Search

Conceived as a theory of competitive harm, self-preferencing has been at the core of recent European landmark cases (e.g., Google Android, Google Shopping). In the context of EU competition law, beyond the anticompetitive leveraging effect, self-preferencing may lead to vertical and horizontal exclusionary abuses, encourage exploitation abuses, and generate economic dependence abuses. In this paper, we aim at characterizing the various forms of self-preferencing, investigating platforms’ capacity and incentives to do so through their dual role, by shedding light on the economic assessment of these practices in an effects-based approach. We analyze the different options for remedies in this context, by insisting on their necessity, adequacy, and proportionality.

French Abstract: En avril 2014, la Commission europeenne a revise ses Lignes directrices sur les aides d'Etat en matiere d'energie et d'environnement. Dans cet article, nous montrons comment l'analyse economique des effets des aides participe a la politique de la concurrence et propose un cadre rigoureux d'evaluation. Nous soulignons cependant que la maniere dont les Lignes directrices presentent la necessite des aides publiques est discutable. Deux logiques s'opposent en realite, l'une distributive consistant a ne pas penaliser les pollueurs domestiques vis-a-vis de la concurrence internationale, l'autre incitative dont l'objectif est de regler des externalites residuelles. La Commission semble admettre trop rapidement les limites des politiques environnementales et ne met pas suffisamment en avant les externalites positives technologiques liees a l'innovation.English Abstract: In April 2014, the European Commission has revised its guidelines on State aids for environmental protection and energy. In this article, we show how the economic analysis of the effects of the aid are useful in competition policy and proposes a rigorous evaluation framework. However, we emphasize that the way the Guidelines present the need of public support is questionable. Two logics are opposed in reality, the distributive one of not penalizing domestic polluters vis-a-vis international competition, the incentive one that aims to resolve residual externalities. The Commission appears to acknowledge too quickly the limitations of environmental policies and does not sufficiently highlight the positive externalities associated with innovation.

In this article, we use a history of economic thought perspective to analyze the process by which the Chicago School of Antitrust emerged in the 1950s and became dominant in the US. We show the extent to which economic objectives and theoretical views shaped antitrust laws in their inception. After establishing the minor influence of economics in the promulgation of U.S. competition laws, we then highlight U.S. economists' very cautious views about antitrust until the Second New Deal. We analyze the process by which the Chicago School developed a general and coherent framework for competition policy. We rely mainly on the seminal and programmatic work of Director and Levi (1956) and trace how this theoretical paradigm was made collective, i.e. the 'economization' process took place in US antitrust. Finally, we discuss the implications, if not the possible pitfalls, of such a conversion to economics-led competition law enforcement.

A recent French merger case involving two large water companies seems to toll the death of ex-post merger control. This paper aims at highlighting the interest of that type of control by showing its crucial role for competition authorities as a complement of the current notification system. Stressing the limits of an exclusively ex-ante control, we show that the possibility to act ex-post on market structures would lead to more virtuous behaviors in the ex-ante control by reducing adverse selection effects. The ex-post merger control would also permit new means of action on agents’ behaviors after the merger. Despite those positive effects, the implementation of an ex-post merger control should be attentively carried out in particular because some legal security problems could emerge. However, those issues might be offset by increasing the competence of the French competition authority in merger cases.