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This paper draws attention to an understudied phenomenon, transnational political alliances (TPA), which occur when multinational corporations cooperate with local companies to influence public policies of the host government. The paper first explores the economic and political sources of TPAs, their structures, and the obstacles to their formation. It then examines TPAs through the context of China, a critical case because of a hostile political environment that discourages TPAs. However, the surprisingly common occurrence of TPAs in China indicates the power of economic incentives for political cooperation across national boundaries. Such alliances do not explain why China originally opened its doors to international trade and investment, but it may explain why the doors are remaining opening. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper contends that one can apply a cultural lens to the study of Chinese security policy through examination of the perceptual effects of military doctrine. Through the development of two brief historical cases, this paper shows the importance of PLA doctrine in shaping the way China viewed its interaction with the United States in the past. The paper also lays out the relevance of this today by probing the way in which modern Chinese doctrine might shape perceptions. I argue that this (relatively narrow) approach to strategic culture has significant advantages in terms of objectivity and clarity of causal statements that can enhance the utility of the study of strategic culture to policymakers and scholars alike. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the changing nature of China's policy toward Taiwan. Many of the sharpest debates in Taiwan, the US and elsewhere have been over whether recent modifications in policy represent a genuine overhaul in Beijing's approach to Taipei. To simplify, some argue that meaningful change already is happening and that such developments warrant careful study and attention. But skeptics conclude that it isn't happening. As one Taiwanese lawmaker complained, the new strategy is designed to "undermine the power of the [Taiwan] government…it's a poison coated with sugar." After analyzing various indicators, this study shows how theories and/or conceptual frameworks often employed in the fields of international relations and comparative politics might help analysts unravel some parts of the complicated puzzle that constitutes China's policy toward Taiwan. In conclusion, however, the author suggests that it is probable that decision-makers in Taipei will require more facts—not theories—before they agree that there is a genuine "paradigm shift" in Beijing's approach to the thorny Taiwan dispute. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper examines China's foreign relations from the perspective of national identity. It primarilly focuses on the deficiencies in concentrating solely on Chinese nationalism within such a dynamic, and, suggests that a broader approach to national identity will provide us with new insight into how this facet of Chinese politics is being constructed. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A central hope of the strategy of engagement is that increased cross-border exchanges with North Korea will have the effect of encouraging the process of marketization and ultimately contribute to a moderation of the country's foreign policy. Results from a unique survey of Chinese enterprises operating in North Korea reveal that trade is still largely dominated by state entities on the North Korean side, although we cannot rule out de facto privatization of exchange. However little trust is evident beyond the relationships among Chinese and North Korean state-owned enterprises. Formal networks and institutions-including dispute settlement mechanisms-are weak and do not appear to have consequences for relational contracting. Rather, firms rely on personal ties for identifying counterparties and resolving disputes. The weakness of formal institutions implies that the rapid growth in exchange does not conform with the expectations of the engagement model and may prove self-limiting. The results also cast doubt that engagement between China and North Korea, at least as it is currently proceeding, will foster reform and opening in the country. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper, through a comparative, empirical study of the role Chinese and Indian diasporas play in the political economy of their respective ancestral homelands, explores the relationship between diaspora and homeland development and how this dynamic relationship affects economic growth and foreign relations of the homelands. The author argues that the significant roles of Indian and Chinese diasporas in their respective homelands' development and foreign relations consistently reflect, and are heavily influenced by, their home countries' economic development strategies and political history and culture. The contributions of Chinese and Indian diasporas to their homelands provide a unique perspective in the comparative study of Chinese and Indian political economy. The research concludes that as globalization deepens, the role of diasporas will become more salient in international political economy, and that the international community needs to pay more attention to the two diaspora groups that are closely linked to the two rising Asian powers. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A number of China's international relations scholars, after a period of intensive study of Western international relations theory, have begun to call for the development of a distinctive Chinese theory of international relations. For many, the distinctive content of the Chinese School would be anchored in Confucian culture, Chinese history, and classical texts, as well as a substantive focus on contemporary China's "peaceful rise" to a position of benign regional leadership in East Asia. If developed in a rigorous and open-minded fashion, this project might spur fresh insights on important issues and enrich the corpus of international relations theory more generally. But there is also a risk that a monolithic Chinese School could produce a stultifying uniformity, intellectual cheerleading for government policies, and an ideological justification for a blinkered Chinese nationalism that hinders rather than expands understanding. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Why have large volumes of FDI streamed into China even though its political institutions seem not able to credibly commit on any long-term policy? Why have special zones been enduringly popular among foreign investors? I argue that China attracts massive amounts of FDI partly because of the authoritarian system that gave political elites the flexibility and capacity to initiate the special zone policy to attract FDI. But China's continuing success in attracting higher quality FDI owes much to the government's credibility of maintaining this policy. Both the central and local governments have strong political motivations to maintain the policy, which creates a self-enforcing solution to this credibility problem. FDI patterns over time reflect foreign investors' response to the change in policy credibility in China. At the initial stage of the open-door policy, foreign investments were mostly small, labor-intensive, and low-tech. When the Chinese government gradually built up credibility on the special zone policy, foreign investors were more involved in large-scale operations in the technology-intensive sectors aimed at penetrating the domestic market. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Why does the Chinese government sometimes allow and sometimes suppress nationalist, anti-foreign demonstrations, and what are the consequences of this choice for China's international relations? I suggest that anti-foreign protests in authoritarian systems are like "audience costs," a source of bargaining leverage in diplomatic negotiations. The mechanism, however, is new. The risk that anti-foreign protests will turn against the government, combined with the escalating costs of making international concessions, enable authoritarian leaders to signal resolve and credibly claim that their hands are tied by domestic constraints. This finding has important implications for research on domestic politics and international relations, since it suggests a mechanism by which public opinion can influence the foreign policy of authoritarian regimes. I utilize a "natural experiment" to test the argument, comparing the occurrence of anti-Japanese protest over the period 1978-2005 in Hong Kong and mainland China, with Hong Kong serving as the control group. To further illustrate, I present a case study of the 2005 anti-Japanese protests in China and the negotiations over U.N. Security Council reform, drawing upon more than 100 interviews with nationalist activists, protest participants, and government officials in China, Japan and Hong Kong. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This research focuses on China's efforts to improve and consolidate relations with South Korea and their limitation. How is China enhancing its soft power in South Korea? Is China charming enough to South Korea as to influence the bilateral relations between South Korea and the United States? ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since the 1980s, changing national identities have transformed the China-Taiwan and Korean conflicts. Democratization in Taiwan and South Korea, and liberalization in China, have forced leaders to compete for popular legitimacy by appealing to national identities. Along with the collapse of the Soviet Union, these contested national identities have been the main factors driving change in the conflicts—pushing China and Taiwan inexorably apart and toward a showdown, while helping to sustain what appeared to be a mortally wounded North Korea. This explains why one U.S. ally, Taiwan, has become more hawkish, while the other, South Korea, has turned more dovish. These foreign policy changes, in turn, have reinforced changes in underlying national identities. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

North Korea has pursued a nuclear weapons capability for about two decades. Many different diplomatic efforts have been made to convince or cajole the Northern regime to give up this quest-and all have so far failed. Since 2003, a new multilateral approach-the Six-Party Talks involving the Koreas, China, Japan, Russia, and the United States-has raised hopes anew. These hopes are based largely on China's active role. China has the potential both to guarantee North Korea's security, and to impose and enforce a denuclearization agreement. We analyze China's changing grand strategy and its implications for China's Korea goals and policies. This discussion indicates that China is more concerned to preserve the North Korean regime and prevent a second Korean War than to eliminate the North's nuclear capability. Therefore, the Six-Party Talks are unlikely to succeed. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Today everyone knows that in the coming century India, like the Medici, has the intention and potential to enhance its wealth, prestige, and power.In this context, observers of world politics are wondering: How will India pursue those intentions? What will it do to realize its potential and assure its security? In the last year and half since the proposed Indo-US nuclear deal was announced, numerous experts have tried to induce answers to these questions from what is still a small universe of cases including India's attitude toward Iranian nuclear policy and energy (particularly pipeline) policy, toward US missile defense initiatives, toward the enlargement of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, toward Chinese activity in South Asia (particularly vis-à-vis Pakistan and Nepal). But, above all, observers have focused on a proposed deal between the US and India on nuclear cooperation.The dimensions and general features of the arena in which India will act are clear. It is a triangular space with China, India, and the US at the corners. The view that a rising India will be the fulcrum of balance in Asia is now increasingly common. A 2004 editorial in the Chinese People's Daily is a good example. "Steadily warming India-US relations have resulted in widespread attention to the geopolitics of Asia. It is difficult to predict whether or not India will become a strategic ally of the US or of China, but the sudden attractiveness of India will sooner or later alter the regional balance of power between the three countries" (Joseph, 2004). The 2005 Indo-US deal was interpreted by many observers to be an obvious American effort to draw India onto the US bandwagon.In the real world, of course, actors are motivated and constrained by power, wealth, and prestige. Syncretic approaches such as the currently fashionable "analytic eclecticism" draw selectively on all three international relations traditions in rendering "explanatory sketches" of important international security questions such as the durability of US-South Korean alliance, the possible revisionist aspiration of a rising China, or whether it is international institutions rather than balance of power dynamics that are shaping strategy in South East Asia. Explaining the future direction of Indian strategy within the China-India-US triangle is as analytically demanding a problem as one is likely to find in contemporary international relations.The conclusion I draw from what follows is that India is very unlikely to balance or to get on the bandwagon. Equipoise is the policy dictated by India's geography, power capabilities, identity, and potential to be a robust actor in global and regional politics. Like the old and now discredited Indian grand strategy of nonalignment, equipoise shuns formal alliances. The term draws on the realist balance of power idiom to identify an alternative stance - neither balancing nor bandwagoning - that is in dynamic equilibrium. That equilibrium is struck between domestic and international dynamics; balancing contradictory domestic cultural and political forces (such as nationalism/cosmopolitanism, anti-Americanism/pro-Americanism, self-sufficiency/trade-optimism) and international appeals and threats (such as American democratic/technological/commercial affinity, American unilateral neo-Imperialism, Chinese commercial appeal, and Chinese threatening intrusion/pressure). ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article examines the interaction of domestic and international factors in determining relations and policies associated with Taiwan and the Taiwan Strait. It considers the possibility of direct military confrontation between the U.S. and its regional challenger, China, over Taiwan. A review of the literature on cross-Strait and the triangular relations of U.S.-China-Taiwan is presented. It considers the impact of U.S. presidential elections on the China policy since 1980.

Recent research suggests that cultural differences in Chinese and Western modes of conceptual reasoning play a significant role in political discourse and relations between the United States and China. In contrast, our analysis of the discourse surrounding the 2001 collision of an American surveillance plane with a Chinese fighter jet over international waters reveals a surprisingly high degree of similarity in conceptual metaphors used across the two cultures. Employing tools from cognitive linguistics and cognitive science, we compare the U.S. and Chinese conceptual metaphors used to frame the incident over a thirteen day period, ultimately distinguishing between shared metaphorical conceptualizations (WAR, JOURNEY, and ECONOMIC) and competing metaphorical conceptualizations (GAME, TECHNICAL FIX, VICTIM, and CIVIL RELATIONS). Our analysis allows us to make empirically grounded claims about Chinese-American relations that avoid cultural stereotypes and suggest possibilities for further integration of interpretive and scientific approaches to understanding intercultural discourse. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]