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This paper is a critical response to the newest version of the rational choice theory of religion (RCTR). In comparison with previous critiques, this paper takes aim at RCTR's foundational assumption of psychological egoism and argues that the thesis of psychological egoism is untenable. Without that thesis, the normative aspects of religious commitment cannot be reduced validly to instrumental reason. On neither conceptual nor empirical grounds therefore can religion or religious commitment be defined comprehensively in terms of exchange theory. With the failure of psychological egoism as a point of departure, the paper articulates an alternative theory of religion, one based on the epistemic rationality grounded in religious experience and religious emotion. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Community remains a potent symbol and aspiration in political and intellectual life. However, it has largely passed out of sociological analysis. The paper shows why this has occurred, and it develops a new typology that can make the concept useful again in sociology. The new typology is based on identifying structurally distinct subtypes of community using a small number of partitioning variables. The first partition is defined by the ultimate context of interaction; the second by the primary motivation for interaction; the third by rates of interaction and location of members; and the fourth by the amount of face-to-face as opposed to computer-mediated interaction. This small number of partitioning variables yields eight major subtypes of community. The paper shows how and why these major subtypes are related to important variations in the behavioral and organizational outcomes of community. The paper also seeks to resolve some disagreements between classical liberalism and communitarians. It shows that only a few of the major subtypes of community are likely to be as illiberal and intolerant as the selective imagery of classical liberals asserts, while at the same time only a few are prone to generate as much fraternalism and equity as the selective imagery of communitarians suggests. The paper concludes by discussing the forms of community that are best suited to the modern world. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper responds to the papers published as a symposium on postmodernism in the Fall 1991 issue of the journal "Sociological Theory." It argues that postmodernism as a rhetoric and postmodernism as a methodology often diverge among theorists. Further, it contends that theorists' professional locations, including their relative disengagement from undergraduates, may help to account for their attraction to postmodern rhetoric and meta-theoretical gesticulations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper argues that the dominance of linear models has led many sociologists to construe the social world in terms of a "general linear reality." This reality assumes (1) that the social world consists of fixed entities with variable attributes, (2) that cause cannot flow from "small" to "large" attributes/events, (3) that causal attributes have only one causal pattern at once, (4) that the sequence of events does not influence their outcome, (5) that the. "careers" of entities are largely independent, and (6) that causal attributes are generally independent of each other. The paper discusses examples of these assumptions in empirical work, considers standard and new methods addressing them, and briefly explores alternative models for reality that employ demographic, sequential, and network perspectives. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper considers the goals and methods of theoretical sociology. The chief goal of theoretical work is a theory in two parts-postulates and predictions-the key challenge being to minimize the number of postulates and maximize the number and variety of predictions. The paper discusses the distinctive character of the sentences in each part of the theory and, in light of that bipartite structure, the two main activities of theoretical analysis: (i) speculative thinking, whereby the theorist identifies the starting ideas for the postulates: and (ii) formal reasoning, whereby the theorist constructs the postulates and derives predictions from them. To illustrate the features of a theory and the tasks of theoretical analysis, the paper briefly sketches the theory of the distributive-justice force. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper develops a social-theoretical approach to public demonstrations (e.g., software demos, the performances of “market pitchers,” even street protests). Public demonstrations are often viewed as proofs, persuasion tools, and theatrical performances. I argue that they play a larger set of roles in social life. Depending the spaces of their enactment, they may serve as transactional and coordination devices, cognitive and relational tools, mobilization and competition apparatuses, observatories for demonstrators, and resources for project design, management, and assessment. They constitute an important form of interaction and help to structure social relationships. My argument is based on investigations into the uses of public demonstrations by the European Commission and U.S. scientists and engineers. These studies illustrate how “demo-cracies”—regimes that use public demonstrations for the management of public affairs—have developed in industrial and postindustrial societies. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

‘Theory’ is one of the most important words in the lexicon of contemporary sociology. Yet, their ubiquity notwithstanding, it is quite unclear what sociologists mean by the words ‘theory,’‘theoretical,’ and ‘theorize.’ I argue that confusions about the meaning of ‘theory’ have brought about undesirable consequences, including conceptual muddles and even downright miscommunication. In this paper I tackle two questions: (a) what does ‘theory’ mean in the sociological language?; and (b) what ought ‘theory’ to mean in the sociological language? I proceed in five stages. First, I explain why one should ask a semantic question about ‘theory.’ Second, I lexicographically identify seven different senses of the word, which I distinguish by means of subscripts. Third, I show some difficulties that the current lack of semantic clarity has led sociology to. Fourth, I articulate the question, ‘what ought “theory” to mean?,’ which I dub the ‘semantic predicament’ (SP), and I consider what one can learn about it from the theory literature. Fifth, I recommend a ‘semantic therapy’ for sociology, and advance two arguments about SP: (a) the principle of practical reason—SP is to a large extent a political issue, which should be addressed with the help of political mechanisms; and (b) the principle of ontological and epistemological pluralism—the solution to SP should not be too ontologically and epistemologically demanding. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

]Four decades have passed since the publication of Gerhard Lenski’s The Religious Factor. While generally regarded as a classic in the sociology of religion, the book has had a curious history, largely because of the interest it generated in differences between Protestants and Catholics. In this paper I provide an alternative reading of The Religious Factor’s impact on sociology of religion that points to its larger theoretical implications. I argue that the book should be understood in relation to continuing debates about the classification of religious traditions, differentiation among socioreligious groups, intergroup relations among religious traditions, and friendship ties within religious communities. Through understanding these contributions, the book's legacy as well as continuities and new opportunities in the study of religion can be appreciated. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper proposes criteria for distinguishing those types of social forms that are susceptible to lawlike explanation from those that are susceptible to interpretive accounts. The main criterion concerns the rankability of choice alternatives. The choice process is modeled as having two subprocesses. The first subprocess is a rational one in which unacceptable decision alternatives are eliminated, reducing the universe of alternatives to the set of interchangeably acceptable options, termed the admissible set. In the second subprocess, an arbitrary choice is made from the admissible set. In rational-choice settings, the admissible set consists of just one element, the optimum. However, this is clearly not the only possibility, as the example of language, with its plurality of interchangeable phonemic options, bears witness. The fundamental concept: At one extreme—the extreme of language—the admissible set is large and the arbitrary-choice subprocess dominates the rational-choice subprocess. At the other extreme—the extreme of rational-choice theory—the admissible set consists of a single element and the rational-choice subprocess dominates the arbitrary-choice subprocess. Social law has its proper home in those territories of human activity where the admissible set is small; social interpretation has its proper home in those regions where the admissible set is large. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article presents a brief history of the authors who contributed to the success of this January 2003 issue of the journal "Sociological Theory." Jack P. Gibbs is Centennial Professor Emeritus of Sociology at Vanderbilt University. His research interests are in deviance and criminology, human ecology, control, the sociology of law, and the methodology of theory construction. Tim Hallett is an advanced graduate student at Northwestern University. This paper is an intellectual precursor to his dissertation, "Symbolic Power and the Social Organization of Turmoil." His dissertation makes an argument about how symbolic power is created in social interaction. Bradford Verter received his doctorate from Princeton University and is currently on the social sciences faculty of Bennington College. He has published articles and reviews on the cultural history of religion in the United States, and is completing a study of the social and ideological dimensions of occultism since the Enlightenment.

Gatekeepers control access to benefits that they do not own. When granted access, their clients incur obligations that take the form of fees owed to the gatekeeper. This paper examines a variety of forms that gatekeeping has historically taken, looking closely at the network positions that gatekeepers have occupied. Not previously resolved is what determines the size of the client’s obligation. The theory presented here predicts 1) the size of that obligation from the value to the client of the access sought. It also predicts that 2) to benefit, gatekeepers must monopolize their positions, or, failing monopolization, 3) must organize to form a shared monopoly. In exchange networks, gatekeeping takes the form of “ordering,” a new structural power condition. Resistance equations generate exact quantitative values for hypotheses expressing the three predictions above. Experimental tests in the well-understood context of exchange networks offer strong support for the hypotheses. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper presents a new “epistemological” theory of culture that explains how individuals enhance their sense of security in the world by creating and maintaining culture as knowledge of the world. Using cognitive and affective processes previously ignored by culture theorists, the theory posits three dimensions of cultural production: we articulate, typify, and orient our experiences to make them meaningful. The theory asserts that we produce culture because it allows us to feel as if we understand our world, and to perceive it as ordered; this in turn triggers an aesthetic response of knowledge-based affect. The theory explains how cultural production is motivated by the pursuit of meaningfulness as well as material interests. The theory describes how an oppressive culture can be reproduced unintentionally, even by the groups it oppresses. The theory also identifies connections between social structure and culture where conditions of ambiguity or control have implications for how meaning can be created. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper addresses holy New York City's workfare program has structured opportunities for collective action by welfare recipients. As workfare blurs the distinction between wage workers and welfare recipients, it calls into question accepted understandings of the rights and obligations of welfare recipients and fosters new claims on the state. The concept of "cultural opportunity structures" can help to explain the political mobilization of workfare participants if it is linked to a Durkheimian tradition of cultural analysis attentive to symbolic classification. The dramaturgic approach to culture exemplified in the work of Erving Goffman can usefully complement this structural approach if a narrowfocus on frames and framing processes is broadened to include interaction rituals and ceremonial profanation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Authors find John Levi Martin's comments on their paper cogently argued and provocative. The main burden of Martin's comment is that authors should accept a false antimony between external determination and unexplainable chance and consequently are reluctant to see human action as causal. First, authors contend that the conception of human agency as cause entails certain insuperable difficulties in analyzing some forms of human conduct, whether on the individual or the collective level. Second, they believe that chance as others define it is defensible as a component of much social behavior. Although social behavior is self-directed, constructed by the actors. As authors have tried to show in their paper, there is a need to recognize an indeterminate, chance component in certain instances. Such instances are most likely to be those entailing blocked or ambiguous courses of action which require decision making. When human beings encounter problematic situations, many alternative possibilities may be present and the outcomes may resist best efforts to explain them causally. The authors insist that this difficulty is ontological not a product simply of ignorance.

As rational choice theory has moved from economics into political science and sociology, it has been dramatically transformed. The intellectual diffusion of agency theory illustrates this process. Agency theory is a general model of social relations involving the delegation of authority, and generally resulting in problems of control, which has been applied to a broad range of substantive contexts. This paper analyzes applications of agency theory to state policy implementation in economics, political science, and sociology. After documenting variations in the theory across disciplinary contexts, the strengths and weaknesses of these different varieties of agency theory are assessed. Sociological versions of agency theory, incorporating both broader microfoundations and richer models of social structure, are in many respects the most promising. This type of agency theory illustrates the potential of an emerging sociological version of rational choice theory. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article traces the impact of philosophical questions regarding the grounds of moral autonomy and heteronomy (rule-from-another as opposed to rule-from-oneself) on classical sociological theory, arguing that both Weber and Durkheim understood sociology to have a contribution to make in the debate with Kant over the grounds of ethical action. Both insisted that the only possible ethical action was one within the bounds of rational knowledge that was inherently authoritative, but this sat uneasily with their focus on the relation between concrete social authority and the authoritativeness of beliefs in the sociology of religion. In rejecting Comte's explicit avowal of the embodiment of moral authority in the secular priesthood of sociologists, Weber and Durkheim had to paper over the social authority supporting the formulation of this rational knowledge. Each then produced a sociology of knowledge without a well-specified mechanism, in turn encouraging the development of the sociology of knowledge as a flawed sub-discipline. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper proposes a sociology of the person that focuses upon the socially defined, publicly visible beings of intersubjective experience. I argue that the sociology of the person proposed by Durkheim and Mauss is more accurately described as a sociology of institutions of the person and neglects both folk or ethnopsychologies of personhood and the interactional production of persons. I draw upon the work of Goffman to develop a sociology of the person concerned with means, processes, and relations of person production. I also propose that the work of Goffman, Foucault, and others provides insights into the contemporary technology of person production and into holy its control and use affects relations of person production. I conclude with a brief outline of the theoretical connections among institutions of the person, folk psychologies, the social constitution of the person, and the prospect of a distinctively sociological psychology. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

By any standard, nonrationality is an undertheorized concept in sociology. This paper attempts to open a discussion on nonrationality by analyzing one of the most fruitful theorizations of the concept: Simmel's Simmel deveioped a theory that placed nonrationality on the same plane with rationality and attributed to the former a role as fundamental as the latter's in the foundations of action, and as central as the latter's in the generation of existential meanings. The gradual eclipse of the nonrational elements of life in the expanses of a modern, highly rationalized world imply, then, an impoverishment of being. I argue that Simmel's theory of the nonrational can serve as a model capable of enriching our understanding of society and of the person and can, in this sense, serve as a counterpoint to current sociological theories that emphasize the rational elements of life and conceive the person in primarily rational terms. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article draws attention to the importance of chance in sociological theory in the recent paper by sociologists Jerome Manis and Bernard Meltzer and their attempt to sketch alternatives to the causal determinism assumed by many sociologists, but they have not correctly specified tie challenges and possibilities in sociological explanation. Manis and Meltzer argue that there exists a class of events which possess the following overlapping features: 1) absence of cause, 2) absence of predictability and 3) absence of regularity in the sequence of the action and its antecedent conditions and that the existence of such events contravenes determinism, a fundamental postulate of science. They maintain that although some events are governed by causal laws, others are not and argue that this latter set includes chaos in the mathematical sense, quantum mechanics, evolution, trends in the arts, global politics and political movements, people actions and many key points in their lives, such as where they work and whom they mate with. The authors conclude that mainstream sociology and its search for causal laws cannot help in studying events in this broad set. This claim is especially significant because the broad set includes human action.

This paper argues the case for a renewed interest in Schutz's work by extending his theory of the conscious subject to the feminist concern with the issue of domination. We present a theoretical analysis of the subjective and intersubjective experiences of individuals relating to each other as dominant and subordinate; as our theoretical point of departure we use Schutz's concepts of the we-relation, the assumption of reciprocity of perspectives, typification. working, taken-for-grantedness. and relevance. Schutz's sociology of the conscious subject is striking in its tack of any extended consideration of power, perhaps one reason why support for his work has diminished since the mid-]970s. Our overlayering of feminist sociological theory's interest in domination with Schutz's concerns about subjectivity and intersubjectivity produces an elaboration and a critique of Schurz and expands feminist understanding of relationships of domination. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper outlines the main tenets of poststructuralism and considers how they are applied by practitioners of queer theory. Drawing on both Michel Foucault and Jacques Derrida, queer theory explores the ways in which homosexual subjectivity is at once produced and excluded within culture, both inside and outside its borders. This approach is contrasted with more sociological studies of sexualities (labeling theory, social constructionism). Whereas queer theory investigates the religions between heterosexuality and homosexuality, sociologists tend to examine homosexual identities and communities, paradoxically ignoring the social construction of heterosexuality. Poststructuralism can inform a sociological approach to sexuality by emphasizing the generative character of all sexual identities. A sociological study of sexuality which is informed by poststructuralism would examine the exclusions implicit in a heterosexual/homosexual opposition. In this process, bisexual and transgender identities can become viable cultural possibilities, and a broad-based political coalition established. Whereas mainstream sociology focuses on the ways in which homosexuals are outside social norms, and whereas queer theory exploits the ways in which this outside is already inside, this perspective suggests that a critical sexual politics seeks to move beyond an inside/outside model. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Postmodern claims for the lack of general coherence in social life and therefore in social research are merely a version of recurrent attempts to accept incoherence as adequate in explanations. Incoherence, however, is less sharply distinguished from the synthetic and generalizing theories that it is held to have replaced than its proponents and critics suppose. Generalizing approaches, in fact, were built around contradictions that contributed to their instability and facilitated postmodern fragmentation. In this paper we demonstrate the central contradictions in social theory, showing their common occurrence in apparently opposed positions. Both postmodernism and what it seeks to replace are features of a conservative and unproductive social science. We trace the contradictory continuties through major modern schools of social theory in order to clear the ground for a progressive social science which accepts contradictions as problems that must be solved creatively in the practice of social research. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper elaborates three approaches to the issue of the state autonomy, and uses two empirical cases (British and American treasury policy during the 1930s) to illustrate them. The three approaches are the group affiliations approach, which considers the social characteristics of the individuals who work in an organization; the structural dependence approach, which considers the structural position of the organization within a network of resource flows; and a cultural approach. The application of these three approaches to the two cases gives some support to all three, but the cultural approach proves especially useful in conjunction with the other two. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The resurgence of rational choice theory, in sociology has given rise to a debate about its scope and limits. This paper approaches the debate in a constructive spirit. Taking Coleman's recent work as exemplary of rational choice theory in sociology, the discussion begins by noticing some elements common to this theory and to the framework employed by neofunctionalist critics of rational choice theory. First, the concept of control plays a central role in both theoretical models. Second, both theories attempt to generalize the general equilibrium theory of economics, thereby capturing the economic theory as a special case. The constructive work consists of showing how key concepts of one model relate to analogous key concepts in the other. The aim is to forge the beginning of the synthesis in which the strengths of each model are preserved in one that includes both. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A central supposition of the "communicative ethics controversy" in modern social theory has been either that there exist universal standards against which we can judge the validity of speech and moral argumentation or, conversely, that there are no determinate standards to which moral claims can be held answerable, and hence no methods by which disputes over contested claims can rationally be resolved. In this paper it is argued that the basic terms of this debate are miscast. The "order without rules" thesis maintains both that the search for universal standards of valid moral arguments is likely to end in disappointment, and that nonetheless there are discoverable methods by which arguments are evaluated, facts constituted, and disputes settled, and for which appeals to general standards of validity are neither requested .or forthcoming. Wittgenstein's numerous remarks on rules and rule following are considered in support of this thesis. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Weber connected intentionality to interpretation. The concept of meaning attribution links his conception of cultural sciences to his definition of culture.' He conceived of means-end rationality as a possible meaning of social action (Weber 1922). Contemporary rational choice analysts in sociology have had less to say about meaning, or about methodological issues raised by the imputation of subjective meaning (Boudon 1977, 1979; Corsi 1981; Elster 1978, 1979, 1982; Heckathorn 1988; R usconi 1984; Szaniawsky 1979). The possibility of in terpretation within a specifically sociological frame of reference, the traditional problem of sociological interpretation, is nevertheless raised anew by the program of rational choice analysis. The program is ultimately dependent on the factual assumptions about the intentions and meanings that rational agents attach to their actions and the actions of others (Burns 1990; Sciolla and Ricolfi 1989). The mutual relevance of the two programs, however, has not been assessed clearly. The aim of this paper is to clarify these relations. Put differently, it is to reassess the Weberian lesson from a contemporary perspective. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Popper `s logic of scientific disco very and Kuhn `s paradigm switches in science have been considered competing schools of thought in the philosophy of science and the sociology of knowledge. In the present paper the author establishes a unified three-dimensional frame work that synthesizes the quintessential ideas of these schools. Theories are tested for confirmation or falsification in the first dimension; their scope conditions are defined and redefined in the second dimension; and they replace their predecessors to become a dominant theory or possibly even a new paradigm in the third dimension. The development of fertility theory is examined in the three-dimensional framework. This framework helps us understand important aspects of theory construction, and thereby shed light on how to build viable sociological theory. Also discussed are major problems in formulating sociological theory. The overcoming of these problems is a necessary condition for a theory to be examined in the Three-dimensional framework, and thereby to become a candidate of a new theoretical paradigm. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Three of the classic "founding fathers" of sociology (Comte, Marx and Tocquevile) were contemporary observers of the French Revolution of 1848. In addition, another important theoretical tradition was represented in contemporary observations of 1848 by Pierre-Joseph Proudhon. The present paper summarizes aspects of the views of these theoretically minded observers, notes some points at which more recent historical research suggests revisions to these classical views, and poses three arguments: (1) The revolution of 1848 exerted a direct shaping influence on classical social theory through lessons (some now subject to revision) learned from observation of the revolutionary struggles. (2) The 1848 revolution influenced classical social theory indirectly by contributing to the submergence of the radical French revolutionary tradition (along with utopian socialism) after the defeat of the June insurrectionaries and Bonaparte's coup. (3) Both writers in the classical tradition and current researchers have failed to thematize adequately a basic transformation in effectiveness of national integration, communication and administration which made 1848 in crucial ways much more akin to 1789 than it was direct evidence for the growth of class struggle and the likelihood of further revolution in advanced capitalist countries. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article locates and examines the micro-macro problem in sociology in the context of the larger problem of levels, the latter tending to include solutions to the former. Levels theory is meta-theoretical, for it is presuppositional to substantive or "sectors" theory. Levels theory constitutes the levels and therefore the "kinds" of social reality, while substantive theory looks for causal connections within and among the levels. The priority of levels over sectors theory, however, is only analytic. Historically the influence can be reversed, as levels shift in power relative to each other. The rise of sociologist Emile Durkheim's sacred self in the nineteenth century or social system in the twentieth are dramatic examples of these shifts. The article attempts to clarify the concept of levels, distinguishing several meanings of the term and choosing one to work with in the paper. The body of the article discusses the levels themselves, that is, what they are and how each is characterized. The article finally comments briefly on the connections among levels.

Because it Consists of an entire family of specific theories derived from the saint first principles, rational choice offers one approach to generate explanations that provide for micro-macro links, and to attack a wide variety of empirical problems in macrosociology. The aims of this paper are (1) to provide a bare skeleton of all rational choice arguments: (2) to demonstrate their applicability to a range of macrosociological concerns kv reviewing a sample of both new and classic works; and (3) to discuss the weaknesses of current rational Choice theory and the possibilities for its future development. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the book "The Structure of Social Action," by Talcott Parsons. The paper was prepared, at the annual meetings of the American Sociological Association in 1987, a session held to commemorate the fiftieth anniversary of the publication of the book and it drew a large and interested audience. The Structure, would at that time have been taken as a founding event in a relatively consensual, proto-scientific discipline. For even as late as the mid 1960, Structure was still seen as parsons had originally presented it: as a framework of accumulated theoretical knowledge, on the basis of which predictions could be made and compared with what social scientists had subsequently discovered about empirical fact. But there are even more important reasons for the continuing contemporary relevance of Parsons' early work. It is not only that there continue to be important discussions about, and in relation to the book earlier concepts. It is also that people can now understand the influence of Structure in a more reflective and more accurate way.

Several authoritative sources have raised the possibility that computer counting and monitoring of work in automated workplaces will transform offices into electronic sweatshops. This paper examines this idea from the vantage point of industrial sociology and managerial theory. Five theoretical models are developed, each of which generates hypotheses about the contexts in which work monitoring becomes important. A brief history of clerical work is given which shows the antecedents of surveillance and work-measurement in this sphere, and a case study of control in an automated office is presented in order to illustrate certain practical limitations on the use of computer surveillance. These insights are combined into a synthetic model which describes those contexts in which surveillance would be likely to result in speed-ups, and those where it would not. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The general domain of this paper is politics, the struggles for power, within sociology. Within this general context, a more specific arena of interest is the rise of micro-sociological theory, especially exchange theory, phenomenological sociology, and ethnomethodology. The excessive reach and intellectual problems of radical microsociology aside, the fact remains that micro-theories and the micro-oriented paradigms with which they are associated are on the ascendancy in contemporary sociology. The critical review of radical microsociology is useful in this context, not only in itself, but also because it points up several lessons that should be of utility to the supporters of all micro-theories. While radical microsociology focuses, for scientific reasons, on interaction, other micro-sociologies could well push for a focus on other aspects of the micro-domain, especially cognitive processes. Beyond the specific lessons of the critical analysis of radical micro-sociology, there is the more general issue of the implications of the rise in micro-theories and micro-paradigms.

In this chapter I review empirical studies directly testing the hypotheses of my 1973 paper "The Strength of Weak Ties" (hereafter "SWT") and work that elaborates those hypotheses theoretically or uses them to suggest new empirical research not discussed in my original formulation. A long the way, I will reconsider various aspects of the theoretical argument, attempt to plug some holes, and broaden its base. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]