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This study tests whether subjects can preference order job outcomes (Vk's) in a transitive manner, a premise which must be supported if expectancy theory is to remain valid, Thirty-one subjects pair compared and rated 14 job outcomes. The paired comparisons were tested for total and stochastic transitivity. Of 3472 potentially intransitive triads, only 94 were observed. Stochastic transitivity accounted for 81 intransitivities, leaving only 13 intransitive triads unexplained. The data suggest that total or stochastic intransitivity may be due to indifference between outcomes. It was concluded that the results provide strong support for the transitivity postulate and, therefore, expectancy theory, and that the model used in this paper might usefully be applied in other components of expectancy theory. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Expectancy theories of work motivation specify a multiplicative relationship between valence of job outcomes (V) and expectancy (E) that effort will lead to these outcomes. But both E and V are typically measured using scales lacking a rational zero point and thus at best interval in nature. Multiplication of such scales is theoretically not a meaningful operation. This paper demonstrates that transformations of E and V scales which change only the location of the nonmeaningful zero point can greatly alter obtained correlations between E × V and measures work motivation or effort. Two potential solutions to this problem are presented. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The following four papers are modified versions of papers delivered in a symposium titled "The Role of Financial Compensation in Managerial Motivation" held during the Spring, 1965 meetings of the Midwestern Psychological Association. Dunnette presents an instrumental model of managerial motivation and discusses its implications for research on the motivational effects of compensation. He also reviews research related to Preferences (motives) most often found to be salient for managers. Lawler summarizes previous research on the effects of secret salary policies on manager satisfaction and presents results of another recent study showing that policies of pay secrecy have several costs not generally recognized. Secrecy apparently blurs managers' perceptions of what others earn; they overestimate the salaries of peers and of subordinates and this can lead to greater pay dissatisfaction and the belief that job performance is rather unimportant in determining pay. Weick reviews the psychological literature bearing on the effects of insufficient rewards on the intensity of effort. He reviews evidence in support of the relationship, postulates several properties of experimental procedures to explain the effects, and suggests that propositions from frustration or cue-utilization theory may afford the most parsimonious explanation of the relationship. Finally, Opsahl provides an overview of current, knowledge about managerial compensation and its effect on managerial job behavior, and suggests areas in need of further intensive research. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article comments on R.C. Dipboye's paper "A Critical Review of Korman's Self-Consistency Theory of Work Motivation and Occupational Choice." His discussion for low self-esteem individuals is inaccurate because the predictions all along have been that low self-esteem individual would seek less achievement and less personal need satisfaction than high self-esteem individual. His article needs to propose an alternative theory and then match it against self-consistency theory over a variety of predictions. There is doubt that self-consistency theory has weakness and that parameters for its limitations need to be established and conditions for its coexistence with self-enhancement theory need to be developed.