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This paper aims to introduce the mimetic theory of René Girard to explore the connection between culture and religious violence to deal with some critical problems in international affairs. It challenges the narrow conceptualization of the issue of religion and violence as an issue of religious violence. As often as the issue of religion and violence is structured in such a manner, allegedly to pick religion seriously without considering politics or culture seriously. The conception is limited because, as an idea, religion is always contested, negotiated, and developed socially, culturally, or politically. It is a biased interpretation of a world actuality, which under certain conditions grounds violence. Furthermore, this narrow definition of religion suits what critical scholars describe as a problem‐solving strategy to theory. This study demonstrates mimetic theory challenges and reconfigures the conventional interpretation of the issue of religious violence and critically analyse the causes of the hidden, exposed violence as well as the scapegoat mechanism that functions in both domestic cultures as well as in international affairs, maintaining political and cultural order of any society. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Experts often play a fundamental role in decision‐making processes. They are the bearers of an epistemic authority, which is primarily grounded on what we may call scientific naturalism. The main tenets of this view can clash though with other values characterising our pluralist societies. This may lead to conflicts but also to a devaluation or to a rejection of the sort of knowledge and advise offered by experts. In this paper we propose a new accommodation between scientific naturalism and the values of our democratic societies. In Section 1, we present a case study highlighting the problematicity of experts' decisions based on mere epistemic soundness. In Section 2, we frame our analysis of expertise in the context of a post‐truth world. Section 3 looks at the relations between scientific naturalism and democracy, while Section 4 focuses on the potential clash between scientific naturalism and the normative character of other forms of knowledge. In Sections 5 and 6, we present practical instances of this clash (additional case studies), involving religious, bioethical, and cultural values. We show that in some cases these values ought to be granted full citizenship in a democratic state. This, (Section 7), leads us to a stalemate that seems to threaten the functioning of modern democracies. In Section 8, to overcome this stalemate, we propose to resort to a more inclusive form of naturalism, namely liberal naturalism. This form of naturalism cannot do without experts' scientific recommendations and yet does not end up excluding (a priori) alternatives forms of knowledge. We conclude, Section 9, by advocating a more liberal ecology of mechanisms for the regulation of decision‐making processes; one that also encompasses socially inclusive (not necessarily scientific) processes of deliberation and judgment. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Affect Theory of Social Exchange (ATSE) research program has produced cumulative insights on how instrumental exchanges lead to the development of affectual attachments. With its focus on task responsibilities, ATSE leaves space to interrogate how factors not related to task execution are at play in the production of interpersonal bonds. In this paper, we integrate insights from social psychology, cultural sociology and organizational research to develop a theoretical framework suggesting (a) why and how cultural tastes contribute to social cohesion and (b) the conditions under which cultural tastes remain a source of strategic advantage or, worse, symbolic exclusion. Our theory rests on the basic proposition that shared cultural tastes increase the likelihood of experiencing positive emotions, which in turn are key in the development and maintenance of affectual attachments. Variations to this proposition are subsequently introduced, considering culture in declarative and nondeclarative forms. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper introduces the concept of “borderline institution” to characterize an institution in which actors push upstream the boundary between the normal and the pathological and find downstream ways of systematically taking advantage of this push ex‐post. This happens for example when actors make decisions based on predictions; and are simultaneously allowed by vertical concentration to manage conflicts generated by the consequences of these decisions when these predictions fail. A theory of how to identify a borderline institution based on this vertical concentration uses bankruptcy proceedings at the Commercial Court of Paris as an example, relying on Karl Polanyi's concept of double movement and Margaret Archer's concept of double morphogenesis. In this court, bankers as lay judges can control both credit‐related predictions at the bank, and bankruptcy proceedings at the court. Enabling conditions for borderline institutional entrepreneurs as “vertical linchpins” in this multilevel context explain how they concentrate enough power to reach a position from which to drive such dynamics. The conclusion asks whether societies promote new borderline institutions to face contemporary and urgent existential challenges. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper introduces the original research articles that constitute the present Forum issue on unpredictability, contingency and catastrophe. In doing so, it also identifies and discusses the specificity of realist approaches to the above questions. It is argued that attentiveness to the ontological dimension of (un)predictability opens promising avenues for reflexive approaches to social science and collective action. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Determining the human activity that social processes consist in is a central task for the philosophy of the social sciences. This paper asks: which conception of agency arising from contemporary action theory is the most suitable for social science explanation? It is argued that a movement‐centered, Davidsonian picture of agency is not suitable for explaining certain social processes such as strikes and boycotts because, instead of intentional bodily movements, they are explained by the intentional omissions of agents. I propose that instead of intentional bodily movements, social processes are better explained by phenomena in which an agent is taking an active relation both to her mental or bodily processes as well as to what is happening around her. Thus, to fully explain social processes, a comprehensive theory of agency that can account for intentional actions and intentional omissions and a conception of agency that includes both materialist and volitionalist aspects is needed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Akrasia, otherwise known as 'weakness of will', is a state of mind whereby people act deliberately against their better judgment. This paper aims to provide a conceptual framework for understanding akrasia from psychosocial perspectives that assume the self is multiple and strongly interconnected with the relational flow of which it is a part. Drawing on key ideas from Dialogical Self Theory, we analyze the main dialogical dynamics that can generate akratic episodes with reference to how individuals organize their personal position repertoire, and to the relational and socio‐cultural setting in which the actions are taken. The discussion enables us to identify some indicators to frame the tendency to betray one's good intentions, and to offer some suggestions on how to reduce the occurrence of the various forms of akrasia analyzed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The unique linguistic profile of autistic people urges linguists to address the divergences in human language, its acquisition and use among major linguistic perspectives. Fitting with the dual roles of language (thought and communication), this paper adopts an internal pragmatic competence (IPC) and a (similar) pragmatic competence for external communication (PCEC) to elucidate how autistic linguistic profile discloses the divergences between nativism and constructionism on language use and acquisition (ultimately language proper). IPC justifies why autistic people resort not to mind‐reading but to self‐sufficient mental interactions among organism‐internal submodules or nearly intact grammatical subsystems when abstractly processing linguistic and communicative needs, contra constructionists' assumption of sole intersubjective language use. PCEC, required for facilitating the authentic intersubjective language use, explains how the dysfunction of modular interactions and their interactions with outside contexts leads to autistics' sociopragmatic impairment and the double empathy gap. In this way, the divergences, along with the possible reconciliation between the two perspectives, can be expounded. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A serious consideration of pain has largely been absent in sociology, especially physical pain's close neurobiological relative, social pain. Social pain is the process by which rejection and exclusion recruits similar neural circuits as physical pain, generating an affectual response that mirrors the response one feels from physical trauma. Pain is essential to any sociological analysis of motivation and action because, like many affective responses, it is a necessary ingredient in cognition and behavior; and, in many cases, it preconsciously commands and even controls how we think and act. While exploring this concept, it becomes apparent that sociology has an entire set of distantly related concepts that can be classified as different processes of social pain that reveal the structural, cultural, and situational conditions shaping the distribution of social pain. The paper concludes by thinking through the implications social pain portends for neuroscience and sociology. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper argues for the sociological relevance of contemporary research from 'relational' or 'systems' biology on the microbiome‐gut‐brain (MGB) axis. I review research on the MGB from microbial neuroendocrinology, nutritional psychiatry and other fields with a specific focus on nutrition as a critical element of the social environment influencing gene‐environment interactions and a range of social behaviors. I discuss two plausible causal pathways from nutritional factors such as dietary inflammatory potential and hypocholesterolemia to social bonding, violence, and political extremism, and conclude with a discussion of the theoretical, methodological, and epistemological implications of these pathways, and of MGB research and relational biology generally, for social science. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The aim of this paper is to introduce the philosophical concept of vagueness and use it to critique the explanatory scope of social ontology as developed by the Cambridge Social Ontology Group (CSOG), and scholars sympathetic to it. Specifically, we will refer to one of its core theories, the theory of social positioning, to formulate our critique. This theory proposes that human beings and artefacts occupy social positions within emerging social totalities by virtue of receiving community accepted, interdependent, rights and obligations. Vagueness, here, is to be understood as a matter of indeterminacy in borderline cases that pose non‐trivial limitations to social positioning. By this we mean to say that there are instances in social ontological theorising that exclude themselves from proper inquiry due to vague terms found in natural languages. As a consequence of these vague terms, theories in social ontology formulated in such languages face limitations when striving for precisification and accuracy of theories. We further argue that these limitations cannot be overcome, but introduce four theories, namely supervaluationsim, epistemicism, truth degree theories and contextualism, which will allow interested readers to understand why these limitations are present. Finally, we consider the controversial theory of ontic vagueness and outline the implications for social ontology. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Ultimate values can be defined as abstract rules or goals transcending specific contexts and defining the utmost purposes of existence. Although the literature about human values is vast, several fundamental questions about ultimate values remain open. What are the processes responsible for the formation of ultimate values? What is the impact of inbuilt affective processes and of learning, respectively? Regarding learning, what is the role of society? Empirical evidence shows dramatic variability in ultimate values pursued by different people. Why? These open questions suggest that a precise picture of ultimate values is lacking. This paper offers a computational theory of ultimate values. The key idea is that our brain represents values along a hierarchy where ultimate values are built upon experiences with inherent affective nature (basic values). Based on these representations, the proposal is that the brain infers the rules that foster basic values in a variety of contexts. These would become ultimate values and drive human behaviour independent of the ongoing context. We discuss how the theory can contribute to understanding a variety of aspects of human values, including morality, to what degree values are innate or culturally determined, and how values shape and are shaped by society. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, I address a range of arguments put forward by Kwame Gyekye (1992) and Bernard Matolino (2014) denying Menkiti's twin propositions that persons differ ontologically from human beings and that human attitudes, behaviours and practices constitute persons in social reality. They argue that his account of "maximal" persons, rooted in African traditional thought‐worlds, conflates issues and ultimately involve him in a category mistake. I argue that their arguments do not succeed, and that Menkiti's view is not in any predicament because of them. Then, I draw on John Searle's account of social ontology to clarify the sense in which attitudes, behaviours and practices are constituents of persons. Thus, I characterise persons as social entities belonging in a social ontology. Finally, I argue that realism regarding persons is not undermined by the threat of conventionalism lurking behind the view. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The capability approach (CA) is a framework for understanding, assessing, and promoting the quality of human lives and social justice. It focuses on capabilities – people's freedoms and opportunities to live in valuable ways. Although its proponents readily acknowledge that capabilities can depend on personal, social and environmental factors, little attention has been paid to the ontology of capabilities (what they are and how they are caused and constituted) and the inherent relationality of the approach is often not well followed through in research and practice. This, we suggest, leaves the CA vulnerable to misinterpretation and misappropriation. In this paper we draw on the complementary lenses of critical realism, hermeneutics and complexity theory to develop an explicitly relational ontology of capabilities that explains how capabilities, as potential for ways of being or forms of doing, are generated by both personal agency and material and social structures. We demonstrate how these lenses can illuminate the relational constitution of particular capabilities through reference to a composite case involving a man called Bert and his healthcare team. We outline how our relational ontology of capabilities can demand and support more theoretically coherent and socially just approaches to CA informed practice, research and policy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Motivated reasoning occurs when judgements subserve motives that go beyond accuracy seeking. Substantial evidence indicates that motivated political reasoning is ubiquitous. This is hard to reconcile with computational theories (following Marr's terminology, theories describing the fundamental principles underlying a cognitive process) like Bayesian inference, because these rely on accuracy maximization. Hence, motivated political reasoning is often interpreted as violating computational principles. Here we propose a different view by offering a computational account of motivated political reasoning which relies on the notion of Bayesian decision (instead of Bayesian inference). The key idea is that utility maximization, and not accuracy maximization, drives political thinking. This implies that agents will tend to endorse judgements that serve their instrumental goals even when evidence in support is poor (though agents will still believe their judgements are the most accurate). In this framework, motivated political reasoning is not interpreted as violating computational principles, although its nature is now conceived as pragmatic (i.e., serving instrumental goals) rather than epistemic (i.e., seeking understanding). The paper presents a mathematical description of the theory and shows how this can help interpreting important phenomena in political psychology such contextual priming, stereotyping, and displaced aggression. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper addresses the question of the relations between emotions and personhood, with a view to advancing a critical realist account of the role of emotions in social life. It is argued that the constitution of persons has to be approached from an ontological perspective, and that this raises questions about how sociology has addressed the meaning and role of emotions. Margaret Archer's critical realist perspective on them as commentaries on human concerns is broadly endorsed, but some significant correctives are proposed, especially with respect to the important distinction between primary and secondary emotions. To this end, it is argued that the affect spectrum theory advanced by Warren TenHouten can be fruitfully appended to a critical realist theory of emotions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, I synthesize recent work in the philosophy of action to propose an analytic reconstruction of the concept of habit. My main point is that habit (or habitus) can be a central, not just supplemental or auxiliary concept in action theory and the explanation of action. To show this, I systematically analyze the way habits can be used as a resource to explain action while comparing the way habits explain action with the standard way we explain action as being caused by the interplay of beliefs, desires, and intentions. I point to the specific "historical" way that habits can be seen as causes of action and show that the conceptual commitments of habit‐based explanations are both more substantial and more robust than intention‐based explanations. Once formed, habits act as inclinations and dispositions, being reliably triggered in the requisite context by the appropriate circumstances. Finally, I analyze the core concept of automaticity as applied to habit. I argue that since automaticity is not a unitary concept, different features of automaticity are more central to habit than others, allowing us to differentiate the most representative members of the habit category from more peripheral members. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Moral‐value perception occurs when sensory perception is directed by cognitive schemas, which selectively sample information in objects and events that represent personally valued means or ends. As a result of the perception of such value representations people experience affect ranging from strongly negative to strongly positive. If one's schemas direct attention to elements of objects or actions that verify schematic expectations, and spark little of no noticeable affect, the new information automatically produces minor alterations of the schema. However, if attention is directed or drawn to information that produces strong affect, and is contradictory of activated schemas, one is likely to engage in conscious assessment, through which the information is re‐conceptualized in a way that preserves schematic integrity. Based on multidisciplinary analysis, this paper (1) addresses the ways in which the perception of things within the natural world are represented in moral‐value perceptions, (2) identifies important cognitive, affective and emotional processes involved in the ongoing experience of such perception, and (3) illustrates some of the ways in which moral‐value perceptions influence moral assessments and judgements. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Scholars increasingly deny that they are strictly biological. Instead, these scholars argue that they are socially constructed. One challenge is to square the notion of social kinds with the apparent perception of those categories. I argue that we do not perceive social categories such as race. Instead, racial categories are visually encoded based on visible markers that are proxies for social kinds. Thus, I argue that the assumption of seeing social categories commits us to a flawed theory of visual essentialism: the idea that some social kinds are visible properties that are biologically determined. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper elucidates a range of the potentials and limitations of nominalist sensibilities in social theory through an examination of their presence in Durkheim and Weber. Nominalism, which emerged in early modern western thought, holds that only individual particular cases exist and that there are no universals or generalities beyond mentally or linguistically constructed concepts; it also introduced new conceptions of will and voluntarism. Nominalism was variously transposed into classical social theories including those of Durkheim and Weber. In our theoretical methodology, we assess tensions between nominalist and realist visualities and modes of reasoning in their works. We conclude by discussing assessments of nominalism, attending to its enduring critical contributions while also explicating a reflexive critique of nominalism as mimetic of chaotic and pathological forms of social organisation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this article, I discuss the importance of ontology and its implications, demonstrated in the examples of different approaches to neoliberalism. The lack of careful ontological considerations leads to confusing and often contradictory usages of the term 'neoliberalism', obfuscating its usefulness. Instead, I suggest a cartography which consists of integrating two ontological debates ‐ structure‐agency and material‐ideational ‐ through the interplay between the problematiques of structuration and semiosis, and the operational debate on ideas/interests. In so doing, this cartography can provide readers with various heuristic devices to understand the making of theories, why and how conceptualizations of neoliberalism differ between and within theories and pinpoint the thematic implications of these differences. The translation of this cartography helps to achieve two things, (1) to move beyond the static analyses of neoliberalism and endorse the dynamic understand of neoliberalization processes, (2) to understand why systemic process‐based understandings of neoliberalization can create distinctions between analytical understandings of neoliberalism in terms of either the commodification of marketization processes or the marketization of commodification processes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The antecedents and outcomes of individual‐level flow are well documented in a large body of literature. However, flow does not only occur in isolation ‐ quite to the contrary, recent evidence suggests that social interaction can facilitate the experience of flow. Therefore, we propose a taxonomy, which distinguishes five different flow states according to two global factors: interactional synchrony and self‐other overlap. Solitary flow bears all characteristics developed by Csikszentmihalyi. Co‐active flow is facilitated or hampered by the presence of other people. Private interactive flow emerges on the grounds of a minimal unidirectional interaction with more passive others; only the active subject is in flow. In shared interactive flow, a fully synchronized activity between group members takes place and all group members are in flow. In group flow, all members reach a level of complete self‐other overlap with the group, which leads to a collective experience of flow on the group‐level. In addition to differences and commonalities of the different types of flow, suggestions for how to induce and study social flow are discussed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

I present a theoretical social psychological framework for social knowledge based mainly on the triadic concept of sign relations and the process of semiosis. The framework is based on concepts from authors aligned with interpretative semiotic approaches, such as Peirce, Deely and Eco. After defining signs and sign relations, I propose to conceive social knowledge as sign relations happening in communication processes, and employ the notion of code to account for socially shared group conventions. I suggest that the analysis of code properties such as content, social acknowledgment and history can identify differences in social knowledge forms and the concrete contexts that sustain them. The framework is discussed in comparison with other social and cultural psychological approaches based on semiosis. Finally, methodological implications are commented. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The vast majority of empirical hypotheses in psychology, or in the social sciences more generally, are directional whereas in other sciences, such as the physical sciences, there are more point or narrow‐interval empirical hypotheses. Characteristics of theories and auxiliary assumptions play a role in the difference. Given that psychology research strongly features directional predictions, it is important to question the extent to which these provide convincing tests of theories that they are designed to test. The present work aims to provide a nuanced view that considers the complex interaction between the obviousness of directional predictions, the obviousness of the theory from which they derive, and the quality of the auxiliary assumptions that push towards directional predictions. Then, too, there is the related issue of vulnerability of directional predictions to alternative explanations and how to address them. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this article, we draw attention to public‐private dilemmas among psychologists that make sense of the debates around the replication crisis, citation practices and networking practices. We argue that the values of justice and caring map onto the public sphere and private sphere respectively and create the horns of a dilemma for academics. While bureaucratic justice is a publicly revered value of modernity in psychological research that underpins ethics, validity, reliability and equality of opportunity, 'caring' is a more subtle value of traditionalism that runs in parallel and is detected only by our psychological practices. In particular, we argue that it is detected by practices such as disputes between the replicated and their replicators in replication studies (understood as a dramatic counter reality) as to who is more 'careless' with procedure; citation (including the self‐care of self‐citation) as thanksgiving and incantation of powerful others in enchantment rituals, and the system of professional indebtedness that accrues in 'kinship' networks – where kinship is understood broadly as adoption into a research group and its network. The clashes between these values can lead to a sense of hypocrisy and irony in academic life, as incommensurate values split between private and public expression. From this position, we delve into Isaiah Berlin's work on incommensurate values to suggest that ethical pluralism, involving more public recognition of the equal but different ethical demands of these values can help overcome these everyday dilemmas in the public sphere. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Judith Butler and Kate Manne shed, in different ways, doubt on the capacity of the recognition‐paradigm to comprehend phenomena of crucial ethical and political importance: whereas Butler argues that deeper than recognition are "frames" in light of which individuals and groups appear as recognizable human beings at all, Manne argues that too much has been made of the capacity of the idea of being recognized as human or person to explain interhuman cruelty and violence. In short, for Butler there is something even more important than recognition that precedes it, whereas for Manne matters of vital (or lethal) importance happen after, or on top of, recognition. In my view both are pointing at crucially important issues, but I am more optimistic of the capacity of the notion of recognition to deal with them. I present an account of recognition as personification, which can both meet the challenges and unite the seemingly disparate views of the two authors as complementary perspectives to, and focussed on dialectically related aspects of, a whole. This whole is recognition, or lack thereof, of particular individuals and groups as full‐fledged persons. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Axel Honneth's theory of recognition outlines the personal and social contexts of family, law and community solidarities in which recognition – and misrecognitions – are experienced. His work has implications for Mezirow's theory of transformative learning. Transformative learning is critiqued for an over dependence on the Dewey/Habermas foundations that demand high levels of rationality and for an over reliance on individual learning to the exclusion of social learning. Honneth's ideas are explored in order to further develop the understanding of how experience is central to transformative learning. Disorienting dilemmas and the perplexities that lead to transformative learning are reinterpreted as experiences that have personal and social dimensions. Experience – often seen as individual and unique ‐ cannot be disconnected from social contexts. Honneth helps us resolve these issues and allows us to re‐interpret transformative learning as the transformation of experience. Finally, two further concepts are introduced: a) the dialectic nature of experience (Negt); and b) the importance of completeness (Negt). These further enhance the experiential grounding for emancipation and the emancipatory project of transformative learning. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Recent writings on recognition and ambivalence highlight the limits of narrowly dyadic and teleological accounts of recognition. In this article, I extend the work on ambivalent recognition by proffering a conception of recognition as vulnerable. I emphasise the need to come to know the self as part of the journey toward recognition and to interrogate the role of the privileged in the dance of recognition. I illustrate vulnerable recognition with reference to literature that highlights this more complicated reading of recognition in practice, including calls for white settlers to come to understand the way settler culture shapes relations with others and Indigenous refusal of recognition. I maintain that a vulnerable and processual conception of recognition takes seriously the demand to re‐cognise or to 'know again', which is at the heart of Hegel's agonistic account of recognition. A vulnerable conception of recognition enables us to better understand our interconnectedness and the place we occupy in particular histories and structures, with their ongoing legacies of privilege and oppression. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article addresses the agency-structure issue from the evolutionary perspective. Rather than treating it as something unique to human society, the article examines this issue in the broad context of how different species of social organisms, with humans being one of them, influence the constitution of their societies. The main finding of this analysis is that social organisms of different species all exert influence on their societal formations, but the impact varies depending on the level of agency the organisms possess, particularly their perceptual capabilities. Social organisms with higher perceptual ability play a bigger part in shaping the structure of their societies. A fundamental difference between humans and nonhuman social animals in the agency-structure relations lies in the fact that humans are the only species on earth known to be capable of constructing institutional rules for societal regulation. This capacity is attributable to the syntactic language and reflective self-awareness humans possess. Within human species, however, there is considerable variation in the exercise of this capacity among individuals, groups, and societies. It is therefore important to examine species and intra-species level differences in addressing the agency-structure issue in human society. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Cognitive sociology has been split into cultural and interdisciplinary traditions that position themselves differently in relation to the cognitive sciences and make incompatible assumptions about cognition. This article provides an analysis and assessment of the cognitive and methodological assumptions of these two traditions from the perspective of the mechanistic theory of explanation. We argue that while the cultural tradition of cognitive sociology has provided important descriptions about how human cognition varies across cultural groups and historical periods, it has not opened up the black box of cognitive mechanisms that produce and sustain this variation. This means that its explanations for the described phenomena have remained weak. By contrast, the interdisciplinary tradition of cognitive sociology has sought to integrate cognitive scientific concepts and methods into explanatory research on how culture influences action and how culture is stored in memory. Although we grant that interdisciplinary cognitive sociologists have brought many fresh ideas, concepts and methods to cultural sociology from the cognitive sciences, they have not always clarified their assumptions about cognition and their models have sketched only a few specific cognitive mechanisms through which culture influences action, meaning that they have not yet provided a comprehensive explanatory understanding of the interactions between culture, cognition and action. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In following Marxist and psychoanalytic theory, we can understand ideologies as social processes that obscure the contradictions (i.e., how an object is not at one with itself) inherent to individual subjectivity and social structures. Despite claiming to be non‐ideological, mainstream psychology has, throughout its history, served the ideological interests of elite classes (e.g., by pathologizing political resistance). Working within the liberation psychology paradigm, I attempt in this article to elaborate on the notion of de‐ideologization (i.e., the politically committed retrieval of people's experiences beyond the ideological reference points of elite classes) through a consideration of contradiction. To do this, I explore how de‐ideologization can connect with contradiction through processes of re‐symbolization, solidarity‐making, and mobilizing progressive ideologies. Considered together, these three processes allow us to use contradiction to understand interlocking currents of oppression, divergent visions of emancipation, the development of insurgent subjectivities, and the building of an intersectional socialist politics. In conclusion, I consider some of the directions that theoretical and praxis‐oriented work on de‐ideologization may take, as well as some paths it may wish to avoid. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Social interaction as the middle phase of the morphogenetic sequence described by Margaret Archer presupposes that interpretative activities go on between individuals and collectivities. Novel meanings emerge in social interaction and spur the processes of structural elaboration. The hermeneutics of actors (or agents) should be part of the morphogenetic explanatory framework. Narratives as a distinctive species of interpretation will then become more susceptible to a mode of analysis based in realism. By adopting Paul Ricoeur's concept of narrative figuration (or threefold mimésis) for use in sociology, it is possible to embark on this task at the rudimentary level of intersubjective communication. The stories and anecdotes in which we describe episodes, events, and processes to others articulate and give order to our experience of time. When we are searching for concord in narratives to cope with discordant elements, we are participating in morphogenesis via the transformation of meaning. The complementary nature of Archer's and Ricoeur's conceptualisations provides an alternative to one‐sided social constructionist accounts of narrative [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since its emergence in the 19th century, academic psychology has striven to become accepted as a scientific discipline. This emphasis on "science" has led to many unprecedented advancements in the understanding of human behavior. However, the view that psychology must be approached as a science has become ingrained in the field over time, and critically discussing the implications of this notion has turned into a taboo. In this article, I examine the benefits and limitations of applying the scientific paradigm to psychology, and I propose when it is not optimal to approach psychology as a science if the field is to maximize its potential. Importantly, I do not imply that practicing psychology as a "non‐science" means practicing it as a pseudoscience. Quite to the contrary, I argue that not always enforcing the scientific viewpoint can prevent pseudoscientific practices and make the field more scientific in the long run. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

There is a long history of discussion about the ability of researchers to generalize their findings. But findings are not the only entity that researchers can attempt to generalize. Scientists have theories, empirical hypotheses, and statistical hypotheses too. The extent to which scientists can generalize these is an open issue. As a prerequisite to proposals about generalizing theories, empirical hypotheses, and statistical hypotheses; they must be distinguished from each other. Another prerequisite is to specify, across what, the researcher wishes to generalize. I show that theories may or may not generalize across auxiliary assumptions, empirical hypotheses may or may not generalize across statistical assumptions, and statistical hypotheses may or may not generalize across inferential assumptions. The reasoning to be presented, pertaining to generalization, militates against the typical practice of using p‐values to draw conclusions about hypotheses. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The "turn‐taking" system, a notion referring to the dynamics of verbal exchanges in face‐to‐face interaction, is often presented as the hallmark of human language (Levinson, 2016). However, recent works have investigated turn‐taking mechanisms in several nonhuman taxa, thus referring to the moment‐by‐moment coordinated alternation of actions or vocalizations, for instance in primates or birds. These findings have been interpreted as evidence of elementary forms of sequence organization in the animal world, and therefore as evidences of an evolutionary pathway, leading from very rough forms of signal alternation, to the complex multimodal and conversational turn‐taking system used by humans. This article first reviews and discusses these findings. It then makes the case for going beyond the study of uniquely intra‐specific forms of communication and interaction. It argues that considering interspecies interaction is of interest for social sciences in general, and linguistics scholarship in particular, at least in two respects. First, on an empirical level, to investigate a widespread phenomenon, namely ordinary human‐animal interactions, as it occurs mostly in domestic settings—a topic that has been relatively neglected in the study of social interaction so far (for a range of reasons that we shall touch on). Secondly, on a more speculative level, it assumes that ordinary interspecies interactions, especially as they unfold with domestic pets or wild animals in natural settings (vs. in experimental settings), are a valuable locus to explore rudimentary forms of sequence organization, that are neither governed by linguistic and cultural norms, nor entirely the product of stereotypical species‐related behavioral patterns. We posit that fundamental principles of sociality are to be found in the contextual adjustments of multimodal actions and in the emergence of meaning in interspecies interactions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Russi (2021) suggests 'eavesdropping' as a way to appreciate the practical implications of Shotter's (2015) stance that social inquiry is an art/craft beginning with experience, rather than a technique pre‐determined by theory and methods. Following Russi's instruction to eavesdrop on his eavesdropping, I explore his concepts of experience and listening. Contrary to Russi I issue a plea for theory, as theoretical frameworks are key for tracking the politics of knowledge surrounding social inquiry. Illustrating the process theoretical character of Russi's concepts of experience and listening, I argue for the possibility of theory as emergent within experience. Here my concept of cultures of listening is relevant, as it helps to consider eavesdropping as a form of dark listening (Motzkau & Lee, forthcoming). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

What can sociology learn about the logic of social behaviour from the field of cultural evolution? How can sociology enrich cultural evolutionary theory? In this article, I present and examine cultural evolutionary theory by specifying its various proposed mechanisms, such as cultural drift, biased transmission and cultural selection (including cultural group selection), and by investigating concrete examples of social phenomena to which the theory has been applied. My findings are three‐fold. First, cultural evolutionary mechanisms should not be dismissed by sociologists but instead, given their strong explanatory power in certain cases, incorporated into their basic theoretical toolkit. Second, one mechanism, i.e. cultural selection, can even underpin a more nuanced and micro‐founded sociological functionalism that avoids some of the errors of structural functionalism. This, however, should not be celebrated too soon as the applicability of cultural selection is more limited than cultural evolutionists acknowledge. Third, drawing on historical sociology and comparative politics I also uncover further important sociological limitations of the cultural evolutionary approach that should be heeded by the latter. I focus on two: (1) its inapplicability to cases of intentional decision‐making and strategizing, and (2) its inability to subsume the phenomenon of social power. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In contrast to the classic theory of contact among groups to combat prejudice against the outgroup (Allport, 1954), we propose the theory of the taboo of contact according to which prejudice against minorities does not arise due to lack of contact, but precisely in order to avoid contact. We summarise a series of themata whereby in the West the majority's fears of losing the purity of their religious, ethnic, or racial identity have been ontologised in four minorities (Jews, gypsies, natives, and black people). The hypothesis is that the greater the proximity to – or danger of mixing with – those vilified minorities, the greater the taboo of contact will be. We conclude that the prejudice against minorities who are victims of current ethnic and racial discrimination is an hysteresis effect of folk‐anthropology themata. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

It is often assumed that social and political thought have nothing to do with issues of concern to metaphysicians. I have referred to this assumption in the past as The Myth of Metaphysical Neutrality. I argue here that social and political theories have metaphysical positions built into them, such that to adopt a given social or political account commits one to that theory's implicit metaphysics ‐‐ and, conversely, that commitment to a given metaphysical position will preclude adopting social or political accounts that are at odds with it. I look first at the issue of emergence, showing that key concepts employed by Aristotle, Rousseau and Marx, respectively, require a belief that wholes do not reduce to their parts. I then turn to Marx's account of alienation, arguing that it presupposes a belief in agent‐causal free will. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Cooperative behaviour paves our development and accompanies us in our daily activities. This article suggests a possible way of exploring cooperation from a cultural perspective under the process‐relational worldview. Firstly, a theoretical framework is proposed that combines a process‐relational worldview with a cultural perspective in psychology and an enactive approach to social cognition in collaborative research. Next, a pathway from comparative studies on cooperative behaviours to cultural approaches looking into what cooperation means and how it is expressed is presented on the basis of the research conducted so far. A critique of previous research has been undertaken, with a focus on their limitations. The aim is to show that the theoretical framework of an embodied, embedded and enactive approach in contemporary developmental sciences along with cultural psychology complement each other, expanding the scope for the study of the development of cooperative behaviours. Research proposals embedded in theoretical reasoning are presented with their scientific value emphasised. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article is an exploration of John Shotter's suggestion to approach social inquiry as a 'craft'. To take this suggestion seriously calls for making visible the specific 'skills' that conjure social inquiry into being, as craft. For this reason, the article presents small vignettes—drawn from the author's practice of supervision of researcher‐practitioners—that elucidate some of the turbulent passages that social researchers learn to negotiate, as they 'acrobatically' stretch themselves to eavesdrop on the messy trails of world‐making activity they are thrown into, as they participate in a social milieu. From waiting at awkward thresholds that do not announce an agenda; to approaching mis‐takes as occasions for bringing experience to articulation; to registering the pregnancy of silences that meet language at its edge. Just like Joyce's masterpiece Finnegans Wake brings into visibility the work that readers must perform to engage with its messy text, so this article argues that social inquiry as craft involves becoming skilled in various heuristic moves, through which social worlds can be listened into articulation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Aron Gurwitsch's four‐domain model of consciousness is placed in political‐economic context to theorize how social forces influence perception. Along with clarifying key concepts in cognitive sociology like "relevance" and "the taken‐for‐granted," the model explains the processes through which social structures—despite being vaguely understood, ignored, or unknown by the typical subject on a typical day—condition thematization and what items are considered relevant or irrelevant to the given theme. A capitalist "social horizon" influences attention by structurally imposing themes on consciousness as well as filters what items are considered relevant to the given theme through hegemonic frames—which select theme‐relevant items conducive to encouraging actors to consensually reproduce the status quo—and reificatory processes, or discursive and material practices that constitute items as fixed and inalterable. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]