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Cultural traits from China have been slowly entering Europe for more than two thousand years. Some of these, such as gunpowder, the compass and paper have been of outstanding importance while others have created but passing fads. It is impossible to identify all of the influences of Chinese origin which have entered European culture during this long period. Even in the case of clearly recognized Chinese traits the records are inadequate as to many of the details of their westward journey. Despite the incompleteness of our knowledge, a brief survey of the existing in formation throws light on some aspects of European cultural history and on some of the mechanisms of diffusion. There were four main periods of contact between China and the West. The first was the era of silk trade with Rome and the ancient Mediterranean world which lasted from the first century B.C. to the middle of the sixth century A.D. The rise of the Arab Empire in the seventh century began a long period of relations between China and the Near East in which the Moslem world acted partially as a barrier but also as an intermediary between China and Europe. The Mongol Empire of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries made possible brief direct contacts of Europe with China. Modem relations of China and the West began with the Age of Discoveries in the sixteenth century.

This article analyzes briefly, two types of socio-political regimes which develop at second phase of modernization, the phase of so-called "mass modernization". This analysis will be based on the several assumptions about modernization developed in other papers--assumptions which see modernization as a process of continuous socio-demographic and structural differentiation of a growing tendency to a "mass-consensual" society--all of which create continuously new, changing problems and which pose therefore the general problem of sustained growth, of the ability to absorb such continuous changes as the major problem of modernization. It is within this broad conceptual framework that the distinction between the two phases of modernization may best be understood. These phases can be distinguished according to the two major aspects of modernization--the continuous structural differentiation, the impingement of broader groups on the center and the problems arising out of these processes on the one hand, and the ability of the centers to deal with these problems-to develop adequate institutional and symbolic arrangements on the other hand.

The article develops an economic hypothesis about the origin of social movements. The paper is divided into three parts: the first elaborates a theory of demand for social change or, more specifically, a theory about why the demand for change manifests itself in social movements. This first part, in turn, is subdivided into two sections examining: first, some structural components of the environment in which social movements originate and discussing, second, the definitions and assumptions of the proposed theory as well as its essential mechanisms. The second part introduces the concept of the supply of social movements and examines how this supply is related to the demand for social change. This discussion sheds some new light on the question of social change itself. This is briefly discussed in Section III. The hypothesis formulated appears to be consistent, at least in the large, with what is known of the history of social movements in Canada, in the United States, and in Europe during the first part of the twentieth century.

Recent studies by Adelman and by Friedlander and Silver, which have investigated whether regression equations derived from cross-section data can be used to predict the impact of socioeconomic development on changing levels of fertility, are reviewed critically. Regression analyses based on data for 57 countries c. 1960 show that fertility (gross reproduction rate) varies cross-sectionally with region as well as with level of development (as measured by per capita income, percent labor force in primary sector, expectation of life, illiteracy rate). Using equations derived from the cross-section study and time-series data for five European countries during the period that their fertility rates fell, it is shown that predictions about past fertility changes are in error. The results suggest caution in the use of cross-section relations to predict the course of fertility in developing countries. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A study by historical comparison of the fertility trends related to mortality levels is made between Latin America and Europe. The purpose of such study is to show why Latin America did not repeat the European mortality-fertility pattern during 1930-1960. Differences between the two areas are established, and an explanation is given about the particular Latin America mortality-fertility model. The effects of such a Latin America trend are pointed out, principally in relation to population growth, city growth and labor force. Hypothetical Latin American populations are calculated under the assumption that the area has repeated the European pattern. A comparison between these hypothetical populations with the actual ones shows how different the situation of the area has actually been. Nevertheless, an analysis of the necessary fertility changes in order to reproduce the European model shows that it was impossible for Latin America to repeat the European mortality-fertility experience during 1930-1960. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Antonio J. Posada, Chief of Agrarian Reform and Rural Sociology Service, speaking on behalf of the Director-General of FAO, thanked the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany for its hospitality and facilities and welcomed the participants. He took note of past accomplishments of the Working Party on significant issues concerning rural social change in Europe, and of the complexities and importance of the social, cultural and institutional aspects of agricultural and general economic development and change in the different countries of the region. The documentation for the current session provided evidence of that complexity. The growing interest on the part of rural policy-makers and administrators in the human aspects of agriculture was a reassuring change. Posada then called attention to the FAO Conference decision to focus more of its resources on helping developing countries and its desire to reduce the number of statutory bodies. The Secretary briefly reviewed the history of the Working Party for the benefit of new participants, its previous seven sessions, the major areas of work and projects undertaken. He considered that the arrangements in this Working Party for the full participation of other international agencies and organizations had enriched the program and deliberations of the Working Party, and that the efforts of this group have helped to focus attention on the scientific analysis of current rural problems in Europe.

The article discusses key issues concerning the Garden City movement and civic reconstruction in Europe. The movement is an attempt to re-organize social conditions. Man represents the more individual and woman the more racial and unifying aspect in humanity. The woman, more obviously than the man, lives not for her alone but for others, and considers herself as part of a larger whole. The modern and womanly spirit of sympathy and oneness, influencing men as well as women, shows itself in part in sympathy with women and their claims, and in part drives us to grapple with the social problems of poverty and disorganization. It is admitted that Europe is moving from an age of individualism to an age of social or civic re-organization, and this tendency is connected with the woman movement. It is a recognition of the fact that man does not live by bread alone, and that fair wages and houseroom in a dull street are not all that he need ask of life. It is a demand for recognition of the common life in all its aspects, material and immaterial.

Manpower developments should be examined against the population background. Population and manpower structure of post-war Europe is the haphazard result of various trends, war losses and tremendous shifts of population. Conditions have been changing rapidly, so that computations regarding the structural changes of populations prior to 1949 are in many cases not significant. The major pre-war trends in economic structure appear to have continued after the war with the exception of commerce, which has not maintained its previous upward trend. The present disturbed situation is not a convenient platform for projections of population or of manpower. Anyhow, any speculation as to future developments should be based on the knowledge of the specific conditions obtaining in the various countries. Differences in the economic and social structure, as well as in legislation between the various parts of Europe, no longer warrant a smooth and uniform development in accordance with the pre-war pattern. There are, on the other hand, some features of a prospective rapprochement in the economic and social field between Western and Eastern Europe. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]