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This article advocates for the production of stipulative definitions of religion, a type of nominal definition that articulates new ways of applying a word to a thing. I propose that scholars look to sites where phenomena historically have been labeled “religion” on lexical or real understandings of the term, this to query how religious agents there chose, implicitly or explicitly, to systematize thought, speech, emotion, and action. Such self-consciously ordered systems, I argue, may properly be labeled “religion.” Next, I apply this method to premodern South Asia, suggesting “religion” refers to the second-order structuring there that links normative social relations to normative states of subjectivity, any innovation in the one demanding innovation in the other. I conclude by inviting other efforts at stipulative definition, all with an eye toward an inductive approach, allowing that the myriad locations of religion present mutually distinguishable systems that may all properly be so labeled.

The issues of definition and theory of Religion continue to be of fundamental importance to Religious Studies. The present essay argues that it is possible (a) to set forth a definition of the term Religion (b) whose analytic components can be construed as systemic "terms" (c) which can then be studied from the perspective of various relations so that all of the important issues in the field of Religious Studies can be exhibited in a systematic manner. Such a systematic clarification could prove useful in constructing a theory or theories of Religion, and it is in this sense that the analysis set forth in this presentation can be taken as "prolegomenon to a theory of Religion." The essay emphasizes the importance of synthetic, conceptual constructs in Religious Studies and attempts to clarify intensional and extensional levels of analysis in our field. Utilizing the theoretical work of L. Wittgenstein, J. L. Austin, and Umberto Eco's A Theory of Semiotics, the following definitions are proposed. Religion is a 'complete system of human communication' (or a 'form of life) showing in primarily 'commissive,' 'behabitive,' and 'exercitive' modes how a community comports itself when it encounters an 'untranscendable negation of. . . possibilities.' Religious Studies is a 'complete system of human communication' (or a 'form of life) showing in primarily 'verdictive' and 'expositive' modes how a community interprets the relations between and within the intension of Religion and its extension. Religions are the class of "entities" to which the term Religion may be applied. The essay suggests that the "referent" of the intensional definition of Religion is essentially negative and that the "referent" of Religious Studies is the "referent" of the "referent" of Religion. Gerald James Larson is Professor in the Department of Religious Studies, University of California, Santa Barbara. His writings include Classical Sidmkhya: An Interpretation of its History and Meaning (Delhi, 1969), soon to be issued in a second revised edition by the University of California Press; and (as editor and contributor) Myth in Indo-European Antiquity (UC Press, 1974). He is also currently editing the Aids to the Study of Religion series of the American Academy of Religion.

Imagine, if you will, a philosopher with the following accomplishments: By 1896, he had established himself as a member of America's high aesthetic tradition of spirituality, joining the likes of Jonathan Edwards, Ralph Waldo Emerson, and William James. By 1900, he had developed a novel, comparative basis for reflection on religious aspirations, had become one of the first major American critics to extricate his judgments from the confines of American spiritual exceptionalism, and had established the basis for a constructionist view of theological method. By 1906, he had articulated all the characteristics of Geertz's 1966 definition of religion as a cultural system and was recognized by a broad spectrum of American intellectuals as one of America's best intellectual statesmen or moralists since Emerson. By 1913, he had developed the core criticisms of liberalism, optimism, and the idea of progress announced over twenty years later in such works as The Church Against the World. By 1922, he had developed a philosophy that was religious by virtue of its structure as a discipline, not by virtue of beliefs per se. By 1923, he had given as developed a pragmatic account of knowledge as James's or Dewey's and a devastating criticism of foundationalist philosophy.1

INTERPRET my invitation to address the American Academy of Religion on the definition of its key concept, religion, as an opportunity to exercise several of what I believe to be my philosophical responsibilities. In this paper I reject, therefore, the currently popular view of the philosopher as technician, restricted in his proper function to the clarification of linguistic meanings. This technical role is indeed one of my important responsibilities, but the "love of wisdom" involves far more than technique. In what follows three sections correspond to my three primary aims for this occasion. First, I have an apologetic aim: to defend the very enterprise of definition-making, particularly the enterprise of defining religion, against several significant criticisms. Second, I have a constructive and critical aim: to sketch out a definition of religion, briefly explain it, test it, and show some of its uses. And third, I have a frankly hortatory aim: I want what I say to make a fruitful difference, both among inquirers in the fields concerned with religion and outside them. I intend, therefore, to close with an appeal to this body to take a vitally required initiative in ending the present state of conceptual chaos engulfing studies about religion.

dreams in their blind outreach for help. The challenge to intelligent educated religious men and women who assume the role of religious leadership is humbling. In one generation we have seen two world wars, and some think another greater world conflict is yet beyond the horizon. Many careful thinkers fear more the coming problems of peace, or an armistice, than the difficulties of a global war. What are we as religious leaders, in our varied undertakings, doing to change world conditions, so that men and women, boys and girls, may have reasons for hope? The seminary is just one school among many on a modern university campus, ignored for the most part by those who are busy in the other schools and departments. The church is one type of organization among many in our modern society, and has few inter-relationships with the others. People deal with religious ideas and practices as if they were inconsequental addenda to the rest of life or unimportant relics of an outgrown age. Leadership is measured by one's following and the accomplishments of one's undertakings. Many religious leaders are discouraged and depressed. What is wrong? What can be done to change the situation? First of all we should be glad if Biblical scholars would help us as religious educators to identify religion, and to find examples of religion in action. There are many illustrations in the records of ancient days of religion becoming decadent and corrupt in the temples and in the established practices. Yet the vital leavening power of religion has never died. It was frequently found where least expected, and a better form of religion arose out of the ashes of the old. Will the Biblical scholars tell us what they think of a functional definition of religion? Do we have good precedent and justification for trying to shift the focus of attention from doctrines and ceremonial