Search

The present study examines the discourse of the then Greek Prime Minister, Alexis Tsipras, following the 2018 July wildfire disaster in the Eastern Attica suburbs including Mati to reveal the frames employed by the main protagonist utilizing existing framing models while also incorporating the notions of ethic of care and strategic ambiguity. The then government received extensive criticism by the media and political opponents in regard to the management and communication responses of the then Prime Minister. A content analysis was conducted to the statements made by the then Prime Minister. Findings indicate that Tsipras during the initial stages of the crisis acknowledged the extent of crisis while also emphasizing the successful crisis response efforts. Moreover, strategic ambiguity along with low levels of "caring" were important elements of Tsipras' narrative at the initial stage. As the public outrage and criticism intensified, Tsipras incorporated a more caring profile and presented the disaster as a "critical opportunity" by shifting the blame to previous governments and proposing policy changes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Inter‐organizational collaboration is increasingly a topic for studies into accidents and disasters as well as exercises. In this study, which is based on interviews with first responders, we compared perceived collaboration during an exercise with crisis work. The three organizations included in this study—fire department, police and ambulance services—perceived the investigated tunnel exercise completely different, ranging from harmonious interaction to power struggles between commanding officers, fragmented decision‐making and ambiguity. When comparing the exercise with an incident, we found that collaboration was more evident during incidents than in exercises. However, collaboration exercises appear to improve inter‐organizational collaboration by stimulating informal structures, practicing listening and delegating, getting to know one another and learning a common language. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In some ways, the author's organization directly aligns with previous conceptions of crisis management stages, that is, pre-crisis, crisis, and post-crisis (Fink, 1986; Myers, 1993; Pearson & Mitroff, 1993). When organizations enter the recovery stage, it is critical that they not only focus on quick resumption of the organization's mission, but also on psychological and social recovery within the organization. Pearson and Claire (1998) define an organizational crisis as "a low-probability, high impact event that threatens the viability of the organization and is characterized by ambiguity of cause, effect, and means of resolution, as well as by a belief that decisions must be made swiftly" (p. 60). [Extracted from the article]

Ambiguity is a central problem for operators working in dynamic, high-risk environments. Operators must decide on a course of action before knowing with certainty how the system will respond. Though ambiguity is expected, how it presents is unexpected. We reduce ambiguity when we can give meaning to information and events through use of context, responsiveness of the system, and when we can view events from a higher level. Preparation and training for routine operations helps identify potential ambiguities before events begin. The experienced operator engages the situation relying on real-time experience to learn what works through action, thus further reducing ambiguity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper proposes a classification system for definition, analysis and management of the primary ambiguities influencing the performance of engineered systems. One category of ambiguities (Intrinsic) is addressed with 'hardware and structure' approach that is intended to develop and maintain 'robust' damage and defect-tolerant systems. The other category of ambiguities (Extrinsic) is addressed with 'human and organizational' approach intended to develop and maintain high reliability organizations having high reliability management with high reliability systems. Proactive (performed before activities are conducted), Reactive (performed after activities are conducted) and Interactive (performed while activities are conducted) risk management approaches and strategies are described to help develop and maintain systems having desirable performance characteristics, including acceptable 'safety'. Results from a study of seven organizations that worked for more than 10 years to implement these approaches and strategies to assess and manage ambiguities are summarized. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Ambiguity may lead us to insert abstractions into our experience that create a greater number of unanticipated, unintended consequences. When people move closer to the flux of ambiguity, they work to make sense of it. High reliability organizations react to ambiguity by increasing it momentarily. To increase ambiguity is to grasp more of the situation, to refrain from simplifications, and to strive for a workable level of ambiguity. This argument is developed through a focus on connotations of ambiguity, assumptions for organizing around ambiguity, and implications for practice. To grasp ambiguity is to adopt an attitude of wisdom. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on the issue of ambiguity in business. Topics include danger of ambiguity description of ambiguity such as reasonable explanations of events and multiple responses to a single intervention, and the vulnerability from ambiguous information that drives resilience and reliability. It also mentions principles of High Reliability which include pre-occupation with failure, commitment to resilience, and sensitivity to operations.

In this paper, we propose that performance under uncertainty and ambiguity is enabled by a two-pronged set of practices enacted by leaders and frontline workers. These contextualized practices fuel performance by enabling teams and organizations to both discern, interpret and make sense of important discrepancies as situations unfold (what we refer to as anomalizing), and to develop a richer understanding of a situation (what we call proactive leader sensemaking). Together, these situation-specific practices contextualize engagement and promote capabilities to contingently tailor actions to unfolding conditions. We test our hypotheses using data gathered from a sample of wildland firefighters and find strong support for our theorizing. We also identify a set of additional group and situational conditions that provide a more nuanced understanding of factors that contribute to reliable performance under dynamic uncertainty. Together, the findings provide quantitative evidence for the micro-foundations of effective performance in uncertain contexts. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper outlines the importance of ambiguity in organizations that manage hazardous operations in a rapidly changing environment. Three kinds of ambiguity are described: fundamental ambiguity in categories and labels for understanding what is happening; causal ambiguity for understanding cause-effect relationships that enable explanation, prediction, and intervention; and role ambiguity of agreeing on responsibilities. Examples of successful and unsuccessful ways that organizations deal with ambiguity are drawn from several industries. Although the most typical response is to avoid ambiguity or to seek a false clarity from confident leaders, more successful strategies engage diverse participants from inside and outside the organization to provide multiple perspectives and innovative suggestions that contribute to learning-by-doing. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]