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The history of recent efforts to establish a science of international politics may be usefully viewed as elaborate glosses on David Hume's powerful philo sophical programme for resolving, reconciling or dissolving a variety of perspicuous dualities: the external and the internal, mind and body, reason and experience. Philosophers and historians of ideas still dispute the extent to which Hume succeeded but if one is to judge by the two leading 'scientific' research programmes1 for international politics?inductivism and na?ve falsifi cationism?these dualities are as unresolved as ever, with fatal consequences for the thesis of the unity of the sciences. For the failure to reconcile or other wise dissolve such divisions shows that, on the Humean view, there is at least one difference between the physical (or natural) sciences and the moral (or social) sciences: namely, that while the latter bear on the internal and external, the former are concerned primarily with the external. How much this difference matters and how the issue is avoided by the proponents of induc tivism and na?ve falsification is the subject matter of this paper. This paper will execute a three-step strategy. At step one, I shall examine the epistemological bases of inductivism and methodological falsificationism, finding them grossly inadequate and simplistic. At step two, I move to a discussion of these self-same methodologies but this time with a view to uncovering their metaphysical features. I shall find these inadequate, entailing excessive commitments to programmatic conceptions of the nature of the world. At step three, I shall recommend a commitment to rationality as a form of common sense and claim that political realism embodies such a commit ment. I shall argue that this commitment constitutes a kind of foundation for international relations which has certain attractive features notably absent from inductivism and na?ve falsification. And the conclusion will be not the red herring that the study of international politics is forever condemned to an inferior, unscientific status, but rather that, in being more felicitously construed as common sense rationality, international politics need no longer be terrorized by any self-imposed invidious distinction between it and, say, theoretical physics.

It is a characteristic of political theory and international politics that certain well worn stereotypes are perennially wheeled out for generations of students. Some of these may be useful landmarks for scholarship, others offer only partial insights. This paper addresses one of these stereotypes which does not dissolve with more intensive study. It attaches to the Hegelian concept of the state in relation to international politics. I refer to the view that Hegel's concept of the state, elaborated in the Philosophy of Right, is the final unit of analysis for any theory of international politics;1 that it is impossible to go beyond the nation state; that it possesses a finality in that international affairs are only to be understood through the relation between nation states. One of the conclusions which is sometimes drawn from this stereotype is that Hegel's account of international politics is Hobbesian in character; that is to say, the relation between states is rather like that between individuals in Hobbes' state of nature. The ruling principle would thus be that 'clubs are trumps' ; or, more conveniently, that might is right. For an Hegelian there cannot be a legitimate concept of international order, because order only exists in the individual state. Each state has its own legal system and concept of right, therefore the relationship between states is simply the conflict of rights. To put this in a moral perspective: states are neither right nor wrong; this is simply how things are. This has often led to the paradoxical conclusion that Hegel is a realist as regards international affairs, though perhaps a better term would be 'idealist-realist'. The aim of this paper is to examine the arguments for and against such a stereotype. The caricature presented above has a great deal of truth to it. There is an impressive body of arguments which can be marshalled in its support. However, what is often not realized is that there is a body of arguments which can show us a contrary perspective. Paradoxically, both sets of arguments can be supported from Hegel's existing writings. A similar ambiguity can be found in some of the writings of his disciples. This paper will attempt to marshall the arguments on both sides as clearly as possible. The cases are overall fairly evenly balanced; however, I will argue that ultimately the most consistent Hegelian position will

Programs to deploy weapons in orbital space have important implications for international relations. In this paper, we analyze the constitutive logic of three modes of space weaponization currently being pursued by the United States – space-based missile defense, space control, and force application from orbital space. We show that these technologies of killing, when bundled together, constitute a new form of centralized sovereign power in a context of de-territorialized sovereignty. This is a new type of international political society, which we call empire of the future, distinct from and more ominous than the de-centralized form of Empire theorized by Hardt and Negri and the modern expression of classical hegemony now widely debated in discussions of putative American empire.

Increasingly, International Relations (IR) theorists are drawing inspiration from a broad range of theorists outside the discipline. One thinks of the introduction of Antonio Gramsci's writings to IR theorists by Robert Cox, for example, and the ‘school’ that has developed in its wake. Similarly, the works of Anthony Giddens, Michel Foucault, and Jurgen Habermas are all relatively familiar to most IR theorists not because of their writings on world politics per se, but because they were imported into the field by roving theorists. Many others of varying success could be cited as well. Such cross-disciplinary excursions are important because they inject vitality into a field that – in the opinion of some at least—is in need of rejuvenation in the face of contemporary changes. In this paper, I elaborate on the work of the Canadian communications theorist Harold Innis, situating his work within contemporary IR theory while underlining his historicism, holism, and attention to time-space biases.

International relations is one of the areas of social science which most clearly brings home the tensions involved in the dual relation of inquirer to object of inquiry, as both scientific observer and moral judge, particularly in times of war. As social scientists, we are required to understand and explain our object, as moral beings, we are required to judge or evaluate it. Received wisdom in international relations premises the possibility of the former on its rigid separation from the latter, so that the understanding of, for example, war, is necessarily distinct from the question of the justice or injustice of war. The former is the task of the science of international relations, the latter task is within the province of the moral philosopher or the normative theorist. I will be arguing in this article that this separation of the realms of morality and politics, on which so much social science and moral philosophy is founded, can be traced back to Kant's critical philosophy, and that this separation has problematic consequences for the possibility of both explanation and evaluation in the international sphere. My argument falls into three parts. In the first part, I will put forward a condensed reading of the Kantian critical position and the problems that it poses. In the second and third parts, I will demonstrate how the discussion of international relations both in moral philosophy, and in political theory, is constructed by the Kantian morality/politics dichotomy, and how this limits and distorts both our moralizing and our theorizing. One contention in the third section of the paper will be that even the recent challenges to traditional international political theory, posed by critical theory and post-structuralism, are in danger of slipping back into a reliance on the morality/politics division, in spite of efforts to overcome it.

International relations, as an academic discipline, is not known for its strength in the area of theory. It has no immediate equivalent to the rich contrasts of perspective generated in sociology by the legacy of Max Weber, Marx and Durkheim—a lack so felt that Martin Wight once wrote a paper called ‘Why is there no International Theory?’ His own answer was, in part, that there is nothing further to theorize after the discovery of the repetitive mechanisms of the balance of power. This was a sad conclusion for such an acute and creative mind to reach. But it does illustrate a central feature of IR theory. For the balance of power, it can be argued, is the limit of any Realist theory of international relations. And Wight's conclusion was perhaps more an index of the dominance of a Realist orthodoxy than a relection of the inherent properties of ‘the international’.

Since antiquity justice has been thought of as a political or civic virtue, more recently as belonging in a ‘bounded society’,John Rawls relies on the idea of a bounded society throughout his work. References to Rawls's writings cited here may be abbreviated in subsequent footnotes: A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1971); ‘Themes in Kant's Moral Philosophy’ (1989), in Collected Papers, Samuel Freeman (ed.), (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999), pp. 497–528; Political Liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993); The Law of Peoples (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999). or as a primary task of states.This view evidently underlies the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948; the text uses a varied range of seemingly nonequivalent terms, including member states, peoples, nations and countries; a coherent reading of the document requires us to take all of these as referring to states. All such views assume that the context of justice has boundaries, which demarcate those who are to render and to receive justice from one another from others who are to be excluded. Yet the view that justice is intrinsically bounded sits ill with the many claims that it is cosmopolitan, owed to all regardless of location or origin, race or gender, class or citizenship. The tension between moral cosmopolitanism and institutional anti-cosmospolitanism has been widely discussed over the last twenty years, but there is still a lot of disagreement about its prpoer resolution.A selection from this literature might begin by noting Charles Beitz, Political Theory and International Relations (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1979), ‘Cosmopolitan Ideals and National Sentiment’,Journal of Philosophy, 80 (1983), pp. 591–600 and ‘Cosmopolitan Liberalism and the State System’, in Chris Brown (ed.) Political Restructuring in Europe: Ethical Perspectives, (London: Routledge, 1994); Simon Caney, ‘Global Equality of Opportunity and the Sovereignty of States’, in International Justice, ed. Anthony Coates (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2000), and ‘Cosmopolitan Justice and Equalizing Opportunities’, forthcoming in Metaphilosophy; Joseph Carens, ‘Aliens and Citizens: The Case for Open Borders’, Review of Politics , 49 (1987), pp. 251–73; Charles Jones, Global Justice: Defending Cosmopolitanism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999); David Miller, ‘The Nation State: A Modest Defence’, in Political Restructuring in Europe, Chris Brown (ed.), pp. 137–62 and ‘The Limits of Cosmopolitan Justice’ in International Society: Diverse Ethical Perspectives, David R. Mapel and Terry Nardin (eds.) (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press), Thomas Pogge, ‘Cosmopolitanism and Sovereignty’ in Political Restructuring in Europe, Chris Brown (ed.), pp. 89–122 and ‘An Egalitarian Law of Peoples’, Philosophy and Public Affairs, 23 (1994), pp. 195–224; Onora O'Neill, ‘Justice and Boundaries, in Political Restructuring in Europe, Chris Brown (ed.), pp. 69–88 and Bounds of Justice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), Henry Shue Basic Rights: Subsistence, Affluence and US Foreign Policy, 2nd edn. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996).

Donella Meadows, John Richardson, Gerhart Bruckman, Groping in the Dark: the first decade of global modelling, Chichester, New York: John Wiley, 1982, xxvii + 311 pp. ?11.00. Harold Guetzkow and Joseph J. Valadez (eds.), Simulated International Processes: theories and research in global modelling, Beverly Hills and London: Sage, 1981, 400 pp. ?18.75. These two books should be welcomed enthusiastically by the international relations community. They describe economically the work done in two important and related fields with which scholars of international relations, no matter what their speciality, should be acquainted. This judgement may not, of course, be accepted by everyone, but I hope this review article will provide reasons in support of it. For even if one concludes (as I do not) that the approaches of these books are wrong, they are interestingly wrong. The two books have similar goals. Both are attempts to show what two research programmes in global politics have achieved after the expenditure of much time, much money (mainly, but not exclusively, dollars) and much intellectual effort. The books are directed at the outsider in that the insider in both areas will be familiar with virtually all they contain. The editors and authors provide sufficient material to give a clear picture of what is going on and to put the work in its context. We are thus able to arrive at some sort of conclusion on the overall legitimacy of their activities and on whether they have been fruitful. Practitioners commonly refer to 'global politics' rather than 'international relations' as the whole enterprise is broader in scope than just the relations between states. They address themselves to the social system of the planet, in which states are important actors. The research programme described in the book edited by Guetzkow and Valadez is the simulation work which, one way or another, traces its origins, usually fairly directly, to Northwestern University. The volume edited by Meadows, Richardson and Bruckman, describes a more heterogeneous collection of projects, the first of which is associated with Forrester and Meadows;1 the other projects have been to some extent devised as extensions or critiques of that initial project. In the first part of this paper I shall give an account of the two books and comment on them in conventional book review form. I shall then discuss the significance of this sort of work for the study on international relations and give some evaluation of the various activities involved.

This paper purports to contribute to the development of a theory of international mediation by considering, in some detail, the experience at Camp David and more specifically the role of President Carter. The uniqueness of this event cannot of course be ignored, but even unique cases can contribute to theory development especially if they are considered as one of a class of events. Single cases can provide a powerful impetus to the development of a general explanation as long as they are historically grounded and their description is not couched in purely idiosyncratic terms. For too long students of international relations have developed theories as normative or deductivist products making minimal use of historical experience. Recognizing the limits of such approaches, I propose to focus on a single case of international mediation, study it intensively in terms of the available data and propositions, explain its outcome in these terms and formulate potentially general izable statements about international mediation. Such an approach is likely to remain

In reviewing any set of books, it is not often that one has the pleasure of welcoming an obvious classic. There is one here: John Vasquez's The Power of Power Politics, and much of this review article will be devoted to saying why. The other books fit together with it very well. They comprise two undergraduate textbooks, by Chan and by Russett and Starr; two lively contributions from the redoubtable John Burton; and an interesting collection of papers on the inter-paradigm debate, edited and commented upon in a rather muddled way by Maghroori and Ramberg. In different ways, all the books are concerned with the same two problems. How can we explain international relations? And how should we present to students what we think we know about it?

The undisputed proliferation of international organizations has been interpreted in several ways by members of the scholarly community. Probably most see the explosion in numbers and kinds of actors as a peripheral development; in the realist and neo-realist tradition, the primacy of the state and the state system remains largely unaffected.1 Others are sceptical of what the trend means and so have developed research agendas examining more closely international organization influence on states2 and impact on issues.3 Yet few international relations scholars have paid attention to what this proliferation means for relations among various organizations and its effects on states. However, with so many of these organizations involved in economic development activities, it is very likely that these organizations willingly and sometimes unwittingly encounter each other particularly in Third World countries. Rumours abound of IGOs and NGOs 'stumbling over each other' in the capitals of Sahelian countries vying for the attention of too few government officials, leading to negative impacts on policy. In Indo-China, Gordenker finds 'increasing friction and clogging* from the rapid expansion of United Nations High Commission for Refugees activities, as they intersect with the International Red Cross, Unicef, and private voluntary organizations.4 Yet not all interaction is conflictual. Non governmental aid agencies in Thailand co-operate closely,5 as do the International Monetary Fund and World Bank in Kenya.6 Based on these findings of the political relationship among both IGOs and NGOs in the field, it may be suggested that among the multilateral development banks, inter-organizational politics is a key, and heretofore understudied, process. In this paper we explore the relationship between the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development7 (hereafter World Bank, WB) and the African Development Bank group8 (hereafter ADB) during the 1980s. Involved in similar activities in one geographic arena (Africa), these two organizations interact in a way which sometimes leads to inter-organizational conflict and at other times produces co-operation. Why do these two organizations with similar overall objectives conflict? Under what conditions does inter-organizational co-operation occur? To answer these questions, both archival research and interviews were conducted in Washington, DC, and Abidjan, Ivory Coast, the headquarters of the African Development Bank.9