Search

They include: (i) ideational labor, (ii) construction labor, and (iii) aspirational costs. Is successful, it was possible only because the ideational necessities for it were met by previous laborers and labor, for example, the labor of feminist philosophers (of all sorts) and men of color philosophers on metaphilosophy and diversity. Alienation, in some form or another, was identified by people working in such areas as comparative philosophy, Eastern philosophical traditions, Africana philosophy, various forms of feminist philosophy, engaged philosophy, philosophies of various sciences (e.g., biology or physics), and even Western "history of philosophy." This underappreciated work load shared by most diverse practioners in the field of philosophy speaks to the way ideational labor can be problematic. Learning the skills that go into epistemological investigation today was part of the training I mentioned above and, as such, was part of the construction labor for "How Is This Paper Philosophy?". [Extracted from the article]

The argument of this paper is that in societies engulfed in extreme violence - where the state is unable to grapple with the phenomenon of missing persons for lack of operational and investigative abilities - authorities should embrace the possibility of seeking collaboration from perpetrators in order to secure information regarding the whereabouts of the victims. In such a context, and especially with the state "captured" in this way, punishment of a few perpetrators alone is unlikely to abate crime unless such punishment is extensive (i.e., broad), reaching all perpetrators. THE FORENSIC PRINCIPLE AND THE PROPORTIONATE PUNISHMENT PRINCIPLE The proportionate punishment principle maintains that the state must punish all those who commit a crime and that said punishment must be proportional[12] to the crime in question. Disappearances as I understand them in the paper refer to those involving some form of state complicity, which international law designates as I enforced i disappearances, as well as to disappearances perpetrated solely by nonstate actors, for example insurgent groups or organized crime, without any kind of state complicity. [Extracted from the article]

In organized institutions of the kind that I consider in this paper (like universities, or scientific societies, or firms, or government), the function expressed by someone in an institutional status role is defined in part in relation to the institutional status roles of others, and this, according to Ludwig, is minimally required for an institutional structure of status roles (Ludwig 2017, p. 7). SFAD makes evident what may help to counteract the subordination that type (3) cases exhibit: effective safeguards ought to be in place to ensure that status role performances of marginalized group members are properly credited to them, so that all those formally in the domain of a status role also comprise its de facto domain. Instead of explaining how the two functions relate, I introduce, in the next section, I one i status function that explicitly includes different membership categories to reflect how the crediting of institutional role performances is often tied to the performer's status with respect to the de facto domain. [Extracted from the article]

Demandingness objections harass major theories in normative ethics as well as prominent moral views in applied ethics and political philosophy. The present paper does the following: it clarifies and distinguishes between various demandingness objections in the philosophical literature, (ii) identifies a formidable and interesting form of the demandingness objection that targets a wide scope of moral views, and (iii) defuses this objection by developing a local skeptical argument from unreliability the form of which may, interestingly, be effectively deployed in other areas of philosophy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article comments on David Copp's argument that there is a need for genuine collectives in the ontology of agents, to accommodate the kinds of normative judgments people make about them, which appeared in his paper "On the Agency of Certain Collective Entities: An Argument from Normative Autonomy." This argument is also developed in Copp's paper titled "The Collective Moral Autonomy Thesis" (CMA) published within the issue. The argument states that individuals correctly assign blame or obligation to collectives in cases, in which it would be a mistake to assign any blame to their members. Moreover, the author also offers insights on Copp's argument in CMA, where he states that people are to judge that a collective act is blameworthy though the group members that act are blameless.

This section introduces several papers on social philosophy featured in this issue of the "Journal of Social Philosophy."

The article comments on the paper "Collective Moral Autonomy Thesis" (CMA) by David Copp, published within the issue. The author argues that Copp's examples, as part of his argument for the CMA, do not demonstrate the truth of his thesis. He states that Copp did not offer an account of what he calls "collectives" yet in his examples, he refer to organized and unorganized collectives. There is also a certain unclarity, which pertains to both moral and mental properties, in his arguments regarding the relationship between collectives and the individuals who partly constitutes them. Moreover, he suggests that Copp should provide clear examples of collectives which possess moral obligation and bears moral responsibility, for him to sustain the CMA.

The article explores the possibility that moral responsibility of individuals can be used to explain one form of collective responsibility: responsibility of collective effects. Here, the author argues that the responsibility for collective effects naturally suggests an analysis in terms of universalizability. Moreover, she explains the distinction between justification of a practice and justification a particular act falling under a practice, which is drawn from a paper by John Rawls. She concludes that under Kantian view, it is not believable to see individual agents as morally responsible for collective effect when the actions they contributed are based on maxims defined by patterns of social organization and not social practices.

This article focuses on the controversy over autonomy with regard to encompassing religious communities. Such communities aim to enclose nearly every aspect of their members' lives within the boundaries of the community. Religion, in these communities, is the basis for a holistic and regulative culture into which members are socialized as children. The article begins with the controversial nature of autonomy for religious communities in the context of the U.S. Supreme Court case Wisconsin v. Yoder, which involved the Old Order Amish. The case will be used as a prism to view the broader conflict over autonomy involving encompassing religious communities in liberal democracies. To approach the conflict, liberal strategies of neutrality and political liberalism are considered to ask how liberal democracies ought to treat these communities. Although these approaches hold some promise, the paper argues for a limited theory of accommodation as a partial resolution to the paradoxical elements of the controversy over autonomy. The paper defends accommodation on the basis that it can contribute to the options required for individual autonomy. In particular, accommodation can make life in a religious community a significant and viable option.

This section provides an overview of the articles, issues, and topics discussed in the Volume 31, Number 4, Winter 2000 edition of Journal of Social Philosophy.

Halliday and Parr discuss a version of years-worked mandatory retirement, in which mandating retirement accelerates the rate of job turnover, resulting in more jobs being created over time, each for a shorter duration (Halliday & Parr, [20]). Unlike age-based mandatory retirement, years-worked mandatory retirement would allow retiring at different ages. For example, in aged societies where there are many more older than younger adults, a disproportionate share of workers might be older, and mandatory retirement in these settings might be a justified means to create age diverse workplaces. Keywords: ageism; dignity; discrimination; intergenerational justice; mandatory retirement EN ageism dignity discrimination intergenerational justice mandatory retirement 152 168 17 06/06/23 20230601 NES 230601 INTRODUCTION Unfounded stereotypes about what older adults can do and be drive age discrimination in many areas of life, including the workplace. While the original Act prohibited mandatory retirement for workers up to age 65, subsequent amendments eliminated any upper age limit, ending mandatory retirement for most Americans. [Extracted from the article]

Detailed historical research on the substantive content of party platforms in the nineteenth-century United States shows that the primary concern of all major parties, decade after decade, was the enabling of economic growth under a capitalist property regime (Bensel, [12], pp. 202-203). If, therefore, "justice is the end of government" (p. 259), as Madison writes in I Federalist i No. 51, then I Federalist i No. 10 tells us that justice, and therefore the end of government, means the protection of humans' natural propensity for property acquisition. Pettit ([62], pp. 173-174) claims that party competition helps counter "false negatives" and promotes a broad "culture of freedom", since the ability to stand for office, form parties, and criticize governing parties implies the prior liberties of "speech, association, and travel" (Pettit, [64], p. 201). Rather than competitive elections, I focus on the competitive party system, since parties are the primary agents of competition in electoral democracies (Bellamy, [9], p. 231; Katz & Mair, [43], p. 1). My aim, then, is not to critique minimalist, aggregative democracy from the standpoint of deliberative democracy, but to critique I maximalist i views of electoral democracy from the standpoint of structural injustice. [Extracted from the article]

Furthermore, a small minority dismiss veganism because they reject the idea of our having moral duties to animals (Hsiao, [25]); while others accept moral duties to animals, but regard veganism as either too demanding (Schwitzgebel & Rust, [62]), as having certain harmful consequences in its own right (Mackenzie, [36]), not leading causally to the desired effects (Harris & Galvin, [19]; Kahn, [30]) or, in turn, leading to moral overreach (Mills, [44]). CONCLUSION We hope to have shown that it can be useful and fruitful for individuals to think of veganism as political solidarity to resist animal oppression both on behalf of other animals and with other vegans. Veganism is commonly described as the attempt to avoid, as far as possible, the exploitation and consumption of animals and animal products. This is because other community members, even if not vegan, have different relations to the system in which they live: some actually oppose it morally (as indicated by the polls quoted above), yet fail to act on their convictions; others might be wilfully ignorant of it (Williams, [69]), but appreciative of systemic changes that reduce animal oppression; and again others might have vested interests in upholding animal oppression, but to varying degrees (a manufacturer of sausages will be more able to adapt to a new system, free of animal-oppression [e.g., by going plant-based], than a breeder of farmed or laboratory animals). Crucially, this commitment does admit disagreements about the precise meaning of "animal oppression", its implications and the best strategies for tackling it (see for example Francione & Garner, [15]).[6] In this sense, veganism as resistance to animal oppression is just like any other social justice movement. [Extracted from the article]

Whether or not luck egalitarians must be committed to basic equality I qua i luck egalitarianism is a question we cannot settle here[4]; but we would certainly expect luck egalitarians to share this basic commitment, even if it is not, strictly speaking, required by luck egalitarianism. Keywords: egalitarianism; equality; ethos; luck egalitarianism; self-respect; shame; talent EN egalitarianism equality ethos luck egalitarianism self-respect shame talent 41 58 18 03/15/23 20230301 NES 230301 INTRODUCTION A recurring concern about luck egalitarianism is that it violates core egalitarian commitments because its implementation would make some individuals, in particular those who lack marketable talents, experience shame. So our response focuses on shame, rather than neighboring phenomena, and asks to what extent shame that occurs in a broadly (rather than ideal) luck egalitarian society can be imputed to luck egalitarian commitments and is inimical to egalitarian values at the same time. This type of respect is a central commitment of any egalitarian view so if the critics can show that the shame felt in a luck egalitarian society leads to unequal recognition respect they would have a strong argument against luck egalitarianism. [Extracted from the article]

There are serious doubts about whether it has short- or long-term negative effects on employment and wages for low-SES residents, as well as whether these costs are significant.[24] For example, while the dominant narrative is that low-wage immigration contributes to unemployment for low-wage residents, Ruth Milkman argues that the causal chain is inverted. However, this still leaves open the possibility that low-SES residents could be harmed by skill-selection, even if they themselves endorse it. 14 This is in addition to role skill-selection can play in reinforcing stereotypes and biases toward low-SES residents in the broader community, as well as in undermining equality of opportunity. Research shows that SES-based status harms exist and that both low-SES residents and others in society are aware of the biases and stereotypes surrounding low-SES. Moreover, if low-SES residents come to recognize a division between domestic status hierarchies and immigration policies such that their social status is not implicated, and if they desired skill-selective policies based on (perceived) economic benefits, then such policies might be permissible. The economic interests of low-SES residents I have argued that generalized skill-selection harms low-SES residents of high-income receiving societies. [Extracted from the article]

Traditional functionalists in social science, for example, Spencer ([64]), Parsons ([54]), Radcliffe-Brown ([56]), Malinowski ([44]), viewed society on the model of an integrated organism whose parts functioned to meet basic human needs and maintain the society's survival and stability. And shouldn't we include social systems such as transportation systems, medical systems, military systems, and educational systems; after all, these are the subject matter of the social sciences. I IntroductionMethodological individualism i (MI) has been a major topic in the philosophy of social science over the past several decades. In the final sections, I sketch an account of how we might distinguish social systems from other (non-social) systems, and argue that prioritizing the level of systems in social ontology has advantages for social critique. (Kukla and Lance 2014, 26) A social ontology suited to understanding social systems, then, must include the worldly components upon which our attitudes and activities depend; and social explanations will typically be incomplete without including the worldly constraints on the systems we are part of. [Extracted from the article]

In the current philosophical literature, there is a common consensus that modern European colonialism constituted a serious historical injustice. At the same time, Bufacchi claims that Ypi's presentation of colonialism as an unequal and unfair political association neglects the theoretical significance of violence as a "comprehensive explanation" of what makes colonialism wrong (2017, p. 198). In the following section, I focus primarily on the injustice of settler colonialism and planter colonialism, as I take it that they are the most commonly discussed sub-types of colonialism in the contemporary philosophical literature. Full appreciation of this point starkly reveals the inconsistency of those who have condemned those atrocities and yet failed to see how colonialism entailed many of the same wrongs.[2] Unequal and unfair terms of political association At the same time, other theorists have pointed out that colonialism can be unjust for reasons other than the violation of basic rights. [Extracted from the article]

We can then distinguish between two I kinds i of moral harm: moral damage - a harm done to the victim's character - and moral injury, a harm whereby individuals become enlisted or complicit in harmful or morally wrong actions and must live with the guilt, regret, or memory of having done so. Living with such regret (as a consequence of your circumstances) that causes you to struggle with your moral assessments of yourself - even when you are not at fault or your fault is uncertain - we can say is a kind of moral injury.[17] While recognizing both Hall and Nussbaum as suffering moral injury, we ought to recognize that there are important distinctions to be made between different degrees or kinds of moral injury. My account importantly differs from Card's by identifying the harms suffered by Nussbaum not as moral damage, or as compromising her moral character, but instead as instances of moral injury. In "What Battery Really Is", Andrea Dworkin describes the famous case of editor, writer, and victim of domestic violence, Hedda Nussbaum (Dworkin, 1989).[1] While working as an editor at Random House, Nussbaum met a lawyer named Joel Steinberg. [Extracted from the article]

Regarding an agent's responsibility for her prejudicial behavior as a type of habit thus allows us to introduce a view of responsibility that resembles Michael McKenna's (2012) conversational stance or Daphne Brandenburg's (2018) nurturing stance, but which, importantly, still makes the prejudiced agent an appropriate target for blame. 3 From now on I will use "prejudicial behaviour" or "prejudicial action" to refer to the behaviour that results from implicit biases, not just any kind of prejudicial behaviour - not the behaviour of the explicitly committed racist, sexist or homophobe, when it is triggered by their explicit biases. The mismatch between our explicit egalitarian beliefs and the stereotypically biased, often discriminatory, prejudicial behavior we often display makes it plausible to think that there must be mental states, other than our explicit beliefs, which are at least partially responsible for such a behavior. In viewing prejudicial behavior as a habit, we highlight the fact that agents who exhibit this type of behavior are not aware of obvious facts about themselves, such as the harm they cause to others. Through the manipulation of the relationship between rats' trained behavior and its outcome, Dickinson established that habitual behavior, unlike goal-directed action, has two distinctive marks: outcome devaluation and action-outcome contingency degradation. [Extracted from the article]

Workplace democracy, exploitation, and liberalism: Why labor-managed firms are neither exploitative nor illiberal Even though LMFs may exist to a limited degree in a POD, an LMF economy is very different to a POD because the vast majority of firms are organized as LMFs (see Sec. An LMF is first and foremost a firm in which workers/labor suppliers ultimately control and manage the firm in proportion to and by virtue of labor supply. Keywords: economic democracy; exploitation; labor managed firms; liberalism; workplace democracy EN economic democracy exploitation labor managed firms liberalism workplace democracy 202 220 19 06/07/22 20220601 NES 220601 INTRODUCTION Democratic workplaces or what I call "labor-managed firms" (LMFs) have been supported by a number of theorists who believe they would lead to a more just and wholly good society that better secures equality across social positions, increased democratic engagement, opportunity for meaningful work, and autonomy. Ultimately, an LMF economy is not exploitative because LMFs, through the process of democratic management, prevent the power asymmetries necessary for exploitation.[1] Neither is a mandated LMF economy illiberal, since the establishment of an LMF economy does not intentionally hinder anyone's pursuit of their individual good. [Extracted from the article]

Even if the participants might not immediately be able to translate the epistemic practices of the camp into their workplaces or other organizations they are active in, they might be motivated to work towards such practices. 12 We understand the notion of "epistemic practices" as different from, and more specific than, the notion of "knowledge practices" that is sometimes used with regard to social movements (see e.g., Casas-Cortés et al., [3]). Our analysis has focused on epistemic practices in the camp, that is, those patterns of organization of practices dealing with knowledge from the point of view of its production, transmission, and implementation, as well as the ensuing learning processes. Thus, the camp fulfilled its function as a "real utopia" also in the sense that it was a training camp for horizontal practices in which participants got to know alternatives to existing hierarchical forms of organizing and could develop the capabilities needed for putting them into practice (cf. [Extracted from the article]

Such reasons may be that the appointing bodies only know male judges, or believe that male judges will be more favorable to them, or more suited to this office, and not whether they are sufficiently impartial and the most judicially competent judges. So if the concern is with I affecting i the deliberations of the bench, the present existence of bias may counsel I against i appointing women: ... a male justice who makes an argument similar to one espoused by a female justice may be more likely to be heard and taken seriously by the other justices, especially on questions where, if pro-feminist, a female justice is more likely than equivalent male justices to be perceived by as "biased."[61] However, there are at least two arguments that support specifically female judges. The arguments for a better balance among male and female international judges would rather regard the judges as "trustees" not "representatives" in Burke's sense.[113] The judges should make decisions according to their interpretation of the law, informed as well as possible also by means of joint deliberation, giving no particular I weight i to the interests of their "constituents." There is no claim that all biases will disappear.[108] Indeed, research on US judges suggest that the judges' ideology - liberal or conservative - and party affiliation - Republican or Democrat - has a much greater impact on their voting than their gender.[109] It appears likely from these studies that gender differences in judgments is largely due to a selection bias: that the female judges are more likely to be liberal and Democrat. [Extracted from the article]

[34] In contrast to this backward-looking assigning of blame, Young insists that we understand structural injustice as "maintained through the behavior of ordinary decent people whose choices are constrained by existing social, political, economic, and cultural institutions."[35] Young does acknowledge the need to publically "criticize powerful agents who encourage the injustices or at least allow them to happen." To describe an injustice as structural is to describe it as a system of practices and processes in which chains of cause and effect are complexly entwined. An obvious consequence of recognizing an injustice as structural is not only that individual responsibilities must be discharged as part of collectives, but also that collective interventions must be made against those structures: The collective does not organize to take on a single agent, but rather a whole host of practices and norms connecting numerous agents. [Extracted from the article]

But I shall suggest a compelling social philosophy of sexual attraction can be articulated by considering the scope and character of sexual desires through the lens of structural injustice, while looking to collective and political rather than primarily individual and ethical remedies to the problem of unjust desire. Like persisting in eating familiar foods, which can begin to form new culinary desires, they reason that socializing with members of unfamiliar groups can make us more open to developing sexual and romantic desires for them. Is it unjust that some people are less sexually desired than others? While both self-reflection and rehabituation can have some effect on desire-formation, exhorting individuals to modify their own desires may be of limited effect. [Extracted from the article]

The article offers the author's opinion on collectivities without intention. She states that in the philosophy of social science, intentionalists define collectivities as individual members who considered themselves part of a social group It discusses the non-intentionalist model, limits of intentionalism, entry rules, imputed membership, and circularity. She argues that the non-intentionalist model could pose significant implications for moral and political obligations.

The article discusses the claim of Neo-Aristotelian virtue ethicists called the eudaimonist thesis. The claim stresses that there is a kind of deep and enduring happiness and it is impossible without virtue. The paper presents an advanced studies from empirical psychology to support the eudaimonist thesis that is interpreted as a psychological claim, and reconsider counterexamples that have been directed against the thesis interpreted as a conceptual assertion. It discusses that refocusing the debate in the way affords a fresh perspective on a familiar philosophical landscape, and provides eudaimonist virtue ethics with a source of empirical support for its moral psychology.

This cannot be subsumed into harmful sex (which need not be perverted) (Section 3.3), rape (which is merely a subset of perversion) (Section 4.4), or morally impermissible sex (since perversion is only one way in which sex may be impermissible) (Section 5). Second, if sexual perversions are defined as those practices that are statistically abnormal or infrequent, then this is sadly not true of rape (especially when including marital rape).[22] Third, on some rather stereotyped accounts of male and female sexuality, it is assumed that men tend to want sex, while women tend to resist it. This kind of "sadistic rape", wherein the rapist desires and takes pleasure in the subversion of their victim's autonomy - in the act of rape itself - is clearly an instance of perversion. Rather than desiring to rape someone and settling with make-believe, the individual may desire to pretend to rape someone - just as their partner desires to be pretend-raped without any implication that they desire to be actually raped. Most importantly, though, perversion is not identical to morally impermissible sex: while all perverted sex is morally wrong, not all morally wrong sex is perverted. [Extracted from the article]

Consequently, if to justify PIDE a neutral state claims that everyone is better off not being deaf, then, a neutral state would also be claiming that Deaf persons are mistaken about what they think "better off" means. And like Guy Kahane - who sympathizes with the idea of deafness as a harm - one would have to say that Larissa's parents have a "morally awry" attitude because they desired to harm Larissa and keep her in a harmful state (Kahane [24], 200). Appealing to autonomy as a neutral state would, one could claim - without claiming that deafness is or is not a harm - that it is not morally permissible to deafen a child because the child should make her own decisions and value judgments about deafness when she becomes an adult. Similarly, if a neutral state attempts to use the "lower quality of life" claim, such state would be claiming that deafness is a condition that necessarily diminishes a person's quality of life. [Extracted from the article]

B Sally Haslanger b is Ford Professor of Philosophy and Women's and Gender Studies at MIT. B Hilkje C. Hänel b is Assistant Professor of Political Theory at Potsdam University and Visiting Professor of Philosophy at the University of Oldenburg, Germany. She specializes in philosophy of mind and language, and philosophy of gender, race and sexuality. [Extracted from the article]

The article discusses the concept of self-awareness involved in group activities and individualism. It talks about the social theory collective self-awareness involved in individuals and their interactions among themselves. It tells about the criticism surrounding attitude involved in group activities along with self-awareness and self-knowledge.

The article discusses the concept of groups and individualism while maintaining self-awareness. It talks about the understanding of beliefs, desires and intentions of people involved in groups rather than as an individuals. It tells about the social theory of representation when working along with a group which differs when working as an individuals.

The article discusses the concepts of social philosophy behind human cognition, coordination and group activities. It talks about the importance of socialization in understanding the emotions and feelings of humans. It tells about the intentions involved behind the idea of cooperation and the beliefs maintained by people.

B Janna Thompson b is the author of I Taking Responsibility for the Past: Reparation and Historical Injustice i , I Intergenerational Justice: Rights and Responsibilities in an Intergenerational Polity i ; and other books and articles on intergenerational and global justice, environmental ethics and politics, and memory and heritage. He works mainly on issues in contemporary moral and political philosophy, especially those relating to ideal and non-ideal theory, political feasibility, linguistic justice, public reason, and public deliberation more generally. B Kenneth Shockley, b the Holmes Rolston III Endowed Chair in Environmental Ethics and Philosophy, is Professor of Philosophy and Affiliate Faculty in the School of Global Environmental Sustainability at Colorado State University. [Extracted from the article]

The article discusses papers on social philosophy within this issue including one on relational autonomy and another on European citizenship.

The article focuses on the need of scrutiny from social philosophers, animal ethicists, and other theorists of food with the food distribution for the food for human consumption and not for nonhuman animal (NHA) companions. It mentions that issue for animal right regarding the slaughter for human consumption. It also mentions that problems posed by carnivorous companions in a political community with the exploitation of NHAs for food.

The article shares the author's perspectives regarding the benefit of advance reasoning and planning capacities of an individual. The author mentions the factors of argument for obligation incldes coercive rulers on legitimacy, knowledge on basic reasoning and developmental knowledge on liberal philosophy. The author also outlines the importance of liberalism, legitimacy and coercion in social philosophy.

The article presents a study on the literature about abortion and the question whether the fetus should be considered as a person and be assigned human rights and moral status. The author discusses both sides of the argument, that of treating fetus as a person and that the fetus can be a person only to the extent that it develops a connection and history with other persons. The meaning of pregnancy and impact of pregnancy loss are also discussed.

The article discusses a study on miscarriages and the moral side of permissibility of abortion and person-denying. The study deals with the moral aspects of fetal killing and the emotional aspects of fetal death. It discusses the moral permissibility of person denying and person affirming. It also mentions the lack of ability of the fetus to self defend.

The article discusses the impact of miscarriages on a woman. The author mentions human pregnancy as purposeful rather than biological and discusses the preparations a pregnant lady make before arrival of the baby including clothes and nursery and sometimes even college fund. The article also mentions special status the society accredits to a carrying woman. The psychological effects of miscarriage on the woman, the family and society and the sense of loss experienced are discussed.

The article discusses the concept of the choice sensitibity, focusing on the liberal resourcists theories of advantge. It considers liberal resourcism to hold that intrapersonal ranings of the advantage of resource bundles must agree with the person's intrapersonal well-being ranking. It outlines the fundamental problem of liberal resourcism and discusses possible solutions.

The article presents the author's view about the commitment to equality of options. The author asks whether the commitment can be grounded in the need to prevent agents from making choices that fail to give due weight to the interest of others. He argues that egalitarians must reject such a rationale because the rationale is in conflict with the egalitarian commitment to equality of options.

In this article the author give response to John Christman for thoughtful and stimulating discussions on the compatibility between liberty and equality. He states about the social philosophy that concerns our relations with other people and the two reasons for interpersonal transactions which includes inconsistency in social principles and reason to refrain the agreed principles.

The article offers information on the role of precautionary principle in social philosophy. It states that precautionary principle is fundamentally a principle born in the context of public policy and includes in a framework that provide a policy which permits action that raises the prospect of a threat of harm to others. It also discusses on principles as an interface rule and moral rule and provide justification for precautionary principle.

In this article the author explores the meaning and importance of public value perfectionism (PVP) in political authority. He explains the neutralist framework and attempts to reach a reconciliation between perfectionism and neutrality. He also discusses the three types of neutrality including scope, target, and strength and explains about the negative and positive requirements needed for neutrality of justification.

The article discusses the characteristics of virtuous persons in relation to the principles of a social role. It explores the key features of the neo-Aristotelian account of right action epitomizing the attributes of a virtuous individual as claimed by ethicist Rosalind Hursthouse. It also attempts to determine the right action in the context of a certain social role as it relates to the neo-Aristotelian virtue ethical terms.

The article focuses on racial classification based from the cognitive accounts of racial thinking. It says that racial cognition is culturally and historically local wherein variation in racial belief is based on ways of individuating race. It says that many social theorists view that racial belief is the result of the mistaken belief that races are biological kinds. It adds that evolutionary cognitive program can clarify some real-world phenomena concerning race.

The article focuses on developing a relational approach to autonomy that restricts normative authority over decisions of import in practical identity and in relations of intersubjective recognition. It talks about a relational approach to the principle of respect for autonomy and argues on the implications of respect for agents whose autonomy is impaired. Two examples from health-care contexts are discussed in order to illustrate the problems arising from debates about autonomy within moral psychology and about the normative requirement to respect another's autonomy.

The article focuses on the justification of criticisms against privacy norms. It talks about the relativity of privacy and the contradictory norms concerning its justification within their respective contexts. The interpretations of arguments on criticisms showing that the second class of privacy-limiting acts committed by others are too large or too narrow are discussed. The article also explores the relationship between harm and certain privacy-limiting acts and the typical reasons for the lack of privacy.

An essay is presented on the varieties of agonism on social and political thought. It offers several discussions related to theorizing conflict in social and political life, while distinguishing synagonism from other agonistic approaches. The author emphasizes the need for synagonism and concludes that the theory is something collective and political which conceptualizes human being not only as social, but also as political.