be overcome in a redemptive movement. It then argues that Francis's theology of history is reflected in his 'dialogical' use of authority, which admits a space and role for us as pastorally accompanying the Church beyond these limitations. Finally, it argues that Francis's pastoral theology is founded on a theology of encounter which suggests that this process is an expression of divine love that draws people to God through a loving encounter with others. Trans people are thus called to put ourselves at the service of this love, and can take hope in its powers even amidst our own weakness. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

While the philosophical study of shame has gained popularity, its application in the interpretation of the Hebrew Bible remains in its early stages. This paper delves into an analysis of shaming and unreasonable shame in the Book of Job, particularly in chapter 19. Through an examination of the Hebrew text and drawing on contemporary philosophical definitions of shame and shaming, I argue that Job perceives his friends, God, and the community to be employing shaming tactics against him, attempting to induce feelings of shame, a sentiment Job considers unjustified. In his case, shame is deemed unreasonable because Job has not violated any cherished values that would warrant such an emotion. Additionally, I demonstrate that while Job senses God shaming him, the biblical character acknowledges that his deity is the sole entity aware of his innocence—God's eyes perceive accurately, in contrast to humans', which only assess outward appearances. The role of God as the perfect witness to Job's life is fulfilled in the epilogue of the book, where Yahweh vindicates Job from the shame he has endured by publicly denouncing the serious faults of his friends. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

One of William Lane Craig's key arguments for the finitude of the past is the Successive Addition Argument (SAA). Malpass (2021) has recently developed a novel challenge to the SAA, utilising a thought experiment from the work of Fred Dretske, which is meant to show that it is possible to count to infinity, to argue that there is a counterexample to the SAA's second premise. In this paper, I contend that the Malpass‐Dretske counterexample should not worry advocates of the SAA. First, I argue that one objection Malpass considers—the Potential Infinite Objection—reveals an interesting fact: the SAA's second premise is unnecessarily strong and can be weakened whilst still yielding the same conclusion. Second, I show how another one of the objections considered by Malpass—the Accumulation Objection—is successful, provided some clarification to the SAA's premises. The upshot of both analyses is that we generate two 'new' Successive Addition arguments that not only move the dialectic forward, but shed light on deeper assumptions and motivating intuitions concerning the Kalām. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract: This paper takes as its point of departure the rise of online Adoration of the Reserved Sacrament during the widespread suspension of worship in response to COVID‐19. Taking the phenomenon seriously as an instance of the sensus fidelium exposes limitations in the Tridentine formulation of the mode of sacramental presence. Alternative approaches may be developed with reference to the thinking of two post‐Heideggerian philosophers, Marion and Nancy, who in different ways explore the subject's encounter with the divine in the phenomenal world as a double kenosis, without reference to an abstract concept of Being. These accounts together suggest an account of adoration as a kenotic response to divine kenosis and so suggest understandings of Eucharistic Adoration that are not bounded by the constraints of physical materiality. The paper concludes by considering the wider applicability of this approach in a world that is, increasingly, a hybrid of physical and 'virtual' phenomena and at a time when US Catholics are believed to be losing their faith in the real presence of Christ in the eucharistic elements. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract: The aim of this paper is to challenge the prevailing polemic between 'necessary' emanation and 'free' creation. I begin by arguing for the presence of freedom and volition in the emanationism of Plotinus. I then move on to explore the role of necessity in the creationism of Maximus. In both cases, I rely upon a twofold schematisation of freedom and necessity to dissolve the dichotomy between them effectively. Having levelled the playing field, so to speak, I conclude that, all things being equal, one does find in Maximus (and Christian thinkers generally) a heightened sense of divine volition and relationality beyond that of the pagan Neoplatonists. This greater emphasis upon the freedom of the divine will, however, has little bearing on whether Maximus's doctrine of creation is 'emanationist' or 'creationist'. Instead, it stems from a biblically inspired sense of the One God as intimately involved in His creation which, though derived from God, is crucially other than God. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract: Martin Luther King's legacy as a Black, Baptist preacher and activist is widely known, but his influence in the public sphere has eclipsed his influence in Black Theology. Additionally, since the Black Power movement succeeded the Civil Rights movement, and thereby the Liberationist movement succeeded the Black Social Gospel movement, the foundations King laid became seamlessly integrated into the theology of James Cone and J. Deotis Roberts. Taking King's social analysis, his concern for crucified peoples, and grassroots activism, Cone and Roberts craft the school of Black Theology. Frederick Ware's book, Methodologies of Black Theology outlined the schools of Black Methodology, including the Black Hermeneutical School, which incorporates indigenous sources to inform theology. Walter Strickland II, building upon Ware, argues the Black Hermeneutical School has three schools of interpretive emphasis: Courthouse, Schoolhouse, and Church House. Cone's theology utilises the methodology of the Courthouse while Roberts utilises the methodology of the Church House. This paper argues that Martin Luther King Jr's activism and theology helped develop Cone and Roberts's Black Theological Method. Roberts carries King's legacy as a pastor‐theologian, and Cone carries King's legacy as a social activist. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract: While Boethius's definition of the person, 'an individual substance of a rational nature', plays a significant role in Christian theology and anthropology, its reception is by no means uncritical. In the last hundred years, virtually every element in it has been critiqued by theologians and secular scholars. Nevertheless, its context suggests that his understanding of the person is potentially far richer than supposed. This paper places Boethius's definition of the person in its historical framework and in the context of his own thought, especially Contra Eutyches and Consolation of Philosophy, in order to demonstrate that despite shortcomings, it represents a dynamic and holistic characterisation of the person. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract: In recent years, attempts to reconcile God's exhaustive providential control over the future and human freedom frequently appeal to Molinism. Through the theory of Middle Knowledge, it is claimed, God can exercise meticulous providence over free creatures while preserving the libertarian agency of those creatures. Historically, both Thomist and Reformed theologians have critiqued the theory of Middle Knowledge for effectively eliminating God's aseity, making God's knowledge in some sense dependent on some non‐God reality. In this paper, I aim to push the discussion forward by integrating Thomist, Molinist, and Reformed perspectives in the view I call Molinist Thomist Calvinism. By resourcing each of these views, I try to offer a coherent way to affirm God's meticulous providence, including God's unconditional election of some and not others, and morally significant human freedom. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract: Ma Dexin (1794–1874), the prestigious Sino‐Muslim philosopher, bridged Sufi ideas and Neo‐Confucian philosophy by his handling of the concept of the Great Mandate. For Ma, the Sufi idea of 'the Muhammadan Reality', namely the reality of the perfect human, could be understood through an adoption and exploration of an ontological and cosmological interpretation of the Confucian concepts 'sage' and 'ming'. The paper explains how Ma departed from the Neo‐Confucian conceptual framework by holding that the Non‐Ultimate had more ontological significance than the Supreme Ultimate. It is proposed that Ma's difference from the Neo‐Confucians on that point explains his identification of the Great Mandate with the Non‐Ultimate. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract: In recent years, Duncan Pritchard has developed a position in religious epistemology called quasi‐fideism that he claims traces back to John Henry Newman's treatment of the rationality of religious belief. In this paper, we give three reasons to think that Pritchard's reading of Newman as a quasi‐fideist is mistaken. First, Newman's parity argument does not claim that religious and non‐religious beliefs are on a par because both are groundless; instead, for Newman, they are on a par because both often stem from implicit rather than explicit reasoning. Second, pace Pritchard, Newman's distinction between simple and complex assent does not map onto the Wittgensteinian distinction between groundless hinge commitments and beliefs that flow from these hinges. For Newman, simple and complex assent differ in terms of the believer's level of awareness of their grounds. Third, and finally, Newman does not reject Locke's evidentialism in toto. Instead, he argues that certitude is not restricted to beliefs stemming from intuition and demonstration but often rightly includes probabilistically supported (or fallibly evidenced) beliefs. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract: My goal in this paper is to draw productively on Meister Eckhart's concept of the 'no‐thing' in order to illuminate Hegel's ontotheological account of both human and divine kenosis. I advance the view that just as divine kenosis is understood as the outpouring of the divine which includes the death of Christ in its economic activity, human kenosis also requires an engagement with death, namely, a spiritual death to the finite. It is via this species of death which is a becoming 'no‐thing' that the reconciliation between the human and the divine is disclosed as a unity that relies on the shared identity of the divine and the human while simultaneously respecting the integrity of both. Indeed, it is in and through their parallel activity of kenosis that finite and infinite being achieve their respective transcendence by necessarily engaging with the being of the other. Hence, Hegel's ontotheological work is not reducible to sheer immanentism as some scholars suggest, but instead upholds the genuine transcendence of the divine. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract: Evagrius famously characterises divine nature as γνῶσις οὐσιώδης, 'substantial knowledge'. In the Alexandrian, Cappadocian, and other intellectual contexts informed by Platonic, Aristotelian, and Philonic thought, characterisations of God as a noetic or intellectual being are fairly common. However, these traditions concur in using the term νοῦς rather than γνῶσις. How can we explain that Evagrius deviates from the metaphysical mainstream? In this paper, I review this question from an historical and systematic point of view. I propose to examine ancient theories of Mind about the function and structure of the νοῦς, compare them to the Evagrian theory, and identify a possible explanation for the substitution of γνῶσις to the νοῦς. Since God is the key element in Evagrius's metaphysics, a clearer vision of the divine essence will help us appreciate the whole system more fully. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Danish theologian and philosopher Søren Kierkegaard is often overlooked as an author in the Christian spiritual tradition. This paper answers Christopher Barnett's call to investigate themes of Christian spirituality in Kierkegaard's writing. In this paper, I argue that we can construct of vision of sanctification from Kierkegaard's The Sickness unto Death. While Kierkegaard does not directly deal with themes of sanctification in The Sickness unto Death, Kierkegaard's pseudonym Anti‐Climacus does demonstrate the 'spiritless' life of despair. The 'spiritless' life, as Anti‐Climacus defines it, is a life that is not truly a 'self'. Anti‐Climacus systematically demonstrates four categories of despair, and all people not living in faith, whether they realise it or not, fit into one of these categories of 'spiritless' existence. I argue that by constructing the opposites of Kierkegaard's categories of despair I demonstrate that a 'spirit‐filled' life exemplifies a vibrant Christian life of sanctification. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper investigates the prospects of a distinctively Plotinian argument for God's existence. Specifically, this paper assesses Plotinus' argument for the One/Good (Enneads; V.1,V.4), a principle rooted in Plato's Republic (509b6‐9), as a philosophical motivation for an argument for God's existence. While the appropriative task of using Plotinus' argument for natural theological purposes is not original to this work, this project remains in its philosophical infancy. It is to this end that the Plotinian background from which the argument proceeds is articulated, and thereafter contextualised in Edward Feser's Plotinian argument. This work defends Feser against two objections he does not consider, concluding that the appropriative strategy is successful and is a significant contribution to natural theology. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Contemporary expositions of God's goodness commonly err either (1) by subjecting God to moral laws, which is to question His sovereignty, or (2) by failing to establish that God will always act in accordance with moral principles, which removes the theist's ability to appeal to God's goodness in response to problems of evil. Current attempts at intermediate positions which avoid these two problems fall short. In this paper, I aim to construct a better intermediate position and account of God's goodness. I do this by claiming that God's ability to create is best explained in terms of God's self‐love. Since God, as the greatest possible being, must be able to create, He must love Himself. I argue that this in turn entails that God loves all things, since by loving Himself, God loves the pre‐existent ideas of everything that will come to exist, and by extension the things themselves. This, I argue, allows us to have confidence that God will act in accordance with moral principles, but without subjecting Him to moral laws. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper argues that it cannot be fitting to blame God. I show that divine immutability, even on a weak conception, implies that God's ethical character cannot change. I then argue that blame aims at a change in the ethical character of the one blamed. This claim is directly intuitive, explains a wide set of intuitions about when blame is unfitting, and is implied by most of the theories blame offered in the philosophical literature. Since blame targeted at God aims to change God's ethical character, an impossibility, such blame is not fitting. I then draw on this conclusion to sketch a new theodicy. I argue that a necessary condition on being blameworthy is that one can be blamed under some possible condition. So, God cannot be blameworthy. Further, I argue that if someone cannot be blameworthy, then they cannot do wrong. Wrong actions tend to make us blameworthy, but since God cannot be blameworthy nothing can tend to make him blameworthy – God cannot do wrong. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Nicholas of Cusa and his daringly speculative theology seem odd matches for Blaise Pascal, the constant critic of the philosophies en vogue during his life. A commonality they share is their mutual concern for the apparent disproportion between the infinite God and the finite human. In this paper, I compare and analyse the shape this question takes in Cusanus's De ludo globi and Pascal's Pensées. Both men observe a sort of 'ludic' character inherent to the pursuit of bridging finite and infinite. Cusanus's 'ball game' realises the universe and the human being's pursuit of salvation as a circular field in which the player seeks to reach the vanishing point of its centre. Pascal likewise portrays human life as a cosmic game that everyone must 'play' with their ethical decisions. Ultimately, they both come to register Christ as the agent and object of their games, the divine player who fashions finitude into infinity. I conclude by sketching a way to reconcile Pascal with natural theology based on his universal game. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The use of sacrificial animal blood in the Hebrew Bible has generated much discussion. While various scholars have attempted to explain the significance of these blood rites, each of these attempts has proved problematic. The current paper employs mimetic theory to develop a more robust and plausible model for exploring biblical animal sacrifice. Using the Passover ritual as a model, I develop a model of sacrificial blood rites as pantomimes of mimetic violence. These pantomimes re‐create a violent yet transformative crisis from the community's collective memory. Such rituals allow the community to enter into and re‐experience the cleansing violence of a mimetic crisis, albeit in a more controlled manner. Through these pantomimes, the community attempts to appease the primitive sacred's blood lust and re‐discover the divine blessing secured through the original crisis. This model may prove helpful when applied to more opaque examples of biblical blood manipulation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article discusses the unique contributions of German philosopher Nicholas of Cusa to various fields, including international diplomacy, mathematics, and astronomy. The paper focuses on Cusa's phenomenology of intentional framing in communities of intersubjective reception and verification. The article reviews Cusa's metaphysics and epistemology, particularly around signs that inspire wonder and amazement.

The notion of social welfare was created by the paradigm shift from duty‐based to right‐based morality, in which the satisfaction of human needs is a right in line with preserving human dignity. This paper investigates Kant's view on social welfare in light of redistribution policy. Kant bases his political philosophy on external freedom. Notwithstanding the ethical principles of his philosophy, he is the first prominent thinker to clearly emphasize the necessity of a redistribution policy by the government toward providing for the needs of the poor and the needy. The important question remaining is whether or not the Kantian ideas of external freedom and redistribution for the sake of satisfying the right to social welfare can reach a compromise. It seems that Kant believes the redistribution policy to be not the right of the poor to be provided welfare by the state, but the right of the state, and as such, the states' right to task the people with providing for the welfare of the poor. Such a policy challenges the freedom of the wealthier class and apparently leads to an inconsistency between the two pillars of Kant's sociopolitical philosophy. The current paper aims to find Kant's response to this challenge by referring to his scattered arguments. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Aquinas's thoughts about the human soul present us with a puzzle. On the one hand, Thomas has been applauded within the analytic tradition as an anti‐dualistic thinker, who emphasises the animal nature of human beings and denies that there could be disembodied human persons. Yet on the other hand he holds, as a faithful Catholic theologian, that the human soul survives death, and maintains that the post‐mortem soul, prior to its reunification with the body is the subject of characteristically personal intellectual activities. This paper reviews the state of the debate regarding whether these commitments of Aquinas's can be reconciled, and concludes that they cannot in his own terms. However, a recognisably thomist approach to the post‐mortem survival of the soul is available, proceeding on the basis that to be rationally ensouled is to have a life‐story. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Many philosophers think that free will requires alternative possibilities. Other philosophers deny this. There are plenty of philosophical arguments on both sides of this debate, but here I want to highlight various theological pressures that might push Christians into rejecting the principle of alternative possibilities. In this paper, I explore six cases that might push Christians in that direction: the case of divine foreknowledge, the case of prophecy, the case of the blessed in heaven, the case of Christ's human freedom, the case of Mary's fiat in light of her immaculate conception, and the case of prayers for the past. As I will argue, in each of these cases, given certain other standard theological commitments, it seems that Christians are pushed to admit that the agent in question does indeed act freely but also that he or she did not possess alternative possibilities at the moment of decision. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Throughout the Confessions, Augustine repeatedly complains about heresy with a special focus on the heresy he once belonged to, Manicheanism. To those of us who live in a culture in which respectable people rarely, if ever, care about religious orthodoxy to such a degree, these complaints seem rather bizarre. Despite this initial appearance, Augustine presents in the Confessions several plausible reasons for thinking heresy is sinful and, therefore, detrimental to a person's sanctity and ultimate salvation. In this paper, I argue that Augustine considers heresy sinful because it involves as many as three kinds of idolatry: loving a lie/false conception of God instead of the true God, loving one's own beliefs more than the Truth, which is God, and loving the worldly praise one receives from developing novel opinions more than God. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The primal sin is an unprecedented event because it is the moment at which creation first became corrupted. This makes it remarkably difficult to explain. In contemporary analytic discussions of the primal sin, a dichotomy has emerged. Generally, scholars working in this area accept inexplicability to avoid blaming God, resulting in a labelling of the primal sin as mysterious. In this paper, I will outline a Felix Culpa model of the primal sin, which I shall call the Primigenius Felix Culpa model. Through this model, I will suggest that the primal sin was made inevitable by God to maximise the value of the actual world. I will argue that, despite inheriting many of the disadvantages that come with a Felix Culpa, this model significantly reduces the inexplicability of the primal sin. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The model of atonement presented in Anselm of Canterbury's Cur Deus Homo has aroused a host of worries from theologians. The gist of their criticism is that Anselm inscribes redemptive violence into theology and thus encourages passive acquiescence to abusive power structures or even licenses the violence of abusers. Some suggest that the way forward would be to jettison Anselm's account and develop alternatives that are not liable to the same abuses. This paper argues that while alternatives may be desirable, Cur Deus Homo looms so large in theological imaginations as to defy jettisoning. We should instead try to perform better readings. This paper presents a close reading of this text as a monastic meditation on mortality oriented less toward resolving a problem of systematic theology than drawing readers into a renewed experience of devotion to God. To do that, Anselm works to rewrite the meaning of human mortality, making it less about the necessity of losing one's life and more about the possibility of a gift of death. The ethical paradigm that emerges is far from a complete moral vision, but is still more alluring than the one about which Anselm's contemporary critics worry. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article seeks to constructively retrieve Anselm's theology of the Holy Spirit by responding to a recent criticism of his doctrine of atonement. This criticism is called the question of efficacy and focuses particularly on how Anselm holds humanity to participate in and receive the divine gift of atonement. In short, this paper argues that the Spirit's prevenient and subsequent grace allow for an individual to respond freely and in faith to Christ's work, resulting in three individually necessary and jointly sufficient conditions for union to be restored with God and human flourishing to obtain in Anselm's thinking. In order to argue this, the paper proceeds in four sections. First, it discusses the question of efficacy. Second, it discusses the Spirit's work in relation to an individual initially accepting Christ's Gift. The paper then proceeds by discussing the subsequent work of the Spirit and redemptive role of faith that are inherently tied to the initial work. The paper then concludes by analyzing alternative approaches to this question of efficacy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Philosophy as a way of life has been undergoing a revival in recent years. This essay explores how the central idea of the spiritual exercises can be used to develop an account of philosophy of religion as a way of life. It details some of the contemporary uses and trajectories of philosophy as a way of life. Through engaging the religiously inflected philosophies of Karl Jaspers and Simone Weil, this paper argues that their thought can present an account of philosophy of religion as a way of life that is both ethically and transcendentally oriented. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

There has been a new reception and revival of interest in the Pseudo‐Dionysius both in popular and academic circles, which has impacted Thomistic scholarship. Scholars roughly from the time of Vatican II have stressed the importance of Pseudo‐Dionysius to Thomistic thought, in reaction to a previous emphasis on the 'Aristotelian' and analytic aspects of Thomistic thought. Whilst this approach uncovered a largely neglected area, the converse now appears to be the case: the Dionysian influence on Thomas is disproportionately exaggerated, leading to a false identification of the two thinkers. This paper argues that whereas the negative theology of Pseudo‐Dionysius entailed the unknowability of God as the One beyond language, concept and being, Thomas developed a 'positive apophaticism' that transformed Denys in light of Augustine, Aristotle and, most importantly, Scripture itself. I first trace the roots of apophaticism showing how neo‐Platonism leads to equivocal God‐talk and why Aquinas goes further than Dionysius in his rejection of equivocity. I then show how the unknowability of God taught by Dionysius is qualified by Thomas through his teaching on the 'quidditative' knowledge in the next life and through the doctrine of analogy in the present life that makes possible the naming of God using positive 'perfection terms.' The primary perfection term is Being which, in contrast to the Dionysian God 'beyond being,' applies to God literally and pre‐eminently. This has implications for epistemology since, as Aristotle showed, knowledge and rational discourse are grounded in Being. The reason Denys' theology leads to an absolute unknowing is because He denies that God is identical with Being, whereas Aquinas' metaphysics, while denying univocal being, retains true speech about God, including logical discourse by analogy. I finally explain how in spite of believing Dionysius to be a first century apostolic convert, Thomas was able to transform his teaching because of presuppositions regarding the authority of Scripture that he interprets in light of Augustine, Aristotle and a developing understanding of a 'literal' sense that stands in contrast to the 'anagogical' hermeneutic of Dionysius. This results in an undermining of Dionysian elitism that anticipates the work of the Reformers, beginning with John Wyclif. In the contemporary context, Thomas' 'positive apophaticism' offers a powerful resource for addressing an increasingly agnostic culture. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, I shall focus on the semantic content of αἰὼν in Maximus the Confessor's works, particularly in the instances in which he employs it as a distinct form of temporality, i.e. not as simply meaning 'eternity'. I focus on αἰὼν as a Maximian terminus technicus in spite of the diverse meanings that he himself ascribes to the word in certain cases. I will also engage with the status of time as humanity's slavery, as humanity's enemy in Maximus' thought, for this is integrally connected with the notion of the Aeon and especially with the need to transcend both time as χρóνος and temporality in the form of the Aeon in striving for ever well‐being. The greater context of this investigation is the understanding of Maximus' conception of temporality as a threefold one, consisting of (a) time as χρóνος, the temporality of the sensible realm and the numbering of motion, (b) αἰὼν i.e. the Aeon, a 'time without movement' and the temporality of the intelligible creation, and (c) the transformed temporality of the ever‐moving repose (στάσις ἀεικἰ νητος). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The problematic assumption that biblical purity thematically represents life and death is commonly held within modern biblical studies. Building upon this assumption, many scholars have attempted to explain the treatment of the ṣāraʿat patient in Leviticus 13:1‐46 as a symbolic banishment of death. However, the current paper attempts to move beyond this reading towards a method of reconstructing the evolution of biblical rituals and practices. Through the utilisation of René Girard's four scapegoat stereotypes, the current paper identifies the scapegoat mechanism in Leviticus 13:1‐46, and reconstructs a proposed evolution of this ritual. This paper suggests that the ritual presented in Leviticus 13:1‐46 may have evolved from an earlier tradition, in which ṣāraʿat patients were executed to halt a mimetic crisis. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper offers a theologically‐orientated examination of some core themes of the works of the philosopher Mary Midgley (1919–2018), identifying areas of possible theological exploration and development. Particular attention is paid to her critique of the reductionist strategies of writers such as Richard Dawkins, her development of the 'mapping' metaphor for engaging complex issues, and her emphasis on the critical role of philosophy. Although the paper offers some brief examples of theological issues which are illuminated by Midgley's philosophical approach (such as soteriological mapping), the primary purpose of the paper is to highlight the theological hospitality that it offers. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Plantinga‐type ontological argument may be tersely represented as follows: (1) If a maximally great being (MGB) is possible, then a MGB exists; (2) a MGB is possible; (3) therefore, a MGB exists. The key premise in this type of ontological argument is the possibility‐premise, namely, that it is possible that a MGB exists. But why affirm the possibility‐premise? Proponents of the argument could claim that they have a strong modal intuition that the possibility‐premise is true. Unfortunately, critics could likewise claim that they have a strong modal intuition that it is possible that a MGB does not exist or that it is possible that a semi‐maximally great being exists, with these premises implying that a MGB does not exist. In this paper, I argue that, in light of this objection to the possibility‐premise, the Plantinga‐type ontological argument is difficult to defend. I then, however, offer a suggestion as to how one may argue for the existence of a MGB without defending the possibility‐premise. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Chad Trainer argues that Frederick Copleston S.J. was wrong to expand the notion of philosophy from Western (Greek) philosophy to include Eastern philosophies.1 He believes that while in Hawai'i Copleston changed his mind to accept what Trainer calls 'aphoristic writings, mystically inspired tracts and exegetical exercises' as philosophy, even though to do so resulted in contradicting his earlier published views.2 In the following paper I will to some extent agree with Trainer's opinion about Copleston. However, based solely on Chinese material, I will explore why it is possible to draw a distinction between Chinese and Greek thought, what that distinction implies and whether the term 'philosophy' can be justifiably expanded to Chinese thought. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Catholics normally approach the Eucharist with great love and devotion. The paper looks at how, through the character, Papa, the reality of this love and devotion to the Eucharist is captured by the Nigerian writer, Chimamanda Adichie, in her novel, Purple Hibiscus. The novel reveals that while Papa, in various ways, shows great love and devotion to Christ in the Eucharist, his devotion remains inauthentic: it does not lead him to a love of this same Christ in his neighbour. The work, therefore, underscores not only the nexus between theology and creative literature, but also, in a special way, the social implications of the Eucharist. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The aim of this paper is to explore in the light of recent scientific discoveries, coupled with a return to biblical orthodoxy, the question of the Fall (Augustine and Paul, Gen. 3, Rom. 7), and the apparent intergenerational conditions of original sin. This is the human condition – East of Eden. Invoking Darwin's theory of evolution through natural selection from random mutation as a means of repudiating the existence of original sin can no longer be sustained, scientifically; the biology of horizontal gene transfer (HGT), transgenerational epigenetics (TGE), accelerated evolution (AE) and biological plasticity (BP) has rendered Darwinism grounded in a Naturalistic methodology an inadequate explanation. If humanity is 'born this way' – mired in sin – have we condemned ourselves and our children to this status? How does this affect the relationship between biology and free will, between a form of predestination and decision‐making? Therefore, this paper is towards an understanding of the ontology of the original, or first, sin, and is a biblical and scientific exploration of postlapsarian humanity's self‐willed state, 'East of Eden.' [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The aim of this paper is threefold: First, I provide a brief account of Ignatian indifference as contained in the Spiritual Exercises. I distinguish between two senses of 'indifference' and apply them to an imaginary Regina who is faced with the decision about whether to give an inheritance to UNICEF or use the funds to finance her daughter's college education. Second, I argue that Jonathan Edwards's polemic, in Freedom of the Will, against Isaac Watts's account of indifference, is open to the 'straw man objection' when applied to the Ignatian concept. Finally, I put forth a Kantian based critique of Ignatian indifference. I claim that while indifference is a logically consistent notion it may very well be psychologically problematic. If it is an open question whether Regina can ever know with certainty that she has acted from the pure motive of duty, then it is also an open question whether she can 'find' herself indifferent in the Ignatian senses of the term. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The problem of divine impassibility, i.e., of whether the divine nature in Christ could suffer, stands at the center of a debate regarding the nature of God and his relation to us. Whereas philosophical reasoning regarding the divine nature maintains that the divine is immutable and perfect in every respect, theological needs generated an ever‐growing demand for a passionate God truly able to participate in the suffering of his creatures. Correlating with the different approaches of Thomas Aquinas and John Duns Scotus, this paper aims to develop, in a speculative manner, key Scotistic insights in order to reconcile the need to preserve God's perfection with the passionate God who loves and suffers with his creatures. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper seeks to re‐examine the relationship between medieval Latin spirituality and the Byzantine theological tradition by drawing attention to a neglected Life of Francis written by the Scholastic Bonaventure of Bagnoreggio. Though Francis is sometimes presented as the very antithesis of Greek patristic spirituality, Bonaventure's Legenda Sancti Francisci presents a figure devoted to asceticism, repentance, and contemplation. Particularly through the motif of deification, and the utilization of hesychast principles, Bonaventure paints a portrait of Francis that is not nearly as inimical to Byzantine spirituality as is sometimes thought. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Many students who sign up for undergraduate‐level philosophy arrive with the expectation that moral philosophy is concerned with how one should act in the concrete and familiar situations of everyday life. Yet moral philosophers are often motivated by an ideal of neutrality, and adopt a detached perspective to achieve a scientific view of the competing moral theories. To concretise the points of disagreement they present highly specific examples that are abstracted from daily reality. There is something odd about the image of morality that comes into view. What kind of guidance about how to act in concrete and familiar situations can this form of theorising bring about? This paper examines Iris Murdoch's account of moral perception as an alternative starting point. Murdoch offers a perspective that is conceptually prior to the separation of thought from action, one that addresses the agent on the level of perception. While accounts of moral perception are often criticized for proposing a complacent moral theory that is inherently conservative, I argue that Murdoch's account offers a radical – or tragic – form of perfectionism. While moral philosophy cannot provide sufficient reasons to act, Murdoch shows that it can, like art, make us practical, capable of acting. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

New ways of relating to the earth and to each other are needed. This paper argues that dialogue with indigenous peoples provides a fruitful way of broadening our ecological imagination on what it means to 'live well' and offers a pathway for living an integral ecology. Their rich cosmovision encompasses and echoes many of the themes found within Catholic Social Teaching and within Latin America it is fostering a space for alternative narratives of well‐being and development to be heard. The paper draws on empirical research with the Macushi people in Guyana. Three theological themes which ground the concept of relational well‐being are discussed: gratitude, reciprocity and solidarity. The cosmovision explored offers the hope that living an integral ecology is a constitutive part of authentic human flourishing and well‐being.© 2018 Trustees for Roman Catholic Purposes Registered [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

I argue that 'classical liberalism' does not sanction any easy permissiveness about suicide and active euthanasia. I will use liberal arguments to argue that the distinction between active and passive euthanasia is real and that assisted suicide is, at the very least, deeply troubling when viewed from an authentic liberal perspective. The usual argument for active euthanasia is a utilitarian, not a liberal argument, as recent calls to eliminate the conscientious objection rights of doctors who refuse participation in such procedures plainly demonstrate. The paper focuses on arguments in the public sphere (such as those articulated by James Rachels). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Generally speaking, just war theory (JWT) holds that there are two just causes for war: self‐defence and 'other‐defence'. The most common type of the latter is popularly known as 'humanitarian intervention'. There is debate, however, as to whether these can serve as just causes for preventive war. Those who subscribe to JWT tend to be unified in treating so‐called preventive war with a high degree of suspicion on the grounds that it fails to satisfy conventional criteria for jus ad bello; – particularly the just cause and last resort criteria. Francisco di Vitoria held that the only just cause for war was 'a wrong received', which renders impossible any justification for preventive war. There are assumptions implicit in recent military practice, however – most notably, the US‐led invasion of Iraq in 2003 – that challenge this ban on preventive war. Interestingly, both supporters and critics attempt to justify their views through the broader logic of JWT; viz., through a conception of what is good for both political communities and individuals, and through a legitimate defence of these goods. Supporters point to situations where so‐called rogue states represent 'grave and imminent risk' of committing acts of aggression as grounds that justify preventive war; critics argue that to attack another political community on the basis of crimes not yet committed is a breach of the very rights JWT was created to defend. The advocate of preventive war does not appreciate important aspects concerning the morality of war. In the ongoing tension between Iran and The United States and her allies – if the rhetoric is to be believed – I am asked to tolerate a threat to my security and liberty, and to risk suffering aggression in defence of the rights of the antagonistic, but not yet aggressive, state. The crucial question is how such tolerance and risk fit in with the logic of just war: at what point, if any, does the risk of being attacked become great enough to justify declaring war in anticipation? In this paper I highlight some of the theoretical and practical difficulties in determining what counts as a grave and imminent threat, focusing especially on the complicated case of 'imminence' in the face of so‐called 'Weapons of Mass Destruction'. Secondly, I will argue that not only is the notion of preventive war inconsistent with the defence of the rights of political communities that JWT requires; it is also forbidden by the proportionality requirement of jus ad bellum. A risk of being subjected to aggression is the price for global peace. Whilst political communities can do much to prevent aggression and prepare themselves in case it occurs, the conditions for just war require that this prevention and preparation stop short of declaring war. We must live with a certain degree of risk in this area. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The outcomes of a market economy depend on human behaviour within business organisations and this, in turn, is closely related to our conceptions of organisational culture and corporate social responsibility. Markets cannot be seen as ‘autonomous' as is often suggested, but behaviour within markets is affected by the cultural environment within which business organisations operate. The first insight of this paper is the importance of culture in the economic sphere in influencing individual decision making. Secondly, we point out that culture itself is shaped bythe decisions of human persons: culture is not exogenous. Thirdly, we argue that an important aspect of a Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) policy within an organisation should be the promotion of virtuous behaviour in order to help create a culture of virtue in the business sector more generally. It is concluded that both individuals and companies have a responsibility to help foster a culture of virtue within the business environment in which they operate which has‘spillovers' outside the organisation itself. A practical application of the ideas to the concept of‘whistle-blowing' is proposed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

William Lane Craig has recently formulated a set of arguments that aim to undermine the rationality of Islamic theism. This paper will consider seven arguments that Craig deploys against Muslim belief. The seven arguments can be summarised as follows: (1) the Quran makes an egregious historical error by denying the crucifixion of Jesus; (2) the Quran contains legendary stories about Jesus; (3) the Quran is mistaken about the self‐understanding of Jesus; (4) the Quran misunderstands the Trinity; (5) the Islamic concept of God is morally deficient; (6) the Islamic concept of God is less plausible than a Trinitarian concept of God; and (7) the Muslim doctrine of salvation compromises God's holiness and proves to be unattainable. I contend that Craig's arguments, when examined closely, do not undermine the rationality of Islamic theism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]