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When critical realists consider epistemology they typically start from "epistemological relativism." We find this position necessary, but we also find it insufficient because it lacks a critique of the highly unequal social relations among observers themselves—relations that shape the very production of knowledge. While it is indeed the case that all knowledge is fallible, it is also the case that all knowledge is positioned, with a particular standpoint. What is more, the social power relations between standpoints organize the production of truth in ways that produce systematic distortions. In this paper, we propose a critical realist social epistemology. We introduce feminist standpoint theory and postcolonial theory as our suggested interventions into critical realism and we use two case studies of existing work to highlight i) the social production of truth and the real, and ii) what is at stake for radicalizing epistemology in critical realism. In so doing, our paper emphasizes the epistemic complexities that continuously shape ontology, a commitment to subaltern voices or experiences, and a thorough interrogation of the relations between positions of knowledge production. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper proposes a way of integrating the concepts of habitus and mood. The purpose of this conceptual move is to enrich Pierre Bourdieu's treatment of habitus with a better recognition of its affective aspects. The paper draws on phenomenological studies of psychic disorders and applies the concept of existential feeling to specify what moods are and do. The framing proposed distinguishes between dispositions that function in the foreground and in the background of habitus. Thereby it is possible to regard moods as background dispositions of habitus. This paper also discusses what this idea of moody habitus can do for research in habitus and human practice. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Hence, Wachelke's ([12]) theoretical framework elaboration seems to be still halfway to the assumption and deployment of a true relational epistemological frame, hindering the possibilities of a real dialogue with the basic assumptions of SR theory and cultural psychology. Does social psychology need a new semiotic overarching framework for grasping social knowledge? Commentary on J. Wachelke: Semiosis, thought and codes: A theoretical framework for social knowledge. [Extracted from the article]

The notion of tolerance is widely embraced across many settings and is generally considered critical for the peaceful functioning of plural societies, and within organizations, institutions, and many professions. However, the concept of tolerance has various meanings and can be discursively used in different ways and for different purposes. The various understandings and their usage can have different implications for normative views and real‐world decision making. This paper focuses on two main understandings of tolerance and how these are flexibly used in a debate about the case in which a social work student was excluded from further study by an university committee. This case serves as a particular illumination of the broader societal context of 'cultural wars' and 'identity politics' in which the notion of tolerance features prominently. It is examined how those who did and did not support the university decision deployed in different ways the notion of tolerance. It is concluded that tolerance has different cultural meanings which can be used for various ends in debates about contentious issues and for justifying or criticizing impactful decisions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Keywords: classical tolerance; democracy; identity politics; political freedom; postmodern tolerance EN classical tolerance democracy identity politics political freedom postmodern tolerance 237 241 5 06/24/22 20220601 NES 220601 INTRODUCTION In his paper "The meanings of tolerance", Maykel Verkuyten (2022) deals with the case of a student who posted comments on Facebook that expressed his disapproval of homosexuality and same sex marriage because it was considered a sin and abomination in his Christian belief. Classical tolerance, democracy, political freedom, postmodern tolerance, identity politics In his study Verkuyten distinguishes "classical tolerance" and a different, "modern" understanding of the term tolerance. CLASSICAL TOLERANCE Despite a long history of the term tolerance its traditional meaning can be summarized as follows: Classical tolerance is understood as enduring and putting up with issues one dislikes and even may disapprove of. [Extracted from the article]

Rights and obligations—sometimes referred to as deontology or deontic powers—are key to most contemporary conceptions of social ontology. Both Cambridge Social Ontology and the dominant analytic conception associated, most prominently, with John Searle, place rights and obligations at the centre of their accounts. Such a common emphasis has led some to consider deontology to be a point of similarity between these different theories. This is a mistake. In this paper, I show that a distinctive conception of rights and obligations underpins Cambridge Social Ontology and its social positioning theory. Moreover, I argue that a fuller understanding of the account of rights and obligations defended in Cambridge in fact reveals that it can be differentiated from other conceptions and, most importantly, Searle's, by its recognition that a practical dimension is always involved in social constitution. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper engages with the theme of individual disenchantment, that is, the process of falling out of love with something that once gave pleasure and purpose. Drawing on the conceptual tools of Pierre Bourdieu, it sketches the process by which individuals become 'enchanted' with the stakes of different fields, the phenomenology of enchantment and disenchantment and several ideal typical modes of genesis of disenchantment. Attention is given to intra‐field dynamics but also, going beyond Bourdieu, inter‐field dynamics too. The final section considers the epistemological consequences of constructing trans‐field objects of inquiry. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Defining clear concepts and constructs is a prerequisite for all forms of validity in management and organization studies. This paper extends the existing recommendations on construct clarity and builds a method on systems thinking and abduction to help scholars with providing clear definitions in cases of (1) the constructs and concepts that come to academia from practice (2) the constructs and concepts on which there is no agreement among scholars, and (3) the constructs that were coined in the past eras but are mapped to the transformed observables in the new era. Moreover, we rethink the terms 'concept, 'construct', and 'variable' and introduce six clarity criteria to be used in the process of concept refinement in management and organization studies, and other disciplines of social and behavioural sciences. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper aims to introduce the mimetic theory of René Girard to explore the connection between culture and religious violence to deal with some critical problems in international affairs. It challenges the narrow conceptualization of the issue of religion and violence as an issue of religious violence. As often as the issue of religion and violence is structured in such a manner, allegedly to pick religion seriously without considering politics or culture seriously. The conception is limited because, as an idea, religion is always contested, negotiated, and developed socially, culturally, or politically. It is a biased interpretation of a world actuality, which under certain conditions grounds violence. Furthermore, this narrow definition of religion suits what critical scholars describe as a problem‐solving strategy to theory. This study demonstrates mimetic theory challenges and reconfigures the conventional interpretation of the issue of religious violence and critically analyse the causes of the hidden, exposed violence as well as the scapegoat mechanism that functions in both domestic cultures as well as in international affairs, maintaining political and cultural order of any society. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Experts often play a fundamental role in decision‐making processes. They are the bearers of an epistemic authority, which is primarily grounded on what we may call scientific naturalism. The main tenets of this view can clash though with other values characterising our pluralist societies. This may lead to conflicts but also to a devaluation or to a rejection of the sort of knowledge and advise offered by experts. In this paper we propose a new accommodation between scientific naturalism and the values of our democratic societies. In Section 1, we present a case study highlighting the problematicity of experts' decisions based on mere epistemic soundness. In Section 2, we frame our analysis of expertise in the context of a post‐truth world. Section 3 looks at the relations between scientific naturalism and democracy, while Section 4 focuses on the potential clash between scientific naturalism and the normative character of other forms of knowledge. In Sections 5 and 6, we present practical instances of this clash (additional case studies), involving religious, bioethical, and cultural values. We show that in some cases these values ought to be granted full citizenship in a democratic state. This, (Section 7), leads us to a stalemate that seems to threaten the functioning of modern democracies. In Section 8, to overcome this stalemate, we propose to resort to a more inclusive form of naturalism, namely liberal naturalism. This form of naturalism cannot do without experts' scientific recommendations and yet does not end up excluding (a priori) alternatives forms of knowledge. We conclude, Section 9, by advocating a more liberal ecology of mechanisms for the regulation of decision‐making processes; one that also encompasses socially inclusive (not necessarily scientific) processes of deliberation and judgment. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Affect Theory of Social Exchange (ATSE) research program has produced cumulative insights on how instrumental exchanges lead to the development of affectual attachments. With its focus on task responsibilities, ATSE leaves space to interrogate how factors not related to task execution are at play in the production of interpersonal bonds. In this paper, we integrate insights from social psychology, cultural sociology and organizational research to develop a theoretical framework suggesting (a) why and how cultural tastes contribute to social cohesion and (b) the conditions under which cultural tastes remain a source of strategic advantage or, worse, symbolic exclusion. Our theory rests on the basic proposition that shared cultural tastes increase the likelihood of experiencing positive emotions, which in turn are key in the development and maintenance of affectual attachments. Variations to this proposition are subsequently introduced, considering culture in declarative and nondeclarative forms. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Organizational citizenship behaviour has generally been associated with organizational effectiveness. However, recent research has shown that this may not always be the case and that certain types of organizational citizenship behaviour such as compulsory citizenship behaviour, may be inimical to the fulfillment of formal goals and organizational effectiveness. Using military historical and business organizational secondary data, the paper maintains that extreme variance in either organizational (task) or personal (social psychological) support organizational citizenship behaviour generates entropic citizenship behaviour which derails completely the effective accomplishment of formal organizational goals. A general model of organizational citizenship behaviour with entropic citizenship behavior as its novel conceptual boundary is developed in the paper, and four specific propositions with implications for future empirical research are delineated. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The visualization of social theory is an important part of the development and communication of our theoretical ideas. While most theorists use figures of some kind, few if any have formal training, or guiding rules or principles for the representation of theory. This has often led to poor visualization efforts, and the visual culture of sociology continues to lag behind the natural sciences. The intent of this paper is to serve as a practical and empirically aided guide for social theorists, by providing insights surrounding the cognitive and perceptual properties of certain elements and figures. Through these properties we identify four major problems in theory visualization: vagueness, reduction, unwanted spatial inferences and unwanted metaphorical inferences. We offer solutions to these problems, and to improving theory visualization more generally. Our hope is that this paper will serve as a resource for more thoughtful and informed visualization for practicing social theorists. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

While many know or have used the term Managerialism, the development of a theory about Managerialism remains largely non‐existent. When management becomes an ideology we speak of Managerialism reaching beyond the simple administration of a business organisation. Like many "‐isms", Managerialism carries connotations to ideology, thereby leading to the question: what would the development of a theory of Managerialism's ideology look like? Since Managerialism has been largely been clarified (Klikauer, 2013 & 2015), this paper builds on these ideas to examine the question of a theory of Managerialism ideology. This is tackled in three steps: the paper discusses what an ideology is; this is followed by a brief outline of twelve characteristics of ideology delivering a threefold definition of ideology and leading to two schools of thoughts; finally, the paper shows how ideology and Managerialism are linked. The paper's key argument is that any theory development on Managerialism cannot avoid the issue of ideology. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the social sciences there is a long standing debate over the primacy of structure or agency in shaping human behavior. Structurationists like Giddens think of individuals' agency and collective features as two sides of the same coin while emergentists including Archer and Elder‐Vass claim that structurationists are blurring an important ontological distinction——they argue for effective social analysis, we should think of structures and individuals as different things because emergence happens when the properties of the collective are not reducible to the properties of the parts that constitute them. This paper contributes to the agency‐structure debate by showing how production and reproduction of emergent properties of social groups sharing same normative commitments (norm circles) can be empirically studied using two behavioral game theory experiments, adding a previously neglected insight that strategic uncertainty can lead to coordination failures of individual behaviors within norm circles, manifested as unintended outcomes of interdependent actions that are difficult to predict. Here the synchronic relation between the unpredictable collective outcomes of each game round and agential reactions of the participants to them defines emergence——the previous outcomes are diachronic inputs but they appear in the new outcome only through their effects on the individual decisions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper first identifies representations of threats in Greek‐Cypriot newspapers related to the negotiations for a Cyprus settlement. Then, it identifies how alternative representations to these core representations of threats are managed through the use of a number of semantic barriers. Therefore, it problematizes the role (function) that such representations of threats play in undermining the potential for transformative dialogue in a post‐conflict and divided country in need of conflict transformation. Focus is on the editorials of two newspapers during a four‐month period before the collapse of the July 2017 Cyprus peace talks. Both were suspicious and polemic vis‐à‐vis the said negotiations but used different strategies to oppose them. Simerini convened recurrently threats such as Turkification, state dissolution and threats against Hellenism. Phileleftheros focused on the issue of security drawing red lines on various dossiers under discussion in the negotiations. The paper contributes to the theoretical debate of the relationship between social representations and identities and the role of threats and historical narratives in undermining transformative dialogue through the use of semantic barriers. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper introduces the concept of “borderline institution” to characterize an institution in which actors push upstream the boundary between the normal and the pathological and find downstream ways of systematically taking advantage of this push ex‐post. This happens for example when actors make decisions based on predictions; and are simultaneously allowed by vertical concentration to manage conflicts generated by the consequences of these decisions when these predictions fail. A theory of how to identify a borderline institution based on this vertical concentration uses bankruptcy proceedings at the Commercial Court of Paris as an example, relying on Karl Polanyi's concept of double movement and Margaret Archer's concept of double morphogenesis. In this court, bankers as lay judges can control both credit‐related predictions at the bank, and bankruptcy proceedings at the court. Enabling conditions for borderline institutional entrepreneurs as “vertical linchpins” in this multilevel context explain how they concentrate enough power to reach a position from which to drive such dynamics. The conclusion asks whether societies promote new borderline institutions to face contemporary and urgent existential challenges. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper introduces the original research articles that constitute the present Forum issue on unpredictability, contingency and catastrophe. In doing so, it also identifies and discusses the specificity of realist approaches to the above questions. It is argued that attentiveness to the ontological dimension of (un)predictability opens promising avenues for reflexive approaches to social science and collective action. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Determining the human activity that social processes consist in is a central task for the philosophy of the social sciences. This paper asks: which conception of agency arising from contemporary action theory is the most suitable for social science explanation? It is argued that a movement‐centered, Davidsonian picture of agency is not suitable for explaining certain social processes such as strikes and boycotts because, instead of intentional bodily movements, they are explained by the intentional omissions of agents. I propose that instead of intentional bodily movements, social processes are better explained by phenomena in which an agent is taking an active relation both to her mental or bodily processes as well as to what is happening around her. Thus, to fully explain social processes, a comprehensive theory of agency that can account for intentional actions and intentional omissions and a conception of agency that includes both materialist and volitionalist aspects is needed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Akrasia, otherwise known as 'weakness of will', is a state of mind whereby people act deliberately against their better judgment. This paper aims to provide a conceptual framework for understanding akrasia from psychosocial perspectives that assume the self is multiple and strongly interconnected with the relational flow of which it is a part. Drawing on key ideas from Dialogical Self Theory, we analyze the main dialogical dynamics that can generate akratic episodes with reference to how individuals organize their personal position repertoire, and to the relational and socio‐cultural setting in which the actions are taken. The discussion enables us to identify some indicators to frame the tendency to betray one's good intentions, and to offer some suggestions on how to reduce the occurrence of the various forms of akrasia analyzed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The unique linguistic profile of autistic people urges linguists to address the divergences in human language, its acquisition and use among major linguistic perspectives. Fitting with the dual roles of language (thought and communication), this paper adopts an internal pragmatic competence (IPC) and a (similar) pragmatic competence for external communication (PCEC) to elucidate how autistic linguistic profile discloses the divergences between nativism and constructionism on language use and acquisition (ultimately language proper). IPC justifies why autistic people resort not to mind‐reading but to self‐sufficient mental interactions among organism‐internal submodules or nearly intact grammatical subsystems when abstractly processing linguistic and communicative needs, contra constructionists' assumption of sole intersubjective language use. PCEC, required for facilitating the authentic intersubjective language use, explains how the dysfunction of modular interactions and their interactions with outside contexts leads to autistics' sociopragmatic impairment and the double empathy gap. In this way, the divergences, along with the possible reconciliation between the two perspectives, can be expounded. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A serious consideration of pain has largely been absent in sociology, especially physical pain's close neurobiological relative, social pain. Social pain is the process by which rejection and exclusion recruits similar neural circuits as physical pain, generating an affectual response that mirrors the response one feels from physical trauma. Pain is essential to any sociological analysis of motivation and action because, like many affective responses, it is a necessary ingredient in cognition and behavior; and, in many cases, it preconsciously commands and even controls how we think and act. While exploring this concept, it becomes apparent that sociology has an entire set of distantly related concepts that can be classified as different processes of social pain that reveal the structural, cultural, and situational conditions shaping the distribution of social pain. The paper concludes by thinking through the implications social pain portends for neuroscience and sociology. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper argues for the sociological relevance of contemporary research from 'relational' or 'systems' biology on the microbiome‐gut‐brain (MGB) axis. I review research on the MGB from microbial neuroendocrinology, nutritional psychiatry and other fields with a specific focus on nutrition as a critical element of the social environment influencing gene‐environment interactions and a range of social behaviors. I discuss two plausible causal pathways from nutritional factors such as dietary inflammatory potential and hypocholesterolemia to social bonding, violence, and political extremism, and conclude with a discussion of the theoretical, methodological, and epistemological implications of these pathways, and of MGB research and relational biology generally, for social science. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The aim of this paper is to introduce the philosophical concept of vagueness and use it to critique the explanatory scope of social ontology as developed by the Cambridge Social Ontology Group (CSOG), and scholars sympathetic to it. Specifically, we will refer to one of its core theories, the theory of social positioning, to formulate our critique. This theory proposes that human beings and artefacts occupy social positions within emerging social totalities by virtue of receiving community accepted, interdependent, rights and obligations. Vagueness, here, is to be understood as a matter of indeterminacy in borderline cases that pose non‐trivial limitations to social positioning. By this we mean to say that there are instances in social ontological theorising that exclude themselves from proper inquiry due to vague terms found in natural languages. As a consequence of these vague terms, theories in social ontology formulated in such languages face limitations when striving for precisification and accuracy of theories. We further argue that these limitations cannot be overcome, but introduce four theories, namely supervaluationsim, epistemicism, truth degree theories and contextualism, which will allow interested readers to understand why these limitations are present. Finally, we consider the controversial theory of ontic vagueness and outline the implications for social ontology. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Ultimate values can be defined as abstract rules or goals transcending specific contexts and defining the utmost purposes of existence. Although the literature about human values is vast, several fundamental questions about ultimate values remain open. What are the processes responsible for the formation of ultimate values? What is the impact of inbuilt affective processes and of learning, respectively? Regarding learning, what is the role of society? Empirical evidence shows dramatic variability in ultimate values pursued by different people. Why? These open questions suggest that a precise picture of ultimate values is lacking. This paper offers a computational theory of ultimate values. The key idea is that our brain represents values along a hierarchy where ultimate values are built upon experiences with inherent affective nature (basic values). Based on these representations, the proposal is that the brain infers the rules that foster basic values in a variety of contexts. These would become ultimate values and drive human behaviour independent of the ongoing context. We discuss how the theory can contribute to understanding a variety of aspects of human values, including morality, to what degree values are innate or culturally determined, and how values shape and are shaped by society. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, I address a range of arguments put forward by Kwame Gyekye (1992) and Bernard Matolino (2014) denying Menkiti's twin propositions that persons differ ontologically from human beings and that human attitudes, behaviours and practices constitute persons in social reality. They argue that his account of "maximal" persons, rooted in African traditional thought‐worlds, conflates issues and ultimately involve him in a category mistake. I argue that their arguments do not succeed, and that Menkiti's view is not in any predicament because of them. Then, I draw on John Searle's account of social ontology to clarify the sense in which attitudes, behaviours and practices are constituents of persons. Thus, I characterise persons as social entities belonging in a social ontology. Finally, I argue that realism regarding persons is not undermined by the threat of conventionalism lurking behind the view. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The capability approach (CA) is a framework for understanding, assessing, and promoting the quality of human lives and social justice. It focuses on capabilities – people's freedoms and opportunities to live in valuable ways. Although its proponents readily acknowledge that capabilities can depend on personal, social and environmental factors, little attention has been paid to the ontology of capabilities (what they are and how they are caused and constituted) and the inherent relationality of the approach is often not well followed through in research and practice. This, we suggest, leaves the CA vulnerable to misinterpretation and misappropriation. In this paper we draw on the complementary lenses of critical realism, hermeneutics and complexity theory to develop an explicitly relational ontology of capabilities that explains how capabilities, as potential for ways of being or forms of doing, are generated by both personal agency and material and social structures. We demonstrate how these lenses can illuminate the relational constitution of particular capabilities through reference to a composite case involving a man called Bert and his healthcare team. We outline how our relational ontology of capabilities can demand and support more theoretically coherent and socially just approaches to CA informed practice, research and policy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper discusses cultural psychology and psychological training in football (soccer). Self‐Determination Theory (SDT; Deci & Ryan, 1980) has shown to be pragmatically successful in sport and suggests that being regulated by autonomous forms of motivation leads to better psychological outcomes. Cultural psychologists would be tempted to dismiss SDT because it is predicated on an a‐cultural approach to mind. It is possible to nurture a stronger and more effective team culture by reframing SDT in a cultural direction. As such, this paper outlines a cultural approach that reconceptualizes SDT in a way that retains the latter's pragmatic value while not approaching mind in a self‐contained individualist manner. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper aims to reconstruct the concept of alienation as a live topic for active social theorizing. Joining Marxian and Simmelian ideas, it provides a multi‐dimensional, formal, and synthetic theory of alienation. The paper develops a set of theoretical tools for articulating formal elements of action that make alienation possible, without giving conceptual priority to alienation in the sphere of production, or within that sphere to the alienation of labor. These tools make it possible to derive classical notions of alienation as specific, contingent combinations of multiple elements, theorizing them as concrete socio‐historical configurations of a broader universe of possibilities. They also organize systematic reflection on various forms and relations of alienation; not only those between for instance labor and capital, but also among all four factors of production: land, labor, capital, and entrepreneurship. The paper accordingly develops an original, multi‐dimensional theorization of alienation for a complex, pluralistic world. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The notion that mass mobilization has analytically important stages is underappreciated in the literature. This paper proposes an approach that decomposes mass mobilization into three main phenomena: origins, protest and outcome. Each stage is characterized by unique factors and mechanisms. Accordingly, the research questions pertaining to each stage are dealt with by multiple levels of analysis and alternative explanations, allowing theory testing and theory development. The paper highlights separate causal mechanisms that operate in the emergence of grievances and protest motivation during the origins stage; mechanisms involving different forms of pressure, organization, psychological processes, and external forces during the protest stage; and mechanisms pertaining to key players and strategies that determine outcomes of mass mobilization. We illustrate that certain factors and mechanisms which are key in one stage have little or no causal relevance in the other stages. Other factors and mechanisms may also dramatically change in content, meaning or configuration between the stages. This theoretical approach facilitates the integration of a large and diverse body of scholarship into a structured analysis of mass mobilization that allows for both a detailed case study as well as comparison of stages across mass protests. The analysis of stages and causal mechanisms is illustrated across cases of democratization, revolution, and protest within democracy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract: John Searle's theory of social reality is among the most influential accounts in the history of philosophy. His theory also implicates concepts and issues of foundational interest to sociologists, including social structure, institutional differentiation and the relationship between linguistic performativity and institutional reality. Despite this overlap with sociological theory, and despite some sustained attention from sociologists (e.g., Lukes, ), no formal theoretical model of Searle's work exists within sociology. This paper reviews the core concepts of Searle's theory before concisely describing and then formally modelling their propositional structure. Though the overlap of Searle's approach with classical and contemporary sociological theory is discussed throughout, the paper concludes with a specific argument about his proper assimilation into sociological theory vis‐à‐vis Durkheim, Bourdieu and Giddens. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Motivated reasoning occurs when judgements subserve motives that go beyond accuracy seeking. Substantial evidence indicates that motivated political reasoning is ubiquitous. This is hard to reconcile with computational theories (following Marr's terminology, theories describing the fundamental principles underlying a cognitive process) like Bayesian inference, because these rely on accuracy maximization. Hence, motivated political reasoning is often interpreted as violating computational principles. Here we propose a different view by offering a computational account of motivated political reasoning which relies on the notion of Bayesian decision (instead of Bayesian inference). The key idea is that utility maximization, and not accuracy maximization, drives political thinking. This implies that agents will tend to endorse judgements that serve their instrumental goals even when evidence in support is poor (though agents will still believe their judgements are the most accurate). In this framework, motivated political reasoning is not interpreted as violating computational principles, although its nature is now conceived as pragmatic (i.e., serving instrumental goals) rather than epistemic (i.e., seeking understanding). The paper presents a mathematical description of the theory and shows how this can help interpreting important phenomena in political psychology such contextual priming, stereotyping, and displaced aggression. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper addresses the question of the relations between emotions and personhood, with a view to advancing a critical realist account of the role of emotions in social life. It is argued that the constitution of persons has to be approached from an ontological perspective, and that this raises questions about how sociology has addressed the meaning and role of emotions. Margaret Archer's critical realist perspective on them as commentaries on human concerns is broadly endorsed, but some significant correctives are proposed, especially with respect to the important distinction between primary and secondary emotions. To this end, it is argued that the affect spectrum theory advanced by Warren TenHouten can be fruitfully appended to a critical realist theory of emotions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, I synthesize recent work in the philosophy of action to propose an analytic reconstruction of the concept of habit. My main point is that habit (or habitus) can be a central, not just supplemental or auxiliary concept in action theory and the explanation of action. To show this, I systematically analyze the way habits can be used as a resource to explain action while comparing the way habits explain action with the standard way we explain action as being caused by the interplay of beliefs, desires, and intentions. I point to the specific "historical" way that habits can be seen as causes of action and show that the conceptual commitments of habit‐based explanations are both more substantial and more robust than intention‐based explanations. Once formed, habits act as inclinations and dispositions, being reliably triggered in the requisite context by the appropriate circumstances. Finally, I analyze the core concept of automaticity as applied to habit. I argue that since automaticity is not a unitary concept, different features of automaticity are more central to habit than others, allowing us to differentiate the most representative members of the habit category from more peripheral members. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Moral‐value perception occurs when sensory perception is directed by cognitive schemas, which selectively sample information in objects and events that represent personally valued means or ends. As a result of the perception of such value representations people experience affect ranging from strongly negative to strongly positive. If one's schemas direct attention to elements of objects or actions that verify schematic expectations, and spark little of no noticeable affect, the new information automatically produces minor alterations of the schema. However, if attention is directed or drawn to information that produces strong affect, and is contradictory of activated schemas, one is likely to engage in conscious assessment, through which the information is re‐conceptualized in a way that preserves schematic integrity. Based on multidisciplinary analysis, this paper (1) addresses the ways in which the perception of things within the natural world are represented in moral‐value perceptions, (2) identifies important cognitive, affective and emotional processes involved in the ongoing experience of such perception, and (3) illustrates some of the ways in which moral‐value perceptions influence moral assessments and judgements. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper constitutes an extended response to Athanasia Chalari's paper The Causal Impact of Resistance, which suggests that one may derive from internal conversations a causal explanation of resistance. In the context of our engagements with critical realism and digital research into social movements, we review Chalari's main argument, before applying it to a concrete case: the student protests in London, 2010. Whilst our account is sympathetic to Chalari's focus on interiority, we critique the individualism that is implicit in her argument, arguing that it emerges because of an underlying neglect of the relational aspects of resistance. Instead, we offer a relational realist analysis that treats resistance as process within an ontologically stratified account of reality that is mindful of the contingency of political acts. Taking this route, we establish resistance as an emergent relation, generative of distinctive 'relational goods' in the context of collective action, which we locate at different levels of reality, as we move from an analysis of individual to collective reflexivity. In doing so we offer a sympathetic critique of Chalari, building on the thought provoking arguments contained within it, whilst also making a contribution to the theorisation of social movements and the 'relational turn' within realist social theory ( Archer, 2010, 2012). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Rom Harré was a philosopher of science who is especially known for his contributions to psychology. But a lot of his writings can also be regarded as exercises in social theorizing and in tackling issues of the social ontology. This paper will argue that he introduced three innovations in the thinking about social ontology: (i) the primacy of conversations and speech acts as the 'substance' of the social world; (ii) the distinction between different epistemological realms when dealing with the social ontology and (iii) the introduction of a new way to think about the levels of the social reality. Moreover, it will be argued that throughout the many concepts and models Harré used to explain and understand the social reality, lays a remarkable unity and consistency in how he pictures and theorizes the society and social phenomena. Using the conceptual scheme developed by Maddi, a Harré inspired general social theory is presented that can also be read as an attempt to provide a synthesis/summary of his social theory, complemented with some insights developed by other scholars. It is proposed to label this theory as the Spoken World Theory. One of the distinct features of that theory is that it demonstrates that social and psychological phenomena are so entangled that it makes no sense to separate them and study them from a single social science's disciplinary perspective. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The work of Rom Harré was groundbreaking in attention to the dynamics of social episodes as discursively produced. In particular, Positioning Theory, as introduced and explicated by Harré and colleagues, focused on the examination of speech and other acts to consider positions and storylines. Positioning theorists also considered the shifting patterns of rights and duties that shape and are shaped by social interaction. In this article, we briefly revisit positioning theory. We then review two critiques of positioning theory—that positioning scholars have neglected real world, naturalistic data and that positioning theory places too much emphasis on verbocentric communication (e.g., speaking, writing). Drawing upon some of the earlier observations of Harré and his collaborators, we urge consideration of artifactual and embodied positions. Extending beyond conversational interactions, we consider how the embodied actions and the artifacts produced by individuals can be analyzed. The paper includes data‐based examples of embodied interactions related to artifacts and multimodal communication in a children's engineering literacy club. The examples demonstrate the ways in which moral orders are created and represented through multimodal interactions with artifacts as well as gesture, speech, and embodied actions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

During the last years of his life, I had a number of discussions with Rom Harré about the puzzling growth of inefficient bureaucracy around the world. He was particularly critical of the sharp rise in the number of administrators at Oxford, Georgetown, and other universities in which he had invested his academic life. In this paper, I provide a normative account of inefficient bureaucracy inspired by Harré. I give priority to narratives that sustain normative systems 'out there' ‐ both beyond individuals, and enmeshing individuals. Through the metaphor of an inverted pyramid with seven levels of identity threat, I interpret the growth of inefficient bureaucracy in organizations as associated with collective narratives about threats against 'us,' with identity threat serving as justification and motivation to adopt and expand inefficient bureaucracy. In the final section, I briefly discuss the role of Artificial Intelligence (AI) in bureaucracy, and possible solutions to inefficient bureaucracy suggested by the normative model. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

There are many differing ways to be a realist about language. This paper seeks to classify some of these and to examine the implications of each for the study of language. The principle of classification it adopts is that we may distinguish between realisms on the basis of what exactly it is that they take to be real. Examining in turn realisms that ascribe reality to the external world in general, to causal mechanisms, to innate capacities, to linguistic signs, to social structures, to language systems, and to linguistic groups, the paper summarises the case for a particular critical realist ontology of language. In the process, it engages briefly with the work of Saussure, Chomsky, Halliday, and more recent explicitly realist thinkers such as Bhaskar, Pateman, Archer, Sealey and Carter. One implication is that language itself is not a phenomenon that separates us from a causally structured world, but rather a part of that world, a part with an identifiable causal structure of its own that is similar to that of other normative phenomena. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract: This paper is a response to the new book by Alexander Wendt (2015) entitled Quantum Mind. The paper commends Wendt on the book's contribution to our understanding, particularly of quantum mechanics, panpsychism, and externalism in the philosophy of mind. At the same time, it takes issue with Wendt's overall thesis, particularly as it relates to materialism, emergentism, and social structure. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This theoretical paper explores the role of social representations in the construction of social reality. Even though this question has been the subject of many debates, the actual processes and mechanisms through which social representations contribute to the construction of social reality have rarely been explored. Citing key works on the topic, the paper explores the role of the genesis of social representations in this process. Each stage of the objectification of social representations (selective construction, structuring schematization, and naturalization) is examined in detail. A more in‐depth analysis of the naturalization process is provided by dividing it into four phases: (1) recognition; (2) elimination of contradictions; (3) instrumental use; and (4) validation through experience. These phases are illustrated using the example of the construction of the social object of drugs in our contemporary society. The present examination of the naturalization process in relation to drugs reveals the mechanisms through which the reality of drugs as a social problem has been constructed and reproduced in our society. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Whilst loneliness may be receiving greater media and political attention, the tendency to present the issue as a discrete individual problem separable from wider social concerns has led to some frustration amongst the sociologically minded. The purpose of this paper is to provide a sociological account of loneliness which is not as susceptible to individualist interpretations as other works in the genre have been. As such the paper focuses on how the structure of a society, rather than its culture, might lead to loneliness. To this end, the paper makes original use of the works of Georg Simmel (1858–1918). Specifically, Simmel's account of how we come to know other people through synthetic construction is applied to his better‐known theory of intersecting social circles. The author claims that when taken together these two aspects of Simmel's thought suggest that social structure can create a form of social isolation in which people find it very difficult to get to know one another, due to a lack of multiple‐context interactions with the same people during their day‐to‐day behavioural patterns. This clustering of interactions within narrow interlocuter‐contexts is hypothesised to account for a portion of the variability in loneliness across individuals, societies and historical time, and is provisionally named as structural loneliness. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Consumer culture and neoliberal political economy are often viewed by social psychologists as topics reserved for anthropologists, economists, political scientists and sociologists. This paper takes an alternative view arguing that social psychology needs to better understand these two intertwined institutions as they can both challenge and provide a number of important insights into social psychological theories of self-identity and their related concepts. These include personality traits, self-esteem, social comparisons, self-enhancement, impression management, self-regulation and social identity. To illustrate, we examine how elements of consumer culture and neoliberal political economy intersect with social psychological concepts of self-identity through three main topics: 'the commodification of self-identity', 'social categories, culture and power relations' and the 'governing of self-regulating consumers'. In conclusion, we recommend a decommodified approach to research with the aim of producing social psychological knowledge that avoids becoming enmeshed with consumer culture and neoliberalism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

John Searle has mistakenly claimed that emergence is the central concept in the account of social ontology defended by Tony Lawson, the central figure in the project now regularly referred to as Cambridge Social Ontology. This is not the case. Rather, if any concept can be considered central for Lawson, it is organisation. In this paper, I explain how Searle could misunderstand Lawson and, in doing so, I bring out the importance of organisation for understanding how phenomena, both social and non‐social, are constituted. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper's task is to outline some foundations of a critical, Marxist‐humanist theory of communication in the age of digital capitalism. It theorises the role of communication in society, communication and alienation, communication in social struggles, social struggles for democratic communication, the contradictions of digital capitalism, and struggles for digital socialist humanism. Marxist humanism is a counter‐narrative, counter‐theory, and counter‐politics to neoliberalism, new authoritarianism, and postmodernism. A critical theory of communication can should draw on this intellectual tradition. Communication and work stand in a dialectical relationship. Communication mediates, organises and is the process of the production of sociality and therefore of the reproduction of society. Society and communication are in class and capitalist societies shaped by the antagonism between instrumental and co‐operative reason. Authoritarianism and humanism are two basic, antagonistic modes of organisation of society and communication. Instrumental reason creates and universalises alienation. Digital capitalism is a dimension of contemporary society where digital technologies such as the computer, the Internet, the mobile phone, tablets, robots, and AI‐driven ("smart") technologies mediate the accumulation of capital, influence, and reputation. A Marxist‐humanist theory of communication aims to inform struggles for a good, commons‐based, public Internet in a good, commons‐based society that has a vivid, democratic public sphere. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Critical realism is a philosophy of science, which has made significant contributions to epistemic debates within sociology. And yet, its contributions to ethnographic explanation have yet to be fully elaborated. Drawing on ethnographic data on the health-seeking behavior of HIV-infected South Africans, the paper compares and contrasts critical realism with grounded theory, extended case method and the pragmatist method of abduction. In so doing, it argues that critical realism makes a significant contribution to causal explanation in ethnographic research in three ways: 1) by linking structure to agency; 2) by accounting for the contingent, conjunctural nature of causality; and 3) by using surprising empirical findings to generate new theory. The paper develops the AART (abduction, abstraction, retroduction, testing) research schema and illustrates its strengths by employing a Bourdieusian field analysis as a model for morphogenetic explanation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

s Issues of communication and the possibilities for the transformation of perspectives through an experimental dialogue resulting in a mutual, open, receptive, and non-judgmental consideration of the other are addressed in this paper from transdisciplinary theoretical and conceptual standpoints. The warrant for cultivating this type of communicative ability is based on arguments resulting from the assumption of widespread confusion and conflict in intrapersonal, interpersonal, intergroup, and ecological relations across the globe. I argue that there are two distinct classes of 'reasons' for this proposed practice of dialogue. First is recognition of the need for human individuals to engage in a regular and systematic 'social maintenance' of embodied consciousness to forestall the continuous colonization of the past/future on the living present that embodied consciousness entails. Second is the teaching of a skill to creatively and respectfully engage with others in a mutual transformation of perspectives. This paper addresses the general problem of perspectives and reflexivity at the root of the communication phenomenon and by extension - to its scale and to its pathologies in individuals and collectives. It is argued that suspension of judgment, assumption, and habit (broadly) helps interlocutors to recognize the possibility of holding one's history in a tensional abeyance and to focus on the living present independent of habitualized and reified identities and the embodied manner in which we unconsciously carry ourselves as social or 'universalized selves' in social situations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Phenomenological sociology is one of the most recognized approaches for explaining the constitution of social behaviour and the construction of social reality. To this day, phenomenological sociology usually belongs to the tradition of Edmund Husserl's transcendental phenomenology and to Alfred Schütz's mundane phenomenology, thus generally presenting itself as sociology of lifeworld, sociology of everyday life, and sociology of knowledge. In contrast to this, this paper intends to outline an alternative kind of phenomenological sociology that finds its philosophical foundation in Hermann Schmitz's "New Phenomenology". With regards especially to Schmitz's theory of the felt body ("Leib") and his theory of situation, the basic principles of Neophenomenological Sociology (NPS) will be introduced. Their main components are (1) felt body and affective involvement as the pre‐personal apriori of sociality, (2) felt‐bodily communication as the basic unit of sociality, and (3) joint situations as the socio‐ontological foundation and empirical manifestation of sociality. With these specific key concepts, NPS proves itself to be a socio‐theoretical approach whose foremost strength is that it can identify and properly analyse the pathic dimensions of social behaviour and social situations that social sciences tend to overlook. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Many scientists and philosophers of science have argued that metaphysical naturalism and methodological naturalism represent distinct and separable philosophical commitments. This claim is true in the sense that metaphysics and epistemology reflect different philosophical projects. The major question of interest to psychologists, however, is whether at the pragmatic level of research designed to discover the psychological sphere in which we live our lives, the metaphysical and the methodological realms are so tightly interwoven that some important aspects of our humanity cannot be faithfully revealed without distortion, or even missed altogether. This paper argues that, in light of its intellectual origins, methodological naturalism is informed by metaphysical naturalism at the level of its formulation, and, thereby, is by its nature more apt to reveal phenomena of certain ontological types and less apt to faithfully reveal phenomena of other ontological types. In this sense, metaphysical naturalism cannot help but subtly shape psychological investigation and thus insert itself to some degree into our understanding of many important psychological phenomena. The work of the French phenomenologist Jean‐Luc Marion, particularly his concept of "saturated phenomena," is briefly discussed by way of a call for greater methodological openness in psychological research – an openness that will permit psychological scientists to better "save the phenomena" in their accounts of human experience. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]