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: Social movement scholars generally view movements as existing outside of government, and even interest group scholars, who acknowledge the revolving door between interest groups and government, have only explored how previous government experience influences outside lobbying. This paper examines feminist activists while they work for the government bureaucracy using historical documents and in-depth interviews with 40 government employees who were also activists in the women's movement. Feminist activists can be found within the federal government bureaucracy throughout the second wave of the women's movement from 1965-2000. This paper asks the question of how their access to government positions and their activism was affected by changes in presidential administrations. Social movement scholars focusing on political opportunities have generally argued that movements have greater access under sympathetic presidents. This paper explores that claim by asking three questions about feminist activists who work for the federal government: 1) when do these activists enter government service (that is, which presidential administrations gave feminist activists greater access to government positions); 2) what happens to bureaucrats who are feminist activists when an administration hostile to feminism takes over; and 3) does location within the bureaucracy influence the degree to which feminist activists must respond to presidential administrations? The results suggest that feminist bureaucrats below the appointment level often remain in hostile administrations. Several case studies explore how their activism changes under hostile administrations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper is part of a project in which I examine the impacts of economic globalization on democratic thought and practice and the predominant responses among democratic theorists to the changes produced by globalization. Among these responses, those which exhibit pronounced nostalgic streaks are the least analyzed and least well understood. Nostalgic responses can be seen in academics concerned with community and social capital (e.g., Bellah et al, Sandel, and Putnam), in popular writing (e.g., Wendell Berry and Michael Shuman), and in political movements, both right (e.g., those of Haider, Le Pen, and Buchanan) and left (e.g., some progressive elements of the ‘anti-globalization’ movement). The role of local politics and the spaces in which citizens live and work is of particular concern for many of these nostalgics. In contemporary political theory, labeling someone’s thought or politics as nostalgic is a rhetorical strategy for dismissing the seriousness of a person’s ideas. Liberal and postmodern thinkers are the most conspicuous in their employment of this rhetorical tactic of dismissal. As Peter Euben points out, “too often the critique of nostalgia is too impatient with the sense of loss that makes it attractive to many and compelling to a few.” Those of us troubled by nostalgic politics need to better understand that, even if manifested in ways we find unsavory, there are real concerns, needs, issues, and justice claims being expressed in much nostalgia. Further, we dismiss nostalgic politics at our own peril. We must address the real losses that provoke nostalgic political responses, especially the more xenophobic, racist, and reactionary of them. Nostalgia can also uncover some valuable political insights, needs, and resources. To neglect these nuggets through the dismissal of nostalgic politics forecloses possibilities of enriching our own political projects. We also need to recognize that even when we disagree with another’s thinking, we may still share with some nostalgics many of the same intentions and aims. Some contemporary nostalgic thinkers are genuinely committed to promoting a just polity of free people who have the resources needed to attend to and nurture that freedom and efficacy. Those of us troubled by aspects of nostalgic politics may find that we can be tense allies who need each other if we hope to rescue from some of the consequences of economic globalization aspects of the democratic project we may both cherish. At the same time, much democratic nostalgia—they are not alone—suffers a kind of utopianism by neglecting to realistically consider the causes of lost institutions and practices, and how we may retrieve the attractive fragments of those loses in ways relevant to today’s political economic conditions. This paper explores some of the attractive resources, institutions, and practices that have degraded or been lost, attempts to see if we can rescue those fragments from some of the more troubling aspects of past socio-economic and political arrangements and practices in manner which might realistically work in contemporary conditions, and considers mitigating institutions and practices as partial alternatives when this is not possible. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Cooperative Politics: Cooperatives as an Institutional Vehicle for Social Transformation The purpose of this paper is to consider whether, and in what form, the cooperative movement has political salience as a vehicle for transformative social change. Currently, cooperatives, with some 750 million members in over 100 countries worldwide, comprise the largest and most extensive existing alternative to traditional capitalism. But while cooperative principles embody such central theoretical concerns as utility and democracy, cooperatives have received very little attention within the discipline, especially in the U.S. This paper is an attempt to begin to address that lack. The central question of this paper is whether the theoretical basis for cooperatives is such that they may be considered a vehicle for fundamental social change. Indeed, from a theoretical perspective, the basic premises of cooperatives?common interest and common property?are attractive to ideological approaches that seek to extend democracy into economic and social realms, and that are opposed to the individualistic and inegalitarian tendencies of capitalism. By definition, a cooperative is an organization that ?has for its object the economic and social betterment of its members by means of an enterprise based on mutual aid . . . an autonomous association of persons united voluntarily to meet their common economic, social and cultural needs and aspirations through a jointly-owned and democratically-controlled enterprise.? Cooperatives in their modern form developed out of the cooperative socialist movement in Britain that was active in the first third of the 19th century. This paper focuses on the work of William Thompson, who has been recognized (by those who recognize him at all) as the principal theorist of cooperative socialism. Thompson was a friend and associate of Jeremy Bentham, and while Thompson asserts that utility?the greatest good for the greatest number?is the fundamental normative principle on which his work is based, the implications which he draws from it are fundamentally different from Bentham?s. Whereas Bentham assumes an opposition between security (as he refers to liberty) and equality, Thompson attempts to reconcile them. His conclusion?the ?natural laws of distribution??leads him to assert that the only rational economic system, that unites security and equality and that affords the distribution of wealth most in conformity with the principle of utility, is one that is based on mutual cooperation. Besides examining the theory of cooperative socialism as articulated by Thompson, the paper seeks to make connections between Thompson?s theory and cooperatives today. While many aspects of the cooperative movement have assimilated themselves within capitalism, the fundamental principles to which all cooperatives must agree (in order to be members of the International Cooperative Alliance) retain at least the flavor of cooperative socialism, and therefore rest on a base that is antithetical to traditional capitalism. This paper seeks to identify an ideological approach to cooperatives that would allow us to politicize them in such a way that they may be engaged in a project of fundamental social change. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the protest literature, the effects of governmental structures have been largely ignored even by structural approaches mainly because of the implied assumption that democracy suffers less contentious politics. However, the frequency and size of protest varies among different forms of democratic government. The empirical evidence shows that the number of protesters in democratic countries with Semi-Presidential systems is greater than what we find in pure presidential or parliamentary systems. This paper identifies the variation of the scale of protests in democratic regimes including European countries and South Korea using daily interval data, and explains the variation by focusing on political institutions. Through theoretical reviews and data analysis this paper argues that citizens in democratic countries with semi-presidential systems find it more difficult to deliver their demands to government than citizens in other states. Presidents in semi-presidential system exercise relatively unchecked power due to the weakness of legislature and the presidential influence on judicial branch, which limit citizens’ access to political processes. Therefore, they are more inclined to protest than their counterparts in democratic countries without semi-presidential systems. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How does public opinion respond to the production of major legislation? A central pillar of representative democracy is that elected officials are held accountable for their actions. There is a rich literature exploring the electoral effects for legislators who deviate from their district’s opinions, and there are numerous anecdotal arguments about the consequences of scandals and foibles for both legislators and executives. However, public policy is neither made by individual Members of Congress nor exclusively by executive actions. The most significant policies are enacted through laws passed by Congress and signed by the president. Scholars have very little understanding of how the public assigns credit or blame for the net output of the legislative system. This paper addresses this question directly. As part of a larger project, this paper will examine the impact of the passage of major legislation on congressional approval. Because approval ratings are collected from individuals but legislation is produced over time, the paper employs hierarchical statistical techniques to answer this question. This method has enjoyed some popularity in education and psychological research, but has not seen frequent use in political science. Concurrent research by the author indicates that while presidential approval is responsive to the production of the system, congressional approval is unaffected. Credit and blame for the joint activities of the political system are laid at the feet of the president, not Congress. This has implications for interbranch power dynamics as well as research on public opinion. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper substitutes variables for countries in analyzing attitudes toward democracy in six Asian nations: Korea, China (Mainland), Japan, Taiwan, Philippines, and Thailand. The working hypothesis of the paper is that national differences in attitudes and opinions reflect underlying socioeconomic variations across nations, rather than inherent cultures within the nations. According to this hypothesis, urban-rural configurations of the populations should dominate opinion orientations, rather than idiosyncratic characteristics of these nations. The fundamental rural-urban cleavage will explain attitudes toward traditionalism-modernism which, correspondingly, will contribute to an explanation of attitudes toward democracy. The data for the study come from probability samples across the selected nations in a multi-nayion study using the same questionnaire in 2001. The analysis shows that rural-urban cleavages, seldom used in cross-national comparisons, are significant explanatory factors within nations. This study examines whether these within-nation associations are also significant for explaining attitudes and opinions in a cross-national analysis. The essential issue is: Is within-nation variance greater than variance among nations on the issues of interest? The inclusion of both developed and developing Asian nations permits examination of whether levels of development contribute to national profiles of public attitudes toward elements of democracy such as preference for democracy over authoritarian forms of government, satisfaction with democracy, desire for democracy, and other indicators of democratic support and consolidation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The political science field has developed a good understanding of how political institutions shape policymaking incentives. This paper investigates whether these incentives differ given underlying societal preferences. Analyzing the provision of public goods, I begin capturing preferences with a measure of ethnic fractionalization. However, I modify this rudimentary conceptualization by adding a measure of how ethnicity is distributed amongst income groups, what I call ethnic-income cross-cuttingness (in reference to the term cross-cutting cleavages). The paper first introduces this new measure and accompanying cross-national dataset. It then builds a socio-institutional theory of the policymaking process. Specifically, following the Horowitz school, I argue that when society is highly ethnically fractionalized and lowly cross-cutting, that small, majoritarian districts generate better incentives for politicians to cater to broader segments of society and provide more broadly-targeted public goods. This stands in contrast to the traditional institutional wisdom (Lijphart school) that large, PR districts are always best for public goods provision. I test my theory with a dataset of 40-odd developing democracies between 1970-2000. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Democratic theorists continue to engage with populismâ€"whether understood as a disruptive or dangerous force in democracy or as embedded in the logic of democracy itself. This paper adds to the exploration of the relationship between populism and democracy by juxtaposing the mass anger often attributed to populist movements in general (and to 19th century American populism in particular) with the “discontent” which drove the American progressive movement of the early 20th century (a discontent that Theodore Roosevelt referred to as “fierce” and Herbert Croly called “aggressive”). The paper would fit well on a panel on American political thought, as it will draw both on populist and progressive rhetoric and writings and on scholarly evaluations of both movements. But the theoretical underpinnings of the project come from contemporary democratic theory and, in particular, from Jacques Ranciere’s description of democracy as a rupture in the logic of arche and his related analysis of the wrong or grievance which gives rise to and constitutes politics. Put most simply, my aim in the paper is to think about populist anger and progressive discontent as possible manifestations of that grievance. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper traces the journey of political parties in Nigeria so far through the murky and turbulent waters of politics. In doing this,the paper seeks to examine the impact of the party system,as practised in Nigeria, on the current political engineering taking place in the country. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Contrary to a long held belief in post-authoritarian Taiwan in the omnipotence of democracy to ensure the island's autonomy in the face of China, this paper argues that toward the end of the second Chen Shui-bian administration the 'marginal utility' of Taipei's use of democracy in garnering international sympathy has been drastically decreasing; recent examples include its failure to persuade major members of the 'liberal democratic community', the United States in particular, to support or at least acquiesce in its proposed referendum on joining the United Nations under the name of Taiwan held alongside the presidential election in March 2008. The underlying reason, however, is not found in the blame game between Taipei and Washington as to whether the United States is bowing to Chinese pressure at the expense of Taiwan's democratic deepening, or Taiwanese ruling elites' tactic of mobilising mass support is unnecessarily provocative which could end up drawing the US into an unwanted conflict with China. Rather, this paper suggests that the quarrel is indicative of the emergence of a new standard of civilisation based on the degree of democratic-ness in world politics. While mainstream security discourse in Taiwan has been deeply embedded in the binary structure of a democratic, peace-loving Taiwan versus an authoritarian, war-like China, in urging Taiwanese leaders to 'responsibly' strike a balance between promoting their political values and protecting their people's vital interests, senior US officials too unwittingly reproduce the rhetoric of democracy as civilisation. Unable to comprehend the operation of this civilised/barbarian trope in which Taiwan as a 'maturing' democracy (meaning potentially trouble-making) has been located between the West and the rest for the purpose of strategic appropriation, Taipei mistakenly believes that it has occupied the moral high ground vis-a-vis the great powers to 'go it alone' as seen in the UN referendum. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

By making the spread of democracy a foreign policy goal, the U.S. is assuming that external factors influence the process of democratization. This paper examines this assumption more closely, looking at how the international system, and specifically conflict within the international system, affects the spread of democracy both regionally and globally. A number of studies have documented a relationship between democracy and the international system both spatially and temporally. Although these studies pose a number of explanations for temporal and spatial trends, none of them test their hypothesized causal mechanism. They only provide evidence of aggregate trends at the global and regional levels. This paper seeks to go beyond analysis at the aggregate level to test one of the hypothesized casual mechanisms, namely emulation. Drawing on Waltz's argument that competition in an anarchic environment leads states to emulate the most successful states in the system, I argue that the success of democracies in the international system prompts other states to emulate them. According to Waltz the driving force of emulative behavior is conflict and so a test of this mechanism begs the broader question: What is the impact of international conflict on the likelihood that a state will become a democracy? I test three sets of hypotheses. The direct emulation hypothesis suggests that states should imitate their competitors: thus nations that have lost wars to democracies should democratize. The indirect emulation hypothesis posits that nations should imitate the most successful states in the system: thus the likelihood of a democratic transition should be a function of the United States relative power and the regime type of the most militarily powerful state in a country's region. The socialization hypothesis predicts that countries imitate states they interact with on a more amiable level: thus states with democratic allies should be more likely to democratize. I use a logit estimator to test these hypotheses. Contrary to Waltz's expectations, I find that emulation prompted by military conflict does not play a major role in the democratization process, with one exception. I find some evidence indicating that countries are more likely to undergo democratic transitions if the most powerful country in their region is democratic. The more powerful the leading country, the greater the influence of its regime type on the likelihood that a country in its region will experience a democratic transition. Thus, if the leading country is a democracy, the more powerful it becomes the more likely countries in the region will democratize. If the leading country is an autocracy, the more powerful it becomes the less likely countries in the region will democratize. I also find support for the socialization hypothesis: the more democratic allies a state has the more likely it is to undergo a democratic transition. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Does the political agenda vary across time and space? This paper provides evidence that both the number and the nature of the fundamental conflicts that underpin political competition differ in advanced industrial democracies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The common good is an ambiguous notion. All those who found democratic governments argue that they are creating governmental structures that will benefit the common good. But what is the common good? The Declaration of Independence argues that British governance of the American colonies did not provide for the common good, and used this as a justification for revolution and independence. The Constitution of 1787 is a document intended to create a governmental structure to promote the common good. But there were two schools of thought at the time of ratification of the Constitution. Federalists argued that the Constitution was the best governmental structure by which the common good could be achieved. Anti-Federalists argued that the Constitution would impede the achievement of the common good. Did both groups define the common good in the same manner? This paper explores the common good in early American thought, using the Federalist and Anti-Federalist perspectives to survey the notion of the common good. It also explores philosophical and political conceptualizations of the common good and analyzes whether the Federalists and Anti-Federalists used the notion of the common good in a philosophical or political fashion to further their cause. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Greens' founders sought 25 years ago to repeal Michels' iron law of oligarchy as a grass-roots democratic party. This paper considers whether the Greens have fallen prey to the iron law, and the implications. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the centrality of bureaucracy to the democratic theory of Jurgen Habermas, both as a means for recasting and defending this theory, and as prescriptive of a model useful for conceiving a more democratic type of administration. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper deals with an aspect of European political culture that is vital for the legitimacy of democracy. On the basis of data from the 1999 European Value Survey the attitudes of Europeans towards democracy is explored. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper moves beyond aggregate cross-sectional tests of a central hypothesis in the literatures and examines instead if democracy might influence growth differently depending upon the regional political context. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

My paper analyzes four American debates in representation and democratic theory: the ratification debate, Lincoln-Douglas debates, Lippman-Dewey "debates," and contemporary debates over deliberative democracy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper attempts to fill an empirical void in the literature that treats the relationship between transition to democracy and economic growth. Most studies in this area examine the impact of a state?s level of democracy on its economic prospects. Few studies have addressed the impact of democratization itself on economic performance. We use an interrupted time series technique to study the link between democratization and economic growth in 22 countries that experienced transitions to democracy during ?The Third Wave? of democratization. Our findings show that transition to democracy has an inconsistent impact on economic growth. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the case for supermajority rules under one form of deliberartive democracy [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Earlier research has demonstrated that there are significant differences in the determinants of the number of political parties in a system as a function of experience with democracy. In short, institutions have greater explanatory power in established democracies, and social cleavages appear more important in newer democracies. Yet existing work fails to distinguish among three rival interpretations for this pattern: that institutional effects are learned, that high levels of wealth break up patronage systems based on social cleavage patterns, and/or that differences in the social context within which democracy develops determine the number of parties. This paper employs a new data set to test these competing hypotheses in both cross-sectional and time-series, cross-sectional analyses. Preliminary evidence suggests that the length of experience with democracy per se is the most important determinant of the dynamics of party systems, providing support for the institutional learning hypothesis. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This is paper for panel #31033 on National Identity organized by Zachary Elkins. Nation-states include, to varying degrees, citizens that ?stand out? due to place of birth, ethnicity, language, and/or religion. We investigate whether these ?distinctive? citizens manifest an attachment to the state equal to that of more ?central? citizens. Using cross-national surveys, we measure national attachment among a nation-state?s ?distinctive? and ?core? population and then seek to uncover the conditions under which national attachment is universalized. We construct a model of national attachment with individual- and country- level predictors as well as a set of interaction terms that test whether various country-level factors condition the effect of ?distinctiveness.? These interactions suggest that distinctive citizens? attachment to the nation-state decreases as the size of the distinctive population increases, and, somewhat surprisingly, as the level of economic inequality increases. We find no evidence that democratic institutions affect the views of distinctive citizens, though there is some evidence that federalism helps mitigate the effect of distinctiveness. These results have particular implications for state-building and democratic consolidation in multi-ethnic states. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

What characteristics make an external actor, such as an international organization or a foreign government, more or less likely to listen to the claims of a political group within another state? Must such claimant groups be unified and legitimate, both in the eyes of their supporters and as accords with international ideas of democratic representativeness? Under what conditions do the internal organizational characteristics of a group make its claims more or less credible? This paper examines the ways in which the degree of factionalization and the democraticness of a group seeking self-determination affects the international community’s perceptions of this group and the legitimacy of their claim for self-determination. Using the Minorities at Risk dataset as well as targeted qualitative comparisons, I test whether self-determination claimant groups are more likely to receive political support from international organizations--and tacit support for the validity of their claims--when the group displays the underlying tenets of democratic governance: representation, adherence to peaceful conflict resolution, and tolerance toward other minority groups. Understanding what drives the international response to self-determination claims helps us understand what impact sub-state or non-state actors have on the international relations of states and how domestic politics and international relations connected. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Although nowadays a large number of regimes are formally democratic, democracy doesn?t work equally well in every place. Often, those groups who wielded power under the old authoritarian regime manage to continue wielding it under democracy, thus bypassing democratic mechanisms for government responsiveness. This paper focuses on one of the most common tactics used to subvert democratic contestation, namely electoral corruption. Electoral corruption is a common phenomenon and it can have decisive consequences in the outcome of elections, yet we don?t currently have a clear theoretical account of its workings. The standard view, implicit in most of the existing literature, is that electoral corruption makes most sense in close elections, when altering the vote count at the margin is most likely to change the outcome. While this view is adequate in some cases, it nevertheless fails to account for some of the main stylized facts about electoral corruption. For one thing, corruption is common even when elections aren?t close. Second, while the literature argues that perpetrators of electoral corruption should try to keep it secret, it is often surprisingly public. I develop a simple theory of electoral corruption that challenges the standard view. I pay special attention to the role that expectations play on the behavior of voters, a critical issue that the standard view largely ignores. Using simple models I show that under certain conditions that are particularly relevant to developing countries, a powerful ruler or ruling group may have incentives to engage in more electoral corruption than merely winning would require, to engage in such actions not only during and after the election but also before it, and to publicize rather than hide its corrupt activities. These findings may at first seem counterintuitive, yet they square well with both historical and survey evidence for a variety of countries and time periods. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the history of political thought, there is a discernible tradition that has long made a distinction between the form and spirit of government. This decisively European (particularly French) tradition is best represented by Montesquieu, but also includes the likes of Hegel, Rousseau and Tocqueville. The central claim of this tradition is that types of governments have both a universal and a particular form. The constitutional (institutional and procedural forms) should be particular to contexts, but should still embody the universal principles that define the form, as that designates the type of government—e.g. a democracy as opposed to a monarchy. Yet, they suggest that for the constitutional form or type to be meaningful and descriptive of the society/country, it is necessary that the principles that underlie this type of government be evident in the mores, manners, and behavior (the spirit) of its people. In other words, the forms are a) only as meaningful and accurate as a description and, more importantly, b) only likely to be successful to the extent that they become embodied in the spirit of the people. In this paper, I will first fully develop the core arguments of this tradition in political thought. As I reconstruct the core content of this tradition, I will trace it through each of theorists cited above. Then, I will argue that this tradition has its orgins in Aristotle, who argued that the legislator should model the educative process after the fact that the sociological evolution of the individual is based first on nature, then on habit, and finally on reason. After having reconstructed this tradition and demonstrated its connection to Aristotelian thought, I will then suggest that the spirit/form tradition is a valuable theoretical tool. I argue that the spirit/form tradition establishes criteria by which a political scientist can: a) Evaluate the stability of a regime type within a country b) Evaluate the legitimacy of a government within a country and c) Suggest what alternative types of government might be better suited for a country. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A core principle of democratic theory is the notion that the government derives its legitimacy from the consent of the governed. This principle is modified in a representative democracy in which elected elites function as a safeguard against the possibly capricious will of the majority. Popular sovereignty is further circumscribed by the institution of judicial review, in which judges – who may or may not be popularly elected – are empowered to nullify laws enacted by popularly elected officials. An even more direct challenge to democratic principles occurs when judges rule on the validity of legislation enacted by the people themselves via the initiative and/or referenda process (allowed by 26 states). The extant evidence makes clear that statutes and constitutional amendments enacted through the initiative are frequently contested in court (Emrey 2002). This begs the question, however, of how judicial behavior in such instances compares with the behavior of judges with regard to legislation duly passed by legislative bodies. In this paper, we use a hierarchical modeling strategy to examine this question by analyzing and comparing the exercise of judicial review by state high courts with regard to both direct legislation and republican lawmaking. In doing so, we offer some useful insights on a crucially important but often overlooked aspect of judicial decision making at the state level, and in the process enhance our understanding of (actual or potential) countermajoritarian behavior on the part of such judicial institutions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Political scientists have studied the causes of democracy for decades, and despite these scholars? valiant efforts, there is still little known about what causes the transition to democracy or stability in newly established democracies. One possible reason for this lack of knowledge is the failure of many political scientists to use, or even consider, political culture in systematic studies of democratization. Although almost all political scientists admit political culture plays a role in the democratization process, there has been virtually no empirical work done on the relationship between political culture and the transition to democracy. The following paper seeks to fill this void in the literature by empirically testing the relationship between Mary Douglas? theory of culture and consolidation of democracy. Using Douglas? theory, one can predict that a country undergoing consolidation of democracy should have an increase in the number of individualist and hierarchical cultures and a decrease in the number of egalitarian and fatalist cultures. These predictions are tested using with an OLS regression model, where democracy is regressed on political culture. From the data gathered from a sample of twenty-three countries, there seems to be strong support of the predictions made by the theory, but as pointed out, there are some problems to be solved through future research in this area. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Not Open For Discussion: A Psychological Account of Democratic Deliberation. Emily H. Hoechst Georgetown University ehoechst@mac.com Deliberative democracy involves exposure to otherness in ways a non-deliberative practice does not. Because deliberative democracy brings participants into direct contact with the views of others, it brings to the fore issues of recognition and identity, separation and relation, freedom and coercion. Deliberative politics is therefore uniquely risky because it requires self-reflection, articulation of one’s reasons, and exposure to criticism These requirements will often evoke anxiety, a response which in and of itself is problematic for the deliberative framework. What makes deliberative participants anxious is not just that they may lose the argument, cause, or vote. It is also the prospect of being personally rejected; of losing intersubjective affirmation from others. Rawls and Habermas have both developed theoretical mechanisms designed to alleviate this kind of anxiety. Both theorists are keenly aware of the psychological position of the other in politics. My argument in this paper is that both Rawls and Habermas rely upon a problematic psychology in structuring their deliberative contexts, one that actually may exacerbate conflict in deliberation, making it more difficult than it needs to be. The models of Piaget and Kohlberg (and Mead, for Habermas) all argue for a postconventional or abstract mode of moral reasoning, one that treats individuals as universal bearers of rights deserving of respect. My critique of this psychology, and the democratic theory that flows from it, is twofold: (1) Based on the psychological theory of D.W. Winnicott and Jessica Benjamin, I argue that Rawls and Habermas, while claiming to support an intersubjective understanding of deliberation, actually remain caught within an intrapsychic psychology. Rawls and Habermas both favor recourse to “the moral point of view.” What intersubjective psychology suggests is that such formulations can produce the undesirable consequence of complementary thinking; those who disagree are now not only “different” but also somehow “less moral,” an unnecessarily binary (either/or) way of thinking. Benjamin in particular suggests a different psychological framework, based loosely on Hegel, which allows difference to exist in a deliberative setting, even if the setting becomes more contentious as a result. (2) Based on the recent literature on the politics of recognition (such as Taylor, Honneth, and Markell) I argue that Rawls’ and Habermas’ deliberative settings are unresponsive to issues of identity and reciprocity. Both theorists engage in a kind of cognitive bracketing for political purposes which is (a) impossible, according to Arendt, and/or (b) undesireable under circumstances that seek more deliberative participation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The European Parliament (EP) has been a center of high attention for a number of uniqueness that stems from its being the first and the only directly elected supranational representative institution. Particularly important issue has been the relationship between the European Parliament as a supranational institution and the people of Europe that it is supposed to represent. The paper discusses one aspect of the relationship between the EP and the people and traces how the evolution of the European Parliament from a “powerless” institution to a relatively more powerful institution could have affected its relationship with the people and more specifically the degree of popularity of the EP in the eyes of the people. This examination of the relationship between the EP and the people of Europe will reveal the nature and the limits of the fledgling post-national democracy in Europe. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

One of the most fundamental criticisms of any democracy is that it represents the interests of the privileged few instead of the broader concerns of the masses. This issue has become more and more pronounced in the American context as voter turnout declines to record levels and as research demonstrates the skewed nature of the electorate. In election after election, individuals with resources are significantly more like to participate in the political arena than are those with few resources. But does the skewed nature of the electorate matter in the end? Research up to this point has almost unanimously indicated that it makes little difference. Focusing almost exclusively on national elections, scholars have found that the interests of nonvoters do not differ dramatically from the interests of voters (e.g. Verba, Schlozman and Brady 1995, Wolfinger and Rosenstone1980). Nonvoters would have voted for essentially the same candidates and supported the same policies as voters. Thus, in the end, we need not be all that concerned about who bothers to vote. In this paper I challenge this finding by switching the focus of attention to local elections where turnout is considerably lower and thus where any bias that exists at the national level is likely to be much more pronounced. It is not uncommon to see turnout fall below one-quarter of the voting age population in local contests. Non-participation by such a large majority of eligible voters could clearly have consequences. Where participation is so low, the voice of the people may be biased and government outcomes may less equitable or responsive. Despite this possibility, no recent academic research has addressed this question. In this project, I assess the effects of voter turnout on perhaps the most important outcome in local democracy - the spending patterns of city governments. In short, does turnout affect local spending priorities. Are low turnout cities less apt to enact redistributive policies that help the disadvantaged and more likely to appropriate funds for development programs that tend to aid businesses and other members of the more consistently voting middle class? To do this, I have merged data on aggregate voter turnout and registration for a representative sample of all cities over 2000 in population (from surveys conducted by the International City/County Management Association) with data on the actual spending patterns of city governments (available from the Census of Governments). The analysis that I have undertaken to this point strongly suggests that changes in voter turnout are closely linked to policy outcomes at the local level. As turnout declines, cities are less and less likely to spend money on programs that might aid the poor. In contrast, as turnout declines spending on infrastructure, downtown development, and other key business interests substantially increases. In other words, when turnout goes down, those who vote less regularly appear to lose out in American democracy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Indices of democracy typically identify democracy with the set of institutions of government which have evolved in ?Western? representative political systems. But on the basis of this specific democratic model these indices produce an ?institutional fallacy? in measuring ?democratic quality?, because they fail to take into account the respective (societal, institutional) context. In this paper we propose a new concept and a new index based on this argument. We apply a minimal definition of democracy, which is based on the logic of individuals? self-determination. Our index takes into account the context and the degree of effective participation. We define the contextual attributes and the different possible institutional opportunity structures to ensure effective participation. We deduce assumptions about the causal relationship between context their effect on the optimal mixture of opportunity structures. We conclude with first considerations regarding the concrete operationalization and measurement of the respective elements of our model. We end with a short qualitative illustration (in German language) of the democratic quality of three European countries to exemplify our concept. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the democratic political dimensions of Dewey's pragmatism and critically evaluates the recent Deweyan justification of Confucian democracy from Dewey's democratic political theory. Its key claim is that neo-Deweyan Confucian democrats, while exclusively focusing on Dewey's advocacy of the social self and also rejecting the democratic value of willing individuality, dismissed that in a Deweyan pragmatic democracy, social inquiry refers mainly to the communicative process of public judgment and willing and intelligent participation in the common will-formation. Therefore, for Dewey, the common good is not disclosed but politically constructed at a particular time and in a particular situation. It closes by suggesting to Deweyan Confucian democrats on how to make their vision of Deweyan Confucian democracy a politically practicable democracy and hence remain fully faithful to Dewey's own vision of democracy or, alternatively, whether or not it makes more sense to explore non-Deweyan Confucian democracy. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Democratic and legal theorists currently disagree about whether the judiciary should be conceived as a democratic, representative institution. While normative political theorists do not tend to view the Court as representative, scholars of regime politics have situated the Court in a larger democratic process: if we collect the Court's democratic impulses as excavated by the regimes literature, we have a picture of an institution that fits within normative models of representation. Turning to recent methodological work in political development, I argue the regimes literature has employed an "off the shelf" method of periodization that has the potential to obscure developmental processes and incorrectly locate agency, contingency, and constraint. In order to study the Court as a democratic, representative institution, I suggest eschewing the regime literature's temporal framework. This paper's intent is twofold: to demonstrate the potential for the conceptualization of the Court as a democratic, representative institution, and to problematize "off the shelf" approaches to periodization. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Contemporary Latin America is experiencing a region-wide violent crime epidemic, the political consequences of which are largely unknown. Many commentators imply that the crime wave bodes ill for democracy in the region, causing disillusionment with government, reducing mass political participation, and increasing popular support for authoritarianism. This paper questions the micro-foundations of that conventional wisdom. Analysis of survey data indicates that crime victimization may cause increased political participation at the individual level. Rather than becoming cynical, disenchanted, or disempowered, Latin American crime victims are actually more politically active than their non-victimized peers. Crime victimization has an ambiguous impact on opinions about democracy and dictatorship; further research will be needed before firm conclusions about this relationship can be drawn. The results are robust to specification checks and multiple different quantitative methods, and they are based on data from multiple years of the LAPOP and Latinobaómetro surveys. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

William Connolly is one of the foremost exponents of the trend of "Left Nietzscheanism." In this paper, I critique Connolly's appropriation of Nietzsche both hermeneutically and normatively, and suggest the outlines of a liberal alternative. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

What accounts for variation in support for democracy among religious organizations? This paper explores the importance of institutional factors in determining support for democracy among church authorities in Latin America from 1970-2005. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Using a twoâ€"stage model of religiousâ€"democratic change from Italy, this paper argues that friendly religion-state arrangements might be useful for democratic transitions in countries who host a religion that is seemingly hostile towards democracy. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Using data from 1950-2000 this paper investigates whether IOs use a hypothesized mechanism to promote democracy within their member states. I test the effects of net characteristics of IO membership on the probability of democratic transition. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper suggests that previous literature has focused too narrowly on the institutional limitations to democratic responsiveness, to the neglect of the cultural-identity concerns raised in democratic theory. I provide and test a framework for conceptualizing identity, and noting its determinants, which takes into account a variety of factors previously addressed in the literature on EU support. Eurobarometer survey data is utilized in a multi-level model, allowing for the simultaneous consideration of both individual-level and state-level theories of identity formation. Identity development is found to be primarily influenced by diffuse elements of policy support and latent socialization mechanisms. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper problematizes arguements which suggest that post-communist states should strive towards liberal and procedural democracy. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper looks at the assumptions of the emerging literature on global justice and show how some of the debates are distorted by inappropriate ideas borrowed from the domestic social contract theories out of which they grow. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper focuses on two institutional settings in federal states, namely direct democratic institutions and institutionalised intergovernmental cooperation, and analyses how they affect policy diffusion. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper exams levels of correct voting -- i.e., voting in accord with one's own preferences and values -- across 32 established and emerging democracies. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines those factors, both international and domestic, that are most influential in a state’s decision to adopt a legislative gender quota, including diffusion patterns and regime-type. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the theory and practice of participatory democracy in recent, current, and future contexts. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the paradoxical endurance of non-consolidated non-performing democracies focusing on the identification of factors contributive to social consent (or political absenteeism) that fill the gap between the stage of institutionalization of a non-consolidated democracy and that of fully consolidated democracies. It utilizes the understanding that consolidation requires the routinization of and a normative commitment to democracy (Diamond 1999), and proposes that to secure democratic continuity the incomplete fulfillment of those requirements demands consummate performance legitimacy, the absence of which must be mitigated by counterbalancing factors. The plausibility of this framing of the endurance of non-consolidated non-performing democracies is tested by examining Brazil's democratic regime. The findings support the instrumentality of the framework of analysis and suggest that counterbalancing factors allowing democratic endurance may in fact preclude consolidation and substantive socioeconomic advances. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the interdependencies between policy areas: how do positions on one issue constrain the choice of positions on other issues? Expert survey data from established democracies is used to explore this question. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the interactive effect of direct democracy and racial diversity on social trust. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper considers the traditional approaches that political theory has taken towards questions of loss. It then presents a critique of these approaches, and suggests an alternative understanding of loss informed by the concept of sacrifice. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper argues that the question of who are eligible to participate in the democratic decision making processes should be determined in the forever-open deliberation among those who share loyalty to democratic procedures. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]