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In recent years a substantial body of research findings (based almost solely on responses to the Dilemmas-of-Choice instrument as the measure of risk), commonly referred to as the "risky shift" phenomenon, has suggested that groups take greater risks than individuals. This interpretation, if generalizable. would replace the commonly held belief that groups make decisions that are more conservative than. or the average of, individual decisions. This paper examines, empirically and analytically, some major limitations of the generalizability of the risky shift phenomenon. The major concerns of this paper are analysis of (1) the conventional method of statistically analyzing the data generated in risky shift studies, and (2) the measure of risk almost universally used by investigators of the risky shift phenomenon. In order to accomplish this task several experiments were designed. The conventional statistic used in the risky shift literature is analyzed and inferences appropriate to it are explored. The conventional test supports the risky shift findings. A revised measurement scale and alternative statistical testing procedures are discussed. The revised scale permits a continuum of response rather than the discrete choices permitted with the Dilemmas-of-Choice instrument. Results using the alternative methods of statistical analysis and the revised scale are presented. These results do not support the previous findings that groups accept a level of risk significantly greater than that acceptable to the average group member deciding alone. These findings strongly suggest that generalization of the risky shift phenomenon may be limited to individuals and groups using the Dilemmas-of-Choice instrument as the measure of risk. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The following paper examines the application of the principles of operant conditioning to the prediction of individual behavior in an organizational setting. The review centers about the extended operant conditioning model of Jablonsky and DeVries (Organizational Behavior and Human Performance, 1972, 7, 340-358). Conceptual errors, such as in an incorrect application of negative reinforcement and an incomplete operant conditioning framework are discussed. Several suggestions for future models are given. Examines the application of the principles of operant conditioning to the prediction of individual behavior in an organizational setting. Review centering on the extended operant conditioning model of Jablonsky and DeVries; Discussion of conceptual errors. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper develops the hypothesis that hierarchical structure and external control in organizations are antecedent variables leading to low achievement, low creativity, and high aggression. An intervening variables of belief systems is postulated and a consistency motivational hypothesis is suggested. Data supportive of the hypothesis is reviewed and implications are suggested. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper describes a normative-descriptive strategy for cognitive research. In a set of illustrative experiments based on models from physics, subjects were asked to judge the positions and weights necessary to maintain equilibrium in mechanical displays of varying complexity. Whenever possible subjects' judgments were accounted for through the appropriate normative models; otherwise descriptive models were generated from the normative models and from the results of the other experiments. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The present paper is concerned with the development of efficient signs or symbols for use in visual communication. In particular, it describes and illustrates a technique for generating such signs, and presents a series of experiments undertaken to evaluate this technique. Although the application of these methods was limited to a specialized set of concepts (military intelligence terms), and the test experiments for signs developed were highly selective, it was believed that the principles involved have implications for several rather divergent areas of psychology which share an interest in language and communication. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper summarizes and integrates research concerned with a long-neglected topic in psychology: the relationship between conscious goals and intentions and task performance. The basic premise of this research is that an individual's conscious ideas regulate his actions. Studies are cited demonstrating that: (1) hard goals produce a higher level of performance (output) than easy goals; (2) specific hard goals produce a higher level of output than a goal of "do your best"; and (3) behavioral intentions regulate choice behavior. The theory also views goals and intentions as mediators of the effects of incentives on task performance. Evidence is presented supporting the view that monetary incentives, time limits, and knowledge of results do not affect performance level independently of the individual's goals and intentions. A theoretical analysis supports the same view with respect to three other incentives: participation, competition, and praise and re- proof. Finally, behavioral intentions were found to mediate the effects of money and "verbal reinforcement" on choice behavior. It is concluded that any adequate theory of task motivation must take account of the individual's conscious goals and intentions. The applied implications of the theory are discussed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Part I of this paper is a review of the literature concerning the effects of culture on cognition. The relevance of these studies to interpersonal relations in international organizations is explored. A number of broad hypotheses are suggested. At a more specific level three hypotheses are presented. In the case of high-status visitors working in a low-status culture: (1), the visitor's stereotype of the hosts will be negative; (2) the visitor's stereotype of the host culture will be more negative than the stereotype of members of the visitor's culture who have not come into face-to-face relationships with the host culture; and (3) the stereotype of the hosts toward the visitors will be negative, but will also reflect the presumed higher competence of the visitors. Part II reports a study which supports these hypotheses. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper argues that organizational researchers should study triads and the process of coalition formation more intensely since triads contain several organizational properties that are not found in smaller groups. A triad task is proposed that offsets many shortcomings of previous tasks used to study three person groups. Procedural variations and psychological properties of the task are discussed as are reformulations of traditional issues in triad theory that seem feasible given the properties of the triad task. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The following four papers are modified versions of papers delivered in a symposium titled "The Role of Financial Compensation in Managerial Motivation" held during the Spring, 1965 meetings of the Midwestern Psychological Association. Dunnette presents an instrumental model of managerial motivation and discusses its implications for research on the motivational effects of compensation. He also reviews research related to Preferences (motives) most often found to be salient for managers. Lawler summarizes previous research on the effects of secret salary policies on manager satisfaction and presents results of another recent study showing that policies of pay secrecy have several costs not generally recognized. Secrecy apparently blurs managers' perceptions of what others earn; they overestimate the salaries of peers and of subordinates and this can lead to greater pay dissatisfaction and the belief that job performance is rather unimportant in determining pay. Weick reviews the psychological literature bearing on the effects of insufficient rewards on the intensity of effort. He reviews evidence in support of the relationship, postulates several properties of experimental procedures to explain the effects, and suggests that propositions from frustration or cue-utilization theory may afford the most parsimonious explanation of the relationship. Finally, Opsahl provides an overview of current, knowledge about managerial compensation and its effect on managerial job behavior, and suggests areas in need of further intensive research. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]