28 results
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2. Attribution and Explanation in Relativism.
- Author
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Rattan, Gurpreet
- Subjects
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RELATIVITY , *FAITH , *LANGUAGE & languages , *KNOWLEDGE management - Abstract
Is relativism a coherent thesis? The paper argues for a new view of relativism that opposes both classic and contemporary views. On this view, the thesis of relativism is coherent even if the key notions in the standard apparatus of relativism—of alternative conceptual schemes, relative truth, perspectival content—are all incoherent. The view defended here highlights issues about attitude attribution and explanation in formulating the thesis of relativism and it proposes a surprising connection between relativism and nonsense. The paper argues further that the thesis of relativism, so understood, is coherent, by considering different accounts of the semantics of attitude attributions in their application to the attribution of nonsensical thinking. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2024
- Full Text
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3. Ockham on Memory and the Metaphysics of Human Persons.
- Author
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Toland, Susan Brower
- Subjects
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METAPHYSICS , *THEORY of self-knowledge , *RESURRECTION , *HYLOMORPHISM - Abstract
This paper explores William Ockham's account of memory with a view to understanding its implications for his account of the nature and persistence of human beings. I show that Ockham holds a view according to which memory (i) is a type of self-knowledge and (ii) entails the existence of an enduring psychological subject. This is significant when taken in conjunction with his account of the afterlife. For, Ockham holds that during the interim state—namely, after bodily death, but prior to bodily resurrection—we retain and recall our embodied experiences. This entails that the subject of our embodied psychological states can survive in a disembodied state and continue to engage in characteristic rational activities—a claim that appears to run against Ockham's own commitment to a hylomorphic conception of human beings (as essentially material). A central aim of this paper is to explore the prospects for reconciling Ockham's account of interim memory with his account of human beings. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2024
- Full Text
- View/download PDF
4. Degrees of Epistemic Criticizability.
- Author
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Boult, Cameron
- Subjects
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EPISTEMICS , *NORMATIVITY (Ethics) , *RESPONSIBILITY , *OPERATIONAL definitions - Abstract
We regularly make graded normative judgements in the epistemic domain. Recent work in the literature examines degrees of justification , degrees of rationality , and degrees of assertability. This paper addresses a different dimension of the gradeability of epistemic normativity, one that has been given little attention. How should we understand degrees of epistemic criticizability ? In virtue of what sorts of factors can one epistemic failing be worse than another? The paper develops a dual-factor view of degrees of epistemic criticizability. According to the view, degrees of epistemic criticizability are (i) an inverse function of degrees of doxastic justification and (ii) a function of degrees of agent culpability. The paper develops an account of each factor, and explains how they should be weighted. The paper also addresses the importance of modelling degrees of epistemic criticizability in a broader context. I focus on the role that such a model can play in the ethics of epistemic criticism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2024
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5. Friends with the Good: Moral Relativism and Moral Progress.
- Author
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Pérez-Navarro, Eduardo
- Subjects
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MORAL relativism , *OBJECTIVISM (Philosophy) , *PUBLIC opinion , *FRIENDSHIP , *SOCIAL context - Abstract
The aim of this paper is to defend moral relativism from the accusation that it would make it irrational to classify past changes in public opinion as instances of moral progress, for they would constitute an improvement only from our current point of view. The argument is this. For our assessment of a change in public opinion as an instance of moral progress to be rational, we need to take the moral claims made before the change to be false simpliciter while being open to the possibility that we ourselves change our minds at some point. These two things can be made compatible if we construe moral relativism as taking the truth of moral claims to be relative to the context of assessment. Thus understood, moral relativism is in fact the only view that makes room for talk of moral progress, as the rest of candidate positions make it irrational. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2024
- Full Text
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6. The Unity of Perceptual Content.
- Author
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Reiland, Indrek
- Subjects
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REPRESENTATION (Philosophy) , *REALISM , *PHENOMENOLOGY , *PHILOSOPHERS - Abstract
Representationalists hold that perceptual experience is a conscious representational state with content, something which is accurate or inaccurate in certain conditions. The most common version of Representationalism takes perceptual content to be singular in the object-place and otherwise consisting of attribution of properties (Singularism/Attributionism). Schellenberg has recently developed a version on which perceptual content is singular even in the property-place in containing a de re mode of presentation of a property-instance (Particularism). In this paper, I show that Particularism faces a version of the problem of the Unity of Perceptual Content. Namely, its supporters haven't told us how objects can be bound together with property-instances into a content such that it represents them and has accuracy-conditions. Furthermore, I argue that Particularists face an in-principle obstacle in solving it. In contrast, Attributionists can solve the problem and that establishes their view as the only game in town. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2024
- Full Text
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7. Group Responsibility and Historicism.
- Author
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Collins, Stephanie and Haan, Niels de
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HISTORICISM , *SOCIAL responsibility of business , *PHILOSOPHERS , *METHODOLOGY - Abstract
In this paper, we focus on the moral responsibility of organized groups in light of historicism. Historicism is the view that any morally responsible agent must satisfy certain historical conditions, such as not having been manipulated. We set out four examples involving morally responsible organized groups that pose problems for existing accounts of historicism. We then pose a trilemma: one can reject group responsibility, reject historicism, or revise historicism. We pursue the third option. We formulate a Manipulation Condition and a Guarding Condition as addendums to historicism that are necessary to accommodate our cases of group responsibility. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2024
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8. Transparency and the Mindfulness Opacity Hypothesis.
- Author
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Lange, Victor and Grünbaum, Thor
- Subjects
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MINDFULNESS , *HYPOTHESIS , *EXPERIMENTAL philosophy , *REPRESENTATION (Philosophy) , *CLINICAL psychology - Abstract
Many philosophers endorse the Transparency Thesis, the claim that by introspection one cannot become aware of one's experience. Recently, some authors have suggested that the Transparency Thesis is challenged by introspective states reached under mindfulness. We label this the Mindfulness Opacity Hypothesis. The present paper develops the hypothesis in important new ways. First, we motivate the hypothesis by drawing on recent clinical psychology and cognitive science of mindfulness. Secondly, we develop the hypothesis by describing the implied shift in experiential perspective, the scope of introspectable qualities, and the level of skill. Thirdly, we defend the hypothesis against various philosophical arguments. We conclude that the Mindfulness Opacity Hypothesis is empirically and theoretically well motivated and supported. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2024
- Full Text
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9. A Fitting Definition of Epistemic Emotions.
- Author
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Deigan, Michael and Glasscock, Juan S Piñeros
- Subjects
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EMOTIONS , *EPISTEMICS , *PSYCHOLOGISTS , *ANXIETY , *COGNITIVE ability - Abstract
Philosophers and psychologists sometimes categorize emotions like surprise and curiosity as specifically epistemic. Is there some reasonably unified and interesting class of emotions here? If so, what unifies it? This paper proposes and defends an evaluative account of epistemic emotions: What it is to be an epistemic emotion is to have fittingness conditions that distinctively involve some epistemic evaluation. We argue that this view has significant advantages over alternative proposals and is a promising way to identify a limited and interesting class of emotions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2024
- Full Text
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10. Are Humans the Only Rational Animals?
- Author
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Melis, Giacomo and Monsó, Susana
- Subjects
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HUMAN-animal relationships , *COMPARATIVE psychology , *THEORY of knowledge , *BELIEF & doubt , *PHILOSOPHERS - Abstract
While growing empirical evidence suggests a continuity between human and non-human psychology, many philosophers still think that only humans can act and form beliefs rationally. In this paper, we challenge this claim. We first clarify the notion of rationality. We then focus on the rationality of beliefs and argue that, in the relevant sense , humans are not the only rational animals. We do so by first distinguishing between unreflective and reflective responsiveness to epistemic reasons in belief formation and revision. We argue that unreflective responsiveness is clearly within the reach of many animals. We then defend that a key demonstration of reflective responsiveness would be the ability to respond to undermining defeaters. We end by presenting some empirical evidence that suggests that some animal species are capable of processing these defeaters, which would entail that even by the strictest standards, humans are not the only rational animals. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2024
- Full Text
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11. A Deductive Solution to the Generalisation Problem for Horwich's Minimalism about Truth.
- Author
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Busse, Ralf
- Subjects
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MINIMALISM (Literature) , *TRUTH , *THEORY of knowledge , *SEMANTICS , *GENERALIZATION - Abstract
Minimalism is the view that our concept of truth is constituted by our disposition to accept instances of the truth schema 'The proposition that p is true if and only if p'. The generalisation problem is the challenge to account for universal generalisations concerning logical truths such as 'Every proposition of the form 〈if p, then p〉 is true'. This paper argues that such generalisations can be deduced using a single example of the logical truth in question and a single corresponding instance of the truth schema, employing the logical method of reasoning with arbitrary instances of universal and existential generalisations. Suggesting an inferentialist construal of Minimalism, the paper introduces conditional and general acceptance dispositions, distinguishes inferential meaning constitution from implicit definition, highlights the inferential nature of acceptance of instances of the truth schema, sketches a suitable account of structured propositions, compares higher-order with first-order means of quantification, and argues that the conception of truth Minimalism attributes to ordinary speakers is essentially inferential. It finally applies the deductive strategy to generalisations concerning logical validity as well as more complex logical truths. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2024
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12. Prudential Problems for the Counterfactual Comparative Account of Harm and Benefit.
- Author
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Carlson, Erik, Johansson, Jens, and Risberg, Olle
- Subjects
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COUNTERFACTUALS (Logic) , *PRUDENCE , *WELL-being , *PLAUSIBILITY (Logic) , *COMPARATIVE studies - Abstract
In this paper, we put forward two novel arguments against the counterfactual comparative account (CCA) of harm and benefit. In both arguments, the central theme is that CCA conflicts with plausible judgements about benefit and prudence. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2024
- Full Text
- View/download PDF
13. Necessarily Veridical Hallucinations: A New Problem for the Uninstantiated Property View.
- Author
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Gow, Laura
- Subjects
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HALLUCINATIONS , *REPRESENTATION (Philosophy) , *REALISM , *METAPHYSICS , *PHILOSOPHICAL analysis - Abstract
Philosophers of perception have a notoriously difficult time trying to account for hallucinatory experiences. One surprisingly quite popular move, and one that cross-cuts the representationalism/relationalism divide, is to say that hallucinations involve an awareness of uninstantiated properties. In this paper, I provide a new argument against this view. Not only are its proponents forced to classify many hallucinations as veridical, such experiences turn out to be necessarily veridical. In addition, I show that representationalists who endorse the uninstantiated property view must reject the common fundamental kind claim and adopt disjunctivism, and naïve realists/relationalists must radically modify their disjunctivism: The distinction between 'veridical' and 'hallucinatory' will no longer track a metaphysical distinction between the relevant experiences. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2024
- Full Text
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14. What is Structural Rationality?
- Author
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Lee, Wooram
- Subjects
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COHERENCE (Philosophy) , *REASON , *VIRTUES , *NORMATIVITY (Ethics) - Abstract
The normativity of so-called 'coherence' or 'structural' requirements of rationality has been hotly debated in recent years. However, relatively little has been said about the nature of structural rationality, or what makes a set of attitudes structurally irrational, if structural rationality is not ultimately a matter of responding correctly to reasons. This paper develops a novel account of incoherence (or structural irrationality), critically examining Alex Worsnip's recent account. It first argues that Worsnip's account both over-generates and under-generates incoherent patterns of attitudes, and then proposes an alternative that both avoids these problems and captures a crucial insight behind Worsnip's account. According to this account, a set of attitudes is incoherent just in case having all of the attitudes in that set is incompatible with reacting to a question in a way that one is, in virtue of having the attitudes, committed to. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2024
- Full Text
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15. Metacontexts and Cross-Contextual Communication: Stabilizing the Content of Documents Across Contexts.
- Author
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Davies, Alex
- Subjects
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SOCIAL movements , *BUREAUCRACY , *INFRASTRUCTURE (Economics) , *SEXUAL harassment , *COUNTERFACTUALS (Logic) - Abstract
Context-sensitive expressions appear ill suited to the purpose of sharing content across contexts. Yet we regularly use them to that end (in regulations, textbooks, memos, guidelines, laws, minutes, etc.). This paper describes the utility of the concept of a metacontext for understanding cross-contextual content-sharing with context-sensitive expressions. A metacontext is the context of a group of contexts: an infrastructure that can channel non-linguistic incentives on content ascription so as to homogenize the content ascribed to context-sensitive expressions in each context in the group. Documents composed of context-sensitive expressions can share content across contexts when supported by an appropriate metacontext. The bible has its church, the textbook its education system, the form its bureaucracy, and the manifesto its social movement. Some metacontexts support cross-contextual content-sharing. Some don't. A promising research programme (one with practical importance) would take metacontexts as its unit of analysis. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2024
- Full Text
- View/download PDF
16. Failure and Success in Agency.
- Author
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Heering, David
- Subjects
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PHILOSOPHICAL analysis , *AGENCY theory , *NORMATIVITY (Ethics) - Abstract
Agency often consists in performing actions and engaging in activities that are successful. We pour glasses, catch objects, carry things, recite poems, and play instruments. It has therefore seemed tempting in recent philosophical thinking to conceptualise the relationship between our agentive abilities and our successes as follows: (Success) S is exercising their ability to ϕ only if S successfully ϕ-s. This paper argues that (Success) is false based on the observation that agency also often consists in making mistakes. We bungle things. We spill water, we miss objects thrown at us, we drop things, misremember lines, and mess up songs. I argue that these mistakes, doings that fall short of being a φ-ing, can only be understood as subpar exercises of the ability to φ. Since this understanding is incompatible with (Success), the thesis should be given up. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2024
- Full Text
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17. ON LIVING THE TESTIMONIAL SCEPTIC'S LIFE: CAN TESTIMONIAL SCEPTICISM BE DISMISSED?
- Author
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Keren, Arnon
- Subjects
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SKEPTICISM , *TESTIMONY (Theory of knowledge) , *REDUCTIONISM , *JUSTIFICATION (Theory of knowledge) , *PHILOSOPHERS - Abstract
Within the contemporary epistemology of testimony, it is widely assumed that testimonial scepticism can be dismissed without engaging with possible reasons or arguments supporting the view. This assumption of dismissibility both underlies the debate between reductionist and non-reductionist views of testimony and is responsible for the neglect of testimonial scepticism within contemporary epistemology. This paper argues that even given liberal assumptions about what may constitute valid grounds for the dismissal of a sceptical view, the assumption that testimonial scepticism is dismissible should be rejected. For even if familiar sceptical positions and scepticism about testimonial justification can be dismissed on such grounds, scepticism about testimonial knowledge cannot. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2024
- Full Text
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18. The Later Wittgenstein on Expressive Moral Judgements.
- Author
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Fairhurst, Jordi
- Subjects
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EXPRESSIVISM (Ethics) , *LITERARY recreations , *PHILOSOPHERS , *ETHICS , *PRESUPPOSITION (Logic) - Abstract
This paper shows that Wittgenstein's later explorations of the meaning of expressive moral judgements reach far deeper than has so far been noticed. It is argued that an adequate description of the meaning of expressive moral judgements requires engaging in a grammatical investigation that focuses on three interwoven components within specific language-games. First, the ethical reactions expressed by moral words and the additional purpose they may fulfil. Second, the features of the actions which are bound up with moral words and are constitutive of our moral evaluations. And, finally, the forms of life in which expressive moral judgements and moral language-games are embedded. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2024
- Full Text
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19. Pain Linguistics: A Case for Pluralism.
- Author
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Coninx, Sabrina, Willemsen, Pascale, and Reuter, Kevin
- Subjects
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PLURALISM , *SEMANTICS , *PAIN , *LINGUISTICS , *LANGUAGE & languages - Abstract
The most common approach to understanding the semantics of the concept of pain is third-person thought experiments. By contrast, the most frequent and most relevant uses of the folk concept of pain are from a first-person perspective in conversational settings. In this paper, we use a set of linguistic tools to systematically explore the semantics of what people communicate when reporting pain from a first-person perspective. Our results suggest that only a pluralistic view can do justice to the way we talk about pain from a first-person perspective: The semantic content of the folk concept of pain consists of information about both an unpleasant feeling and a disruptive bodily state. Pain linguistics thus provides new insights into ordinary pain language and poses an interesting challenge to the dominant unitary views of pain. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2024
- Full Text
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20. Closing the Conceptual Gap in Epistemic Injustice.
- Author
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Fürst, Martina
- Subjects
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JUSTICE , *THEORY of knowledge , *HERMENEUTICS , *CATEGORIES (Philosophy) , *PHENOMENALISM - Abstract
Miranda Fricker's insightful work on epistemic injustice discusses two forms of epistemic injustice—testimonial injustice and hermeneutical injustice. Hermeneutical injustice occurs when the victim lacks the interpretative resources to make sense of her experience, and this lacuna can be traced down to a structural injustice. In this paper, I provide one model of how to fill the conceptual gap in hermeneutical injustice. First, I argue that the victims possess conceptual resources to make sense of their experiences, namely phenomenal concepts. Second, I show how one might work the way up in a two-step process from a subjective, phenomenal concept to a novel, public concept. Finally, I discuss the conditions that have to be met for this process to be successful. The resulting model shows a way how the victims might alleviate hermeneutical injustice by developing novel concepts, given that the dominant group does not care about their predicament. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2024
- Full Text
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21. Can Civic Friendship Ground Public Reason?
- Author
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Billingham, Paul and Taylor, Anthony
- Subjects
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POWER (Social sciences) , *PHILOSOPHERS , *POLITICAL community , *PLURALISM , *THEORY of knowledge - Abstract
Public reason views hold that the exercise of political power must be acceptable to all reasonable citizens. A growing number of philosophers argue that this reasonable acceptability principle (RAP) can be justified by appealing to the value of civic friendship. They claim that a valuable form of political community can only be achieved among the citizens of pluralistic societies if they refrain from appealing to controversial ideals and values when justifying the exercise of political power to one another. This paper argues against such accounts. In order to justify RAP, one must explain and defend a conception of reasonableness. Civic friendship is unfit to perform this task, rendering it unable to ground public reason alone. Meanwhile, pluralist views that combine civic friendship with other considerations in order to specify RAP either fail or make civic friendship a spare wheel in the argument for public reason. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2024
- Full Text
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22. Assertion and Certainty.
- Author
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Dinges, Alexander
- Subjects
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ASSERTION (Linguistics) , *CERTAINTY , *THEORY of knowledge , *MOORE'S paradox , *LANGUAGE & logic - Abstract
Assertions have a curious relationship to certainty. On the one hand, it seems clear that we can assert many everyday propositions while not being absolutely certain about them. On the other hand, it seems odd to say things like 'p, but I am not absolutely certain that p'. In this paper, I aim to solve this conundrum. I suggest a pretense theory of assertion, according to which assertions of p are proposals to act as if the conversational participants were absolutely certain of p. I suggest that this explains why absolute certainty is not required to make assertions, while it is still problematic to voice your uncertainties once you have made an assertion. By voicing your uncertainties, you thwart your very own proposal to act as if everybody was absolutely certain. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2024
- Full Text
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23. On the Epistemic Significance of Perceptual Structure.
- Author
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Alford-Duguid, Dominic
- Subjects
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PRESUPPOSITION (Logic) , *PARADIGM (Linguistics) , *JUSTIFICATION (Theory of knowledge) , *COGNITION , *SKEPTICISM - Abstract
Our awareness of the boundedness of the spatial sensory field—a paradigmatic structural feature of visual experience—possesses a distinctive epistemic role. Properly understood, this result undermines a widely assumed picture of how visual experience permits us to learn about the world. This paper defends an alternative picture in which visual experience provides at least two kinds of non-inferential justification for beliefs about the external world. Accommodating this justification in turn requires recognising a new way for visual experience to encode information about the world. Reflection upon the epistemic contribution of sensory experience's structural features thus forces us to revise our understanding of how perception, cognition, and the world fit together. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2024
- Full Text
- View/download PDF
24. Can We have Justified Beliefs about Fundamental Properties?
- Author
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Bradley, Darren
- Subjects
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METAPHYSICS , *THEORY of knowledge , *PROBABILITY theory , *SKEPTICISM , *BELIEF & doubt - Abstract
An attractive picture of the world is that some features are metaphysically fundamental and others are derivative, with the derivative features grounded in the fundamental features. But how do we have justified beliefs about which features are fundamental? What is the epistemology of fundamentality? I sketch a response in this paper. The guiding idea is that the same properties cause the same experiences. I argue that a probabilistic connection between epistemic fundamentality and metaphysical fundamentality is sufficient for justified beliefs about the metaphysically fundamental. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2024
- Full Text
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25. Rationality is Not Coherence.
- Author
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Heinzelmann, Nora
- Subjects
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COHERENCE (Philosophy) , *REASON , *INTENTION , *ETHICAL problems , *CONFLICT (Psychology) - Abstract
According to a popular account, rationality is a kind of coherence of an agent's mental states and, more specifically, a matter of fulfilling norms of coherence. For example, in order to be rational, an agent is required to intend to do what they judge they ought to and can do. This norm has been called 'Enkrasia'. Another norm requires that, ceteris paribus, an agent retain their intention over time. This has been called 'Persistence of Intention'. This paper argues that thus understood norms of rationality may at times conflict. More specifically, Enkrasia and Persistence of Intention may place demands on the agent that are impossible to fulfil. In these cases, the framework of requirements does not provide us with norms that make us rational. A rival account, according to which rationality is a kind of responsiveness to one's available reasons, can overcome the problem. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2024
- Full Text
- View/download PDF
26. Sense Perception and Mereological Nihilism.
- Author
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Brenner, Andrew
- Subjects
- *
WHOLE & parts (Philosophy) , *NIHILISM (Philosophy) , *PHILOSOPHERS , *PERCEPTION (Philosophy) , *SENSORY perception - Abstract
In the debate over the existence of composite objects, it is sometimes suggested that perceptual evidence justifies belief in composite objects. But it is almost never suggested that we are perceptually justified in believing in composite objects on the basis of the fact that the phenomenology of our perceptual experiences enables us to discriminate between situations where there are composite objects and situations where there are merely simples arranged composite object-wise. But while the thought that the phenomenology of our perceptual experiences cannot enable us to discriminate between situations where there are composite objects and situations where there are merely simples arranged composite object-wise is commonly taken for granted, it requires some defence, both in light of its importance in shaping the debate and in light of its recently coming under attack by a prominent philosopher of perception. In this paper, I offer such a defence. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2024
- Full Text
- View/download PDF
27. Syntax, Truth, and the Fate of Sentences.
- Author
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Collins, John
- Subjects
- *
SEMANTICS , *METAPHYSICS , *EPIPHENOMENALISM , *SYNTAX (Logic) , *TRUTH - Abstract
Truth appears to be a predicate of sentence-like structures. This raises the question of what a sentence is (or what it is to be sentence-like) such that it is truth-apt. A natural move is to treat sentences and truth-aptness as somehow conceptually or metaphysical coeval—made for each other. This resolution conflicts, however, with now standard approaches in syntactic theory that treat sentences as mere epiphenomena. Siding with the developments in syntax, the paper argues that truth-aptness properly belongs, not to sentences, but to clauses as structures that can be selected by verbs that specify truth-apt states. It is further argued that this arrangement is perfectly consistent with truth-conditional semantics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2024
- Full Text
- View/download PDF
28. An Argument from Proof Theory against Implicit Conventionalism.
- Author
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Golan, Rea
- Subjects
- *
PROOF theory , *LOGIC , *LINGUISTICS , *CRITICISM , *AUTHORS - Abstract
Conventionalism about logic is the view that logical principles hold in virtue of some linguistic conventions. According to explicit conventionalism , these conventions have to be stipulated explicitly. Explicit conventionalism is subject to a famous criticism by Quine, who accused it of leading to an infinite regress. In response to the criticism, several authors have suggested reconstructing conventionalism as implicit in our linguistic behaviour. In this paper, drawing on a distinction from proof theory between derivable and admissible rules, I argue that implicit conventionalism has not been stated in a sufficiently precise way, as it leaves open what one needs to say about admissible yet underivable rules. Moreover, it turns out that this challenge cannot be easily met, and that any attempt to meet the challenge makes conventionalism much less attractive a thesis. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2024
- Full Text
- View/download PDF
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