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The shift in U.S.-Indian relations around the turn of the twenty-first century provides an ideal opportunity to test competing explanations of global power relations. Through examination of primary and secondary source materials, this paper investigates the timing of and justifications for the rapid changes in the relationship between the United States and India. This evidence is used to test the utility of explanations based on political regime type, extent of economic liberalization, global and local balance of power considerations, and nuclear proliferation concerns in light of changes in U.S.-Indian relations. Although the United States currently has friendly relations with China, this paper finds that the U.S. government is engaging India as a balancer against Chinese power. This suggests that the United States' role as a regional hegemon encourages it to promote a balance of power in Asia, even if the immediate threat of China is arguably minimal, implying that U.S. foreign policy decision-makers feel compelled to intervene in order to remain the sole regional hegemon. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We often imagine that countries with nuclear energy programs are nuclear weapons states waiting to happen. Yet there are multiple ways that states can enhance their nuclear security, even when they possess the requisite technology for a weapons program. They may undertake diplomatic efforts to reduce the level of threat, they may seek shelter under an ally's nuclear umbrella, and they may adopt unilateral military measures, up to and including the development of a nuclear arsenal. Over the past five decades, India has engaged in all three of these approaches. Since India's pursuit of nuclear weapons is already well-documented, this article focuses on its efforts to elicit nuclear restraint from other states through diplomacy and to seek the protection of nuclear-armed allies. Drawing on archival documents and interviews in New Delhi and Mumbai, it documents how Indian leaders eventually became disillusioned with these two alternatives to nuclear armament. In doing so, it depicts India's emergence as a nuclear power not simply as a response to regional threats, but also as the result of dissatisfaction with alternative paths to nuclear security. The paper concludes by exploring the implications of this finding for possible U.S.-Indian cooperation in nuclear energy in the future. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Trying to establish themselves as global actors, both European Union and India pursue their interest through multiliteralism. Although both of them developed intense relationships with the United States, Russian Federation, China and other regional actors, EU and India do not find profoundly attracted to one another. While EU steers Central Asia or China, India in its part sees the European framework as the sum of its parts at best and prefers bilateral proximity with individual nations once at the time: UK, France Italy, Germany or Poland. The irony of this state of affairs is that both EU and India have similar traits if judged by their effort to bridge ethnic, religious and economic diversity into a single body. Apart from that both EU and Indian economies struggle to shape a compromise between social protection and the neoliberal agenda. In this paper we analyze the relationship between European Union and India by focusing on their foreign policies. Our main hypothesis is that EU and India should cooperate due to their attraction to the same values and norms. As future unfolds along with common challenges such as regulating financial flows or tackling terrorism and environmental issues, European Union and India should try to reach a common language. This relation can also be a test for EU's aim to become a global actor because an established cooperation with an Asian country would provide the necessary framework to work outside the European space and to demonstrated its commitment to become an important player in IR. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

One of the most significant developments in the nonproliferation regime in recent years has been the Indo-US nuclear cooperation agreement, which was first announced in July 2005. It seeks to allow nuclear cooperation between India and the U.S. New Delhi is not a member of the Nonproliferation Treaty, and because it does not maintain full-scope safeguards on its nuclear installations, full nuclear cooperation has been denied to it ever since it conducted its first nuclear test in 1974. Under the agreement, U.S. companies will be allowed to supply India with nuclear technology; in return, India will submit 14 of its 22 existing reactors under safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), putting them on a 'civilian' list. The remaining eight reactors will be put under a 'military' list for use in India's strategic nuclear program. While this is the basic structure of the agreement, several steps have to have be taken before its implementation. They include amending the rules of the Nuclear Suppliers Group and concluding a safeguards framework with the IAEA. But the first, and arguably most crucial step, has been concluding a bilateral nuclear agreement between India and the U.S., under Section 123 of the U.S. Atomic Energy Act. It specifies the benefits that India will receive as well as the concessions it will have to make with regard to its nuclear program. The '123' agreement also requires approval from the U.S. Congress.However, despite some expectations that the bilateral agreement would be concluded speedily, several hurdles cropped up between India and the U.S., reflecting long-standing differences between the two sides on the future of nuclear energy and fissile material production. These differences include - whether India would legalize its unilateral moratorium on nuclear tests; whether India would be allowed to reprocess spent fuel; and whether India would be granted assurances of permanent supply of fuel for nuclear reactors. This paper examines the '123' agreement negotiations between New Delhi and Washington, in context of their broader bilateral relations as well as their positions on nuclear proliferation-related issues. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper argues that Indian-American citizens' groups in the United States, and the efforts of an increasingly professionalized and well-funded "India lobby" on Capitol Hill, were critical in rallying congressional support around a significant and controversial bilateral nuclear trade and cooperation agreement between India and the United States in 2006. This episode may represent the consolidation of the "India lobby" and portend its emergence as of the most important ethnic communities seeking influence over US foreign policy in the 21st Century. Existing scholarly literature on ethnic lobbies and American foreign policy typically focuses on communities such as Jewish and Cuban Americans (the "Israel lobby," in particular has been the subject of recent contentious academic and policy debates ), and argues that wealth, geographic concentration, and group cohesion are important factors explaining ethnic lobby influence in the US foreign policy process. Indian-Americans as a community broadly fit the first two criteria, but until very recently were highly segmented into particular professional and Indian language/regional associations, and received scant attention in the ethnic lobby literature. Recently, though, the community has become more unified and politically mobilized, with potentially important implications for US policy in South Asia, the broader Asian region, and the world. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

During the visit of Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh to the U.S. in July 2005, the Bush administration declared its ambition to achieve full civil nuclear energy cooperation with India. In pursuit of this objective, the Bush administration agreed to "seek agreement from the U.S. Congress to adjust U.S. laws and policies," and to "work with friends and allies to adjust international regimes to enable full civil nuclear energy cooperation and trade with India, including but not limited to expeditious consideration of fuel supplies for safeguarded nuclear reactors at Tarapur." India, on its part, promised "to assume the same responsibilities and practices and acquire the same benefits and advantages of other leading countries with advanced nuclear technologies." The U.S.-India nuclear pact virtually rewrote the rules of the global nuclear regime by accepting India as a nuclear state that should be integrated into the global nuclear order. The nuclear agreement creates a major exception to the U.S. prohibition of nuclear assistance to any country that does not accept international monitoring of all its nuclear facilities.This paper will examine the implications of this nuclear pact for global non-proliferation regime and argues that this agreement reflects how strategic considerations drive the non-proliferation priorities of great powers. Nuclear weapons states have always subordinated their non-proliferation agenda to their strategic interests. The Bush Administration believes that it is in the strategic interest of the US for India to emerge as a major global player and the nuclear agreement is merely a means towards the end. Global political realities have, once again, trumped the institutional imperatives of the nuclear non-proliferation regime. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A dramatic transformation has occurred in India-US relations in the last decade. The interactions between the two democracies have expanded enormously and their impact is beginning to be felt beyond the bilateral realm. This evolving partnership holds the potential to shape not only the regional politics of South Asia but the international relations of the wider Asia-Pacific region. Some analysts project an even grander vision, claiming that this relationship may play a decisive role in determining the future global order. Taking these projections as a point of departure, and recognizing the impressive strides that have been made in Indo-US ties, this research focuses on the strategies, outputs and consequences of this foreign policy engagement. Its impact on Asian stability in the context of a rising China is also analysed. The research also studies the dynamics between the three major Asian powers, India, China and Japan, whose bilateral equations with the US are divergent and therefore of concern to the smaller powers of the region. How these major powers relate to one another and whether their mutual interactions can be autonomous are some of the questions that this research explores while charting the course of Indo-US relations. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]