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The responses of African states to the HIV/AIDS epidemic have varied greatly. This paper will analyze the political reasons that South Africa and Ghana have addressed the HIV/AIDS epidemic in different ways. I will examine the cases of South Africa and Ghana because of their different political experiences, HIV infection rates, and levels of economic development. Politically, South Africa endured over forty years of apartheid and a recent democratic transition. After years of military rule, Ghana recently underwent a transition to democracy. In terms of the HIV/AIDS issue, South Africa has an HIV-positive rate of 20 percent among its 18-49 year old population, while Ghana’s infection rate is 3 percent . South Africa’s GNP per capita of $3,210 is ten times higher than that of Ghana ($390). Data for this paper come from government documents, news accounts, and interviews with policy-makers. This paper questions how several variables shape policies on HIV/AIDS in each country: civil society associations, dependence on donors for health revenue, democratization, political leadership, media coverage, public opinion, and the neopatrimonial nature of the African state. In doing so, the paper illustrates the complex relationship between political forces and aspects of the disease itself that make policy-making to address HIV/AIDS problematic. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The political inclusion of minorities has rarely been studied cross nationally and when it has it is most often used as an independent variable. Most often political inclusion is assumed as a component of democracy. This paper explores those factors that increase the probability of minimal political inclusion for minorities. We aggregate the treatment of Minorities at Risk to the state level and examine the causes of minimal political inclusion at the state level. In this paper we examine the impact of democracy on both the international and domestic level on states minimal political inclusion of their minorities. Controlling for a countries wealth and the international security environment. We find that democracy both as an international norm and as a regime have a positive impact on a state having minimal political inclusion for its minorities. The other variables, were not significant. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper substitutes variables for countries in analyzing attitudes toward democracy in six Asian nations: Korea, China (Mainland), Japan, Taiwan, Philippines, and Thailand. The working hypothesis of the paper is that national differences in attitudes and opinions reflect underlying socioeconomic variations across nations, rather than inherent cultures within the nations. According to this hypothesis, urban-rural configurations of the populations should dominate opinion orientations, rather than idiosyncratic characteristics of these nations. The fundamental rural-urban cleavage will explain attitudes toward traditionalism-modernism which, correspondingly, will contribute to an explanation of attitudes toward democracy. The data for the study come from probability samples across the selected nations in a multi-nayion study using the same questionnaire in 2001. The analysis shows that rural-urban cleavages, seldom used in cross-national comparisons, are significant explanatory factors within nations. This study examines whether these within-nation associations are also significant for explaining attitudes and opinions in a cross-national analysis. The essential issue is: Is within-nation variance greater than variance among nations on the issues of interest? The inclusion of both developed and developing Asian nations permits examination of whether levels of development contribute to national profiles of public attitudes toward elements of democracy such as preference for democracy over authoritarian forms of government, satisfaction with democracy, desire for democracy, and other indicators of democratic support and consolidation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines democracy as an international norm, and the problems encountered establishing it in Africa. The paper argues that each country's unique characteristics act as filters through which international norms are implemented. Uganda is used as a case study to generate hypotheses that can be untilized to study ways in which democracy is defined, or ways in which its institutions are adopted.Three hypotheses that we can use to explain democracy in Uganda are presented in this paper. First, it is hypothesized that countries with a history of violent ethnic conflicts are more likely to prefer no-party/one-party democracy. Second, it is suggested that the meaning of democracy in African countries is defined by the dominant elite faction. Third, it is hypothesized that African leaders who are capable of providing security are more likely to succeed in framing a norm differently from the international standards. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Contrary to a long held belief in post-authoritarian Taiwan in the omnipotence of democracy to ensure the island's autonomy in the face of China, this paper argues that toward the end of the second Chen Shui-bian administration the 'marginal utility' of Taipei's use of democracy in garnering international sympathy has been drastically decreasing; recent examples include its failure to persuade major members of the 'liberal democratic community', the United States in particular, to support or at least acquiesce in its proposed referendum on joining the United Nations under the name of Taiwan held alongside the presidential election in March 2008. The underlying reason, however, is not found in the blame game between Taipei and Washington as to whether the United States is bowing to Chinese pressure at the expense of Taiwan's democratic deepening, or Taiwanese ruling elites' tactic of mobilising mass support is unnecessarily provocative which could end up drawing the US into an unwanted conflict with China. Rather, this paper suggests that the quarrel is indicative of the emergence of a new standard of civilisation based on the degree of democratic-ness in world politics. While mainstream security discourse in Taiwan has been deeply embedded in the binary structure of a democratic, peace-loving Taiwan versus an authoritarian, war-like China, in urging Taiwanese leaders to 'responsibly' strike a balance between promoting their political values and protecting their people's vital interests, senior US officials too unwittingly reproduce the rhetoric of democracy as civilisation. Unable to comprehend the operation of this civilised/barbarian trope in which Taiwan as a 'maturing' democracy (meaning potentially trouble-making) has been located between the West and the rest for the purpose of strategic appropriation, Taipei mistakenly believes that it has occupied the moral high ground vis-a-vis the great powers to 'go it alone' as seen in the UN referendum. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

By making the spread of democracy a foreign policy goal, the U.S. is assuming that external factors influence the process of democratization. This paper examines this assumption more closely, looking at how the international system, and specifically conflict within the international system, affects the spread of democracy both regionally and globally. A number of studies have documented a relationship between democracy and the international system both spatially and temporally. Although these studies pose a number of explanations for temporal and spatial trends, none of them test their hypothesized causal mechanism. They only provide evidence of aggregate trends at the global and regional levels. This paper seeks to go beyond analysis at the aggregate level to test one of the hypothesized casual mechanisms, namely emulation. Drawing on Waltz's argument that competition in an anarchic environment leads states to emulate the most successful states in the system, I argue that the success of democracies in the international system prompts other states to emulate them. According to Waltz the driving force of emulative behavior is conflict and so a test of this mechanism begs the broader question: What is the impact of international conflict on the likelihood that a state will become a democracy? I test three sets of hypotheses. The direct emulation hypothesis suggests that states should imitate their competitors: thus nations that have lost wars to democracies should democratize. The indirect emulation hypothesis posits that nations should imitate the most successful states in the system: thus the likelihood of a democratic transition should be a function of the United States relative power and the regime type of the most militarily powerful state in a country's region. The socialization hypothesis predicts that countries imitate states they interact with on a more amiable level: thus states with democratic allies should be more likely to democratize. I use a logit estimator to test these hypotheses. Contrary to Waltz's expectations, I find that emulation prompted by military conflict does not play a major role in the democratization process, with one exception. I find some evidence indicating that countries are more likely to undergo democratic transitions if the most powerful country in their region is democratic. The more powerful the leading country, the greater the influence of its regime type on the likelihood that a country in its region will experience a democratic transition. Thus, if the leading country is a democracy, the more powerful it becomes the more likely countries in the region will democratize. If the leading country is an autocracy, the more powerful it becomes the less likely countries in the region will democratize. I also find support for the socialization hypothesis: the more democratic allies a state has the more likely it is to undergo a democratic transition. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Can a quantitative relationship between corruption and democracy be demonstrated? This paper studies the quantitative relationship between democracy and corruption and its consequences. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The common good is an ambiguous notion. All those who found democratic governments argue that they are creating governmental structures that will benefit the common good. But what is the common good? The Declaration of Independence argues that British governance of the American colonies did not provide for the common good, and used this as a justification for revolution and independence. The Constitution of 1787 is a document intended to create a governmental structure to promote the common good. But there were two schools of thought at the time of ratification of the Constitution. Federalists argued that the Constitution was the best governmental structure by which the common good could be achieved. Anti-Federalists argued that the Constitution would impede the achievement of the common good. Did both groups define the common good in the same manner? This paper explores the common good in early American thought, using the Federalist and Anti-Federalist perspectives to survey the notion of the common good. It also explores philosophical and political conceptualizations of the common good and analyzes whether the Federalists and Anti-Federalists used the notion of the common good in a philosophical or political fashion to further their cause. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper offers a discussion of three questions central to the practice of indigenous autonomy in southern Mexico. Why did the federal government grant it? Is it consistent with liberal democratic principles? Does it benefit indigenous Mexicans? [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper deals with an aspect of European political culture that is vital for the legitimacy of democracy. On the basis of data from the 1999 European Value Survey the attitudes of Europeans towards democracy is explored. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper moves beyond aggregate cross-sectional tests of a central hypothesis in the literatures and examines instead if democracy might influence growth differently depending upon the regional political context. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Observers of democracy have long worried that it has the potential to degenerate into rule by the poor. Yet this has never happened in the United States. Is this because the U.S. has a relatively egalitarian class structure, or are there other reasons to be considered? For some of the ancient Greeks, democracy was a form of class rule, and the concern that poor majorities would threaten property rights has surfaced and resurfaced in democratic political thought ever since, including in the thinking of the American Federalists. In response to this concern, Aristotle suggested that an ideal democracy (or polity) would have a large middle class, and Alexis de Tocqueville believed that American democracy worked in part because there were no extremes of wealth here. However, if we wish to understand why democracy in America has never been a vehicle for rule by the poorer classes, class structure alone does not offer us an adequate explanatory framework. Ironically, the thinker who gives us the best clue as to why democracy does not become a vehicle for rule by the poor is Adam Smith, who understood the powerful grip that the dream of upward mobility can have on “poor men’s sons,” and who was aware of the peculiar admiration for the rich that seems to go with this dream. In short, what Smith recognized is power of ideology, culture, and class consciousness. The dream of upward mobility has had a powerful grip on the American imagination since at least the Jacksonian era, and today, according to one study, nearly 40 percent of all Americans believe that they either are in the top 1 percent of wealth-holders, or that they will be within their lifetimes. Under these circumstances, the concern that democracy will become rule by the poor seems moot—to say the least. But does not, then, a new concern arise? If such a large proportion of Americans identify themselves not just with the wealthy but with the extremely wealthy, how can the political interests of the non-wealthy be adequately represented? The dream of upward mobility would seem to cause citizens to vote not their own class interests, but the interests of a class of which they believe they will be a member some day. This paper traces the history of democratic thought about the implications of class structure for democracy. It then focuses on the rise of liberal populism in the United States in the early 19th century, and examines the continued power of the ideology of upward mobility. It considers explanations for the continued grip of this ideology on the American imagination, and it raises concerns about the future shape of democracy under these circumstances. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the case for supermajority rules under one form of deliberartive democracy [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Earlier research has demonstrated that there are significant differences in the determinants of the number of political parties in a system as a function of experience with democracy. In short, institutions have greater explanatory power in established democracies, and social cleavages appear more important in newer democracies. Yet existing work fails to distinguish among three rival interpretations for this pattern: that institutional effects are learned, that high levels of wealth break up patronage systems based on social cleavage patterns, and/or that differences in the social context within which democracy develops determine the number of parties. This paper employs a new data set to test these competing hypotheses in both cross-sectional and time-series, cross-sectional analyses. Preliminary evidence suggests that the length of experience with democracy per se is the most important determinant of the dynamics of party systems, providing support for the institutional learning hypothesis. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the history of political thought, there is a discernible tradition that has long made a distinction between the form and spirit of government. This decisively European (particularly French) tradition is best represented by Montesquieu, but also includes the likes of Hegel, Rousseau and Tocqueville. The central claim of this tradition is that types of governments have both a universal and a particular form. The constitutional (institutional and procedural forms) should be particular to contexts, but should still embody the universal principles that define the form, as that designates the type of government—e.g. a democracy as opposed to a monarchy. Yet, they suggest that for the constitutional form or type to be meaningful and descriptive of the society/country, it is necessary that the principles that underlie this type of government be evident in the mores, manners, and behavior (the spirit) of its people. In other words, the forms are a) only as meaningful and accurate as a description and, more importantly, b) only likely to be successful to the extent that they become embodied in the spirit of the people. In this paper, I will first fully develop the core arguments of this tradition in political thought. As I reconstruct the core content of this tradition, I will trace it through each of theorists cited above. Then, I will argue that this tradition has its orgins in Aristotle, who argued that the legislator should model the educative process after the fact that the sociological evolution of the individual is based first on nature, then on habit, and finally on reason. After having reconstructed this tradition and demonstrated its connection to Aristotelian thought, I will then suggest that the spirit/form tradition is a valuable theoretical tool. I argue that the spirit/form tradition establishes criteria by which a political scientist can: a) Evaluate the stability of a regime type within a country b) Evaluate the legitimacy of a government within a country and c) Suggest what alternative types of government might be better suited for a country. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Although nowadays a large number of regimes are formally democratic, democracy doesn?t work equally well in every place. Often, those groups who wielded power under the old authoritarian regime manage to continue wielding it under democracy, thus bypassing democratic mechanisms for government responsiveness. This paper focuses on one of the most common tactics used to subvert democratic contestation, namely electoral corruption. Electoral corruption is a common phenomenon and it can have decisive consequences in the outcome of elections, yet we don?t currently have a clear theoretical account of its workings. The standard view, implicit in most of the existing literature, is that electoral corruption makes most sense in close elections, when altering the vote count at the margin is most likely to change the outcome. While this view is adequate in some cases, it nevertheless fails to account for some of the main stylized facts about electoral corruption. For one thing, corruption is common even when elections aren?t close. Second, while the literature argues that perpetrators of electoral corruption should try to keep it secret, it is often surprisingly public. I develop a simple theory of electoral corruption that challenges the standard view. I pay special attention to the role that expectations play on the behavior of voters, a critical issue that the standard view largely ignores. Using simple models I show that under certain conditions that are particularly relevant to developing countries, a powerful ruler or ruling group may have incentives to engage in more electoral corruption than merely winning would require, to engage in such actions not only during and after the election but also before it, and to publicize rather than hide its corrupt activities. These findings may at first seem counterintuitive, yet they square well with both historical and survey evidence for a variety of countries and time periods. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Not Open For Discussion: A Psychological Account of Democratic Deliberation. Emily H. Hoechst Georgetown University ehoechst@mac.com Deliberative democracy involves exposure to otherness in ways a non-deliberative practice does not. Because deliberative democracy brings participants into direct contact with the views of others, it brings to the fore issues of recognition and identity, separation and relation, freedom and coercion. Deliberative politics is therefore uniquely risky because it requires self-reflection, articulation of one’s reasons, and exposure to criticism These requirements will often evoke anxiety, a response which in and of itself is problematic for the deliberative framework. What makes deliberative participants anxious is not just that they may lose the argument, cause, or vote. It is also the prospect of being personally rejected; of losing intersubjective affirmation from others. Rawls and Habermas have both developed theoretical mechanisms designed to alleviate this kind of anxiety. Both theorists are keenly aware of the psychological position of the other in politics. My argument in this paper is that both Rawls and Habermas rely upon a problematic psychology in structuring their deliberative contexts, one that actually may exacerbate conflict in deliberation, making it more difficult than it needs to be. The models of Piaget and Kohlberg (and Mead, for Habermas) all argue for a postconventional or abstract mode of moral reasoning, one that treats individuals as universal bearers of rights deserving of respect. My critique of this psychology, and the democratic theory that flows from it, is twofold: (1) Based on the psychological theory of D.W. Winnicott and Jessica Benjamin, I argue that Rawls and Habermas, while claiming to support an intersubjective understanding of deliberation, actually remain caught within an intrapsychic psychology. Rawls and Habermas both favor recourse to “the moral point of view.” What intersubjective psychology suggests is that such formulations can produce the undesirable consequence of complementary thinking; those who disagree are now not only “different” but also somehow “less moral,” an unnecessarily binary (either/or) way of thinking. Benjamin in particular suggests a different psychological framework, based loosely on Hegel, which allows difference to exist in a deliberative setting, even if the setting becomes more contentious as a result. (2) Based on the recent literature on the politics of recognition (such as Taylor, Honneth, and Markell) I argue that Rawls’ and Habermas’ deliberative settings are unresponsive to issues of identity and reciprocity. Both theorists engage in a kind of cognitive bracketing for political purposes which is (a) impossible, according to Arendt, and/or (b) undesireable under circumstances that seek more deliberative participation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper is an empirical examination of the well studied but curiously still misunderstood relationship between democracy and war. In my opinion, this state of affairs is the result of four defects in how we think about the nature of conflict participation in general and about how democracy fits into that story in particular. First, we have too often employed the singular notion of conflict participation when we should instead be looking at the separate notions of the propensity to start wars and the propensity to reciprocate challenges which lead war. Second, we have overlooked how differences in the expected costs of war can disproportionately affect the decisions for war. While low cost wars will tend to fall under the radar of societal actors, high cost wars will attract not only not only the vocal minority but will also draw in a large proportion of the silent majority as well. Third, we have tended to focus on the perceived uniqueness of democratic conflict when we should be focusing on how democracy affects the general, universal patterns of conflict participation. Fourth and finally, we have too often resorted to explanations that are, at best, linked or related to democracy. This is problematic since it draws attention away from democracy as an explanatory factor. After all, if there is anything to the relationship between democracy and conflict, our analyses should not overlook the possibility that there is something inherent in democracy that is driving that relationship. I address these issues by constructing a explanation of democratic conflict frequency based on the simple fact that, all else being equal, democracies have a greater number of political actors. From this, I am able to make two deductions. First, democracies will face a greater range of political pressure, from full resistance against to full support for war, than will nondemocracies. Second, democracies will be more sensitive to high-costs wars but will be virtually equally sensitive to low-cost wars as nondemocracies. Putting these two arguments together, I conclude that while there will be little difference at the low end of the conflict cost scale, at the high end democracies will start fewer high-cost wars and will more readily respond to challenges that lead to high-cost wars. Using both two-by-two contingency tables and multivariate regressions which takes into account a host of controls (including polity type; institutional strength; major power status, geography and alliances), I test the hypotheses above for the period from 1816 to 1992. Given the amount of data available, I find general support for the model of democratic conflict participation outlined above. Moreover, while I find evidence of a democratic peace at the low end of the conflict cost scale, in the face of high cost wars, such patterns are overwhelmed by the effects of democracy described above. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Can critical theory sensibly address the problems and perils of democratic politics in the XXIst century? On what basis? Rather, based on which model of democracy? In order to assess democracy today, the tools and conceptual framework of critical theory must undergo some changes and develop conceptual clarifications that allow it to grasp (and contest) the inegalitarian dynamics of democratic politics. In this brief paper I want to take issue with the proceduralist model of deliberative democracy espoused by Habermas and point the way to a new understanding of political interaction in contemporary democracies. I will base my critical appraisal on the critique of Thomas McCarthy to Habermas’ reliance on systems theory, on Seyla Benhabib’s understanding of the normative basis of a discourse theoretic framework and Nancy Fraser’s developments concerning the character and dynamic of political interaction in contemporary (‘real existing’) democracies. In order to present my case I will 1) Identify how the systems theoretic dimension impinges on Habermas development of the concept of power, before and after the turn to communicative power based on Arendt’s notion of political action. I will map and develop the dimensions of power identified by Habermas, paying particular attention to the differences between power as steering media and power as social potential. 2. Track the implications of a limited notion of power on understanding democratic politics, based on Nancy Fraser’s (and others) development preconditions to political interaction. 3. Present the idea that egalitarian reciprocity is not a fact (nor is equality of conditions), and point to a series of issues that have to be addressed in order to develop a model capable of dealing with the challenges of inequality and domination. I want to claim that these asymmetries are not restricted to availability of resources, information or ‘natural’ abilities. They are directly created by a dynamic of exclusion and a ‘subverted’ public sphere that have to be accounted for. And the key to understanding them is a modified notion of power. 4. Explore the possibilities for a deliberative democratic model that does not hinge on the notion of a separate systems action context. I want to claim, along the lines developed by Fraser but going beyond, that the forced differentiation created by systems theory necessarily hinders the capacity to appreciate the ways in which ‘the subversion of the public sphere’ has taken, and is taking, place. I do not intend to dispense or supplant the procedural deliberative model espoused by Habermas and Benhabib. I do claim, however, that a new conceptual framework can help us better understand the perilous reality of democratic politcs and develop alternatives for action. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper uses evidence from Mexico to test two competing visions about how democracy produces responsive government. Electoral theories of democracy, such as accountability theory, posit that democracies are responsive to the public interest because citizens are able to use elections as a means of controlling politicians. Participatory theories explain levels of responsiveness as a function of a citizenry?s ability to articulate demands and influence government through a wider range of political action. I test hypotheses derived from these two theories, using an original dataset that combines electoral, socioeconomic, public-financial, and demographic indicators for virtually all of Mexico?s 2400 municipalities, from 1980 to 2000. Although most recent research on Mexico has emphasized the importance of elections as instruments of democracy, my data show that electoral competition has little effect on municipal government performance. Non-electoral forms of participation, on the other hand, are closely and strongly correlated with government performance. Most surprisingly, the data show no evidence of an interactive effect: a competitive electoral environment does not appear to be a necessary condition for participation to be influential. I argue that Mexico?s institutional context is responsible for the failure of elections to influence government responsiveness in Mexican municipalities. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, I present two alternative paradigms of democratization The first paradigm is the dominant approach in contemporary comparative politics and is exemplified by the work of Robert Dahl. This dominant paradigm focuses on procedural aspects of democracy. The proposed alternative paradigm moves beyond procedure by drawing upon Aristolelian traditions to create an explicitly normative concept. This approach is teleologically oriented to the ends of a democratic polity and builds upon the work of contemporary Aristotelians. The aim is to adapt these Aristotelian concepts to an applied, alternate notion of democratization. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Although most scholars agree that an independent judiciary is indispensable for the functioning of democratic regimes and for establishing the accountability of executive and legislative branches, most students of democratization have shied away from studying the courts. In many new democracies, however, courts are among the most prominent political actors. In this paper, I argue that this judicial activism is not always in the service of democracy and the protection of civil liberties and can prevent the consolidation of the democratic regime. I focus on the structure and political functions of the Turkish Constitutional Court in comparison to its European counterparts. I argue that compared to constitutional tribunals in other democracies, the Turkish Constitutional court is democratically unaccountable. I also argue that the courts record suggests that it should be perceived as the guardian of the values of the state elite against the encroachments of the democratically elected institutions. The Constitutional Court was established in the aftermath of the 1960 military coup and was modeled after the German Constitutional Court. The powers of the court and its functions were further modified after the 1980 coup. Since Turkey’s last return to civilian rule in 1983, the court has annulled more than 300 laws and governmental decrees and has closed 18 political parties, including two of the largest political parties in the country. Despite this willingness to act against the parliament and the political parties, however, the court has failed to emerge as a guardian of civil liberties and democratic freedoms. The courts record shows that it has been willing to act against the political class, while it has been more reluctant to act against the state, particularly against the security forces and the military. When the constitutionality of an act of parliament or a cabinet decree is challenged and the case is referred to the Court for abstract review, the challenger can expect a favorable outcome in 72 percent of the cases. Not surprisingly the opposition has found referrals to the Constitutional Court an effective way for frustrating the policies of the government in power. Chances of success are less than 15 percent when a case is brought before the court for concrete review, where most questions concerning civil liberties and democratic are likely to arise. I argue that in unconsolidated democracies like Turkey, the courts, particularly constitutional tribunals, should be seen as “guardians of the state” In unconsolidated democracies democratically elected institutions have to share power with unelected guardians, often the military. The political empowerment of the courts in these countries is part of an attempt by the guardians to protect their interest after turning power over to the democratically elected officials. Although this encourages judicial activism, the activism is to protect the interest of the guardians and to ensure their continued privileges in the political structure at the expense of democratic consolidation and the protection of constitutional freedoms. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Indices of democracy typically identify democracy with the set of institutions of government which have evolved in ?Western? representative political systems. But on the basis of this specific democratic model these indices produce an ?institutional fallacy? in measuring ?democratic quality?, because they fail to take into account the respective (societal, institutional) context. In this paper we propose a new concept and a new index based on this argument. We apply a minimal definition of democracy, which is based on the logic of individuals? self-determination. Our index takes into account the context and the degree of effective participation. We define the contextual attributes and the different possible institutional opportunity structures to ensure effective participation. We deduce assumptions about the causal relationship between context their effect on the optimal mixture of opportunity structures. We conclude with first considerations regarding the concrete operationalization and measurement of the respective elements of our model. We end with a short qualitative illustration (in German language) of the democratic quality of three European countries to exemplify our concept. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper will highlight major features of the Chinese political system and elaborate a China’s model of democracy. In a world where democracy has been regarded as a universal value, the political legitimacy of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has been a suspect. There have been calls for democratizing the Chinese political system, implicitly after the fashion of Western democracies, in particular the American model. Few scholars have questioned the desirability of building a democracy in China, yet it is far from being clear what the Chinese model of democracy should be. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

William Connolly is one of the foremost exponents of the trend of "Left Nietzscheanism." In this paper, I critique Connolly's appropriation of Nietzsche both hermeneutically and normatively, and suggest the outlines of a liberal alternative. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper presents a systemic-level analysis of the determinants of armed great power conflict between 1870 and 1913. It finds that globalization and the spread of democracy were the most important causes of rising military conflict in this period. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper problematizes arguements which suggest that post-communist states should strive towards liberal and procedural democracy. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper presents an analysis of the renowned abolitionist Frederick Douglass’s understanding of the virtues proper to citizens of a free society. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the theory and practice of participatory democracy in recent, current, and future contexts. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the paradoxical endurance of non-consolidated non-performing democracies focusing on the identification of factors contributive to social consent (or political absenteeism) that fill the gap between the stage of institutionalization of a non-consolidated democracy and that of fully consolidated democracies. It utilizes the understanding that consolidation requires the routinization of and a normative commitment to democracy (Diamond 1999), and proposes that to secure democratic continuity the incomplete fulfillment of those requirements demands consummate performance legitimacy, the absence of which must be mitigated by counterbalancing factors. The plausibility of this framing of the endurance of non-consolidated non-performing democracies is tested by examining Brazil's democratic regime. The findings support the instrumentality of the framework of analysis and suggest that counterbalancing factors allowing democratic endurance may in fact preclude consolidation and substantive socioeconomic advances. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the origins of development-promoting property rights institutions. Specifically, I focus on democracy and veto players as key political foundations of property rights institutions. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the interdependencies between policy areas: how do positions on one issue constrain the choice of positions on other issues? Expert survey data from established democracies is used to explore this question. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the interactive effect of direct democracy and racial diversity on social trust. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the United Nations General Debate speeches by Islamic country leaders at the opening sessions of the UN in autumn 2005, 2006 and 2007. It assesses levels of support for rule of law, good governance, electoral democracy, political participation, religious freedom, human rights, and economic freedom, and considers them against established benchmarks of political, civil and economic freedom. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines William Graham Sumner's views on plutocracy and democracy, tensions within those views, and their relationship to his understanding of liberalism, in an effort to better inform contemporary political-philosophical discourse. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper considers the traditional approaches that political theory has taken towards questions of loss. It then presents a critique of these approaches, and suggests an alternative understanding of loss informed by the concept of sacrifice. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper argues that the survival of liberal societies depends on their citizens' understanding of the uses and misuses of violence in the service of freedom. An awareness of the contingency of liberal political life is essential in this regard. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper analyzes the extent to which greater female representation in cabinet-level positions in advanced industrial democracies influences the implementation of additional female-friendly social policy. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper examines the petition drive as a prominent yet relatively unknown feature of contemporary democratic politics. It seeks to determine why some petitions attract the attention of political leaders, while others are some simply ignored. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper addresses the appropriateness of generally accepted concepts of autonomy and equality given that citizens fail to exhibit the qualities presumed. These central concepts are redefined in the attempt to better orient democratic theory ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Recent theoretical research has found that inequality strongly affects boththe likelihood that non-democracies transit to democracy and the likelihoodof survival in already established democracies. Empirically, however, theseclaims either rest on a small number of case studies or samples subject to severeselection bias. In this paper, I present a model showing that inequalitydoes not systematically affect the probability that non-democracies transit towarddemocracy, but that, once established, equal democracies are unlikely tocollapse. Using a Markov transition model and a dataset covering about 2400country-years between 1950 and 2001, I indeed find that - contrary to whatthe previous theoretical research has predicted - inequality has no systematiceffect on democratization. Inequality does, however, destabilize already establisheddemocracies. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Previous studies largely validate the link between direct democracy and increased responsiveness. This paper provides an extended critique of the methodological assumptions underpinning these findings, and presents an alternative approach. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

My paper challenges the "taming nationalism" arguments which mistakenly view nationalism and liberal democracy as opposites. It is nationalism's encounter with liberal democracy that has transformed nationalism into a strong and even dangerous ideology. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Both democracy and state capacity have been linked to improvement on development indicators in low-income countries. This paper tests the proposition that the combination of these characteristics is especially effective for fostering development. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

I develop and test a simultaneous equation model of corporate lobbying in democratic capitalism. Using data on 31 countries, my results show that business? informational and structural privileges jointly affect the early stages of policy formation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Under Balance of Threat theory, and considering offensive intentions as a function of domestic alikeness, we find that democracies not only don?t fight each other, but they balance each other to a lesser extent. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

I argue that the normative aspect of the democratic peace is one based on social agreement, when evaluated in terms of Kohlberg's levels of moral reasoning, offers a mechanism for understanding the inter-democratic 'pacification effect' of democracy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

That and why 'democracies don't fight one another' has become an important justification for imposing democracy in Iraq and elsewhere. Reasonably simple computational models show the tenuous grounds on which these claims rest. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Using a comparative analysis that includes democracies in Europe and Latin America, I demonstrate that gender-based shortcuts do function outside of the US, and that their function and power varies in different political environments. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Analysis of legislative control of bureaucracy in presidential regimes. Particular emphasis on the role of electoral democracy and the ability of congress to implement instruments of bureaucratic control in developing presidentialisms. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]