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C. Wright Mills' The Sociological Imagination (1959) represents one of the most influential texts of postwar American sociology. The title has become a catchphrase that stands for a style of thought that transcends both theoretical dogma and the constraints of mere methodological rule following. This article sets out to show that Mills' vision of the sociological imagination had more in common with the then dominant lines of scholarship than his broadside against Parsonian grand theory and Lazarsfeldian abstracted empiricism in the main part of the book would suggest. Among the tools that Mills introduced as fostering the sociological imagination were 2 × 2 tables. The article traces the use of such tables over time and across scholarly communities and shows that, contrary to Mills' own estimate, these tables describe a common nexus between his own work and that of Parsons and Lazarsfeld. All three scholars made ample use of this formal tool to construct sociological arguments at central places of their oeuvre. Given its shared use across otherwise divergent schools, the 2 × 2 table is a prime example for what historians of science have called paper tools, i.e. statistical formulas, algorithms, tables, diagrams, graphs, etc., that structure scientific research across different schools of thought and theoretical approaches. Drawing on the notion of paper tools, the article advances a post-Kuhnian perspective on the history of sociology that shifts the research focus from substantive ideas to formal tools and demonstrates elements of commensurability among presumably incommensurable schools of thought. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article analyzes the Amherst papers in relation to development of Parsons' theory. A careful analysis of the Amherst papers reveals that the basic ideas and philosophical principles that Parsons followed throughout his life were already in place, some more fully developed than others, yet forming an integrally coherent pattern to a surprising degree. The clear existence in Parsons's Amherst papers of a metatheoretical framework predating his later professional writing calls into question some still existing myths about radical breaks in the development of Parsons's theory. In one version of this mythology, Parsons began his theory as a voluntarist, then became a structural-functionalist, later moved on to become a systems-theorist and ended up as a social evolutionist. Despite such claims, Parsons always was a voluntarist, even during his so-called structural-functionalist middle period. The Amherst papers reveal an amazingly complex and logically coherent theoretical system-in the mind of a twenty-year-young man-and testify to an extraordinary scope of philosophical depth, and intellectual maturity.

The article discusses economic and social theory of Talcott Parsons. Parsons's persistent attention to economic theory has been relatively neglected by critics of Parsons who, in attacking the alleged functionalism of Parsonian sociology, concentrated on the issues of value consensus and normative integration, believing that Parsons had relatively little interest in the economic base of society. This neglect of Parsons's economic sociology was probably intensified by the Marxist undercurrent of much so-called conflict theory. In recent years there has fortunately been considerable interest shown in Parsons's analysis of economic theory and more specifically in his economic sociology. At Amherst, Parsons came under the influence of the philosopher Alexander Meiklejohn, who prompted his students to consider broad questions relating to alternatives to industrial capitalist society and who created an educational environment within which students were involved in a general analysis of the social sciences. It was this engagement with institutional economics that marked Parsons's departure from biology into the social sciences as an academic career. Parsons was introduced to a broad spectrum of social theory relating to cultural and biological dimensions of human existence as explanations of social differentiation.

Talcott Parsons did not leave us with a global and consistent sociology of education. Instead, different aspects can be found in Parsons's oeuvre in different theoretical contexts. This paper summarises these different parts of Parsons's sociology of education – his writings on the concepts of education and socialisation, the university, the school, the professions, and modernisation – and discusses central criticisms and perspectives for further theoretical development. The paper goes on to argue that the value of cognitive rationality serves as a common basis of Parsons's sociology of education and that Parsons's sociology of education should be characterised as normative functionalist. Since the current sociology of education does not deal very intensely with Parsons's theoretical approach, the paper also considers references to other authors and the relevance for current questions and research in the sociology of education. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper provides insights on the contemporary relevance of Talcott Parsons's writings by analyzing 20 textbooks from Austria, Germany, Great Britain and the United States, published in 1999–2019. Whether having knowledge of Parsons is helpful to today's students and other interested readers, and what knowledge, deserves consideration. Therefore , the paper asks: Which future gains of readers did textbook authors envision when they chose, in their own present, to discuss (or not) sociological writings from long ago? In order to understand what future opportunities authors wanted to create for readers, as well as how they chose to discuss Parsons to this end, the paper draws on Niklas Luhmann's notion of memory. The analysis reveals several key competencies that student and other interested readers might acquire through having knowledge of Parsons' writings and its critiques. These potentials would have gone unnoticed if authors had assessed Parsons's relevance only according to whether he adequately considered conflict or not, as has been done in many debates about his work until today. Moreover, through analyzing how authors remembered Parsons, I distilled two key selective criteria: First, what must be remembered in order to enable readers to acquire those competencies? Second, which memories would be impeding for readers and thus be better left out? These criteria are relevant for research, as well. Looking at the future, it would be desirable that sociologists let Parsons assist them in their research in many different ways, if possible. As a result, we might see a revival of Parsons that enables genuine advancement. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Following reflections by Talcott Parsons and Niklas Luhmann, this paper is concerned with the changing meaning of the profession as a sociological category for analyzing modern society. Professions are practical academic occupational groups oriented to certain social values, to which a special significance for society was attributed in the social sciences for a long time, thus marking a connection between professions' research and theory of society. This paper now describes that the causal relationship between profession and society is limited to a historically relatively early period. In the transition to modern society, this close network of relationships begins to dissolve, and now professions operate in the context of some function systems of society whose task is the professional assistance of single clients, such as in the fields of health, law, and pastoral care. However, the professions' highlighted position in the knowledge and action structure of single function systems seems to dissolve more and more today so that one can ask whether we can speak here already of an end of the social form profession. This would correspond with the observation that actually the professions no longer appear at all in the newer theories of society and therefore their function as an important mechanism of social structure formation is no longer attributed to them. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper builds on Joel Isaac's analysis of "interstitial" arrangements that generate scientific knowledge, and also draws upon the networking model of theory groups articulated by Nicholas and Caroline Mullins. I consider how the "interstitial academy" at Harvard, as well as Talcott Parsons's navigation of it, facilitated his professional rise from a vulnerable young instructor in economics in 1927 to one of the most prominent social scientists in the United States in 1951. I examine Parsons's engagement with curriculum-building committees in sociology and social ethics, in "the area of social science" and in social relations, as well as with undergraduate courses on institutions and on sociological theory, including a graduate student discussion circle, and with seminars on Pareto, on rationality and on "basic social science." In some instances, Parsons's involvement as a newcomer or junior participant led to important peer alliances, or to the support of higher-ranking faculty and administrators who sponsored his advancement. In other instances, especially as his ascent progressed, Parsons played the more powerful role of "indispensable hub" who gained stature by organizing cross-disciplinary interaction. Parsons's interdisciplinary dialogue and collaboration also placed him an initial administrative role that would prepare him to serve as chair of two academic departments. The final and most important outcome of the process of upward mobility was the creation of a "theory school" that elevated Parsons to a unique status as the most boundary-spanning theorist of the social sciences. The paper thus supplements existing accounts of the rise of Parsons while also offering a mode of analysis that might be widely applied to the careers of other social scientists, both contemporary and historical (e.g., to figures such as Jane Addams and W. E. B. DuBois), in diverse academic settings and national contexts. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the course of research using Talcott Parsons's papers at the Harvard University Archives, Charles Camic read "Prolegomena to a Theory of Social Institutions" in manuscript form. Given sociologists' continuing interest in Parsons's ideas, Camic suggested that ASR make the paper widely available. We are pleased to do so in this issue. Camic's prologue places "Prolegomena" in the historical context of Parsons's work. Both James Coleman and Jeffrey Alexander have previously written about Parsons and were asked to comment on the implications of "Prolegomena" for our understanding of his theoretical contribution. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The decline of interest among sociologists in the works of Talcott Parsons over the last several decades has been driven in substantial respects by a belief that he was personally conservative in his political views and that his theoretical formulations were rigidly tied to a conservative view of social order. The present paper reviews Parsons' major political involvements through the course of his career from his student days through the last decade of his life. The review demonstrates that Parsons was a typical academic liberal of his time and that his liberalism was expressed especially in several major applied essays. In the 1930s, he was an early and active opponent of Nazism. During World War II, he taught professionals to administer occupied territories and nations effectively. After the war, he advocated for government support of the social sciences, citing the important contributions they had made to the war effort. In the 1950s, he wrote a famous critical analysis of the Joseph McCarthy movement in American politics. In the 1960s, he contributed supportive essays to the Civil Rights movement. Later in the decade and in the 1970s, he contributed to the protection of academic freedoms while also proposing accommodations to the demands of the student movement for more "relevant" teaching and greater participation in university governance. Throughout his career, he taught and worked closely with students of various political views and sought to protect their rights of freedom of political expression. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the last decades of his life, Talcott Parsons was often indicted as conservative. More recently, his analyses of contemporary society have been perceived as obsolete. In the present paper, I argue that both these accounts are wrong. Parsons's biographical and intellectual profile is clearly – and rather consistently – that of a New Deal liberal. His "ate" works, moreover, articulate an original view of the integrative processes in modern societies that is still both theoretically compelling and politically relevant. Parsons's view of modernity has made possible the development of a sophisticated theory of societal pluralism, able to deal analytically with the astonishing variety of structural strains (and resources) arising from an increasingly diverse – in racial, religious, ethnic, sexual and moral terms - membership in contemporary societies. His sociological enthusiasm for inclusion has never been blind to the likelihood of backlashes and the strength of discontent such inclusion may bring. His work provides thus some important directions in the current storm. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper illuminates, in a discussion of my relationship with him, how Talcott Parsons acted out his commitment to the values of cognitive rationality, how he implemented those values when working with students who did not share his liberal politics. I illustrate how students may learn not only from divergences in perspective with one professor, but also from the contradictions between their teachers's work. There are two contentions here. One concerns the importance of professors encouraging students to encounter points-of-view divergent from the professor's viewpoint, and then the significance of supporting them when they do so. This is possible only when the values of cognitive rationality regulate activity within a university setting. I illustrate these contentions in a discussion of my work with the political sociologist, Barrington Moore, Jr., the economic theorist, Kenneth Arrow, and the political philosopher, Judith Shklar, each of whose work diverged greatly from Parsons's theoretical perspective. Lastly, I contend that an understanding of our teachers's work is manifest in our extension of it, not in criticisms of their ideas, their texts. I show how this was the case in my own work. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The place of Georg Simmel in the thought of Talcott Parsons has come under increasing scrutiny, a concern fuelled by a "Simmel Renaissance" on the one hand, and by a resurgence of interest in Parsons's early writings on the other. This paper raises some question, about Parsons's interpretation of Simmel in light of the discovery of a second manuscript on Simmel that Parsons wrote in 1939. This document (which was unknown until quite recently) may best be seen as an elaboration and reworking of the fragment on Simmel that had been left out of The Structure of Social Action (1937). After summarizing and comparing the two documents, the paper demonstrates that Parsons blurred them in his recollections. This means that interpretations of his engagement with Simmel--which have often drawn on Parsons's later testimony (19681979)--need to be reconsidered. The discovery of the second manuscript also underscores the importance of examining how Simmel fit into Parsons's evolving thought, rather than narrowly focusing on why he left Simmel out of the convergence in European social thought that he traced in Structure. Taking the former approach as a point of reference, the paper outlines some interpretive issues that arise from the discovery of Parsons's second Simmel document. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper endeavours to summarize a variety of arguments for a reconsideration of ends in Economics. The logical structure of the rationality of ends (practical rationality) differs from the one of means (instrumental rationality). The paper sets out to explain the differences between both rationalities and some of the implications of incorporating this new emphasis on ends, given that Economics adopts the means rationality. The emergence of the topics of incommensurability and incomparability of ends is presented and a possible way to tackle it is suggested. Finally, some implications for Economics are drawn. This article emphasizes the importance of incorporating practical rationality into economic analysis. The arguments of the paper are built on Aristotelian grounds. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article relates the details of a meeting between sociologists Talcott Parsons and Ken'ichi Tominaga in 1978. The discussion between Talcott Parsons and Ken'ichi Tominaga took place at the Iwanami Shoten publishers office in Tokyo, Japan on the afternoon of December 12, 1978. Parsons arrived in Tokyo at mid-day, after having taken the train that had departed from Osaka around 9:00 a.m. that morning. In a letter written to Parsons, a few weeks before the Parsons' visit to Tokyo, Professor Tominaga described the Iwanami Shoten session as a colloquy with himself concerning the retrospection of Parsons on the formation of his own sociological thought. What Tominaga had in mind was something along the lines that Parsons had written for Daedalus. Iwanami Shoten had already shown some interest in Parson's work, having published in 1958 a Japanese translation of Economy and society, with an introduction by Tominaga. Parsons was paid an honorarium of 50,000 yen for the discussion, the same amount that he was given for his lecture later in the day. A few days prior to the discussion, Tominaga had supplied Parson with the following list of provisional questions: voluntarism vs. utilitarianism, motivation vs. value orientation, nature of system theory, relation between the Theory of Action and the Structural-functional theory, phenomenological approach.

The following section presents several papers focused on Talcott Parsons and Georg Simmel. The first is the fragment on Simmel of Ch. XVIII, Georg Simmel and Ferdinand Toennies. This chapter has been the subject of scholarly discussion since Parsons revealed in 1968 that he had drafted it for his early major work, The Structure of Social Action (1937), but had ultimately decided not to include it. The second, Simmel and the Methodological Problems of Formal Sociology, is a previously unpublished manuscript by Parsons--apparently written in 1939--that continues his engagement with Simmel's approach. The third is a commentary on the second Simmel manuscript that Edward Shils sent Parsons, in response to the latter's request. Finally, there is William Buxton's paper, From the Missing Fragment to the Lost Manuscript: Reflections on Parsons' Engagement with Simmel, which compares the two Parsons manuscripts and reflects on their significance. In addition, Simmel's second manuscript is also published for the first time along with ore famous missing fragment on Simmel, thereby facilitating scholarly analysis and comparison. Buxton's careful and searching analysis identifies as series of issues that merit further examination.

Talcott Parsons is often identified as the 'master' of mid-twentieth-century social theory. In the 1960s and 1970s, however, his writings were hardly any longer discussed, but mostly neglected. The American University is Parsons's last monograph published during his lifetime. On the basis of extensive archival research, this paper discusses the conception, construction and publication of this monograph. The first section clarifies how and why some fine distinctions were made within 'the team,' viz. between co-author (Gerald Platt), collaborator (Neil Smelser) and editorial associate (Jackson Toby). The second section focuses on the two epilogues of this monograph, viz. Smelser's epilogue to The American University and Parsons's epilogue to Smelser's coeval study on Public Higher Education in California, in which the tensions within 'the team' surfaced most visibly. The third section looks at the publication of the monograph and the failed attempts to complete related research projects. Altogether, this reconstruction of the making of The American University clearly illuminates the descending phase of Parsons's scientific career. It also sheds light on the substantive problems of the work Parsons produced in the latter part of his life and career. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This short article pleads for research rather than rumor regarding Parsons' alleged role regarding the admittance to United States of an ex-Soviet citizen in 1948 or 1949. Some evidence on background issues that could be found among the Parsons papers at Harvard University Archives is being presented verbatim. I argue that the point is to refrain from fabrications. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article comments on the paper Prolegomena to a Theory of Social Institutions, by Talcott Parsons. In his paper, Talcott Parsons addresses a problem on which little headway has been made since 1934 when he submitted the paper for publication to the Journal of Social Philosophy. This problem is the development of a theory of institutions, or a basis for such a theory. Parsons called his paper a prolegomena to a theory; but the prolegomena never led to the development of the theory itself either by Parsons or by others. The surfacing of Prolegomena now provides an opportunity to ask just how that theory might most profitably be developed. Prolegomena can be seen as an attempt by Parsons to establish a footing for the subjective approach to institutions based on a theory of rational action, opposing the objective approach. What Parsons calls the objective approach defines an institution as a set of social relations, a concrete social structure or organization. Parsons never explicitly defines institution in his subjective approach, but it seems clear that he means the set of regulatory norms that give rise to a concrete social structure or organization. Parson's subjective institution thus constitutes a way-station between the micro level of individual actors and the macro level of structures of relations or systems of action. In Prolegomena to a Theory of Social Institutions, a product of the early Parsons, there is a flawed but rich introduction to a theory of institutions.

The article discusses the creation of an intellectual biography of the U.S. sociologist Talcott Parsons. The researcher discusses Parsons' doctoral dissertation dealing with capitalism that was analyzed by sociologist Max Weber, and how Parsons' work delivered sociology from social Darwinism at the turn of the twentieth century. The author supports Parsons' work on the basis that he was a thinker and academician who did not use inconsistent analysis. The author utilized Parsons' archives at Harvard University, such as Parsons' paper "The Problem of Controlled Institutional Change."

Sociology has a long history of researching health, yet its theorisation of the health system, as a system or structured set of interlinked practices and institutions, has more recently been neglected. This stands in contrast to the prominence of the term in the policy literature. The importance of the concept of a system is demonstrated through a brief historical examination of the conceptual apparatus available within the discipline, beginning with the work of Talcott Parsons. It is proposed that the under-theorisation of the term makes it difficult to explain social action, specifically how social action might be shaped by the structures of the social system, and indeed, how social action might influence, and bring about change in the system itself. The paper proposes Bourdieu’s concept of the field as an appropriate replacement, demonstrating its greater utility for theorising the role of social structure in shaping healthcare practices and for modelling the healthcare sector itself. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This section introduces the articles featured in the summer 2000 issue of The American Sociologist. As a new millennium unfolds, a global dialogue in sociology is underway that promises to enrich and renew culture-bound sociological imaginations. As Gary Marx notes, by 1911 Edward A. Ross, a towering figure in his day, had published a book for popular audiences about China as seen by a sociological traveler. Karl Marx brings this commentary up to date, and provides insight into a reality that Ross did not experience, namely, the teaching of sociology in Chinese universities. William Buxton has gathered together a fascinating set of materials about U.S. interest in Asia, with particular reference to Talcott Parsons, Harvard University and Japan. As he notes, these materials call into question simplistic views of Parsons as a Eurocentric thinker by documenting an ongoing encounter with Asia that extended from the 1940s through the late 1970s. One product of events at Harvard was a graduate-seminar paper written in 1941 by Marion Levy and rediscovered by him a half century later. In addition to its relevance for the emergent sociology of Asia, Levy's paper is a most interesting example of early functionalist analysis in U.S. sociology.

This paper argues that while Hobbes has been very influential in sociological thinking, in particular through the influence of Ferdinand Tönnies and Talcott Parsons, there is an important alternative reading of Hobbes that one might call the ‘real’ Hobbes, which has remained unknown to social theory. Because these classical readings of Hobbes still inform most social theory, sociologists are in effect trapped within them. Through a careful analysis of classic interpretations of Hobbes by Tönnies and Parsons, coupled with a close reading of Hobbes’ actual texts, and his criticisms of Aristotle, this paper will suggest that a different understanding of the ‘people’ who populate Hobbes’ social universe is possible. It will be suggested that this new understanding of Hobbes also makes the contemporary understanding of the history of political philosophy more fruitful for theoretical sociology. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This paper considers the work of Shmuel Noah Eisenstadt mainly in the perspective of the author’s specific encounters with his work, in the course of which Eisenstadt’s work is compared with that of Talcott Parsons. There are several aspects of this programme. First, brief attention is given to the biographies of Eisenstadt and Parsons; second, their styles and approaches to sociological analysis are compared and contrasted; third, the subject of their somewhat different approaches to what I will call globality is raised, against the background of Eisenstadt’s great reliance on the later work of Karl Jaspers and the somewhat problematic issue of civilization(s). The discussion of Eisenstadt’s deployment of Jaspers’ insights is explored with particular reference to the former’s Japanese Civilization. Often regarded as the graveyard of comparative sociology, Eisenstadt’s attempt to place Japan in a comparative context is, in a number of respects, the consummation of his life’s work, though he had many years yet to live. The paper concludes with a question concerning whether global consciousness has superseded, or transcended, the contrast between differential modernization and global civilization. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The main claim of this paper is to show that any canon of citizenship studies should include Talcott Parsons. Contrary to the received views, Talcott Parsons provides an innovative view of citizenship as a key sociological structure, rooted in his theory of modern society. In doing so, he anticipates contemporary debates on the topic by highlighting the relationship between citizenship and cultural pluralism in modern Western societies. The paper provides both an interpretative account of Parsons’ analysis of citizenship and an assessment of its contemporary relevance. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The introduction focuses on the work of sociologist and economic theorist, Talcott Parsons, who is featured in this issue of "The American Journal of Economics and Sociology," and the development of economic sociology. The taping of Parsons' March 1973 seminar at Brown University was directed by Alan Sondheim of the Rhode Island School of Design; a follow-up seminar was also videotaped. An edited transcript of the event is published in this issue. The archived copy is in the Parsons Papers collection which is housed at Harvard University.

Max Weber did not invent the image of the iron cage; it was Talcott Parsons who created that image in preparing the first translation of The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism into English to be published. But that has not prevented it from catching on and even acquiring the status of a popular symbol of Weber's entire view of modern life. Despite its popularity, however, the image does not have a commonly accepted meaning. In part this is because of the creative uses to which it has been put by other scholars, but it is also a result of the fact that Weber himself used the German terms that were the source of Parsons' translation in a variety of different ways over the course of his scholarly career. The purpose of this paper is to examine those uses to determine whether the meanings they convey add up to something coherent, and if so, what exactly that meaning was. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Der Aufsatz untersucht den Terrorismus als Form der Kommunikation von Terror. System und Form des Terrorismus werden im Rahmen einer Modells bestimmt, das mit den Differenzen Codierung, Ausdifferenzierung, Reproduktion, Paradoxie und unmarked state arbeitet. Das Modell wird als Formkalkül aufeinander bezogener Differenzen angeschrieben und als Modell der kommunikativen Produktion und Reproduktion eines sozialen Phänomens erläutert. Die anschließenden Überlegungen des Aufsatzes sind hypothetisch. Sie können eine systemisch-partizipative Auseinandersetzung mit dem Gegenstand der Untersuchung im Feld dieses Gegenstands nicht ersetzen. Das System des Terrorismus konstituiert sich, indem Aufstände als Terrorakte codiert und unter funktionalen Anforderungen ausdifferenziert werden; diese können mithilfe von Talcott Parsons' AGIL-Schema bestimmt werden. Das System reproduziert sich als märtyrerhafte Negation des Gewaltmonopols des Staates und es schließt sich in seiner aktuellen Fassung in der Paradoxie eines Dschihad, der die Gewalt sät, weil er den Frieden will. The essay examines terrorism as a form of communication of terror. The system and form of terrorism are determined within the framework of a model that works with the differences of coding, differentiation, reproduction, paradox and unmarked state. The model is written down as a form calculus of interrelated differences and explained as a model of communicative production and reproduction of a social phenomenon. The following considerations of the paper are hypothetical. They cannot replace a systemic-participative confrontation with the object of investigation in the field of this object. The system of terrorism is constituted by encoding uprisings as acts of terror and differentiating them according to functional requirements that can be determined with the help of Talcott Parsons' AGIL schema. The system reproduces itself as a martyr-like negation of the state's monopoly on the use of force, and its current version closes in on the paradox of a jihad that sows violence because it wants peace. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article consists of a commentary by the author to reciprocate to the writers, Jeffrey Alexander and Giuseppe Sciortino, who took his article published in the 1992 issue of the journal "American Sociological Review," as an occasion to mount a critique of tendencies that they discern throughout his recent writings on the early intellectual career of socio-scientist Talcott Parsons. The author has used this commentary only to address specific objections that they raise, but to step back from these criticisms to examine their connection to Alexander's work more generally. The author's claim is that as a tool for analyzing the development of ideas, the development, that is, of various intellectual products or kinds of social-scientific knowledge, Alexander's work is fundamentally antisociological. Since his own goal has been to work out a sociology of ideas, he necessarily clashes with Parson, in more serious and consequential ways than identified by Alexander and Sciortino.

This article focuses on Prolegomena to a Theory of Social Institutions, an essay by Talcott Parsons first published in the American Sociological Review. Parsons's Prolegomena is an object lesson for those who would read past theoretical work in terms of present-day conceptual categories. Written more than a half century ago, before it became standard sociological practice to differentiate the micro from the macro, a voluntaristic approach from a functionalist approach, a focus on action from an emphasis on social system and social structure, the paper escapes latter-day pigeonholes. Prolegomena shows that the early Parsons upheld a package of ideas that circumvents such polarities by combining what he terms a voluntaristic conception of human action in which the factors of will and effort are central, with a functionalist analysis that views economic, political, educational, and other social institutions as constituting a system that regulates action in relative conformity with the ultimate common values. The goal of the essay is to arrive at social institutions and certain aspects of social structure by beginning with human action, understood subjectively in terms of the means-end schema, and proceeding from there to action systems composed of long and complex [means-end] chains--chains analytically divisible into the conditional factors of heredity and environment, an intermediate sector made up of technological, economic, and political elements, and the sector of ultimate values.

In his late work on Christianity, Talcott Parsons obviously built upon the writings of both Durkheim and Weber. While he departed from the idea that increasing differentiation of the system of action did not have to threaten the unity of the system as a whole, his emphasis on structural differentiation was also complemented by one on value integration. He believed that, especially in the New World, religion (i.e. Christianity) has gradually become able to impose its definition of the situation in highly different, highly heterogeneous contexts of action. In this paper, I reconstruct Parsons’ historical-sociological analyses of the relation between Christianity and modern society. I discuss how Parsons appropriated the writings of Durkheim and Weber – in ways which did not fully exploit the potential of some of these writings. I suggest some alternatives, which rely less on a concern with value integration (Durkheim) but more on one with the differentiation of meaning systems (Weber). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, the authors discuss the history of correspondence with the well-known sociologist, Talcott Parsons, in 1977 and again, just before his death in May 1979. A prolegomenon introduces Parsons, contextualizes the correspondence, and explains how the authors came to collaborate on this project, which seeks to preserve the history of this correspondence with a leading school of social work. The discussion begins with a brief introduction to Parsons, followed by each of the other's reflections on the project. There follows a section on Parsons himself and a note on the collaboration. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Social network analysis has been one of the most influential scientific revolutions of the past century. Its success has been due, in part, to its methodological sophistication and the emphasis it places on identifying and clearly depicting features of social structure. As such, social network analysis is often viewed in stark contrast to the structuralist paradigm that dominated the social sciences prior to its rise – structural-functionalism – in the mid-20th century. In this paper, we highlight important connections that exist between the key assumptions of social network analysis and the key tenets of some of the most influential structural-functional theories – especially those of Robert K. Merton and Talcott Parsons and their collaborators and followers. We reveal a substantial affinity between some of their most influential ideas and contemporary analysis of social network dynamics, in particular, and several ways in which their work could inform promising advances in this line of research. Our ultimate goal is to highlight the prospect of using these theories to guide future analyses of the dynamics of large social systems and the sequences of real-time action that compose them. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article presents information on scholarly exchanges between Talcott Parsons and Alfred Schutz, two sociologists. Parsons and Schutz met for the first time at Harvard in April, 1940, where Parsons, had invited him to read a paper entitled "Rationality and the Structure of the Social World" at a seminar on rationality. These two men, despite a great deal of similarity in their approaches to key problems in the social sciences, tended to talk past each other and never reached a basis for a meeting of minds. The importance of subjective categories in the analysis of social action is at the center of the exchanges between Parsons and Schutz. At the time these exchanges took place, Schutz was a refugee intellectual, as yet without any foothold in the American academic World; white Parsons, having already produced a considerable body of work and was solidly ensconced at Harvard University and had already helped train a number of brilliant younger sociologists.

In several of his analyses, Talcott Parsons describes the establishment of modern societies as a differentiation process across spheres of mutual recognition. In this paper, I use Parsons’ social theory of recognition to examine features of recent social conflicts. I begin with Parsons’ description of the struggles for recognition that took place during his lifetime in the highly industrialized societies of the West (I). I then use Parsons’ view of normatively ordered recognition conflicts to point out societal trends that led, in the final third of the twentieth century, to a gradual undermining of the pacification structures postulated by Parsons (II). An initial outcome of this apparent disintegration I describe as a ‘brutalization’ of social conflict. By this I mean a state of society where struggles for social recognition escalate and become anomic because resolution can no longer be found in the existing systemic spheres of negotiation (III). This paper shows the importance of the term recognition to social theory by following Parsons' theory in analyzing structural transformations that are currently emerging in response to social conflicts. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The aim of this article is to contribute to the discussion about the social functions of the market. I am interested in the special kind of social order the social interaction in the market produces, which has been mostly ignored in sociology. In the first part I look for historical reasons for the peripheral role of the market in sociological analysis. My argument in this regard is that this omission of the economic realm becomes more understandable if one takes into consideration not only the prerequisite of entrance into the academic field, namely not to step on the toes of older and more established fields of research, but also the very ambivalent and, in some strands of social thought, even openly hostile attitude to the market. The second part of the paper presents two paradigmatic but problematic cases of a sociological analysis of the economic realm: Émile Durkheim's views and Talcott Parsons' early conception of a society-economy relationship. In the third part I figure out another way to think about the role of the market in society from a standpoint that accepts the centrality of aspects such as values and norms in social life. I do not, however, postulate a societal value consensus at large, but see the economic sphere itself to be the source of those stabilizing mechanisms. As a starting point I use Talcott Parsons' theory of communication media and the concept of social order it implicitly contains. It offers possibilities for finding connections to earlier discussions of the social functions of the market, labelled 'commercial ideology', referring to eighteenth-century social thought. With my discussion I hope to show that interactions in the market have wider ramifications for social order, while the market produces its own distinct kind of order not captured by the dichotomy of value vs. interest-based actions and orders so common in sociology. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The first four chapters of Max Weber's Economy and Society presented by Talcott Parsons in 1947 as Theory of Social and Economic Organization present a coherent and complete analysis of social, economic and political structures based upon a consistent theory of social action and its understanding. Parsons did not see them this way. His lengthy introduction sought to insert them into his own "action frame of reference", and his rearrangement of the text made it difficult for a reader to understand why it was constructed the way that it is. This essay describes how Parsons came to be principal translator and editor of the text, examines the changes that he made to it, and links his editorial practice to the analytical procedures that he followed in his Structure of Social Action. ☆ This essay is developed from a paper originally presented in June 2005 at a conference on Max Weber's Basic Sociological Concepts at ZiF, Bielefeld University; an earlier version of the present paper was published as "Talcott Parsons als Übersetzer der 'Soziologischen Grundbegriffe' Max Webers". Max Webers 'Grundbegriffe'. Kategorien der kultur- und sozialwissenschaftlichen Forschung. Ed. Klaus Lichtblau. (Wiesbaden: Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 2006) 337–366. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper I closely examine Talcott Parsons's notion of functional requisites as articulated in his action-system requisite model - the AGIL schema - which includes the application of the generalized symbolic media of interchange. My goal is to conceptually extend Parsons's analysis of how the symbolic media dealt with three sociological factors of crucial significance to action theory in the Weberian tradition: historical analysis, communicative processes and social change. As a structural basis for symbolic representation, I propose, as an alternative to Parsons's conceptualization, social carrier theory. In preliminary form, I demonstrate how, in tandem with Max Weber's notion of elective affinity, social carrier theory can address more precisely than Parsons's media theory the themes of historical analysis, communication and social change. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Immanuel Kant distinguished between religion as cult in which people seek favours from God through prayer and offerings to bring healing and wealth, and religion as moral action that commands human beings to change their lives. Kant further defined religion as a 'reflecting faith' or 'moralizing faith' that compels humans to strive for salvation through faith alone. The Kantian distinction was fundamental to Max Weber's view of the relationship between asceticism and capitalism. Talcott Parsons's early sociology of religion engaged with this theme in Kant and Weber, but in his later work Parsons came to a re-appraisal of Émile Durkheim. In the concept of the expressive revolution, Parsons followed Durkheim in studying individualism as a major transformation of society. There is, however, a contradiction between individualism as either the legacy of Protestant pietism or the product of modern consumerism. Parsons's sociology of religion remains distinctive because he did not subscribe to the secularization thesis, but instead saw American liberalism as the fulfilment of Protestant individualism. The paper concludes with a critical assessment of the differences between the values of the expressive revolution and the legacy of Kantian individualism. Romantic love in modern society is an aspect of the expressive revolution, but it is also a legacy of the emphasis on emotional conversion and attachment to the person of Jesus in pietism. The expressive revolution developed this legacy of emotional expressivity, but combined romantic love with a consumer ethic. Religiosity survives in the context of consumerism as an aspect of what Robert Bellah called the 'civil religion in America'. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How does one identify a phenomenon as radically new or "unprecedented"? Do, in fact, "unprecedented" phenomena exist at all, as presumably some degree of continuity marks every state of affairs? If however, the idea of continuity is taken too far, are we not at risk of domesticating a radical tendency by conceptually transmuting it into something that is already known? These questions are of pressing importance since September 11th, as commentators warn that America and its allies face radically new enemies in the guise of "rogue" states, movements, and terrorist organizations. Yet sociology has had to grapple with similar issues before. In the 1930s and 1940s, the consolidation of fascist and Nazi movements also taxed sociological understanding and competence to the maximum. This article describes aspects of American sociology's response to that earlier challenge, contrasting it with the approach of Hannah Arendt, who condemned the discipline for systematically failing to appreciate the uniqueness, enormity, and gravity of the events that assailed the epoch. Arendt's critique of sociological methods is followed by a case study--Theodore Abel's investigation into National Socialism--that lends some credence to her misgivings. The work of other sociologists of this period--notably, Talcott Parsons's--is also briefly considered. The concluding section of the paper examines the theoretical problems involved in seeking to conceptualize an "unprecedented" event (movement, institution). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the book "The Structure of Social Action," by Talcott Parsons. The paper was prepared, at the annual meetings of the American Sociological Association in 1987, a session held to commemorate the fiftieth anniversary of the publication of the book and it drew a large and interested audience. The Structure, would at that time have been taken as a founding event in a relatively consensual, proto-scientific discipline. For even as late as the mid 1960, Structure was still seen as parsons had originally presented it: as a framework of accumulated theoretical knowledge, on the basis of which predictions could be made and compared with what social scientists had subsequently discovered about empirical fact. But there are even more important reasons for the continuing contemporary relevance of Parsons' early work. It is not only that there continue to be important discussions about, and in relation to the book earlier concepts. It is also that people can now understand the influence of Structure in a more reflective and more accurate way.

Parsons' theory of economy and society has reemerged as an important reference point in the development of social theory. This paper focuses on Parsons' contribution to a possible theoretical rapproachment between economic and social theory. The issue addressed is the indifference of economists to the project for theorctical reunification announced in the Marshall Lectures. The author argues that Parsons' understanding of economic theory was seriously incomplete, while his assumption of a shared commitment between the two disciplines to develop a general synthetic theory was highly dubious. At the same time, Parsons' attempt at rapproachment remains relevant in a contemporary situation where many social scientists propose an economistic annexation of sociology by rational choice theory. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper seeks to demonstrate the inherently practical intent of the Marshall Lectures. It argues that Parsons' views on the relationship between sociology and economics were presupposed by his broader vision of how the social sciences could contribute to the successful functioning of the social order. This conception of a new division of labor in the social sciences arose from Parsons' concern with the shortcomings of both utilitarian economics and Marxism. Evidence from Parsons' writings of the 1930s and 1940s is provided in support of these claims. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The ‘conflict school’ in contemporary sociology emerged in large part as a critique of the theory of social change that Talcott Parsons developed during his middle period, which began with the empirically-oriented essays that appeared after The Structure of Social Action (Parsons, 1937), and extended through the simultaneous publication of Towards a General Theory of Action (Parsons and Shils, 1951) and The Social System (Parsons, 1951). The conflict critique, now enshrined in textbook lore and highbrow writing alike, accused Parsons of a static, idealist bias that ignored issues of process, conflict, and change. While Parsons's attitude toward change, during this and later periods of his development, was complex and often ambiguous, this evaluation was certainly incorrect. I will demonstrate, in fact, that in this middle period Parsons actually produced a more systematic and compelling approach to conflict and change than the theories produced by the conflict critics themselves. In the first part of this paper, I will present the formal elements of Parsons's change theory. The second part will add substance to this theory by showing how Parsons applied it to the empirical problematics of recent Western development. In the third section, I will relate this formal and substantive theorizing to the vastly misunderstood deviance paradigm from The Social System. In conclusion, I will return to the question with which I began: What is the real relationship between the conflict theorists and their very useful straw man, ‘Talcott Parsons’? [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Organized in three parts, this paper I. summarizes Parsons's analysis of fascism and National Socialism written during the 1940s; II. places his work into the context of earlier and later theories of fascism; and III. suggests how Parsons's later theoretical work may aid our understanding of National Socialism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]