1. Behavioral Corporate Finance
- Author
-
Hersh Shefrin
- Subjects
Value (ethics) ,History ,Actuarial science ,Polymers and Plastics ,Agency cost ,Behavioral economics ,Industrial and Manufacturing Engineering ,Microeconomics ,Corporate finance ,Incentive ,Incentive compatibility ,Order (exchange) ,Economics ,Relevance (law) ,Business and International Management - Abstract
Managers and corporate directors need to recognize two key behavioral impediments that obstruct the process of value maximization, one internal to the firm and the other external. I call the first obstruction behavioral costs. Behavioral costs, like agency costs, tend to prevent value creation. Behavioral costs are the costs associated with errors that people make because of cognitive imperfections and emotional influences. The second obstruction stems from behavioral errors on the part of analysts and investors. These errors can create gaps between fundamental values and market prices. When they do, managers may find themselves conflicted, unsure of how to factor the errors of analysts and investors into their own decisions. Proponents of value based management emphasize that with properly designed incentives, managers will maximize the value of the firms for which they work. As such, either they treat behavioral costs as simply another form of agency costs, or they deny the relevance of cognitive errors. In contrast, proponents of behavioral finance argue that behavioral costs are typically large, and cannot be addressed though incentives alone. This is not to say that incentives are immaterial. On the contrary, incentives are of critical importance. The point, however, is that there are limits to incentives. If employees have a distorted view of what is in their own self-interest, or if they have a mistaken view of what actions they need to take in order to maximize their self-interest, then incentive compatibility, although necessary for value maximization, will not be sufficient.
- Published
- 2023
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