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A conference paper about the U.S. constitutional politics is presented which was prepared for presentation at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, from August 30-September 2, 2012. The paper discusses topics including American political life, liberal democracy of the U.S., and the political thoughts of political scientist Herbert Storing.

The Occupy movement sweeping the country has drawn critical attention to the need to develop new economic models that enrich communities rather than a small group of investors that have little or nothing to do with the communities from which their wealth is extracted. This need is nothing new, of course, especially for New Orleans in the wake of Hurricane Katrina, although liberal capitalism among other factors has produced long-running economic disasters in many cities that parallel the natural disaster that befell New Orleans. However, there is more at stake here than economic resources. In fact, as I will argue in this paper, addressing the problem of wealth extraction also requires addressing the separation of economics and politics through the democratization of the economy. Specifically, this paper will examine the role of cooperatives as democratic institutions and an important element of the solidarity economy, giving attention to their historical development as a way of drawing out their democratic character. The size and extent of cooperatives in the U.S. is not often recognized, yet with some 120 million members (and 800 million members worldwide), cooperatives may represent the world's largest democratic social movement. Indeed, the nature of cooperatives as democratic enterprises must be better understood, as they vary considerably in terms of size, shape, and the degree to which they adhere to their founding principles of egalitarianism, shared property and democracy. For example, while worker cooperatives are often regarded as the paradigmatic case of a democratic enterprise, they remain fully engaged in the capitalist logic of production for exchange rather than use. By the same token, the consumer cooperative model gets away from the problem of exchange-value vs. use-value, but their large size may mitigate against participatory frameworks in favor of the kind of alienated representative governance that tends to produce apathetic, disinterested publics. Two models, an associative model and multi-stakeholder cooperatives, will be considered as ways to address some of the problems of democratic deficits. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

While the content of Alexis de Tocqueville's political categories has been voluminously studied, his use of religious categories in moral argument are only occasionally noted and almost never explained. In this paper I argue that Tocqueville's use of the category of Providence in Democracy in America I is best understood in relation to the history and practices of Jansenism. Secondly, I argue that Tocqueville's use of the idea of Providence points to his use of other Jansenist categories as well, especially the idea of an 'order of justification.' Tocqueville's use of this concept allows him to defend the democratic social state as a set of political and social relations independent from the world of religion while maintaining that the ultimate ethical justification of the democratic social state is that it is, in fact, an expression of divine will. The approach I follow in this paper is closest to that of Jean-Louis Benoit in Tocqueville Moraliste because I view Democracy in America I as moralist work, intended to move the reader emotionally and provoke action. Tocqueville's use of Jansenist categories owes the most to his reading of Pascal but Pascal is by no means the only Jansenist in Tocqueville's intellectual genealogy. Without an understanding the connections between Pascal's religious and political ideas, our understanding of the influence of Pascal on Tocqueville remains incomplete. The advantage of using the history and ideas of Jansenism is that it gives a mechanism of transmission and a hierarchy of ideas that more robustly explains the influence of Pascal on Tocqueville. Moreover, it is certain that Tocqueville knew Pascal was a Jansenist. In the next section of this paper I explain the basic philosophical substance of Jansenism with a special focus on Pascal's use of Jansenist categories of the hidden God, an 'order of justification.', and Providence. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper discusses a major question candidates must address in campaigning for the presidency of the United States. In a pluralistic democracy with a constitutional commitment to religious freedom and church-state separation, how, if at all, should a president's religious beliefs influence his or her governing? Should he or she use the bully pulpit of the presidency or the appointive and coercive powers of the executive branch to translate his or her religious convictions and church teachings into public law and public policy? If so, how, when and on what issues? The paper examines this issue through an analysis of three major speeches given by political leaders in the last two generations: the Houston speech of President Kennedy in 1960, the Notre Dame address of Governor Cuomo in 1984, and the Texas address of Governor Mitt Romney in 2007. This analysis raises a deeper question: has the official American Catholic Church moved away from supporting the strict separationist position of John F. Kennedy in 1960 to advocating a more active and interventionist approach to recent Catholic presidential candidates? And if so, why? ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Though the debate pro and con over the initiative process has many aspects, the question at the heart of the debate is majoritarianism. This paper--which is unfinished and in progress--attempts to place the debate over initiatives against a background of theoretical discussion on the subject of majority rule. A preliminary section considers a variety of claims that the initiative is not really a majoritarian process, but rejects them. The rest of the paper in its present form, deals with mid-20th century theorist Willmoore Kendall. Early in his career he was a "self-confessed" defender of "absolute majority rule." Later, he developed a more nuanced position. Later versions will also consider Elaine Spitz, whose "Majority Rule" in the 1980s examined how majorities are formed. It is not expected that the paper, when completed, will dramatically influence the debate over direct democracy, but it may help show how the issues in that debate match with more general debates over majority rule. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper extends analyses of tax policy in Swank (2006). The earlier article argues that, through competition-driven diffusion, the highly visible 1980s market-conforming reform of corporate taxes in the United States shaped subsequent tax policy reform in other nations. It also argues that there are substantial reasons to believe that domestic political and institutional forces shaped policy maker assessment of the benefits and costs of neoliberal tax policy and, in turn, the pace and depth of tax reform. In the current paper, I expand my treatment of democracy and internationalization, their interaction in shaping tax policy, and the time period for empirical analysis. Using new data and analysis of 1982-to-2002 corporate tax rates in 16 nations, I find, consistent with Swank (2006), reforms in U.S. taxation influence subsequent tax reforms in other polities; in the long-term, all polities shift toward the U.S. neoliberal tax structure. The short-term responsiveness to US tax reforms is, however, notably stronger where liberal market institutions are dominant. Analyses also show that trade openness and capital mobility, domestic economic conditions and fiscal pressures matter. The degrees to which institutions coordinate markets and disperse political power also have direct effects on the transformation of tax policy. There is modest evidence that recent tax change in a nation's full set of competitors shapes current tax reform, but little evidence that domestic shifts of median voters, right party governance, or political signals on imminent tax reform from competitor nations significantly influence the spread of neoliberal tax reform. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the current representation of Hispanics in state government throughout the United States. The analysis explores Hispanic educational attainment in relation to representative bureaucracies in state government. The findings of this paper suggest further research to be conducted in explaining bureaucratic representation beyond Hispanic growth rates in demographics. Bureaucratic representation appears to be challenged by underlying factors that relate to the attainment of a critical mass in state government demographics. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper considers the question of whether and to what degree citizens are responsible collectively for the actions of their state. In contrast to current accounts of collective responsibility which focus on causality or affect as means for transmitting responsibility, the paper develops an alternative account, the "authorized state" model. This model, drawn from core intuitions of the social contract tradition, sees collective responsibility as being transmitted through the state as the agent or representative of its citizens. Having developed this model as an ideal type, the paper then assesses under what circumstances the model is most applicable, arguing that it is most relevant (1) when a collective undertakes unified, often violent or coercive action (such as in war), (2) when that action is undertaken through democratic procedures relatively free of manipulation or deception and (3) where such action does not entail the application of collective punishment. The paper finally applies the model to the U.S. war in Iraq to assess the collective responsibilty of U.S. citizens for the outcomes of that war. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since its inception into American politics, the Internet has been a source of great debate for scholars in numerous fields. Many scholars feel the jury is still out in considering questions such as the Internet's ability to better deliberative democracy, heighten social capital, and encourage citizens into the political system. Questions still surround our ability to determine the Web's potential versus actual influence in these and other topics of American politics. In attempt to offer answers to some of these outstanding questions, this paper offers new insight into how social capital is created on the Web. Drawing on a case study of the 2006 Connecticut Senate election, including an in-depth interview and content analysis of YouTube videos, this paper points to the Internet as an important contributor in unseating Joe Lieberman from his position in the Democratic Party. I argue that four main characteristics of challenger Ned Lamont's digital campaign earned him substantial social capital from his blog supporters. These four characteristics are valuing a Web presence, embracing interactivity, empowering the liberal blogosphere, and maintaining relations with this blogosphere in the post-election era. I also describe how political history dating back to the 2004 election caused incumbent Joe Lieberman to take a very conservative approach to his online campaign, thus limiting him from attaining such social capital.This research demonstrates that, while it may not be the end-all-be-all solution for scholars who see a decline in deliberative democracy and social capital, the Internet does have the power to play an important role in the revitalization of American politics. Although only a single case, the Lamont campaign gives us perspective and encouragement on how social capital can not only be build online, but also maintained. With the Internet still in its infancy in our politics, time will tell how widespread this type of impact will be in the future. By examining future candidates at different levels of government, scholars will be able to better understand other characteristics that may or may not attribute to the construction of social capital online. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Alexis de Tocqueville was only one of many French liberals who visited America in the nineteenth century, and yet his account of America is read to the almost total exclusion of those presented by his fellow French writers. In the spirit of trans-disciplinarity, this paper will turn away from Tocqueville's Democracy in America as a work of political theory in order to focus upon the experience of travel as a factor informing Tocqueville's vision of America. More than this, however, this paper will seek to locate Tocqueville's journey within the broader context of the other voyages to America undertaken and written about by his French contemporaries, thereby spanning the period from the early 1830s to the period immediately after the Civil War. Some of these accounts were written by friends and acquaintances of Tocqueville, some by those he saw as rivals and competitors. Into the first category fall J-J Ampère, whose 2 volume Promenades en Amérique was published in 1856 and Ernest Duvergier de Hauranne, author of Huit mois en Amérique: lettres et notes de voyage (1864-65). In the latter fall Michel Chevalier, author of Lettres sur l'Amérique du Nord (1836) and the unlikely-named Guillaume-Tell Poussin, author of several books on America, including Considérations sur le Principe démocratique qui régit l'Union Américaine (1841) and of De la Puissance Américaine (1843). In this way the paper intends to cast light on the 'mirage' of America and the long-cherished European hope of finding not just a lost paradise but the possibility of establishing and founding a new civilization and ideal republic. Yet as these accounts make clear, if American reality could be embellished so as to provide an image of a radiant future, it also gave intimations of the dangers that the future held in store. To that extent the collapse of the American dream was foretold in its very beginnings. However, by focussing upon these travel writings the intention is to show how the lived experience of America shaped the views of these writers about the nature of a democratic society and how this in turn shaped their perceptions of the possibilities in their own country. The paper will conclude by comparing these accounts with the most recent travelogue/philosophical analysis provided about America from the pen of a French liberal: Bernard Henri-Lévy's American Vertigo. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper looks at the issue of presidential tenure from the perspective of the founding generation. The main concern is to understand the theoretical underpinnings of the debates over presidential tenure, especially focusing on the concepts of power and democracy. Guided by a conceptual focus on power and democracy, the paper proceeds chronologically. It first looks at the issue of presidential tenure during the colonial period, examining the differing models of royal governors. Next, it analyzes the state constitutions forged in the wake of independence to understand the main views of executive power and tenure. The Articles of Confederation are also addressed in this section. Third, the debates surrounding presidential tenure at the Convention itself are examined. The major views and plans-with regard to length of term and possibility of reeligibility-are analyzed, with an emphasis on the final product, a four year term with unlimited reeligibility. The arguments at the time of ratification, particularly the debates in the writings of the Federalists and Anti-Federalists, are also addressed. Finally, a two dimensional theoretical chart is offered to help focus the connections between power, democracy, and executive tenure historically and contemporarily. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the name of fighting terrorism, the government of the United States has curtailed some civil liberties, particularly the right to trial by jury, the right of privacy, and the protections against indefinite internment. This type of reaction is common among states confronted with terrorism, but it is a strategy that might pose grave risks to the fundamentals of American democracy as guaranteed in the Bill of Rights of the Constitution. These measures are dangerous because they give greater power to the government, specifically the executive branch, and increase the chances that power will be abused. Nevertheless, there are steps we can take to make sure these powers are not abused or, that at the minimum, the abuses of power are minimized. This paper describes three important institutions that can minimize the abuses of power by the executive branch: the legislature, the judiciary, and the press. This paper will analyze how these institutions have performed in the United States while comparing their role to that of similar institutions in other democracies that have also curtailed civil liberties to fight terrorism. The central argument of this paper is that the United States can better protect civil liberties while fighting terrorism even though in comparison to other countries (like the United Kingdom, Peru, and Uruguay), the power of the executive branch in the U.S. has been relatively constrained. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article explores diversity and citizenship in U.S. cities. The first part of the paper argues that residential segregation is not a problem of democracy, rather it is a result of democracy. The second part of the paper argues that class diversity is more important to democratic citizenship than race diversity. It is noted that residential segregation is more pronounced in the U.S. today as people exercise their liberty.

What explains the dynamics of lawmaking? Many researchers have argued that bicameralism is a key institution that increases legislative delay and gridlock. However, there is virtually no research to date on the effects of bicameralism in recently democratized countries. The existing work on bicameralism focuses on the U.S. presidential system and European parliamentary systems. The purpose of this paper is to analyze, taking Brazil as a case, the determinants of the dynamics of lawmaking in a nascent presidential bicameral democracy. In legislative research, surprisingly little work exists that examines lawmaking itself except when individual pieces of legislation are analyzed as case studies. Instead, much of influential quantitative legislative research both in American and comparative legislative studies have focused either on legislative behavior, usually analyzing patterns of roll call voting or on the propensity for gridlock at the aggregate level. In this paper, I take individual bills as a unit of analysis and examine how various legislative rules, preferences of the two chambers, and environments that shift over time affect legislative timings and outcomes in the Brazilian Congress. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper attempts to evaluate Bruce Ackerman?s theory of dualist democracy. He distinguishes two different decisions that may be made in a democracy. The first is a decision by the people themselves, which is designated as higher lawmaking that embodies the general will of the people; the second is a decision by government, which is designated as normal politics. The objective of Ackerman?s two-track theory of democracy is to resolve the tension between self-government and the rule law in American constitutionalism. I attempt to demonstrate that Ackerman?s idea of dualist democracy is a virtue-centric, populist, republicanism. His synthesis relies on the premise of the priority of self-government over the rule of law. It constitutes a solid alternative to the recent neo-Roman republicanism of Quentin Skinner and Philip Pettit, which emphasizes law-centric republican constitutionalism. The relevance of dualist democracy is explored via a contextualized analysis of the virtue-centric republicanism from Hannah Arendt to J. G. A. Pocock and Hanna Pitkin. Ackerman?s interpretation of the Federalist Paper as the main intellectual resource of his project is also examined. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

During the last decade the two largest democracies of the world, i.e., India and US have been constantly coming closer. Advent of satellite channels and beginning of economic liberalization program in India has generated a keen interest in U.S. affairs. US has become the hottest destination for Indian software professionals. Sociologists have been expressing deep concern regarding Americanization of Indian youth because of channels like MTV and Hollywood movies. 911 attacks on US and ensuing war on terror have been extensively covered and scrutinized by Indian media. Indian media has a love-hate relationship with US. On the one hand Indian media admires American democracy, entrepreneurship and rule of law, on the other it is portraying war on terror as hegemonistic design intended to turn international politics completely unipolar. While deepening commercial ties and joint military exercises between the two countries are being welcomed by all sections of media, certain quarters are vehemently critical of US attack and subsequent occupation of Iraq. The reason Indian government dithered, debated and ultimately decided not to send troops to Iraq can be attributed to media?s vociferous opposition. Bush administration?s unstinted support to Musharraf government in Pakistan is being termed by Indian media as the most glaring example of ?double standards? in war against terror. Indian media accuses that in spite of having full knowledge of terrorist camps in Pakistan, Bush administration has refused to take penal actions against Pakistan. This paper will deal with how media has covered America?s war on terror and what impact it has had on Indian public opinion and decision making process. The perception of Indian media regarding the burgeoning American hegemony in new world order will also be analyzed in this paper. The paper will make suggestions regarding what role media can play in bringing these two countries together in their mutual fight against terror. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper considers whether constitutionalism presupposes the existence of a ?people.? After reviewing some of the relevant literature, the paper makes three claims. First, there are multiple varieties of constitutionalism. Only those varieties that aim at self-government presuppose the existence of a people, and not all constitutions need have that goal. Second, there are multiple conceptions of self-government which correspond to different conceptions of what a ?people? is. Third, there is a plausible version of constitutional self-government that presupposes only modest conditions for the existence of a people. In particular, it presupposes the right to travel, a common discourse, and a widely (though not unanimously) shared sense of mission, but it does not presuppose shared values, character, ethnicity, or (except in a very thin sense) heritage. These conditions are probably satisfied within the United States. The paper therefore concludes that it is possible to interpret American constitutionalism as an effort to secure a form of self-government that does presuppose the existence of an American people, but that does not presuppose the existence of shared American values, an American character, or an American ethnicity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper is about the foreign policy thinking of neoconservatives, a group that distinguishes itself from others with its pessimistic outlook about world affairs and its belief that the U.S. should spread its values and ideals to the rest of the world, by unilateral force if necessary. This paper argues that the neocons? imperial project of imposing American values (especially democracy) on the world in general, and the Middle East in particular, has certain limits. The most important limits are related to the nature and character of American society, politics, and government. Moreover, people on the receiving end of U.S. power may be ambivalent towards American values and ideals. In order to illustrate these points, I draw on the example of post-war Iraq. It has become clear in Iraq that the neocons overestimated the capacity of the U.S. for nation-building which is a necessary condition for building an empire and establishing a decent democracy. Neocons also underestimated the cultural difficulties involved in transforming the political landscape of Iraq and the Middle East. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper argues that, in conjunction with relative power, ideational changes in US nationalism explain long-term variation in American democracy promotion strategy, including its most recent iteration in the Bush administration. The paper concludes by using this perspective to critique the neoconservative approach to extending liberal values and instituions in the international system. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The United States are usually described, in general discussions of American as well as comparative politics, as the most constitutionally stable democracy, and as a model of presidential system ‘engineered’ by the creative minds of framers dedicated to establish a democracy based on separated institutions checking their respective use of delegated power. This paper challenges this mechanic approach to constitutional design and evolution. It argues, through historical and theoretical evidence, that the American constitution (much like most constitutions generally, and like the French Fifth republic constitution specifically) could have lead, in the early phase of its implementation, to either a presidential system or a ministerial government, given the combined influences of historical forces and the political sensibilities and strategic actions of the nation’s first leaders. The American constitutional construction has been the product of unstable and temporary coalitions, not the straightforward design of a coherent and cohesive majority. The process is full of doors left open, interpretative disputes, and turning points in the implementation phase, and this project first reviews the different ‘constitutional moments’ of the American constitutive process, and replaces these turning points in a larger political and historical context, as products of historical struggles and legacies of competing visions of governance. The key element of our analysis is to make better substantive use of observations made by different scholars: namely that American revolutionaries, in their efforts to construct a republic, sought not to get rid of the architecture of institutions of Great Britain, but to improve them by setting up mechanisms that would prevent the corruption that had perverted British politics. The British institutions were for the new American political leaders, both their main source of inspiration and the very system they had built so much resentment against. After the frustrating experience of the Articles of the Confederation, the United States Constitution was to be the perfected synthesis of two extremes, executive corruption and legislative tyranny. The two institutions newly constructed had different historical roots: while the presidency was essentially a transformation of the British Crown and Cabinet, Congress was the refinement of much more recent and radical idea of democratic governance. The challenge was to make democratic, efficient and stable not only the institutions themselves, but their interaction as well. This paper indicates that the early United States went, from 1789 to 1800, through a much more floating and unstable implementation phase than what is generally believed: an uneasy struggle of each institution to test and practice its potential for subordination, to assert its prerogatives, and to find its place in the constitutional order. Next, the paper traces the evolution of clauses, statutes, and behaviors that could have led the United States on the evolutionary path towards ministerial government, or a close version of it. We will first look at the design of the constitution and look for clauses that signaled the erection of a presidential system, but left the door open for different ulterior developments: selection process, presence of Cabinet members in the House, senatorial power of appointment, presidential power of removal, … We will then examine the early implementation phase to identify when and how the original model could have taken different equilibration paths. Much attention is given to historical evidence regarding Alexander Hamilton’s political entrepreneurship, his critical attempt to shape executive-legislative relations, and his underlying desire to morph his executive function into prime ministership -in a tellingly similar fashion as the British Lord Treasurer. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Students of political thought traditionally read Tocqueville’s writings as a strong endorsement of the institutions and political culture he encountered during his travels through America. Indeed, Democracy in America is undoubtedly the text most frequently cited by modern scholars seeking to glorify the American democratic experiment. This paper joins a burgeoning literature in the field that seeks to take seriously the very important criticisms he leveled against America’s political institutions and cultural traditions in the text of Democracy in America. The central argument of this paper is that Tocqueville believed America’s long-term potential as the primary vessel for the expansion of equality in the modern world was significantly circumscribed by what he saw in relations between the races. Unlike previous studies that have taken up Tocqueville’s commentary on race relations, this paper argues that the Frenchman’s examination of the status of free blacks represents was his most important contribution to the subject. This is so because it bridges to the concerns about democratic despotism (or majority tyranny) that Tocqueville expresses in the first book of Democracy in America. Paying careful attention to this linkage not only reveals Tocqueville as a critic of America’s democratic political institutions and culture, but it also shows that his insights are far more applicable to modern race relations than those made by the celebrated twentieth century critics Gunnar Myrdal and W.E.B. Du Bois. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Drug policy poses a fundamental challenge to American democracy. Nowhere is this more evident than in its impact on marginalized communities. To be sure, scholars have noted the social problems associated with the implementation of drug laws of the 1980’s, including: continued drug use and addiction; increased incarceration; and spread of drug-related illnesses. Additionally, civil rights activists attack the individual rights’ restrictions central to drug policy. Still, less attention has been paid to other ways in which drug policy harms citizens’ democratic experiences, particularly those of marginalized community members. The focus of this paper will be to examine the effects of contemporary drug policy on the political expressions and experiences of African Americans. Using Harlem as a case study, this paper confirms the argument that a racial gap exists across Americans’ perceptions of the drug problem. Factors influencing this cognitive divide include: 1) the disparate impact of drug legislation; 2) the symbolic messages communicated by political leaders about drug victims and culprits; and 3) the distrust and suspicion of the political motives of the government by African Americans. This study uses interviews, contextual and survey data to explore the democratic implications of these racial disparities. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper argues against certain features of one prominent account (by John Rawls) of democratic legitimacy, justice, and rights. The paper also argues for an alternative account. Rawls argues in his later writings (well after A Theory of Justice) that to set out some basic conditions for constitutional democratic legitimacy, we need an account of justice appropriate for the "domain of the political", we need "an overlapping consensus" of "reasonable comprehensive doctrines" about what is just, we need need citizen endorsement of "constitutional essentials" as described in the account of justice. On a Rawlsian view, religious, philosophical, or moral comprehensive doctrines that try to say what is generally valuable in human life cannot be enforced without the oppressive exercise of state power. I argue that a better philosophy would be more qualified about comprehensive doctrines, more empirical and disconfirmable, not so Kantian. Rawls is right that the legal enforcement of religion is likely to require the oppressive exercise of state power but wrong to say that enforcing philosophical and moral comprehensive doctrines can be ruled out across the board as involving the oppressive exercise of state power. This depends on the "comprehensive doctrine". I question Rawls’s rejection of what he calls "comprehensive doctrines’ that would enforce the ideal of autonomy (e.g., some of Joseph Raz’s views). Only if we defend the possibility of some philosophical and moral doctrines being used in correcting the societal consensus on "constitutional essentials", and effectively advocating constitutional reform, can we avoid political dogmatism about the nature of democratic legitimacy, justice, and rights. I offer some empirical and political confirmation of my view by drawing on what Cass Sunstein argues about socioeconomic rights embedded in the South African Constitution among many others, an arrangement that could be drawn on to criticize the American Constitution. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the applicability of the democratic peace (DP) thesis to a rapidly changing global security environment and, more specifically, to examine the motivation of the United States, the most prominent democratic power, to use force for the promotion of peace through the spread of democracy. In this paper, we distinguish between traditionally accepted instrumental, normative, and institutional use-of-force motivators that apply to democracies and non-democracies alike, but we also add a discussion of contextual use-of-force motivators which are unique to democracies. The basic assumption underlying the DP argument is that democratic states are less prone to wage wars than non-democratic states. But, if democracy makes states more peaceful, why do democratic states still use force? Illustrating each motivator in light of contemporary U.S. national security decisions shows that the DP thesis can provide valuable insight into the reasons why democracies may continue to use force and, in the extreme, wage war. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In recent years, the public choice school, which has dominated the debate on metropolitan governance since the 1980s, is facing new intellectual challenges. Like the reformers during the first half of the 20th Century, many urban scholars and practitioners are again demanding more integrated governance structures for sprawling metropolitan areas. There are also fundamental differences between the early reformers and the current advocates of a new regionalism in metropolitan areas. The new conceptions can be seen as the latest step in a dialectic development of governance paradigms. Whereas the early reformers adopted a technocratic, "steering" perspective and proposed a consolidated regional city, the public choice advocates relied on an individualistic "choice" approach to propose decentralized and (territorially or functionally) fragmented government structures. The latest turn of the debate goes beyond a pure instrumentalist view on political institutions which is embodied in both traditions. Social constructivists understand the attempts for "boundary (re)drawing", which is at the core of all metropolitan reform plans, primarily as a process of constructing/ constitutionalizing individual and collective identities. This paper presents an analysis of distinct definitions of fundamental governance goals and the corresponding proposals for institutional design. Very different understandings of "democracy" can be described in Abraham Lincoln’s terms: Early reformers based their plans on a top-down perspective on democracy as "government for the people", rational choice advocates stress the bottom-up concept of "government by the people" and social constructivists focus their attention on "government of the/of what people" - an aspect which is gaining center stage in a world where socio-economic and cultural spaces of flows are superposing traditional spaces of place. The formula for economic success has changed from focusing on effectiveness (a concept based on welfare theory) over efficiency (based on political economy) to competitiveness (based on trade theory). Dominant definitions of social justice have been transformed from equality over equivalence to equity/difference. The paper uses those different definitions of core values and the corresponding proposals for institutional design to analyze the discourse on institutional reform in metropolitan areas in the United States from the 1950s to the year 2000. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We begin with a discussion of the president’s ministerial function, specifically as it relates to his ability to inspire the polity and serve as the nation’s moralist. The paper then explores what it is about the American context that makes this function one of the presidency’s most important. We then cite specific examples from recent administrations to illustrate the ways in which contemporary chief executives have fulfilled their ministerial role. Finally, the paper concludes by relating the role of minister-in-chief to the broader question of democracy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A central tenet of democratic theory is that the elected should reflect the preferences of the citizenry. However, despite generating contradictory and directly testable hypotheses, leading representation theories have not yet been empirically tested. This paper bridges this gap by testing the conflicting predictions of two important representation models, the Standard Control Model (Bernstein 1989) and the Alternative Control Model (Arnold 1990, 1993). The results demonstrate that legislators reflect constituents? preferences even on issues about which citizens know little. A shift in constituents? ideology from moderately conservative to moderately liberal corresponds to about a 30 point change in the probability that a legislator will vote for a bill. This research is important because it provides the most conservative test of representation?if representation occurs on issues about which citizens have little knowledge, it seems certain to occur on issues about which citizen knowledge is high. Consequently, this research provides substantial evidence for the Alternative Control Model. Check author’s web site for an updated version of the paper. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The goal of the IEA Civic Education Study has been to examine in a comparative framework the political socialization of adolescents as they prepare to undertake their roles as citizens in democracies. Approximately 90,000 students from the modal grade for 14-year-olds from nationally representative samples in twenty-eight countries were tested during 1999. This paper focuses on the predictors of four different types of political engagement: electoral, partisan, volunteer, and protest. The potentially influential factors to be examined are knowledge of democracy and skills in interpreting information, sense of trust in government related institutions, several aspects of the schools (perceptions of curriculum, sense of efficacy developed in the school culture, perceived encouragement of discussion in the classroom, and current participation in organizations). The countries included in this presentation include Australia, England, Greece, Norway, and the United States. The theoretical base for the paper is Wenger’s work on communities of practice. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Many commentators of late have bemoaned the demise of manliness in the modern world. This paper argues that manliness, understood as courage (andreia), is not in decline. Instead, it appears in another form. By turning to Tocqueville’s assessment of courage in America, it is demonstrated that what has been superceded is not courage and manliness in general, but the martial courage of the old European order. In America, Tocqueville sees what is in this paper called economic courage. Interpreting this aspect of Tocqueville’s thought reveals that the source of this new manliness lies in the American woman. From their deep adherence to the dogma of equality, American women establish and reinforce Tocqueville’s feminine democracy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper utilizes the theoretical insights from the literature on transitional justice to address issues of racial justice (pertaining to African Americans) in the United States. The title is a bit misleading, as I say little about racial reconciliation as such. A more appropriate title would be something like "Racial Justice as Transitional Justice." Still, I do want to examine what would be required for a just resolution to a wide range of political issues involving race in the contemporary United States. The general argument is that much of the racial injustice in this country can be traced to the incomplete nature of the transition that took place during the civil rights era. More recent regime transitions in various parts of the world have taught us a great deal about what is necessary to make a just transition from a human rights-abusing regime to a human rights-respecting regime. In light of these more recent transitions, and the theorizing to which they have given rise, our own transition to democracy looks very incomplete. It therefore remains incumbent upon us to complete this transition in order to become a (more) racially just society. The argument proceeds in three main stages. I first discuss the range of views among theorists of transitional justice, and defend what I take to be a moderate position on the requirements of a just transition. These requirements include a strong prima facie presumption in favor of certain backward-looking measures such as prosecution, reparation, and acknowledgement. Next, I argue that the civil rights era in the United States was a regime transition, analogous to more recent transitions, and thus can be evaluated in light of the normative standards that have emerged from reflection upon recent transitions to democracy. By the standards I defend in the first section, our transition to democracy with respect to equal citizenship for African American was not just, or at least is so far incomplete. The country certainly did not undertake the measures that are prima facie required for a just transition, and it seems that the conditions that could rebut the presumption in favor of those measures did not obtain. The third section of the paper suggests a range of issues that should be considered in an effort to complete our transition to a nonracist liberal democracy. These include policies designed to implement a program of black reparations and symbolic and cultural issues related to the acknowledgement of the injustice of the past. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Religiosity in America is a two-edged sword. On the one hand, the highly religious more nearly approach the ideal democratic citizen than any other group. They are more neighborly, altruistic, and selfless. Despite this, the non-religious perceive the highly religious to be intolerant and selfish. Using an innovative experimental design, this paper explores how religiosity influences individual behavior (both political and non-political) and finds that the highly religious are significantly less likely to engage in everyday activities with non-believers. This bias is distinct from partisan motivated bias that might come as the religious and the non-religious separate into opposing political parties. The findings suggest that those who are openly atheistic are excluded from the social networks that seem to help the religious develop the attributes of the democratic ideal. The potential exclusion from these social networks could explain why some Americans choose to remain in the closet about their atheism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Many scholars have theorized that judicial review can provide a "friendly hand" to the elected branches by enforcing legislative bargains, taking on politically difficult decisions, clarifying vague or conflicting legislation, and/or buttressing federal power against state actors. Other scholars contend that empowering the judiciary to have an active role in policymaking has undesirable consequences - to these scholars, the judicialization of politics unwisely reframes the policy debate in legal terms, disempowers social movements by removing issues from traditional political contestation, and generates public and political backlash. This paper addresses these claims by examining an area where the courts, through either actively declining jurisdiction or passively acquiescing to executive power, have deliberately abstained from claiming a role in policymaking. We examine the negative space caused by such willful "un-juridification" by looking at American immigration policy. Courts have traditionally shown extraordinary deference to the plenary authority of the elected branches in immigration law. Federal courts have largely abdicated responsibility in determining, enforcing, or reviewing immigration laws -- holding that the elected branches have unrestricted power over immigration policy, border security, and qualifications for citizenship as a matter of state sovereignty. This "oil- and-water relationship" between immigration law and judicial review has generated much scholarship providing historical and socio-political explanations for the reticence and its adverse impact on immigrant rights. However, the literature lacks a comprehensive analysis of the impact of judicial deference on the elected branches. We look at the effects of this judicial void using institutionalist and rational choice frameworks. We develop a formal model of the politics of judicial abdication in the immigration context by looking at the institutional legacies, structural aspects of independence and separation of powers, and feedback and direct effects on coalition building and statute drafting. Our research thus seeks to go beyond the standard debate about judicial activism and constraint and explore the dynamics of the court as a political branch engaged in strategic decision-making within the larger democratic framework. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Although numerous scholars have explored the linkage between constituency policy preferences and the roll-call behavior of legislators, little effort has been devoted to understanding variation in policy responsiveness. In this paper we posit a comprehensive theory of the effects of member and district characteristics on the linkage between constituency opinion and legislative policy responsiveness. We focus primarily on the effects of district diversity, which represents the degree to which legislative constituencies send clear signals to their representatives about their policy expectations. Using data on the U.S. House for the years 1981 to 2000, we find that legislator responsiveness is significantly stronger for House members representing homogenous districts and whose constituents are politically sophisticated and engaged. Policy responsiveness is also ameliorated by seniority and chamber activities--more senior House members and those who sponsor more legislation are less responsive to their constituents. Our findings have important implications for how we perceive the representative-constituency relationship. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

the purpose of this paper is to examine the extent to which party system institutionalization, electoral rules, and national economic performance affect political representation in Latin America. Political representation is measured by the citizen-representative congruence in two issues: support for democracy and political ideology. The general assumption is that higher / lower levels of political representation correspond to higher/lower levels of institutionalization, less/more permissive electoral rules, and better/worse economic performance. Countries included in the study are México, Chile, Argentina, El Salvador, Bolivia, Honduras, Colombia, Costa Rica, Nicaragua, Guatemala, Paraguay, Ecuador, Dominican Republic, Perú, Uruguay, and Panamá. According to the results, the citizen-representative congruence in support for democracy model was not significant. However, the same factors included in such model did have something to do with the citizen-representative correspondence in political ideology, although two variables, gender quota and ballot structure, were not statistically significant. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The United States frequently represents its foreign policy as a strategy of democratic renewal by focusing on the processes involved in creating popular sovereignty in other nation states. It has added rhetorical force and, in some cases, empirical reality to its claims of democratization by using the language of nonviolence and nonviolent resistance in its support for popular uprisings around the world (Chile, Indonesia, Philippines, Serbia, Iran, Tunisia, and Egypt to name a few). Yet, this language is relatively new. America overtly changed its policy of supporting dictatorships into a policy of supporting democratic regimes after the fall of the Shaw in Iran and the overthrow of the U.S. supported Somoza dictatorship in Nicaragua, according to William I. Robinson (1996). The so-called "Arab Spring" of 2011 offers an opportunity to further pay attention to this representational shift by comparing the U.S. treatment of Arab and African states in revolt. This paper devises three categories of nonviolence in order to better understand and evaluate the United States' policy of supporting those who struggle nonviolently. By interpreting and evaluating the Arab and African Uprisings in terms of both the literature on nonviolence and democracy promotion, and US foreign policy it is hoped that this essay will contribute to debate between mainstream scholars and those participating in more critical analysis. Ultimately this essay's focus on democracy and nonviolence seeks to bring people back into the discussion of international relations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Efforts to operationalize democracy at the national level have occupied a central place in the discipline since the 1960s, and have resulted in a cumulative body of literature and in a variety of datasets of increasing rigor and geographic and temporal coverage. Attempts to measure democracy at the subnational level are much more recent and inchoate, cover only a few countries and periods, and, critically, are not comparable across nations. After reviewing the state of the subject at the national level and the existing (objective) national subnational indices, this paper proposes six versions of an objective Subnational Democracy Index that can be calculated on the basis of (typically available) electoral and institutional data. Because of their modest data demands, the proposed indices can easily be applied to very different national and temporal contexts, thus permitting comparisons of subnational regimes across countries. The measures are pilot-tested on the first-level subnational units of five federations (Argentina, Brazil, Canada, Mexico, and the United States) and of one unitary country (Uruguay). The ultimate goal of this line of research is to produce cross-sectional--time-series datasets of subnational democracy with broad geographic and temporal coverage similar to those existing for national regimes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Though much ink has been spilled examining negative ad techniques, little is still understood about how elites at different branches of government may have an effect in encouraging this negativity. This paper examines whether certain campaign techniques, particularly the decision to "go negative," are diffused from top-ballot campaigns to judicial campaigns within particular states. Specifically, I focus on comparing campaigns for state judicial seats, for which candidates have only recently begun to go negative, with U.S. Senate and gubernatorial election tones, which have a far longer history of negative campaign tactics. If the tone of the campaign goes negative at the top level of the ballot, does it trickle down to other--specifically judicial-- campaigns? I explore this question by examining negative ad frequency in contested U.S. Senate/gubernatorial and state supreme court elections in the American states, merging data from 2000, 2002, and 2004, which are available from Justice At Stake and the Wisconsin Advertising Project. I find that several states exhibit copycat behavior, but that this effect is not consistent. Despite serious data limitations, analysis reveals that interest groups are more likely to run negative ads in judicial ads, and that judicial races are quickly going negative, much like their upper ballot counterparts. In addition, negative ads are most likely when the election is a low-salience retention election. This suggests negative ads are being carefully employed, especially by interest groups, in order to increase the salience of the lower ballot race in voters' minds. I describe the data's patterns as well as identify avenues for future research when further data will be available. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In 2010, the Department of Justice asserted in U.S. District Court and before the U.S. Courts of Appeals that the federal government has exclusive control to regulate immigration and therefore Arizona's controversial SB 1070 immigration control law was unconstitutional because it had been "preempted" by federal authority. That assertion of the division of labor between the national and sub-national government units on immigration policy needs to be empirically and doctrinally evaluated. In fact, for a century and a half before the federal government actively became involved in immigration policy, colonies and then states actively regulated that policy area. This paper explores the political and doctrinal reasons for the delayed federal intervention in this policy area. It argues that in the nineteenth century, the federal government simply lacked the administrative capacity to regulate immigration and that only competition among the states that impeded commercial interests and entreaties from the states themselves for federal financial assistance in the late 1880s paved the way for federal entry into immigration regulation. Moreover, our historical amnesia of this century and a half of sub-national immigration regulation distorts contemporary debates by making it appear as if federal power over immigration always was and that state and local regulation are anomalies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

With the concept of democratic disobedience this paper introduces a justification for civil disobedience that differs from the traditional account of liberal civil disobedience primarily in two aspects: first, the grounds on which disobedient actions are justified and second, the scope of legitimate demands within this mode of protest. To demonstrate the potential of this new mode of justification it is applied to the case of anti-abortion activism in the U.S. The liberal concept of civil disobedience is based on the idea that in cases of blatant injustices civil disobedience is a means to trump and correct democratic decisions in the name of justice. Democratic disobedience, on the other hand, does not invoke an external corrective instance, but rather bases its justification on the assumption that the democratic process is inherently imperfect and therefore inevitably produces democratic deficits, i.e. incongruities between the will of the citizens and governmental politics. Contrary to the liberal model, democratic disobedience does not refer to prepolitical or metaphysical concepts like justice, God or personal conscience, but grounds its justification in the conflictual practice of democratic decision-making processes. This theoretical reorientation expands the legitimate reasons for civil disobedience beyond strict violations of justice. To counterbalance this tendency democratic disobedience is strictly confined to demand only a reintroduction into the political decision-making process and, accordingly, the justification for democratic disobedience expires if a political re-engagement with the issue in question is successfully triggered - and this includes the case in which the sovereign reaffirms the policy. By virtue of this construction liberal and democratic disobedience can co-exist and complement each other depending on the particular context and the justifying reasons for civil disobedience. What renders the concept of democratic disobedience especially valuable, however, is that this new formulation avoids any tendencies towards an instrumental understanding of democracy and justifies disobedience rather as a productive form of participation than as a parasitic external revising mechanism that limits democratic self-government. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Recent quantitative evidence indicates that higher-income Americans have considerably more influence than lower-income citizens on national policy decisions. But the implications of these findings depend on what the affluent want from politics. If their policy preferences closely resemble those of other Americans, the extent of their political power may make little difference. On the other hand, if the affluent tend to pursue their own narrow economic self interests, they may bring about policy results that thwart the wishes of ordinary Americans and cause problems for democracy. Or if affluent Americans tend to be altruistic and strongly concerned about the common good, any disproportionate power they exert may actually have benefits for society. Currently available survey data based on samples of the general population include too few highly affluent respondents to tell us much about what they want from politics. Even combining respondents from several surveys is of limited use because of the "top-coding" problem: we seldom know respondents' precise incomes, but only their presence in a rather loose top-income category. In this paper we make the best use we can of existing data, combining respondents from three past years of General Social Surveys in order to identify some political views of (roughly) the top 4% of U.S. income earners. These views turn out to be quite distinctive: much more socially liberal or libertarian, and more economically conservative, than those of the average American. They are also more distinctive than the opinions of the top third of income earners. These findings are suggestive. But they are tentative, limited in scope, and based on rather old data. We argue that it is important to conduct an original, highly-stratified survey of the political and social views of the most affluent Americans: particularly the rarified top 1% and top 1/10 of 1% of U.S. wealth-holders and income-earners. We briefly describe the project on "Affluent Americans and the Common Good," which is undertaking to carry out such a survey, beginning with a small Pilot Study to be fielded this fall. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A conference paper about rethinking the role of exclusion of political disadvantage groups in the U.S. It discusses the need of democratic citizens to address who should be included in the political arena. It notes that the representation of historically disadvantage needs both the perspective of inclusion and exclusion. It mentions the importance of exclusion in achieving democratic objectives.

Our goal in this paper is to reinvigorate the comparative study of partisan effects in an effort to begin to answer the following question: is partisanship a phenomenon that travels beyond the shores of the United States? If so, does it have different effects in different political contexts and, if that is the case, then why? To do so, we conduct experiments to test the impact of party cues on policy opinions of both partisans and non-partisans in one of the oldest democracies in the world, Great Britain, and two new post-communist democracies, Hungary and Poland. Our experiments test the effects of party cues on public opinion formation in two ways: Single Party Cue (SPC) experiments examine whether being told that one's preferred party supports a particular policy proposal makes the respondent more likely to support that proposal; while Multiple Party Cue (MPC) experiments test whether the explicit linking of positions on a policy question to a number of political parties makes respondents more likely to select their preferred party's position on that issue. Our findings are nuanced but clear: party cues can indeed have effects on public opinion formation by partisans outside of the United States, and these effects are both stronger and are more sharply distinguished between partisans and non-partisans in the established democracy of Great Britain. That being said, at least some of our findings from Hungary look surprisingly more similar to the results from Great Britain than they do to the results from Poland. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

When immigrants arrive to the U.S., do they learn new political orientations and behaviors, or do their prior political socialization continue to shape their attitudes and behavior even in their new setting? If prior socialization continues in new settings, then how much does it matter if immigrants arrive from more or less authoritarian or democratic contexts in their in their countries of origin? Are individuals with less experience with the functioning of democracy in their countries of birth also less likely to be participants in the democratic process in the United States? Using data from the 2006 Latino National Survey this paper examines the prior political socialization of Mexican immigrants in the United States, finds some counter-intuitive results, and suggest some of the implications for participation in the U.S. stemming from the continuity and discontinuity of prior political socialization among immigrants. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

There are very few cases of homegrown religious based terrorism in democracies. Therefore, it is logical to assume that democracy inhibits religious violence and that democracy might be a solution to the current wave of global religious terrorism and violence. Two democracies that have seen instances of homegrown religious terrorism are Israel and the United States. This paper will compare right-wing religious terrorism (anti-abortion) in the United States with right-wing settlement related Jewish terrorism in Israel. My hypothesis is that the appearance and growth of these groups is related to the fortunes of right-wing political parties. In other words, right wing terrorism and violence is suppressed by the success of right wing political parties at the polls. This will examine that religious political groups are willing to use legitimate means to achieve their goals. However, these groups will abandon these legitimate avenues for change and turn to violence when the political process works against them. Thus, democracy may not be a suppressor of religious violence and terror but, rather, a tool used by "rational extremists" to get what they want. This question is of significance as many Islamic political groups are being shut out of the political system in a variety of Islamic countries, because it is claimed that they will use democracy to ultimately destroy it and install theocracies. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

It is the argument of this paper that the thinking of this eminent Frenchman who made himself the keenest observer in history of the American regime may not be as clear to us as we think—that in fact there are at least two and perhaps three Tocquevillian linesof thought that are relevant to the contemporary debate on the proper role for the government of the United—the focus of its attention and the means most suited to its aims—in spreading the truths about liberty that Tocqueville contended were valid at all times and places. That we have inadequately appreciated the variety of counsel that Tocqueville has given us has perhaps been due to our neglect of Tocqueville the political actor as opposed to Tocqueville the author, and to a temptation to concentrate too exclusively on Democracy in America, and particularly on Book One of that seminal work, to the neglect of his other writings. There is more than one Tocquevillian path to liberty, and some of the alternate routes lead over unexpected terrain. Let us unfold the complete map. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Is citizens’ interest in politics indelibly shaped by the political events they experienced during their adolescence and young adulthood? The conventional story attributes cohort differences in political interest to the force of dramatic events experienced during one’s “formative” years. In this paper, I cast doubt on this notion, showing that at least with regard to the development of political interest, the evidence for the role of great collective events in generating the generational disparities is tenuous at best. Drawing on three distinct datasets, I find only sporadic and inconsistent support for the “formative events” hypothesis. We are left with the impression that when such events incite citizens’ interest in politics, as they seem to have at the midst of the controversies over the Vietnam and Iraq wars, their effect is short-lived. I also cast doubt on the widely held belief that “the Vietnam generation” marks the decline in political interest, and more generally, on the idea that the changes in Americans’ interest are accurately captured by the notion of “good times” followed by “bad times.” I argue that neglecting to consider the possibility that the relationship between education and interest is cohort-relative, not absolute, misrepresents the shifts in Americans’ political interest. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper undertakes three tasks. First, I try to spell out what Rawls means by the idea of a "property-owning democracy"; second, I undertake a sympathetic reconstruction of what such a political economy might look like under modern conditions; and third, I address the question of whether there is a politically plausible path to move from "here to there": i.e., whether there is an imaginable route by which advanced democratic societies could effect a transition from current models of corporate capitalism to something approximating a property-owning democracy. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper presents research that explored the connections between neighborhood characteristics, social capital formation and civic engagement in a new form of common interest development called Cohousing. Cohousing neighborhoods are resident-driven, collaborative projects that cluster homes along pedestrian pathways and employ a range of physical and governance structures aimed at fostering a strong sense of community among residents. This study represents one of the few to examine Cohousing on a national scale.This analysis draws on an Internet-based survey of residents of 57 U.S. Cohousing sites as well as in-depth case analyses of three geographically diverse Cohousing neighborhoods to investigate social capital formation and civic engagement practices in these communities. Survey results indicate high levels of social capital and civic engagement among Cohousing residents, as compared to both nationally representative and demographically similar populations. Preliminary analysis suggests that a range of factors may be implicated in this phenomenon including specific patterns of resident involvement in a variety of forms of community engagement.Social Capital has been much studied in recent years in the fields of urban planning, sociology and political science. Nonetheless, whether and how social capital may be created and supported continues to be vigorously debated. This study contributes to this ongoing discussion by exploring social capital formation and civic engagement within this new form of intentional neighborhood development. Results indicate that a combination of physical design and carefully devised governance structures can indeed have a significant influence on the development of social capital and civic practices of Cohousing community residents. This study highlights both the potential and limitations of looking to intentional neighborhood development strategies as a way of fostering social capital creation and increased civic engagement. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper investigates the role of domestic, country-specific conditions in the target countries for the conception and implementation of democracy promotion strategies by the European Union (EU) and the United States of America (US). First, an analytical framework is outlined to allow the identification of 'differentiated strategies'. We build upon the assumption that the 'grey zone' of semi-authoritarian regimes presents the greatest challenge to external democracy promotion. Empirically, we look for conceptual differentiation at the global level and analyze differentiation in implementation in four country case-studies (Morocco, Tunisia, Belarus, and Ukraine). In general, we find a surprising similarity between the two actors' democracy promotion efforts. Even though the EU highlights a cooperative approach whereas the US openly pursue a two-track approach, democracy promotion efforts of the two actors are similarly adapted to a country's context and its development in our four case-studies. Our findings suggest that both actors only choose a truly conflictive approach in reaction to a dramatic worsening of the political situation. In contrast, undemocratic but stable semi-authoritarian regimes are not the focal point of democracy promotion efforts: the scope for cooperative action is significantly limited and not backed up by a conflictive approach. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Kantian Peace theory emphasizes the mutually enforcing pacifying effects of democracy and economic interdependence. This apparent relation between democracy, interdependence and peace became one of the most fundamental guiding principles of American foreign policy in recent years. Nevertheless, the last decade, which has seen record levels of interdependence and democratization, provides us with ample anecdotal evidence that can challenge the simplicity of the democracy~interdependence~peace argument. In this paper I will contrast Kant's approach to this conundrum with that of Rousseau. While Kant's well known argument suggests a mutually reinforcing relation between democracy, interdependence and peace, Rousseau postulates that the pacifying effects of democracy are not sustainable under conditions of heightened interdependence. Rousseau's analysis adds complexity to the familiar Kantian argument by qualifying the conditions under which we can expect democracy and/or democratization to reduce the probability of conflict, and by adding an important social and ideational component to the largely material approach of the Kantian Peace theory (especially regarding the effects of interdependence). ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]