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This paper aims to discern, clarify, criticise, and advocate some uses of phenomenology in sociological research. Phenomenology is increasingly evoked or implicitly employed in sociological endeavours. Little attention, however, is paid to what is entailed in taking a phenomenological approach, and whether it is employed to advance empirical or theoretical knowledge. I build an analytic typology of different empirical and theoretical uses of phenomenology, criticise a range of these uses, and argue that other uses bear significant potential for the advancement of theoretical and empirical knowledge. The paper's main contribution lies in comparing and contrasting the many invocations of phenomenology in contemporary social scientific research to discern their benefits and shortcomings. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Efforts to challenge mental health-related stigma have been limited by an insufficient conceptualization of the problem space. As is common in health communication, practitioners have neglected the multiple tacit understandings the public embody in everyday life. Using the example of our recent research into the public’s social representations of mental health and illness, in this paper, we will work through the theoretical-methodological considerations involved in how we approached expanding the problem space. Using social theory, we tailored thematic analysis and natural language processing techniques to examine the public’s polyphasic sense-making processes. The approach is novel, as it diverges from standard methods in understanding health communication and the possibilities for behaviour change. Instead, we root our approach in a dynamic and relational epistemology to iteratively reveal in greater complexity some of the contents and processes that sustain mental health-related stigma. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, I attempt to shed more light in Bourdieu's habitus and doxa, by drawing on phenomenological and Bourdieusian‐based literature, social theory and some findings from sociological research. Despite the fact that there is a vast work concerning the examination of these two concepts, there are still some misunderstandings about them. For that reason, I have tried to draw a clearer picture of habitus, by linking it with phenomenological "being‐in‐the‐world" and describing its elements. As for doxa, I discuss its conceptual relation with habitus and phenomenology's natural attitude. Also, attention is given to some aspects of both habitus and doxa, which have not addressed in detailed fashion yet, but they are nevertheless theoretically useful for empirical qualitative research. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Social positioning theory, or an account of the human individual that it grounds, qualifies as a quantum social theory. This is an assessment that I explain and defend in the paper. It is of interest in that, in a world where increasing numbers are seeking to construct quantum social theories, it serves to help demonstrate that this goal can be achieved without giving up on meeting criteria like explanatory intelligibility or power or discarding real‐world notions like human (and other) entities. As it turns out, a central feature of the account defended and a core element of the 'standard' interpretation of quantum mechanics are found to stand in an interesting, unanticipated and suggestive relation to each other. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A serious consideration of pain has largely been absent in sociology, especially physical pain's close neurobiological relative, social pain. Social pain is the process by which rejection and exclusion recruits similar neural circuits as physical pain, generating an affectual response that mirrors the response one feels from physical trauma. Pain is essential to any sociological analysis of motivation and action because, like many affective responses, it is a necessary ingredient in cognition and behavior; and, in many cases, it preconsciously commands and even controls how we think and act. While exploring this concept, it becomes apparent that sociology has an entire set of distantly related concepts that can be classified as different processes of social pain that reveal the structural, cultural, and situational conditions shaping the distribution of social pain. The paper concludes by thinking through the implications social pain portends for neuroscience and sociology. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The capability approach (CA) is a framework for understanding, assessing, and promoting the quality of human lives and social justice. It focuses on capabilities – people's freedoms and opportunities to live in valuable ways. Although its proponents readily acknowledge that capabilities can depend on personal, social and environmental factors, little attention has been paid to the ontology of capabilities (what they are and how they are caused and constituted) and the inherent relationality of the approach is often not well followed through in research and practice. This, we suggest, leaves the CA vulnerable to misinterpretation and misappropriation. In this paper we draw on the complementary lenses of critical realism, hermeneutics and complexity theory to develop an explicitly relational ontology of capabilities that explains how capabilities, as potential for ways of being or forms of doing, are generated by both personal agency and material and social structures. We demonstrate how these lenses can illuminate the relational constitution of particular capabilities through reference to a composite case involving a man called Bert and his healthcare team. We outline how our relational ontology of capabilities can demand and support more theoretically coherent and socially just approaches to CA informed practice, research and policy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract: John Searle's theory of social reality is among the most influential accounts in the history of philosophy. His theory also implicates concepts and issues of foundational interest to sociologists, including social structure, institutional differentiation and the relationship between linguistic performativity and institutional reality. Despite this overlap with sociological theory, and despite some sustained attention from sociologists (e.g., Lukes, ), no formal theoretical model of Searle's work exists within sociology. This paper reviews the core concepts of Searle's theory before concisely describing and then formally modelling their propositional structure. Though the overlap of Searle's approach with classical and contemporary sociological theory is discussed throughout, the paper concludes with a specific argument about his proper assimilation into sociological theory vis‐à‐vis Durkheim, Bourdieu and Giddens. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, I synthesize recent work in the philosophy of action to propose an analytic reconstruction of the concept of habit. My main point is that habit (or habitus) can be a central, not just supplemental or auxiliary concept in action theory and the explanation of action. To show this, I systematically analyze the way habits can be used as a resource to explain action while comparing the way habits explain action with the standard way we explain action as being caused by the interplay of beliefs, desires, and intentions. I point to the specific "historical" way that habits can be seen as causes of action and show that the conceptual commitments of habit‐based explanations are both more substantial and more robust than intention‐based explanations. Once formed, habits act as inclinations and dispositions, being reliably triggered in the requisite context by the appropriate circumstances. Finally, I analyze the core concept of automaticity as applied to habit. I argue that since automaticity is not a unitary concept, different features of automaticity are more central to habit than others, allowing us to differentiate the most representative members of the habit category from more peripheral members. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Rom Harré was a philosopher of science who is especially known for his contributions to psychology. But a lot of his writings can also be regarded as exercises in social theorizing and in tackling issues of the social ontology. This paper will argue that he introduced three innovations in the thinking about social ontology: (i) the primacy of conversations and speech acts as the 'substance' of the social world; (ii) the distinction between different epistemological realms when dealing with the social ontology and (iii) the introduction of a new way to think about the levels of the social reality. Moreover, it will be argued that throughout the many concepts and models Harré used to explain and understand the social reality, lays a remarkable unity and consistency in how he pictures and theorizes the society and social phenomena. Using the conceptual scheme developed by Maddi, a Harré inspired general social theory is presented that can also be read as an attempt to provide a synthesis/summary of his social theory, complemented with some insights developed by other scholars. It is proposed to label this theory as the Spoken World Theory. One of the distinct features of that theory is that it demonstrates that social and psychological phenomena are so entangled that it makes no sense to separate them and study them from a single social science's disciplinary perspective. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract: This paper considers the use made of Vygotsky's work by many who take a sociocultural perspective and, in particular, by those who use his work to advance a particular view of second language acquisition and the ‘silent period’. It is argued that Vygotsky's account as represented in Thought and Language (Vygotsky, ) needs to be thought of as consisting of two distinct aspects: first, the observations he made (or claimed to have made) and, second, the theoretical account he proposed to explain them. It is shown that some of Vygotsky's observations are problematic but that, even if they are accepted, Vygotsky's theoretical account suffers from fundamental difficulties. Thus the support claimed from Vygotsky in accounts of second language acquisition is misplaced, first because of those difficulties and, second, because many who claim support from Vygotsky, do not need or even use his theory but instead focus their attention on his empirical observations and assume incorrectly that if their own empirical observations match Vygotsky's, then Vygotsky's theory can be accepted. Wittgenstein's later philosophy is shown to provide a perspective which dispels confusions about, and gives us a clearer insight into, the issues. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper elucidates a range of the potentials and limitations of nominalist sensibilities in social theory through an examination of their presence in Durkheim and Weber. Nominalism, which emerged in early modern western thought, holds that only individual particular cases exist and that there are no universals or generalities beyond mentally or linguistically constructed concepts; it also introduced new conceptions of will and voluntarism. Nominalism was variously transposed into classical social theories including those of Durkheim and Weber. In our theoretical methodology, we assess tensions between nominalist and realist visualities and modes of reasoning in their works. We conclude by discussing assessments of nominalism, attending to its enduring critical contributions while also explicating a reflexive critique of nominalism as mimetic of chaotic and pathological forms of social organisation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The question of the ontological status of social wholes has been formative to the development of key positions and debates within modern social theory. Intrinsic to this is the contested meaning of the concept of emergence and the idea that the collective whole is in some way more than the sum of its parts. This claim, in its contemporary form, gives exaggerated importance to a simple truism of re-description that concerns all wholes. In this paper I argue that a better way to test the ontological status of wholes is to ask whether their causal properties can be reduced to the qualities of their parts. If reduction is possible the ontological status of emergent wholes is diminished. A close analysis of William Wimsatt's definition, conceptualisation, and characterisation of emergent phenomena provides an understanding of the relationship between wholes and their parts and suggests, also, that the properties of collective phenomena of a social kind reduce to the activities of people. Social wholes and their parts reside in the same mode (or level) of organisation. This paper concludes by employing Jaegwon Kim's method of 'functional reduction' to demonstrate how to reduce the qualities of wholes to those of their parts. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper proposes a dynamic theory of embodiment that aims to get beyond the absent moving body in embodied social theory. The first somatic revolution, inspired by Merleau Ponty, provided theories based on the feeling and experience of the body. The theory of dynamic embodiment focuses instead on the doing itself as embodied social action, in which the embodied person is fore-grounded as a complex resource for meaning making. This represents a theoretical enrichment of the earlier turn to the body in social theory, which tended to separate the semiotic, as necessarily representational and/or linguistic, from the somatic as a wide range of corporeal processes and practices assumed to be separated from mind, language and/or conscious thought. We argue that overcoming this persistent Cartesianism requires a New Realist approach to the proper location of human agency as a causal power, one that promotes a bio-psycho-social concept of personhood. Part one of the paper presents a general framework for this perspective, while part two applies this paradigm ethnographically to illustrate how bringing semiosis and somatics together requires a robust conception of multi-sensory modalities. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The theory of autopoiesis, that is systems that areself-producingorself-constructing, was originally developed to explain the particular nature oflivingas opposed to non-living entities. It was subsequently enlarged to encompass cognition and language leading to what is known as second-order cybernetics. However, as with earlier biological theories, many authors have tried to extend the domain of the theory to encompass social systems, the most notable being Luhmann. The pur-pose of this paper is to consider critically the extent to which the theory of autopoiesis, as originally defined, can be applied to social systems-that is, whether social systems are autopoietic. And, if it cannot, whether some weaker version might be appropriate. It addresses this question by considering whether autopoiesis can be applied to the theoretical conceptions of Giddens and Bhaskar. It follows an earlier paper that evaluated Luhmann's autopoietic social theory. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper focuses on the concept of the reified and consensual universes in the theory of social representations, and the relationship between them. Having examined the different ways in which Moscovici discusses this concept, and the different ways in which these discussions have been interpreted, I will suggest that many of the criticisms levelled at this facet of social representations theory appear somewhat misplaced. However, it does seem that some aspects of the concept of the consensual and the reified universes are rather under-developed within the theory as a whole. It will be suggested that the recent addition of the notion of the representational project to the theory of social representations goes some way towards addressing some of these emergent issues, most notably with regards to the relationship between knowledges from different spheres. As an example, the area of representations of health and illness will be considered: drawing on work that takes the perspective of the sociology of scientific knowledge, it will be suggested that the theory of social representations needs to make the possibility of a bi-directional relationship between knowledge from the fields of scientific and common sense understanding more explicit. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper provides a critical comparison of two leading exponents of the relationship between morality and selfhood: Charles Taylor and George Herbert Mead. Specifically, it seeks to provide an assessment of the contribution each approach is able to make to a social theory of morality that has the self at its heart. Ultimately, it is argued that Taylor's phenomenological account neglects the significance of interaction and social relations in his conceptualisation of the relationship between morality and self, which undermines the capacity of his framework to explain how moral understandings and dialogic moral subjectivity develop in a world of shared meaning. I then argue that Mead's pragmatist interactionist approach overcomes many of the flaws in Taylor's framework, and offers a grounded conceptualisation of the relationship between self and morality that is able to provide a basis for a properly social account of moral subjectivity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, we argue that trust is an important aspect of social reality, one that realist social theory has paid little attention to but which clearly resonates with a realist social ontology. Furthermore, the emergence of an interest in trust in specific subject fields such as organization theory indicates the growing significance of issues of trust as market liberalism has developed. As such, the emergence of an interest in trust provides support for Archer's characterisation of late modernity in The Reflexive Imperative (2012) as a period of heterogeneity and greater incongruity. Commenting on this provides an opportunity to discuss the issue of habit in relation to trust and also the importance of the analysis of integration as a means to explain problems of trust. The commentary draws on examples from finance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper argues that an explanation of the role of aesthetic patterning in human action needs to be part of any 'qualitative' social theory. It urges the social sciences to move beyond contextualism and to see art as visual, acoustic and other media that lead to heightened sensory perception and the coordination of feelings through symbols. The article surveys the argument that art provides a basic model of how the self learns to interact with external environments; and the complementary thesis that art could be seen as integral to the emergence of systems of human knowledge, communication and economy. Ornamentation and stylization are advanced as two concrete devices through which human attention is captured and experience is ordered through aesthetic patterns. The conclusion is drawn that art offers the social sciences a meaningful account of the perceptual or 'qualitative' dimensions of social interactions; and that this is much needed today. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

I this paper, I draw on recent research on the radically embodied and perceptual bases of conceptualization in linguistics and cognitive science to develop a new way of reading and evaluating abstract concepts in social theory. I call this approach Sociological Idea Analysis. I argue that, in contrast to the traditional view of abstract concepts, which conceives them as amodal 'presuppositions' removed from experience, abstract concepts are irreducibly grounded in experience and partake of non-negotiable perceptual-symbolic features from which a non-propositional 'logic' naturally follows. This implies that uncovering the imagistic bases of allegedly abstract notions should be a key part of theoretical evaluation of concepts in social theory. I provide a case study of the general category of 'structure' in the social and human sciences to demonstrate the analytic utility of the approach. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, I argue that recent sociological theory has become increasingly bifurcated into two mutually incompatible styles of theorizing that I label formalist and behavioral-realist. Formalism favors mathematization and proposes an instrumentalist ontology of abstract processes while behavioral-realist theory takes at its basis the “real” physical individual endowed with concrete biological, cognitive and neurophysiological capacities and constraints and attempts to derive the proper conceptualization of social behavior from that basis. Formalism tends to lead toward a conceptually independent sociology that in principle requires only minimal reference to the empirical and ontological storehouse of other disciplines, while behavioral-realist theory leads to an interdisciplinary sociology that can be located within a hierarchy of behavioral sciences, leading to questions regarding the relationship between sociology and other disciplines as well as issues of transdisciplinary unification and possible interdisciplinary reduction. I explore the consequences of this split for the project of explanatory sociological theory within the context of how it has manifested itself in sociological network theory and social psychology. I close with a critique and assessment of formalist tendencies in sociological theorizing. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

By focusing on the unique velocity and over-stimulation of metropolitan life, Georg Simmel pioneered an interpretation of cultural boredom that has had a significant impact on contemporary social theory by viewing it through the modern experience of time-pressure and social acceleration. This paper explores Simmel's account of boredom by showing how—in the frenzy of modern life—it has become increasingly difficult to qualitatively distinguish which choices and commitments actually matter to us. Furthermore, this emotional indifference invariably pushes us towards more excessive and risky behavior, towards, what I call, “extreme aeshesia.” Insofar as novel experiences quickly become routine in the technological age, it appears that only extreme sensations and experiences can break the spell of boredom, allowing us to momentarily feel strongly for something. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article presents abstracts on social behavior which include a dynamic behavior of embodiment that aims to get beyond the absent moving body in embodied social theory, a paper on institutions and social structures, and a report on the Vygotskian tradition in the realist theoretical discussion of the structure-agency problem.

This article provides a critical overview of the controversy between the Radical approach to Discursive Psychology (RDP) and the Social Representations Theory (SRT). After having analyzed several positions, the first part of the article aims to show what is potentially complementary and contradictory in Discursive Psychology (DP) and the Social Representations Theory, when and why they are incompatible. In the second part of the article, we examine some of the main pillars of the RDP's antagonistic dispute and confutations and describe how the radicalism of the socio-constructionist thesis upheld by Radical Discourse Analysis can give rise to several hard-to-solve problems, which may then be translated into a boomerang effect: a) making relativism relative; b) reflecting on reflexivity; c) reducing the subject's role in a radical "contingentism" perspective; d) affirming the "totalising" and "reifying" role of discourse-action; e) assuming a "tautological" model of the binomium communication and representations, rejecting the concept and metaphor of communication. The paper concludes by arguing for a "dialogical" perspective not only in the terms peculiar to the SRT, but also for a "cross-fertilization" between the researchers inspired by the less radical approach to discursive psychology and those inspired by Social Representation Theory, highlighting the effect of the methodological implication that this would entail if researchers with various "school" memberships would instead of speaking and writing for their own academic circles would also learn to listen and read each other with respect. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

ABSTRACT:In order to delimit the realm of social phenomena, sociologists refer implicitly or explicitly to a distinction between living human beings and other entities, that is, sociologists equate the social world with the world of living humans. This consensus has been questioned by only a few authors, such as Luckmann, and some scholars of science studies. According to these approaches, it would be ethnocentric to treat as self-evident the premise that only living human beings can be social actors. The methodological consequence of such critique is a radical deanthropologization of sociological research. It must be considered an open question whether or not only living human can be social actors. The paper starts with a discussion of the methodological problems posed by such an analysis of the borders of the social world, and presents the results of an empirical analysis of these borders in the fields of intensive care and neurological rehabilitation. Within these fields it must be determined whether a body is a living human body or a symbol using human body. The analysis of these elementary border phenomena challenges basic sociological concepts. The relevant contemporary sociological theories refer to a dyadic constellation as the systematic starting point of their concept of sociality. The complex relationship between at least two entities is understood as the basis of the development of a novel order that functions as a mediating structure between the involved parties. Based upon empirical data, I argue that it is necessary to change this foundational assumption. Not the dyad but the triad must be understood as the foundational constellation. This implies a new understanding of the third actor, which is distinct from the concepts developed by Simmel and Berger and Luckmann. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The two most common names to invoke for a perceptualist aesthetics are Rudolf Arnheim and E. H. Gombrich. But the similaritied and differences between them have never been explicitly drawn. This paper undertakes such an analysis based on the three categories of representation, expression and historical objectivity. Arnheim's less stringent solutions to the problems of representation and expression are applauded but Gombrich's unique attempt to ground both of these categories in a form amenable to non-historicist approach to history are also praised. Gombrich's anti-historicism derives from Karl Popper and Arnheim is fleshed out with the theories of Maurice Mandelbaum. The parallel comparison of Popper-Mandelbaum helps to underscore differences and show an alternative to Gombrich and Popper's nominalism. Ian Verstegen , Arnheim and Gombrich in Social Scientific Perspective, pp. 000–000 [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper introduces two theoretical approaches on symbolic boundaries that have become standard within Science and Technology Studies (STS), but which have little theoretical connections and seem to be talking about different types of boundaries. I will conceptually combine these two approaches, as well as providing a deeper explanation of what is going on when scientists draw boundaries, by utilising theoretical concepts from social psychology: social representations and identities. I will explore how the two boundary concepts can be explained through social representations and identities with an example of popular science authors' depictions of the philosopher of science, Karl Popper, and where the philosopher can become both a boundary marker that separates science from other pursuits as well as defining scientists' identity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Developments in sociological theory since the 1960s have been responses to disciplinary problems rather than changes in fashion. The problem of topic and resource—where sociology has to use everyday understandings and practices as study resources even though they are legitimate topics of enquiry—has been an important and sometimes neglected spur to many of these developments. The turn to discourse, conversation analysis and the rise of Bourdieu's reflexivity are all attempts to address the problem, but each is shown to be unsatisfactory in different ways. In summary, they seek to address the issue as requiring either a principled methodological or a principled theoretical solution, and neither approach is capable of comprehensively addressing the matter. It is argued that these 'solutions' depend, in turn, on one of two particular construals of what the 'problem' consists in, neither of which is necessary or coherent. Each, it is argued, depends on a philosophical trick: making language out to need formal improvement (the Bertrand Russell trick) or introducing inappropriate scepticism to everyday life (the René Descartes trick). It is suggested that treating topic and resource not as a problem but as something which opens up new areas of investigation successfully deflates the issue and avoids unnecessary theoretical and methodological contortions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Most sociologists are not content with merely relating macrosocial phenomena to preceding macrosocial causes in their causal explanations of social phenomena. Instead they are seeking to provide (non‐reductive) microfoundations with which they can corroborate and make understandable the connection between macrosocial phenomena. In order to do so a theory (or theories) of human action is required. One such theory, rational choice theory (RCT), has long been viewed with strong suspicion in sociology. I show such suspicion to be partially justified. RCT cannot be a general theory of social behaviour. Nonetheless, there are important insights in various versions of RCT that should not be discarded. In order to improve upon RCT and move toward a more unified or integrative theory of action social‐psychological research has to be taken note of. I demonstrate how dual‐process theories and the research on heuristics can help sociologists move beyond RCT without contradicting some of its more basic insights. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Decisionists use decision/choice concepts to understand and represent X: bees, Deep Blue, and Ron Carter make decisions. Explicit decisionists argue that X should be understood and represented using decision/choice concepts: it's correct to speak of bees', computers', and jazz improvisers' decision‐making. Explicit anti‐decisionists disagree: bees, computers, jazz improvisers, algorithms, and drug addicts aren't correctly understood and represented as decision‐makers. Sociologists look at decisionism and explicit decisionism as social phenomena, which show up in discourses, practices, technologies, and organizations. I make a contribution to the sociology of decisionism and the sociology of morality by examining three kinds of explicit moral anti‐decisionism: Murdochian, sociological/structural, and Confucian/Daoist. I show why these discontents are discontent, what theories and evidence they draw on, what assumptions they make, and how they conceive of morality without decision/choice concepts. Then, I consider how moral anti‐decisionism might matter, how the sociology of decisionism might matter, and where to go from here (if anywhere). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

There has been increased interest in character strengths or virtues in recent years in social research and in various policy domains. However, while the notion of virtue has gained credibility in the fields of positive psychology and moral philosophy, it has yet to be satisfactorily considered from the perspective of social theory – in spite of the ongoing calls of researchers who have identified the need for further investigation into the role of culture and social context in the development of individuals' characters. In order to consider how good character and excellence in specific virtues are formed and sustained in social context, this article gives a theoretical account of character and virtue using well‐known microsociological concepts. It is argued that whereas virtues are often understood as psychological 'traits' or 'dispositions', they are also socially practiced and represented. Analyses of their related social processes are therefore appropriate and empirically promising, particularly in institutional settings, and can complement other theoretical and methodological approaches. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract: This comment addresses some of the critiques of “Quantum Mind and Social Science” by the other contributors, with special reference to the challenge that the mind‐body problem poses to conventional, classical thinking about social science. A quantum social ontology transcends those challenges, and in the process could transform social scientific thinking across the board. As an example the essay concludes with a consideration of the physics of social structure. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since its inception, experimental social psychology has arguably been of two minds about the nature and role of theory. Contemporary social psychology's experimental approach has been strongly informed by the 'nomological-deductive' approach of Carl Hempel in tandem with the 'hypothetico-deducive' approach of Karl Popper. Social psychology's commitment to this hybrid model of science has produced at least two serious obstacles to more fruitful theorizing about human experience: (1) the problem of situational specificity, and (2) the manifest impossibility of formulating meaningful general laws of human social behavior. It is argued that a social psychology based on the search for this kind of lawfulness, under the auspices of either a strict or loose interpretation of the largely Hempelian model, is ultimately unworkable. An alternative approach to social psychology that is attentive both to the need for understanding individual situations and behaviors and to the need for generalized understanding of actual human behaviors is offered. This approach is grounded in the hermeneutic tradition. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The growing body of research on temporal and spatial experience lacks a comprehensive theoretical approach. Drawing on Giddens' framework, we present time-space distanciation (TSD) as a construct for theorizing the relations between culture, time, and space. TSD in a culture may be understood as the extent to which (1) time and space are abstracted as separate dimensions and (2) activities are extended and organized across time and space. After providing a historical account of its development, we outline a multi-level conceptualization of TSD supported by research on cultural differences in the experience of time and space. We impact this conceptualization by examining two ethnographic case studies. We conclude by highlighting future research directions. TSD is an integrative, interdisciplinary, multi level construct with the potential to guide the burgeoning social science of time and space. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the contemporary epistemological debate on social reality, characterized by the crisis of post-modern theories and the emergence of new forms of realism, are there any approaches not acknowledging some specific ontological character to the construction of social objects? The question is apparently rhetorical, but the implication of this problem are not obvious. In the sociological literature the opposition between reality and construction is not clearly defined. Sometimes it is considered a dichotomy, in other situations the synthesis of alternative theses in a dialectical horizon. The more systematic attempt considers reality and construction as analytical macro-dimensions where the relation between social ontology and epistemology operates. From this stance, the acknowledgement of the role of social construction in a wider realist horizon is the true overtaking of postmodern philosophy. If it is true that facts exist beyond representations, it is also true that representations themselves have a specific effect on reality, who continually re-structures itself around specific relations of emergent power. Stating that reality is socially constructed is an evident limit of postmodern theories. On the other hand, stating that only facts exist constitute an impoverishment of realism and its replacement in neo-positivism. Social phenomena are real because they are based on specific properties of the inter-subjective construction of social reality. This thesis represents the revitalization of an advanced, anti-positivistic realism and the definition of the specificity of social objects. The aim of this essay is to search for a specific place of construction within the development of realist social ontology. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The author responds to an article by philosopher Tony Lawson who examined his work on social ontology. He discusses the conditions of adequacy of a theory of social ontology. He explores the basic ontology of human civilization and the requirements for the minimal apparatus necessary to explain human social ontology. He also examines the important role of language in the construction and the constitution of social reality.

The author responds to comments on his article on ontology and social relations. He defends his conception of rights-obligation relations by criticizing relations of exploitation in relation to Marxism. He also discusses several alternative forms of social relation in relation to his belief that the community is the most basic form of social totality bounded by the positional rights and obligations.

In this article the author compares his concept of social ontology with other alternative conceptions advanced by other philosophers including John Searle. He discusses the apparent similarities of various conceptions of social ontology. He elaborates on his conception of the nature of society which he refers to as social positioning. The author also examines the relationship between social relations and power.

The author comments on the concept of social ontology in relation to the agency-structure problem in international relations. He discusses four levels or planes of existence under which all human activity occurs, including material transactions with nature and social relations. He also examines the views of philosophers Jean Searle and Lawson on the concept of social ontology.

The author responds to an article by philosopher Tony Lawson on the contrasting social ontologies of his Social Ontology Group at Cambridge University and the Social Ontology Group headed by philosopher John Searle at the University of California at Berkeley. He comments on Lawson's use of the term positioning, which seems to mean set socially to function as, while Searle considers the social as what functions socially. He considers Lawson's social ontology as too subjectivist.

The author responds to an article by philosopher John Searle on his conception of social ontology. He discusses conditions of adequacy of a theory of social ontology and the defining feature of social reality. He examines the explanatory relevance, and use made, of the concept of emergence and social entities. The author also reflects on questions of ontological and causal irreducibility.

There are now countless social scientific disciplines-listed either as the science of ... X ... or as an -ology of one kind or another-each with their own internal controversies as to what are their 'proper objects of their study.' This profusion of separate sciences has emerged, and is still emerging, tainted by the classical Cartesian- Newtonian assumption of a mechanistic world. We still seem to assume that we can begin our inquiries simply by reflecting on the world around us, and by allowing our conceptualizations to guide our actions in our inquiries. Beginning our inquiries in this retrospective manner, however, means that our concepts and conceptualizations are both after-the-fact and beside the point, for 'something else' altogether is guiding us in the performance of our situation-sensitive actions than merely our conceptualizations. We need before-the-fact, hermeneutically-structured inquiries that can 'set out' inner 'landscapes of possibilities', to think-with and to provide guidance, as we try in our more scientifically organized efforts to achieve socially desired outcomes in particular socially shared situations. Conducting such preliminary inquiries is thus an art, requiring not only judgment, but also imagination and poetic forms of expression aimed at creating such shared, inner landscapes among all concerned. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article explores the relationship between visual culture and the fight for visibility and attention in contemporary society. It draws on a concept of visual culture which not only sees the rising significance of the visual and the proliferation of images as its defining traits, but also the fact that, today, people are-to a much higher degree-both consumers as well as producers of images. Based on this definition, it is argued that in visually oriented communication and media societies, the anthropologically fundamental need for attention manifests itself as a fight for visibility which takes on the form of ever more extreme forms of public self-display. Furthermore, a portrait of two social figures-the star and the voyeur-will serve as further analysis and description of the social trends which can be tied to the emergence of today's visual culture. The article will close by discussing attention and visibility in terms of inclusion and exclusion and by proposing an analytical model for differentiating four modes of existence in a visual culture. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

I present a theory of alienation that accounts for the cognitive processes involved with moral thinking and political behavior in modern societies. On my account, alienation can be understood as a particular kind of atrophy of moral concepts and moral thinking that affect the ways individuals cognize and legitimate the social world and their place within it. Central to my argument is the thesis that modern forms of social integration-shaped by highly institutionalized, rationalized and hierarchical forms of social life-serve to constrain the moral- cognitive powers of subjects leading to a condition of alienation as moral atrophy. This state results from the withering of the subject's internal powers of moral reflection and an overriding predisposition to rely on external value schemas to make sense of moral and political problems. I then present an analysis of alienated moral consciousness and its implications for modern social theory. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Barry Barnes and David Bloor of the Strong Programme of the sociology of knowledge advance a naturalized epistemology that reduces all accounts of normativity to social causes. I endorse their program of naturalizing one kind of normativity, but I argue that there is another kind they cannot naturalize. Within the context of sociological explanations of rationality, there are (1) norms of rationality instantiated by scientists that Barnes and Bloor study, and (2) Barnes and Bloor's own normative ascriptions of scientists as rational beings. I argue that Barnes and Bloor successfully justify their naturalization of the norms of rationality of the scientists they describe by a methodological caution and arguments from under-determination and finitism. But they inevitably fail to naturalize their own normative ascriptions of those scientists as rational. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Lizardo argues that The Social Theory of Practices is refuted by the discovery of mirror neurons. The book argues that the kind of sameness of tacit mental content assumed by practice theorists such as Bourdieu is fictional, because there is no actual process by which the same mental content can be transmitted. Mirror neurons, Lizardo claims, provide such a mechanism, as they imply that bodily automatisms, which can be understood as the basis of habitus and concepts, can be shared and copied from one person to another. This response to Lizardo points out that the Gallese arguments on which Lizardo relies relate to phylogenetic and universal body movements, not to the learned movements characteristic of practices, and that there is no sameness producing mechanism parallel to the genetic one. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Roy Bhaskar's Social Cube model based on critical realist philosophy has not been dealt with in theory of decision-making at any length, nor has it raised any notable debate in social theory in general. The model demonstrates that decision-making is regulated and transformed by a constantly evolving complexity of mechanisms emerging from physical, mental, material, human and social levels of reality. With the help of this device, Graham Allison's argument against the Rational Actor Model (RAM) that decisions are not so much acts of unitary decision-makers but more outputs of large organisations can be elaborated and converted into a statement that decisions are products of a complexity of knowledge-producing mechanisms. The openness of social systems revealed by the Social Cube therefore requires methodological pluralism, for example the application of psychological theories in order to explain political phenomena. By applying the Social Cube model and by drawing new empirical evidence from the Linda Melvern Rwanda Genocide Archive, this article demonstrates that the Somalia effect on the UN's failure in Rwanda was more complicated than the existing literature claims; it was “multi-layered”, generated not only by intentional political calculations, as previous studies argue, but also by a multiplicity of other mechanisms operative at various levels, particularly cognitive dissonance in organisational learning at the unintentional or subconscious level. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]