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he article is devoted to the early elections held in Serbia on December 17, 2023 – parlia- mentary, metropolitan and partly local. The main motive for their early holding: the desire to confirm the legitimacy of power after mass protests of the opposition, also to demonstrate its political impo- tence, and simultaneously buy time on the foreign policy stage to reduce pressure from Washington and Brussels. The outcome of the election was another victory for President A. Vučič and ruling Ser- bian Progressive Party. She was not a mystery to observers or participants beforehand. You could only argue about the account. But in the capital, the opposition had good chances, and this was con- firmed. The voting results were considered and an assessment was given of the opposition demon- strations after the elections, as well as the degree and nature of involvement in these events of Brus- sels and Washington. The reasons for the persistent invincibility of the ruling «progressives», the partial strengthening of the pro-Western «democratic» opposition and the unexpected success of the new populist movement «We are a voice from the people» have been revealed. The logic of political behavior and the relationship between foreign and political balancing of the President of Serbia were analyzed. It was concluded that A. Vučič mainly achieved his goals and retained such a struc- ture of power that provides him with a central role in Serbian politics, as well as free hands in fur- ther orientation in the international arena. It will not be unambiguous and straightforward in any case. But his room for maneuver has narrowed, and the direction of drift will be determined by the balance of power in the confrontation between West and East.

This article examines the protracted and controversial process of government formation in Montenegro in the aftermath of the presidential (19.03–02.04.2023) and early parliamentary elections (11.06.2023), although their results had already indicated who won, who lost. The problems revealed during the negotiations between the candidates for participation in power, which clearly characterize the mores of the subjects of the political scene of the country and the prospects of the new cabinet, are analyzed. Its structure and program are considered. The balance of power in the parliament is correlated with the sentiments of citizens revealed by polls. The forecast of Montenegro’s foreign policy orientation under the new government and the likelihood of its early admission to the EU are given. It was stated that normalization of relations with Serbia is possible, but in any case, no change in the general anti-Russian vector of foreign policy should be expected.

The article examines two parameters of the subject stated: policies of the state governments of South-Eastern Europe in view of the new developments in Ukraine, widespread attitudes, and the configuration of political forces in these countries which may provide a chance to pro-Russian circles. An analysis is based on both national and international opinion polls and the results of the last elections. As is shown, the traditionally strong Russophile sentiments in many countries of the region have reverberated again and affected the perception of the conflict. However, the potential of the pro-Russian forces is insufficient for a fundamental change in policies although the ruling circles cannot completely ignore it. The article concludes that the status and prospects of Russian cooperation with the countries of the region will remain unfavorable until the end of military operation in Ukraine, although the EU and the US are unlikely to succeed in achieving complete abandonment of Russian energy sources in a short time.

The article discusses the prerequisites and results of the presidential (19.03 – 02.04.2023) and early parliamentary elections (11.06.2023) in Montenegro. It analyses the dispositions of the electorate in view of the polls data and the election results. The results of the vote are interpreted: the defeat of the long-term ruler of the country M. Djukanovic in the struggle for the post of the head of the state and the loss of his party’s dominant position in the Assembly. An explanation is given of the reasons for the resounding success of the newly created movement «Europe Now!» and the preservation of relatively strong positions by the Democratic Party of Socialists. Suggestions have been made about the possible composition of the new ruling coalition and government. The forecast is given of the foreign policy orientation of the future cabinet and the prospects of Montenegro’s early admission to the EU. It is stated that in any development no change in the general anti-Russian vector of foreign policy is expected.

The article discusses the prerequisites and results of the fifth elections to the People’s Assembly called during the two year period and held on April 2, 2023 It analyses the dispositions of the electorate in view of the Eurobarometer polls data and the election results. The past vote, despite some changes in the party structure of the People’s Assembly, testified once again to the deep disappointment of the weary Bulgarian voter in the entire political class. At the same time, it has recreated the stalemate in Parliament. The leaders of the warring majority camps (GERB-SDS vs «We Continue the changes» – «Democratic Bulgaria») already fear of being branded as the culprits of a new failure leading to appointment of one more temporary technocratic government by the president and the next snap elections. Such a prospect does not bode well for them, while their coalition is potential of seriously damaging their reputation. In such circumstances, the fighting forces are trying to find a magic formula for formation of a coalition cabinet. The near future will show whether the instinct of self-preservation will work or selfish party interests will prevail followed by déjà vu. However, in any development no change in the general anti-Russian vector of Bulgarian foreign policy is expected.

This article discusses the regular general election hold in Bosnia and Herzegovina (02.10.2022), the course of their electioneering, and the voting results. The analysis reveals the same main actors flashed on the political scene, the same principle collisions repeated, and even the methods of winning victory with the help of nationalist rhetoric remaining unchanged. However, the realignment of political forces has led to a new formula of power both in the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and at the national level. The loser was the leading Islamist-nationalist Party of Democratic Action of the Bosniaks, which already bored its Western patrons with its destructive activity. Keeping up with these developments, an assessment of the prospects of the coalition government of Bosnia and Herzegovina formed by 21 political actors is suggested. Among them are the Croatian Democratic Union and the parties blocking with it, the Alliance of Independent Social Democrats with their partners from Republika Srpska and also eight secular Bosnian parties. A significant factor in maintaining the cabinet cohesion is the need to demonstrate to the EU its «cooperation», a sine qua non for Western support and funding. The Federation theoretically could face problems with the losers being able to block the process of authorities formation. However, according to the common understanding, Christian Schmidt, the High Representative of the international community in the country, will not allow this. It can be assumed that under the current international climate (when the Russian Federation is absorbed by the conflict in Ukraine, and Serbia is barely able to withstand Western pressure and the aggravation of the situation in Kosovo), even the allegedly pro-Russian President of the Republika Srpska, Milorad Dodik will be forced to take into account new political realities. If Brussels and Washington are smart enough to not push the Serbs «to the limit», the new Bosnia and Herzegovina government will finally have a chance to get down to business and do something useful for their citizens.

This article analyzes the background and results of the fourth elections held within 18 months to elect members of the National Assembly (02.10.2022). As predicted, the coalition government formed on the third attempt and led by Kiril Petkov, a leader of the new movement «We Continue the Change» did not last long. It fell victim to a no-confidence vote initiated by its main opponent, the GERB party of ex-premier Boyko Borisov. The latter gained unexpected support from Slavi Trifonov’s «There is such a people» movement, a member of the previous multi-party cabinet. This election, despite some changes in the party structure of the National Assembly, actually testified to the deep disappointment of the disillusioned Bulgarian voters in the entire political spectre. At the same time, they replicated the stalemate in the Parliament. Under such conditions, the formation of a new coalition cabinet is extremely unlikely and one should expect «déjà vu»: another caretaker government appointed and next elections announced by the president. The general conclusion to be drawn from the present developments is that the political system with parties being called upon as the main subjects of the parliamentary model and diligently exercising in discrediting parliamentarism instead is deeply sick. There is seemingly no way out of the protracted political crisis!

The problem addressed in this article is the lifting of the Bulgarian veto on the start of the EU accession negotiations with Northern Macedonia (and Albania). It traces the main stages of the prolonged Bulgarian-Macedonian dispute and the development of the postures of both parties. It also explicates the domestic political situation in both countries and the causes under which the dispute aggravates and mitigates. Consequently, the unexpected willingness of Brussels for maximum concessions to Sofia’s ultimatums, actually contradictory to its principles, is explained. An apparently impulsive decision to grant, notwithstanding the established procedures, a candidate status for admission to Ukraine and Moldova tested the EU’s relations with the Balkan region. After having long stood in line, the leaders of the Western Balkan states viewed this step with jealousy and did not hide their disappointment. Under these conditions, the European Union felt it imperative to do something at any cost to revive the idea of «enlargement» in their eyes and restore its authority. However, in the end, the Bulgarian-Macedonian dispute is only ostensibly resolved, but in fact only mothballed. Therefore the difficult socio-political situation and the balance of power in both countries will not provide for rapid progress either in their relationship or in the EU negotiation with Skopje. The forecast in conclusion is that such tactics are unlikely to have a positive impact on the authority of the European Union in the Western Balkans. But the new idea of the «EU political community» put forward by Emmanuel Macron and supported by Olaf Scholz will probably continue to disguise the obvious fact that the EU in its current form is not ready to accept new members.

The article deals with the parliamentary elections held in Slovenia on April 24, 2022. The extremely high voter turnout and the result of the voting would appear unprecedented in the political history of the country. A crushing victory (with an unusually high score: 41 mandates out of 90 in the State Assembly) was won by the new «Freedom Movement» created shortly before the elections and led by Robert Golob. However, a more in–depth analysis leads to a different conclusion: what happened is nothing else but déjà vu. This is the fourth time that Slovenian society has expressed its distrust of the political class and traditional parties, pinning all its hopes on the next messiah called upon to miraculously solve all problems. The election held is reviewed in terms of its outcome and the balance of power inside and outside the parliament. The result is also scanned in view of the present developments in Ukraine and Slovenia’s relationship with Russia. The Slovenian electorate’s attitude regarding the party structure is examined, and prospects of Robert Golob’s new cabinet are also assessed. It is concluded that the new government is able to change the situation in the country and make its policy more predictable. Nevertheless, it is unlikely to be able to disrupt the wellestablished algorithm of the Slovenian political system’s performance, especially at the times of extremely high turbulence in the international arena, to which small states are particularly sensitive.

This article deals with the general elections (presidential, parliamentary and partly local) held in Serbia on April 3, 2022 The main motive for the snap National Assembly elections was the intention to get the Parliament legitimized, since the existent body with no opposition discredited the country and its head applying for admission into the EU. The outcome of the elections – another win of President Alexandar Vučić and his ruling Serbian Progressive Party – was not a secret from the start for either observers or participants. The only thing to argue about was the score. However, the developments in Ukraine have made their own adjustments to the calculations of both the authorities and their opponents, and the results of voting along with their perception by winners and losers. The article also addresses the reasons for the persistent invincibility of the ruling «progressists», the long-term failures of the pro-Western «democratic» opposition and the unexpected success of the pro-Russian right-wing nationalist blocs, which previously miserably dragged out on the political margins. The mood of the Serbian electorate in relation to the party structure is also the object of special consideration. The logic of political behavior and the relationship between the external and internal political balancing of the President of Serbia are analyzed. An explanation of his seemingly strange post-election move is suggested: taking a time-out in the formation of the government, he took a step towards the defeated «democrats». It is concluded that A. Vučić is aiming at structuring the government in a way that will preserve both his central role in Serbian politics and free hand in further adaptation on the international arena, which in any case will not be single valued and straightforward. The general vector of the drift will be determined by the balance of forces in the confrontation between the West and the East at present at its climax.

The topic of the article is the 2021 elections to the municipal bodies of Kosovo and Northern Macedonia. Although usually of little attention, in the present case they went beyond local importance calling into question the stability of the governments. Backing from the protest vote the ruling parties in both states were dependent upon turned out to have had a limited shelf life during the socio-economic crisis caused by the pandemic, which their long-time opponents have effectively used. This even prejudged the extremely negative outcome for those who are currently at the helm. In neighboring Bulgaria, too, the strength of the new government began to cause increasing doubts due to discrepancies between the president and the prime minister, seemingly political associates. The enhanced cooperation between Sofia and Skopje has raised hopes for an early compromise in their long-standing dispute related to the problems of Macedonian identity, language and their common history. However, this development runs the risks of becoming a hostage or a victim of internal political strife in neighboring countries. In such a case Brussels and Washington that have urgently pressed for the lifting of the Bulgarian veto on the start of talks for accession of North Macedonia to the EU, will once again find themselves in the unenviable position of «the tail wagging the dog!».

The article analyzes the preconditions, course and outcome of this year third consecutive elections to the National Assembly (14th November) and of the Head of State (14th November to 11th November). The epilogue of the protracted political crisis caused by the inflexibility of the leadership of the new «protest parties» (ETN, DB and «Stand Up Bulgaria...») resulted in their loss of both people’s trust and a significant number of parliamentary seats. The «We continue the change» movement hastily put together by two Harvard graduates Kiril Petkov and Asen Vasilev, both former ministers of the interim cabinet who proved themselves sensible managers, turned out to be able to respond to surviving hopes of the electorate for changes for the better. They were backed both by the President and external partners (Washington and Brussels). The President’s upright behavior in a complex situation ensured his re-election for a second term thus demonstrating obvious superiority over his main electoral contender. Based on the tough lessons learned by the hapless former leaders of the protest, the new movement changed the course of action, and Petkov managed to form a coalition government with the participation of socialists, although the same could have been achieved immediately after the first elections. The rather diverse new cabinet faces difficult tasks of tackling the pandemic in a country with a majority actively advocating against vaccination, of putting an end to the corrupt practices of the former regime whose members still retain strong political positions, and of starting economic and social recovery. These challenges do not promise an easy or a long life to the government. The general conclusion that can be drawn from the recent developments is that brought to power on the tide of a mass protest political amateurs might be able to play the role of a battering ram against a rotten regime but they turn out to be less competent in effectively exercising their authority. It remains only to believe that the government that has got to work will be able to prove the opposite.

The subject of the article is repeat parliamentary elections in two countries by mere chance run on the same date. The external parallels of both election campaigns, such as the low turnout and the importance of voters from abroad, the continuing relevance of the agenda of toplevel corruption, the electoral failure of the socialists in both rounds are striking, and are scrutinized in the article. However, the outcomes of the campaigns are very different. In Bulgaria, even the second attempt to renew the government and the political class ended with an uncertain intermediate result, and its main triumphant Slavi Trifonov’s standing is far from looking encouraging. The success of the new counter-elite force and its leader is not promising to end the political crisis and is remindful of the previous scenarios already seen twice in Bulgaria: the unexpected rise of political psychics and the subsequent shift of sympathies to the next idol of the masses. In Moldova, the renovators succeeded in consolidating their grip on power and securing impressive credit of popular trust thus making a credible step towards implementation of their promises. It remains to keep track of who will be more successful.

The paper deals with three interrelated topics: the recent parliamentary elections in Albania, the current situation in neighboring Kosovo, and the renewed dialogue between Pristina and Belgrade. It contains the analysis of the run-up to the election and its result along with the longstanding assumptions regarding the specificities of Albania’s electoral geography. It also assesses the pan-Albanian rhetoric of the leading politicians in Tirana and Pristina which is actively exploited for political strengthening and used as a right means for blackmailing Brussels. Nonetheless, whoever resorts to it looks upon other as rivals and is not ready to give up leadership in the implementation of the national ideal. The author also speculates about the prospects for the future negotiations between Serbia and Kosovo, believing that a serious result cannot be expected until the presidential elections 2022 in Serbia.

The topic of the article indicated in the title is considered outside the historical and cultural ties of two neighboring states, which both make them related and at the same time contrast them. Purely external parallels are easy to draw: low turnout and special significance of votes from the diaspora in both cases, high relevance of the topic of government corruption of power in election campaigns, relative failure of the socialists in both elections. Moreover, there is a noticeable mutual training of the elites and the use of each other’s experience. But а concrete analysis shows that the outcome of the elections was decisively influenced by the balance of power in each of these countries. Their outcome is also not identical. In Romania, power will almost certainly be formed without the Social Democratic Party, although it retained the largest faction in parliament. In Moldova, the political cycle is not over yet. Only after the expected early parliamentary elections will it become clear: who, with whom and on what terms will share the power.

The paper examines the parliamentary elections in Croatia, Serbia and North Macedonia that took place during the summer of 2020. In all three cases, the authorities sought to quickly take advantage of the positive psychological effect of lifting the quarantine and appear as epidemic winners ahead of their electorates felt its economic consequences. Overall the ruling parties and their leaders achieved their goals – they did stay at control, but had to pay a high price for their success. In Croatia, the ruling Croatian Democratic Union and Prime Minister A. Plenkovich held power and did not allow a shift to the right-wing nationalist course many feared. However, the fragile majority that the former Prime Minister's new Cabinet is based on seems unlikely to allow him any resolute steps. The crushing victory of the Serbian Progressive Party which resulted in its constitutional majority and the absence of opposition in the Parliament proved to be pyrrhic for President A. Vucic. Enjoying full discretion, he seriously damaged already dubious legitimacy of the regime. This makes it both more compliant and cautious. The Social Democratic Union and its leader Z. Zaev in Northern Macedonia remained in power by renewing the deal with the Albanian parties, but became even more dependent on them. To conclude: the hard-fought victories have ensured the extention of power, but deprived it of essential political force.

The topic of the article is the phenomenon of the rapid rise of anti-systemic new politicians and their imminent fall. Author makes analysis of the results of the parliamentary elections in Slovenia and Kosovo and the effects of a short stay in power of two Prime Ministers – in Slovenia M. Shareс and in Kosovo A. Kurti. To complete this task the factors of electoral victories of both politicians and their subsequent failures had been under consideration. Аuthor makes an as- sumption that similar events in very different societies have a common basis. The conclusion reached by the author is that the reason for the recent successes of the counter-elite politicians and their defeats is the same namely the accepted role and image of the leader of the mass protest which had assisted them to gain popularity and win elections, but limited the possibility of unavoidable necessary compromises in state and political activities.

The election of the head of state in Croatia though a rather symbolic figure, and the parliamentary elections in Kosovo resolving issues of power, are different processes. Croatia and Kosovo are not really similar. It is all the more striking that in both cases these elections have proved to be significant. Although the overall appraisals of both events are quite opposite and reflect the processes fundamentally different from each other, some unexpected parallels still might be drawn. It turned out, for example, that flirting with a fairly strong nationalism, practiced in both election campaigns, does not guarantee victory in itself. The public demand for the renewal of a po- litical scene, for new political forces and leaders outside the traditionally dominant political parties of the establishment, has become much more important. In Croatia, this factor influenced the out- come of the elections, but the anti-establishment protesters still could not win. In Kosovo, on the contrary, it was this type of movement and its leader A. Kurti ‒ the «enfant terrible» of Kosovo pol- itics – who managed to take power for the first time. How long-term this success is and whether they will be able to implement their plans is an open question. Much makes one doubt that luck will be their lot for long. It is equally unclear whether the new Cabinet of which the former «field com- manders» for the first time are not a part of, will be able to move the negotiations between Pristina and Belgrade, thus meeting the expectations of the EU and the US. In any case, the victory of the counter-elite party of the political alternative is an instructive precedent.

An experiment on eleven rice genotypes was designed at field of Institute of Agriculture and Animal Science, Lamjung, under randomized complete block design with three replications from June-October, 2018 to study genetic variability and character association. Analysis of variance showed significant difference among the genotypes for all the characters studied except for grain yield and fertility percent which indicates the existence of sufficient genetic variability and potential for selection and further improvement. Grain yield was significantly positively correlated with panicle length while positively and non-significantly correlated with days of flowering, leaf area and straw yield except for plant height, SPAD60, fertility percent, thousand grain weight and effective tillers. Leaf area had maximum positive direct effect on grain yield followed by panicle length, thousand grain weight and effective tillers which indicates help for selection and improvement of rice genotypes. The higher value of correlation between panicle length and grain yield is due to the direct effect of panicle length which exhibit true relationship between them. The variability study showed that there was high genotypic coefficient of variation (GCV) and phenotypic coefficient of variation (PCV) for thousand grain weight. High heritability estimates coupled with high genetic advance as per percentage of mean (GAM) was found for thousand grain weight, days of flowering, leaf area and effective tillers which indicate the control of additive gene of action and a greater scope of selection for crop improvement.

It is commonly known that pre-election rhetoric and subsequent policy after elections differell visibly. The general elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina (October 7, 2018) and further developments in the republic demonstrate how striking such divergence can be. The author comes to a conclusion that overactive attempts exercised by Washington and Brussels in order to influence the electoral process, as expected, were counterproductive. In terms of geopolitical rivalry, these elections were won by Moscow, almost without making any efforts. Nevertheless, her rivals are not going to watch idly further developments. They lost their fighting «against Dodik», but they will try to recoup, fighting for influence on him.

Objective: to analyze special measures and safeguards enshrined in the provisions of Art. 7 of the European Social Charter, which provides protection of children and adolescents from the danger of causing physical or psychological harm in the process of their labor, and its implementation in the Labor Law of the Russian Federation, in connection with acceptance of obligations under Art. 7 of the European Social Charter. Methods: comparative legal research method was applied. Results: the comparative legal analysis was carried out of the implementation of measures and warranties, expressed in Art. 7 of the European Social Charter, which guarantee the right of children and adolescents to be protected from the danger of causing physical and psychological harm in the process of their employment within the Russian Labor Law; investigation was made of the degree of compliance of norms of the Russian Labor Law with the specified provisions of the Charter and the requirements of European Convention; the necessary measures are listed to fill up the norms and gaps in the Russian Labor Law. Scientific novelty: for the first time, the article presents a comprehensive comparative legal study on the implementation of measures and safeguards embodied in Art. 7 of the Charter, which guarantee the right of children and adolescents to be protected from the danger of causing physical and psychological harm in the process of labor activity in the Russian norms of Labor Law; the degree of their compliance with the Charter is determined; practical steps are offered to reform the Russian legislation, with the aim of implementation of the assumed Charter obligations by the Russian Federation. Practical value: the measures for the protection of children, proposed by the author, can be used in scientific, legislative and law-enforcement practice in Russia.

Objective to analyze special measures and safeguards enshrined in the provisions of Art. 7 of the European Social Charter which provides protection of children and adolescents from the danger of causing physical or psychological harm in the process of their labor and its implementation in the Labor Law of the Russian Federation in connection with acceptance of obligations under Art. 7 of the European Social Charter. Methods comparative legal research method was applied. Results the comparative legal analysis was carried out of the implementation of measures and warranties expressed in Art. 7 of the European Social Charter which guarantee the right of children and adolescents to be protected from the danger of causing physical and psychological harm in the process of their employment within the Russian Labor Law investigation was made of the degree of compliance of norms of the Russian Labor Law with the specified provisions of the Charter and the requirements of European Convention the necessary measures are listed to fill up the norms and gaps in the Russian Labor Law. Scientific novelty for the first time the article presents a comprehensive comparative legal study on the implementation of measures and safeguards embodied in Art. 7 of the Charter which guarantee the right of children and adolescents to be protected from the danger of causing physical and psychological harm in the process of labor activity in the Russian norms of Labor Law the degree of their compliance with the Charter is determined practical steps are offered to reform the Russian legislation with the aim of implementation of the assumed Charter obligations by the Russian Federation. Practical value the measures for the protection of children proposed by the author can be used in scientific legislative and lawenforcement practice in Russia. nbsp

Objective: to analyze individual aspects of the process of realization of the right for profitable activity in the territory of any other party, expressed in Art. 18 of the European Social Charter, in EU law and in the Russian Federation law, with the aim of Russia's taking obligations under item 1, 3 of Art. 18 of the Charter, and, in particular, to carry out a comparative study of the constituency of the current Russian Federation legislation with the requirements of individual or collective “liberation” of the legislation on foreign labor (item 1, 3 of Art. 18 of the Charter). Methods: comparative-legal method of research. Results: The key trends, similarities and differences of the sources of international regional law of the Council of Europe and the European Union are identified. The detailed analysis of the Russian Federation legislation is carried out on the compliance with the principles of legislation liberalization on the employment of foreign workers (item 1, 3 of Art. 18 of the Charter) as well as the existing state limitations on Russia's taking obligations under item 1, 3 of Art. 18 of the Charter, by adopting the law on foreigners’ access to employment on this territory. Scientific novelty: The article for the first time presents a deep comparative-legal analysis of the provisions of item 1, 3 of Art. 18 of the Charter, acts of the Council of Europe and the EU about the individual aspects of the right for profitable activity in the territory of any other party, as well as the Russian Federation domestic legislation on the compliance with the provisions of item 1, 3 of Art. 18 of the Charter for the adoption of such obligations by the Russian Federation. Practical significance: The conclusions on the implementation of certain aspects of the right for profitable activity in the territory of any other party, expressed in Art. 18 of the Charter and other acts of the Council of Europe and EU law, as well as the established similarities, differences and inconsistencies of the Russian Federation domestic legislation with item 1, 3 of Art. 18 of the Charter can be used in law-making and law-enforcement practice to eliminate the revealed inconsistencies (to providing guarantees for migrant workers), to observe the principles of equality and non-discrimination in employment.

Objective: to comprehensively show the process of implementing the right for just payment for work, expressed in the European Social Charter, in the Russian law and law of some European countries. Methods: comparative-legal method of research. Results: During the research, based on comparative-legal analysis of the sources of international regional law of the European Union, Council of Europe and precedent practice of the European Committee on social rights and the European Union courts, the author studied the process of implementing the norms of the European Social Charter. Scientific novelty: The article for the first time presents a deep comparative-legal analysis of the norms of internal labor law of Russia and some European countries for their correspondence to the norms of the European Social Charter and the requirements of the European Committee on social rights in the part of implementation of citizens’ rights for just payment, able to provide a decent living standard for them and their families. Particular drawbacks of the European and Russian labor laws are revealed, ways to improve them are proposed. Practical value: the provisions formulated in the research, as well as the results of the comparative-legal analysis of the norms of internal labor law of the Russian Federation and the considered European countries concerning the Charter norms, can be used in scientific, law-making and law-enforcement practice in Russia. The obtained results can be used to eliminate the revealed drawbacks in implementing the citizens’ rights for just payment in the Russian national legislation, as well as for progressive moving towards European law.