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This article examines the proposition that, because of their historical experience, Asian states tended to accept hierarchy in international relations; the Chinese world order was both peaceful and benign. By examining Asian international history, I argue that the notion of a benign Asian hierarchy is a myth because it is based on a misreading of the region's history. The article addresses three questions: First, has the Asian international system been hierarchic in history? Second, during periods of hierarchy, has the system been peaceful? Third, was the Chinese world order a benign one? Asian history shows that the regional order was not always hierarchical and that warfare characterized international life, even during periods of hierarchy. When Asian states became tributary vassals, it was not because of a cultural tendency amenable to hierarchy, but because of their relative weakness, geographic proximity, and unavailability of allies. History shows that Asian states preferred balancing to hierarchy. The Chinese world order was not necessarily more peaceful. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The call for a Chinese school of international relations arises from the alleged inability of existing theories to explain the Chinese experience—China's Confucian culture has produced a fundamentally different experience from that of the West. The central question of this article is thus: To what extent does Confucian culture influence China's use of military force against external security threats? By examining Song China's relations with the Liao empire during the crucial years of 960-1005, I argue that, despite having a pacifist Confucian culture, China has been acting like a realist power in Asia, expanding its political and military interests as its power grew. By doing so, this article makes the case against Chinese exceptionalism. Chinese use of force was rooted in the structure of the system; culture played a supplementary role in China's military policy. Despite having different cultures, the Chinese experience was no less different from that of the West: both were driven by the anarchic structure of the system. I consult primary documents in the Chinese archives, supplemented by secondary literature, and examine the decision-making process leading up to the use or non-use of force. Contrary to what is widely believed, China had behaved according to the dictates of structural realism. It had preferred to use force to resolve external threats to Chinese security, adopted a more offensive posture as its power grew, and expanded war aims in the absence of systemic or military constraints. In the end, Western IR theory does a reasonably good job of explaining the Chinese experience. There is little need for a Chinese school of international relations. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The central question of this article is: To what extent does culture influence the aggressive behaviors of states? Empirically, I examine China’s military policy during the Northern Song Dynasty (960-1127). I argue that a cultural approach is not a fruitful way to understanding Chinese national security policy. Rather, Chinese behavior can be best explained by structural realism that emphasizes the pursuit of power as the best path to state security. The source of this behavior lies in the structure of the system, not culture. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines the proposition, popularized by Samuel Huntington, that Asian states have historically been prone to accepting hierarchy in the international system. As China rises in power, will Asian states choose to accept a hierarchical order dominated by China or will they attempt to counterbalance Chinese power? By examining Asian international history and the contemporary period, I argue that the proposition of a benign Asian hierarchy is flawed because it is based on a misreading of Asian history. Asian states have historically preferred balancing to bandwagoning. When they did bandwagon, it was because of their relative weakness, geographic proximity, and the unavailability of allies. In other words, they bandwagoned because they had no better alternatives. The logic of balancing power remains the best way to understanding East Asian security policy. Unless the United States pulls out of Asia, the emerging security order in Asia will not be hierarchic or Sinocentric. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]