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Following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States, the European Union has attempted to reinforce its existing nascent capabilities to combat terrorism. The European Council adopted a comprehensive Plan of Action and reached political agreement on a number of important counterterrorism initiatives, including strengthening of Europol and Eurojust; and the introduction of a European Arrest Warrant. This paper provides a critical analysis of these key operational measures and reveals that the EU counterterrorism policy suffers from an implementation deficit, in large part due to the absence of genuine pro-integration thinking in the area of Justice and Home Affairs. A multitude of political, legal, and cultural challenges still need to be overcome in order to make the EU counterterrorism policy less of a paper tiger and more of an effective counterterrorism device. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper focuses on the question of how the dominant free-market model of globalization-a model I call globalism-has been impacted by 9/11 and the war on terrorism. Can globalism survive in our post-9/11 world? The paper makes the case that it cannot--at least not in its pre-9/11 form. In order to save at least some of its original agenda, free-market globalization is currently being transformed into a globalism with an American face-a much more imperialistic and militaristic variant than its more economistic predecessor. Military operations and ideological propaganda maneuvers have become as important-or even more important-than global trade initiatives. The paper examines and analyzes some of these ideological maneuvers. Undermining the establishment of a multilateral global community, the new globalism with an American face is instead raising the specter of an American global empire unilaterally imposed on the world. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper studies George W. Bush?s narrative; the relationship between U.S. national security and information technology after the painful experience of 9/11. Bush?s phrases of national security and information technology are in the nucleus of international and national political challenges, yet they are in many ways problematic and controversial. I am asking if they even are a central part of the problem of global war on terror itself. Nevertheless my intention is rather to try to understand what I suggest as Bush?s narrative of ?nightmare? by generating questions from political philosophy that challenge and open up these fundamental phrases. As President Bush is boldly able to simplify the complex phenomenon of terrorism, his acts will raise a question more fundamental in the West: how far he can go with the phrases. Colonizing a cyberspace with totalitarian surveillance activities maintains a paradoxical silence; a vast amount of information without knowledge. In this sense, President Bush has taken in his ?ride? American national security culture to the new frontiers. This has a potential to lead to the deterritorialization of national security. Using Lyotard?s thoughts, the paper discovers questions of putting the phrase ?take the battle to the enemy? into practice. On an information technology level of analysis this can be seen as total accident, in Paul Virilio?s terms, with the pragmatism of permanent cybersurveillance (Patriot Act) of the Americans and not just terrorists. It is a logical step for modernity to define information technology as a tool in this battle in which ?freedom does not come free?. On a narrative level of analysis, I suggest that phrases of information technology should be turned into recognizing a differend. These phrases put forward the unpresentable which, even though it opens up a question of the concept of ?enemy?, reveals how the United States in its travel is struggling not with the enemy but with itself. Bush?s disputable phrases of information technology occupy an important place in U.S. national security culture because of their contradictory relation between state and individual to western expansion of freedom. This is enabled in Bush?s narrative which is legitimated by a possible ?nightmare?. By ?discovering? this ?frontier? in Bush?s universe, we can better understand the modern project grounding its legitimacy in the imaginable future ? and not in 9/11. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines biological, chemical, and nuclear warfare preparedness exercises in the United States. The paper argues that not only are biological warfare preparedness exercises designed to test for weaknesses in the internal security and public health apparatus, but are also explicitly designed forms of information warfare and perception management that are targeted at both reassuring the population of the ability of the state to respond to weapons of mass destruction incidents, and to communicate a message of deterrence to potential enemies, be they domestic or transnational terrorist networks, criminal organizations or states. The paper locates the current counterterror and homeland security mobilization in a broader historical context by comparing current preparedness exercises and guidelines to civil defense exercises and guidelines of the Second World War and Cold War. In the paper I utilize the Darkwinter and TOPOFF (Top Officials) 1 and 2 preparedness exercises that have taken place in the last several years as case studies. I examine: the discourse used by the planners and participants in these exercises at both the federal, state and local levels; media coverage of these exercises; and public opinion data to determine the effectiveness of these preparedness exercises in meeting their proclaimed goals. The case studies are designed to answer the question included in the title of the paper; do these exercises demonstrate prudence or panic? Are the exercises necessary tests of the capacity of internal security apparatus and public health system (the first responders) to cope with imagined scenarios that are likely to occur? Or are the exercises staged events and perception management that are largely ineffective at either testing the capacity of the government to respond to such threat, assuring the general public and participants in the exercises, and communicating a message that will deter potential enemies? [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Typial counter-terrorism (CT) thinking focuses on the act of violence, or its associated threat, to identify and exploit associated avenues for meaningful response and reaction. Other CT thinking takes an alternative path in attempting to identify and define the causal factors of militancy and terrorism. Both approaches have led to noteworthy successes, yet both have significant shortcomings. Response and reaction strategies leave the initiative with the terrorist, ensuring government efforts are largely geared towards crisis response and management. Efforts to define terrorism’s causes suffer since there are no universally present conditions and factors upon which to direct preventive attention. As a result, terrorist violence is too often seen as largely unpredictable and unavoidable. This paper examines the possibility that a more thorough understanding of the communicative dynamic of terrorism can lead to significantly increased opportunities for both strategic prediction and preemption. Building on the premise that terrorism is, indeed, propaganda of the deed, this paper offers a preliminary theory of the rhetorical and symbolic aspects of terrorism, their role in determining and describing the evolutionary trajectory of the terrorist group, and how this understanding may open doors for more effective and lasting CT efforts. PLEASE NOTE: This paper is still udergoing required prepublication review by the U.S. Department of Defense. Once clearance release has been received, the paper will be available and posted in its entirety. You may also obtain a complete copy, once clearance release has been granted, by emailing Dan Gressang at either Gressang@aol.com or Daniel.Gressang@dia.mil [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Bush is a liar and unless Americans own up to this fact America as a country will lose its credibility as a force for justice in world politics. The situation is so tenuous in fact that when Secretary of State Colin Powell went before the UN Security Council to demonstrate his irrefutable proof that Iraq was hiding weapons of mass destruction, American diplomats asked that a tapestry depicting the horrors of war be covered up by the Security council flag?as if the artwork itself would be more convincing than Powell. As the art historian Robert Hughes notes, Guernica is the most powerful invective against violence in modern art. When the Fascists bombed the independent Basque republic’s capital city of Guernica in 1937, killing nearly 1,600 civilians, the world saw the action as a symbol of Fascist barbarism. Picasso’s artwork is unmistakable as Maureen Dowd notes, Mr. Powell can’t very well seduce the world into bombing Iraq surrounded on camera by shrieking and mutilated women, men, children, bulls and horses. But it seems unlikely that Powell could seduce anyone of war, unless that is they are already committed to war. The problem, according to columnist John Nichols, is that Substantial portions of the report that Powell used to support his critique of Iraq were lifted from an article written by a postgraduate student who works not in Baghdad but in Monterey, California, and who based much of his research on materials left in Kuwait more than a dozen years ago by Iraqi security services. Thus, the covering of Geurnica represents a greater covering of the debates that are raging in the United States and around the world the direction of the war on terrorism. The covering of the Guernica tapestry summarizes the conflict between war and peace but also depicts the relationship between the forces on either side: those opposed to preemptive war are simply covered over. But power, like Machievelli’s fortune often acts in fickle ways, independent of those who claim it for themselves. Asking the question, are we safer today than we were on September 11th, 2001? This paper seeks to understand the rhetoric of what I refer to as the popular realists of the Bush administration and the theoretical and normative foundations of realism in international affairs (what I refer to as the sophisticated realist following the work Alan Gilbert). In order to understand the claims of realism it will be helpful to discuss the work of two scholars who attempt to save realism from itself. Alan Gilbert and David Goldfisher have recently attempted to look back into the past in order to discover the implications of various interpretations of realist and neo-realist international relations theory. Goldfischer and Gilbert argue similarly that realism has an ethical core that is often overlooked in the particular interest of ruling elite. In such a context of historical and political amnesia, it is easy to forget that important realist figures from Thucydides to Hans J. Morgenthau argue that corruption (lack of a concern for the common good) cancels the realist’s moral core (defense of national survival, the life of each citizen?against aggression ). This paper follows in three parts. First I discuss the popular realist position of the Bush administration in an attempt to make the best case for Bush by employing texts from Bush’s speeches. Second, I discuss the sophisticated realist position and its subsequent analysis of the popular realist position. Finally, I conclude with an analysis of realist security versus insecurity following from the Bush administration’s leadership and directorship of the war on terrorism. I also offer policy recommendations following from the sophisticated realist paradigm. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The events of 9/11 have induced a worldwide paradigm shift. This shift has affected many aspects of life both here in North America and abroad. The United States drafted the Patriot Act, which provisioned for far-reaching security measures. Some of these measures challenge the constitutional rights of every American citizen. Yet there is clearly a need for enhanced security measures both domestically and internationally. Whereas it is unclear whether or not the Patriot Act and the potentially forthcoming Patriot II Act will improve security for citizens both in the US and abroad, it is clear that these acts will affect the lives of common citizens worldwide. Since 99% of the Internet is bound neither by geo-political borders nor by geographic distances, the Patriot Act will have a unique affect on Internet usage worldwide. One of the broad-sweeping measures of the Patriot Act allows the United States to monitor all Internet traffic and voice traffic in search of terrorist data. This paper will explore how the need to protect a nation’s citizens with enhanced security measures is balanced against the rights of those citizens to privacy and free speech. The paper will focus on the EU and United States and the measures they are taking to ‘protect’ their citizens. I will close the paper with a discussion about the issues that governments will face over the next 5 years in balancing security, privacy and free-speech on the Internet. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Bush administration’s response to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 was to declare war on terrorism. The aspects of this war that have received the most attention have been the unilateral and military nature of the US response. What has been overlooked is another part of the Bush administration’s reaction: an effort to reconfigure the international norm of sovereignty as it applies to state sponsors of terrorism. The US has adopted the view that by supporting terrorists, states forfeit their sovereign right to autonomy over their territory. This has been accompanied by an effort to persuade or compel the international community to accept this view as well, as can be seen in US efforts to garner international support in the military campaigns against Afghanistan and Iraq. This raises several theoretical questions, which this paper will try to address. First, is this merely a hegemon acting to reshape the international community to suit its national interests? Realists and neoliberal institutionalists disagree about the value of international institutions; will a dominant state reject institutions that it doesn’t think serve its interests, or will it try to modify them to avoid the costs of creating replacements? Constructivists and proponents of the English School argue that the shared rules, interests, and values of the international society of states will influence the behavior of its members. US behavior over the last two years includes elements that support each of these views; it has adopted a with us or against us approach, but at the same time has worked to persuade other states to revise the norm of sovereignty. Second, can a state unilaterally reshape international norms? The US appears to be trying to change shared understandings of when states retain the sovereign right to non-intervention by other states. The US is tacitly arguing that by supporting terrorists, states forfeit their right to internal autonomy, because they have not fulfilled the responsibilities inherent in sovereignty. (This effort on the part of the US is not entirely new; during the 1990s the US government tried to shape international attitudes toward rogue states, but without arguing that these states had forfeited sovereignty.) While some studies have examined the role of individuals and international organizations in shaping international norms, the role of the state in reshaping international norms deserves further attention. This paper will contribute to this inquiry. It will examine the efforts the US has made to persuade other states to adopt a similar stance toward state sponsors of terrorism, and responses by other states and the international community in forums such as the UN and regional organizations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

What role do ideas play in the establishment and maintenance of hegemony? The proposed paper seeks to answer these questions by building upon the model of international relations (Role Realignment theory) described in International Political Science Review 24/1 (January 2003), and refined in The Precarious Balance Revisited: The War on Terrorism and System Transformation (CEISA/ISA Conference, Budapest, 26-28 June 2003). The paper will explore the proposition that this theory sheds light on the process of endogenous norm generation in international relations. The model incorporates ideas/ideology as endogenous variables alongside traditional measures of power in a closed-system model that emphasizes the process dynamics through which ideas/ideologies compete for acceptance/dominance in international relations. The four major variables (foreign policy role elements) are operationalized using metrics that can be tested historically, producing an explanatory rather than a normative theory. Findings will emphasize U.S. foreign policy role behavior and its impact on America’s leading role in world affairs. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

PLEASE NOTE: This paper is still undergoing the required prepublication review by the U.S. Department of Defense. Upon completion of that review and clearance for public release, the paper will be posted in its entirety. You may also request a copy of the paper by emailing Dan Gressang at either Daniel.Gressang@dia.mil or Gressang@aol.com. Upon clearance for release from DoD, the paper will be emailed to you. Thank you for your patience. Bringing strategic level and tactical level analysis and prediction together are not easy tasks. Yet it is in strategic and predictive analysis that we need for effective threat recognition and effective homeland defense and security. And it is strategic and predictive analysis which are the least developed and leveraged at all levels of government. Terrorists are hard targets, constantly adapting, constantly changing, constantly threatening us and our interests in a variety of ways. The target ? terrorists ? is here, there, everywhere and nowhere. The threat seems to change daily, certainly with each new attack. Effective preparation demands broad cooperative efforts involving local, state, and national authorities. It demands the incorporation of law enforcement, intelligence, public health, first responder, and policy perspectives. It requires broad consensus on mission, goals, objectives, and processes if it is to be successful. It must, above all else, be dedicated to the predictive, the anticipatory so that threats can be identified before violent acts have a chance to highlight our shortcomings in security. Responding and reacting to terrorism is a necessary practice of government. Effective homeland defense and homeland security, however, revolve around anticipation of those threats and around efforts to disrupt and deter. Disrupting and deterring terrorists while securing the homeland from attack from within or without, in turn, requires the effective cooperation and coordination across jurisdictions, across perspectives, across levels of government. This paper examines one such effort, the Maryland Coordination and Analysis Center, and uses it to draw some operative lessons for building and operating an effective multi-jurisdiction analysis and warning effort. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The 'National Vision' of the Bush Administration with regard to homeland security aimed to 'prevent the entry of terrorists and the instruments of terror while facilitating the legal flow of people, goods, and services'. International implications of homeland security measures have resulted in the emergence of new class of foreign policy makers: Customs and Border Protection, Transportation Security Administration, and other units in the Department of Homeland Security whose exposure to international partners increased considerably. This paper challenges a reader to make a certain conceptual shift and look at homeland security as a foreign policy issue as well as the internal security one. The analysis of transatlantic homeland security progresses in two steps. First, it explores the post-September 11th development of homeland security cooperation between the US and the EU in order to identify challenges to the transatlantic governance of homeland security. Then, the attention is paid to internal challenges stemming from domestic politics on each side but also to external ones posed by the international environment and third parties. Issues under discussion in this paper include aviation security and customs cooperation which represent most impressive but at the same time most problematic dimension of the contemporary transatlantic homeland security cooperation. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since 1975, American foreign policy in Southeast Asia can be characterized as "benign neglect". After the 9/11 attack, the Southeast Asian region has become refuge of Al Qaeda members and a "second front" of US global counter-terrorism operation. The rapid rise of China presents new challenges to US foreign policy. China's growing influence comes at the expense of US power and influence in Southeast Asia, hastening US-China competition in the region and increasing the probability of the outbreak of conflict. In order to prevent the decline of US influence in the region and maintain its sole super power status in the world, the US has sought to enhance and promote its relations with ASEAN countries, this way, the US has taken steps to become re-involved in the region. The purpose of this paper is to clarify expectations of future US strategy towards Southeast Asia by exploring the causes of US re-involvement in Southeast Asia as well as strategies the Bush administration undertook. This paper analyzes US goals and interests in the region, influences of the development of terrorism on the US and the effects of the rapid rise of China. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper argues that dynamically developing border security policies of the European Union are influenced by transnational regulation originating from the United States. It shows that the process of transatlantic homeland security is increasingly taking place through network structures. The emergence of transatlantic networks and socialisation processes within them allowed for the US involvement in the EU policy-making. This is mostly due to growing personal relationships between policy makers, gradual substitution of formal legal instruments with psychological contracts, and informal understandings providing the contents for formal agreements. Consequently, the paper analyzes the implications of these developments, looks at still unresolved issues and proposes potential solutions. The empirical examples for this paper are derived in particular from the EU-U.S. cooperation on data protection in the context of homeland security. The networks under investigation include the High Level Political Dialogue on Border and Transportation Security and the High Level Dialogue on Data Protection. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper explores a very little researched area: the use(s) of the Internet for purposes of counter-terrorism pre- and post-9/11. It includes description and analysis of the use of the Internet for anti-terrorism in the immediate aftermath of 9/11; relevant legislation promulgated by the US, UK, and EU; and the changing role of the Internet in counter-terrorism operations with the development of the 'War on Terrorism.' The final section of the paper considers criticisms of the various operations engaged in and procedures adopted, and the outlook for the future(s) of the Net given the foregoing. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper begins by providing an overview of contemporary anthropological perspectives on and approaches to the study of state terrorism. This is followed by analysis of the politics of the definition of ‘terrorism’; terrorism in reality and propaganda, or subjective, political, and objective perspectives on terrorism; and the politics and taboos of ‘terrorism studies’ and the ‘terrorism industry’. The paper then concludes by presenting a power-conflict theory of modern state terrorism fundamentally relating it to three dominant global trends of the past half-century â€" growing inequality, increasing oppression and human rights abuses, and the massive growth of state power in the world today. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper analyzes the impact of different organizational structures on the operations of United States intelligence agencies. U.S. intelligence has recently seen a move towards greater centralization of organization and control, most notably with the creation of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence in December 2004. Indeed, citing the need for improved coordination and accountability among intelligence agencies, many commentators have advocated even greater integration. At the same time, calls have been heard for additional flexibility in terrorism-fighting techniques, and for a more “networked” approach to combating new, less centrally organized foes. Clearly an intelligence system must be both integrated and supple, ordered and adaptive. But how, exactly, should these different goals be balanced? This question is not unique to intelligence. For more than fifty years, students of organization theory have considered whether hierarchies, markets/networks, or hybrid structures are best suited to given constellations of organizational tasks. This paper considers what has been learned about the advantages and drawbacks of these different structural forms, and, given the unusual information and communication challenges posed by intelligence, whether these lessons might be profitably applied to the reform of intelligence organizations. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Partnerships between U.S. and former Soviet Union (FSU) states are essential in reducing terrorist access to nuclear and biological weapons, facilities, and expertise. The English Language and Nonproliferation (ELAN) Program at the Center for Nonproliferation Studies provides the language training necessary for the success of cooperative threat reduction programs, collaborative research projects on drugs and vaccines, and reconfiguration of former weapons facilities. This paper describes how the ELAN Program supports the work of U.S. and FSU nuclear and biological scientists, export control and border control officials, and nuclear engineers who participate in U.S. cooperative threat reduction programs. ELAN participants are employed by former weapons institutes and may be involved in conversion of those facilities to civil use, in new public health research projects, in biodefense, or in export controls. Trainees learn about the larger proliferation dynamics beyond their individual institutes and labs and how a culture of safety and security can help to prevent the proliferation of weapons materials, information, and expertise. They exchange ideas and discuss solutions to proliferation problems in class and with CNS nonproliferation experts. By learning the language of nonproliferation in an intensive English-speaking environment, ELAN participants can be better engaged in cooperative research and threat reduction efforts with their U.S. counterparts. The paper also explores opportunities for expanding the program to other countries, for on-site training at labs and institutes, and for developing international communities of practice for safety and security in the nuclear and biological sciences. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

It is often thought that success impedes substantial change in the ideas underpinning and the discourses legitimating foreign policy and that failure is necessary, although not sufficient, for such change. Yet, when viewed through the lens of narrative, this proposition is not borne out by the history of US foreign policy in the latter half of the twentieth century. The Korean War, made possible by the emerging Cold War, was widely seen as a failure, but it led to the consolidation of the so-called Cold War consensus, not its rejection. The debacle of Vietnam led to only the partial unraveling of that consensus, as substantial elements remained intact through the 1970s and facilitated Reagan’s rise. The Iraq fiasco does not appear to have opened up great fissures in the edifice of the War on Terror, to which the administration had bound it so tightly. The greatest changes in America’s foreign-affairs narratives have in fact come in the wake of unalloyed victory, as previous narratives came to seem less illegitimate or wrong than irrelevantâ€"such as after the Second World War and the Cold War. The proposed paper seeks to explain why policy failure has not led to wholesale narrative change, even when it might have been expected. The key lies in the rhetoric of opposition elites, to which mass audiences turn as the policy’s supporters lose credibility. Because policy failures typically reveal themselves as such only in stages, opposition elites early on have incentives to depart only from elements of the existing dominant narrative, and consequently their criticism reproduces much of that narrative. Later, once the fiasco is well established and opposition elites wish to depart from the narrative that had sustained the failure, they find themselves locked into that narrative whose core they had themselves recently reproduced, and they find the path to meaningful narrative change blocked. To substantiate these claims, the paper will explore empirically the dynamics of political opposition during America’s wars in Korea, Vietnam, and, if space permits, Iraq. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In his recent book, Gandhi and Beyond, David Cortright argues that “nonviolence is the exact opposite of and the most effective antidote to terrorism.” More simply, Tom Hastings states that “violence has not worked to eliminate terrorism. It is time to try the nonviolent approach.” Though Cortright’s and Hasting’s books go far to make the case for nonviolence in an “age of terrorism”, this paper goes further by placing nonviolence in the context of what I call the “new global security agenda”. It therefore links nonviolent theory with practice. I take seriously Cortright’s assumption that “terrorism is fundamentally a political phenomenon, and the strategies against it must be political as well.” Thus, strategy and tactics must return to the classic, Cluasewitzian formulation of war as a “true political instrument.” The US lead “war on terror” fundamentally misunderstands the relationship between means and ends (as witnessed by the strategy of preventative war). This paper compares the US strategy employed so far in the war on terrorism with nonviolent means. It concludes that by using nonviolent strategies and tactics the United States and its allies will more realistically achieve its goal of defeating terrorism. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How will the US pursue the “war or terror” after the Bush administration? While changing the name of the American strategy will almost certainly be part of the new approach what will also be required is a disentangling of the various conceptions of the “war on terror” which emerged during the Bush Administration. This paper will demonstrate how the Bush Administration’ approach inflated and conflated the threats which America faced and developed competing strategies to deal with these threats.The “Counter Terrorism” strategy focused on the terrorists themselves, involved traditional counter-terrorism techniques and lead logically to war in Afghanistan. The second strategy, ‘Pre-emption and Pre-eminence’, represented a step change in Washington’s conceptualisation of the terrorist threat and how to deal with it. The third approach, the ‘Forward Strategy for the Democratisation of the Middle East’, sought to identify both the root causes of and the long term solutions to the War on Terrorism. This paper shows how and why American thinking evolved in this way and how the tensions between these different strategies have complicated America’s task of dealing with the terrorist threat. It argues that only by disaggregating these different threats and responses will it be possible to develop a coherent and workable strategy. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper will examine several of the actions of President George W. Bush and argue that in his assertions of presidential authority he has pushed the boundaries of presidential power further than the Constitution allows. Four instances of President Bush's claims to extraordinary presidential authority will be examined: his suspension of the Geneva Agreements in 2002, his denial of the writ of habeas corpus for detainees in the war on terror, his order that the National Security Agency monitor messages to or from domestic parties in the United States without a warrant, and his use of signing statements. The paper will conclude that the principles of constitutionalism and the rule of law are basic to the United States polity. Insofar as President Bush, in cases such as these, has refused to acknowledge the constitutional limits on his executive authority, he has undermined both of these fundamental principles. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The emerging international counter-terrorism regime has been imposed by powerful states on the less powerful. Through a range of international agreements and bilateral negotiations, countries around the world are pressed to join the "war on terror" by adopting relevant domestic legislation, sharing intelligence, and cracking down on target groups. Despite heavy pressure, most obviously from the United States, levels of compliance with the regime have varied. Some countries have jumped on board and seized the anti-terrorism rhetoric, others have been reluctant partners, and several have actively resisted the imposition of the regime. This paper examines levels of compliance with the counter-terrorism regime in Africa, where the relative lack of power might have been expected to necessitate conformity. By focusing on three contrasting cases in East Africa (Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda), the paper shows that domestic political factors (both institutions and constituencies) are particularly important in explaining different levels of compliance with the regime. The government's perception of the terrorist threat and the availability of funding (both internal to and external to the regime) also play a role. To the extent that democratic pressures reduce compliance, the paper raises interesting questions about the international legitimacy of this imposed regime and its ability to induce cooperation. By focusing on weak states that are at various stages of political liberalization, the paper contributes to a growing body of literature about the influence of domestic politics on international commitments. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper is a consideration of what, at its core, is a state-building question: is the United States adept at creating highly centralized internal security bureaucracies such as the DHS? After the attacks of 9/11, the resurrection of a national civilian defense program, under the moniker "homeland security," has become a crucial domestic policy of the federal government. Disaster planning and civilian defense, subjects that had been relegated to the academic sub-discipline of security studies, are now the daily grist of newspapers and television news channels. There has always been a tension among the general public, state and local government, and the federal government regarding civilian defense policy and its expected outcomes. One area that is worth closer analysis is how expectations are dealt with in a large nation that is, by constitutional design, a federal republic. This essay examines the fate of the DHS in light of its place within a federal republic and the conflicting types of civilian defense that its organizational structure produces. The paper is organized in two sections. The first section outlines a conceptual problem related to civilian defense and its objective. The second section outlines how DHS organizational development perpetuates the conditions necessary for the flaws summarized in the first section of the essay. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Immigration legislation after 9/11 or what might be termed "homeland security racism," signals the emergence of what might also be understood as a new form of institutionalized nativism. In this paper I ask how homeland security politics at the turn of the twenty-first century compares with previous forms of nativism. Anti-immigrant sentiments are not a new phenomenon in the United States and many scholars have found that more recent forms of nativism have been primarily directed against "illegal" or undocumented immigrants. What I find, however, is that today's nativism is highly institutionalized, through key post 9/11 immigration legislation. Significantly, new institutionalized nativism is resulting in the blurring of the legal distinctions between legal and illegal immigrant, and immigrant and refugee rendering all categories of non-citizen as undesirable and suspect. As a consequence, institutionalized nativism is not merely aimed at bolstering the nation's borders from in-flows of immigrants. More significantly institutionalized nativism is aimed at expanding technologies of surveillance and apparatuses of policing to identify immigrants, regardless of legal status, for removal from American society through long periods of detention and ultimately deportation. In addition, refugees, once a distinct and almost valorized category of foreigner, no longer enjoy the legal privileges they once did. This paper explores how today's nativism is eroding immigrant rights in the United States through ethnographic and interview research in California and New Jersey. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper I examine the themes of terrorism and counterterrorism in the popular culture of the United States by focusing on four case studies of either cinematic or televisual representations in the post-September 11th environment. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper explores the distinctive dynamics of French anti-Americanism, showing first that France harbors an enduring distrust of America centered in the past decade on the related issues of unilateralism and globalization. I then explain why French distrust of the United States is so deeply institutionalized, arguing that the deep reservoir of anti-American arguments sedimented over the centuries and the simultaneous coexistence of all types of anti-Americanism have made anti-American rhetoric a tool that can be used for political benefit at no cost. Finally, I focus on the potential consequences of French anti-Americanism on economic relations and the war on terrorism. This paper is part of a larger exploration of anti-Americanism edited by Peter Katzenstein and Robert Keohane. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the name of fighting terrorism, the government of the United States has curtailed some civil liberties, particularly the right to trial by jury, the right of privacy, and the protections against indefinite internment. This type of reaction is common among states confronted with terrorism, but it is a strategy that might pose grave risks to the fundamentals of American democracy as guaranteed in the Bill of Rights of the Constitution. These measures are dangerous because they give greater power to the government, specifically the executive branch, and increase the chances that power will be abused. Nevertheless, there are steps we can take to make sure these powers are not abused or, that at the minimum, the abuses of power are minimized. This paper describes three important institutions that can minimize the abuses of power by the executive branch: the legislature, the judiciary, and the press. This paper will analyze how these institutions have performed in the United States while comparing their role to that of similar institutions in other democracies that have also curtailed civil liberties to fight terrorism. The central argument of this paper is that the United States can better protect civil liberties while fighting terrorism even though in comparison to other countries (like the United Kingdom, Peru, and Uruguay), the power of the executive branch in the U.S. has been relatively constrained. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]