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The People's Republic of China (PRC) and the Republic of China (ROC) (Taiwan) have taken divergent paths in the area of human rights. Since the two leaders Xi Jinping and Tsai Ing-wen came to power, the differences in the area of human rights have further increased. The paper analyses and compares their external human rights strategies based on realist assumptions and the soft and hard power resources of the PRC and the ROC. The PRC's objectives are to deflect international criticism of its human rights situation and to weaken the global human rights system and its underlying human rights norms. Taiwan's objective is to use its record as a human rights leader in Asia to expand its limited international space and to strengthen its ties with other consolidated democracies and the global civil society. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

There is a growing risk of a military attack on Taiwan by mainland China (otherwise known as the People's Republic of China, or PRC) to achieve what the latter terms "reunification." Taiwan, the US, and Japan must urgently and interactively prepare for this contingency—which is also the best way of deterring it. Taiwan must increase military spending (as it has begun to do), with an emphasis on a "porcupine strategy" of lots of distributed, mobile, survivable, affordable, and lethal weapons. The US must increase its military deployments and joint exercises in the region, again emphasizing the types of weapons that can survive a preemptive PRC attack and counter a Chinese blockade or amphibious invading force. Japan will double defense spending over the next five years in a welcome and transformative move, but effective deterrence requires that it also signal that the collective defense of Taiwan against a military attack is existential for its own security. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Taiwan's opposition to PRC demands such as acceptance of the '92 Consensus' and 'One Country, Two Systems' formula since 2016 has invited a series of retaliatory measures from Beijing, designed to coerce Taiwan into compliance. Given the stark asymmetry in economic size, military capability, and diplomatic status, Taiwan provides a case for studying coercive diplomacy that takes the form of threats to punish. Material differences suggest that Taiwan should capitulate, and 'cheap talk' theses expect PRC threats to have no discernible effect, while balance of threat arguments expect resolve. In this article, we use the survey data collected in the 2016, 2019, and 2020 rounds of the Taiwan National Security Study to examine how Taiwanese respond to China's intensifying and expanding threats. Our paper identifies four strategies that the public sees as responses to PRC coercion: isolation, bandwagon with China, balance against China by allying with the USA and Japan, and hedge by deepening economic ties with China while aligning with the USA and Japan against China. We show that the popular support for balancing against China rises as PRC coercion grows and Taiwanese citizens increasingly perceive China to be a threat. Our findings imply that citizens in a liberal democracy can develop the will to pushback against pressure from an authoritarian regime despite sharp asymmetries in capabilities and material limitations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper describes the growing human rights gap between China on one side and the US and Taiwan on the other side and analyses its impact on cross-strait relations. Since Xi Jinping's ascent to power in the People's Republic of China in 2012/2013 and the elections of Donald Trump in the US and Tsai Ing-wen in Taiwan in 2016, the relationship between China and the other two countries has worsened. The US and Taiwan have a similar view on human rights in the PRC. The increasing repression and authoritarianism of the PRC leads to a human rights gap in the Taiwan Strait that increases the divide and the tensions between both sides. The failure of the PRC to address in its proposal for a peaceful unification the concerns of the Taiwanese for their democracy and human rights pushes Taiwan further away. The similar assessment of the PRC's authoritarian threat by the US and Taiwan strengthens the bond between both, based on the shared values of democracy and human rights. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since 2008, the Taiwanese business group Want Want, having made a fortune in China, has returned to Taiwan to buy a major media group and attempt to exert political influence on Taiwanese society. This paper analyses the rise and rationale of this new type of media investor in the light of the business-government relationship under China's model of state capitalism. According to the analysis developed in this paper, when China needed foreign investment in the early 1990s, Taiwanese investors were warmly welcomed by the Chinese government, which provided Taiwanese businesses with tax incentives at that time. After 2000, however, when not only domestic Chinese entrepreneurs emerged but also more non-Chinese investors entered the Chinese markets, Taiwanese businesses realised that the investment environment had become much more competitive, so they had to work hard on building ties with Chinese officials. Under these circumstances, Want Want bought into media in Taiwan as an asset to be used in order to build social ties with the Chinese government, but in doing so, Want Want has also triggered resistance from Taiwanese civil society. Future researchers and regulators can continue to watch and define this new type of investment, which has become increasingly significant in this region. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

An analysis of PRC leaders' public communication with respect to Taiwan from 2003 to 2013 shows the presence of three conflict frames: aspiration, process and image. Chinese leaders most often use the process frame to convey the preferred process through which both sides could find a common ground. These messages are reinforced by rhetoric about China's capacity, resolve and sincerity to reach out to Taiwan for peaceful solutions. Communication of China's own aspirations of national unification is usually less visible. However, it becomes more prominent when the Taiwanese are not the intended audience, indicating its utility in rallying internal support. Using these frames as broad parameters, the paper discusses how they may have influenced policy actions toward Taiwan in the early days of the Xi administration. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The island of Taiwan has successfully managed 60 years of fast-paced economic growth. Taiwan is a demonstrably resilient player in the global economy, while also maintaining high levels of income equality. However, there is a great deal of uncertainty surrounding whether the factors that have enabled and sustained the Taiwanese development project thus far will be an adequate means of managing the contemporary challenges facing the island. Taiwan may be becoming increasingly vulnerable to global economic conditions, and the island's future seems also to be increasingly tied to developments in the Chinese mainland. This paper examines the prospects for a continuing Taiwanese growth paradigm from both a cultural and an economic perspective and finds reason for optimism. This optimism is contingent on the strength of international export markets and prudent management of cross-Strait relations with the Chinese mainland. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines how Taiwan moved from being viewed as a model Asian democracy to one allegedly suffering from democratic reversal. The reasons for the declining domestic and international reputation of Taiwan's democracy are discussed. Lastly, some key political challenges facing Taiwan's democracy are outlined. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of China Quarterly is the property of Cambridge University Press and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of China Quarterly is the property of Cambridge University Press and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Tensions between Beijing and Taipei in 2022 reached their heights since the 1995- 1996 Third Strait Crisis. The decision by the outgoing Speaker of the US House of Representatives Nancy Pelosi to visit Taiwan in August, few months prior to the momentous 20th Congress of the Chinese Communist Party, was immediately followed by an unprecedented display of military capabilities by the People’s Liberation Army in the waters and airspace surrounding Taiwan. Forceful assertions of sovereignty over the island by Beijing, and explicit declarations of support in case of a Chinese attempt at a military takeover by President Biden preceded and followed the events that occurred in August, only to partially wane by the end of the year following the XiBiden G20 meeting in Bali. With no open route to improve cross-Strait relations, the Tsai administration further deepened relations with the US and expanded unofficial engagement with Washington’s East Asian allies and the European Union and its member states. Shared support for Ukraine against Russia’s aggression and growing synergies in industrial policy related to the semiconductor sector drove this engagement, without however producing meaningful results in trade policy. In November, the Kuomintang obtained a sweeping victory in the local «nine-in-one» elections. The result showed the party’s continuing competitiveness in local elections, but the slowdown of the Taiwanese economy, rising inflationary trends, and declining popular support for the Tsai administration complicated the ruling Democratic Progressive Party’s prospects for the 2024 general elections. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper offers an institutional account of how President Chen Shui-bian of Taiwan has sent important messages across the Taiwan Strait. Under Taiwan's constitutional system, the parliament can neither hold the president accountable for what he says nor sack the premier appointed by the president, while a president who lacks legislative support also finds it hard to put his policy goals into practice. These problems give President Chen the excuse to set up extra-constitutional channels to deliver pro-independence messages, some of which go against his official pledges. Here, a collection of Chen's important remarks directed across the Taiwan Strait are analyzed, and a consistent pattern is revealed of when and where he is likely to say what. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Peloponnesian War, a conflict between the Greek city-states of Athens and Sparta and their respective allies, is held to be a classic example of war between a hegemon and a rising power. Graham Allison has recently coined the term "Thucydides' Trap" to emphasize how structural forces are leading to instability in U.S.-China relations. This interpretation of history is inaccurate and reflects the influence of misleading translations. Drawing on the original Greek text of Thucydides' History of the Peloponnesian War, I argue that the concept of Thucydides' Trap does not find support even in the case that has given it its name. Thucydides' famous attribution of the war to "the growth of the power of Athens" actually refers to the expansion of the Athenian Empire rather than a shift in the distribution of capabilities. Structural arguments do offer valuable insights about potential sources of conflict in U.S.-China relations, but the causal mechanism has little to do with the analogy of Athens and Sparta. As exemplified by the flashpoint in the Strait of Taiwan, structural change has aggravated long-standing differences between the United States and the PRC. Beijing's growing economic and military power has resulted in a growing threat to Taipei, which has led the United States to affirm its commitment to Taiwan's security in ways that are inconsistent with the One-China policy. If this trend continues, it will raise the potential for a military confrontation between the great powers in East Asia. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The widely believed notion that Taiwan will inevitably submit to rule by Beijing is not politically, economically, or strategically well grounded. Despite its economic influence and growing military might, China's ability to compel involuntary unification is far from certain if Taiwan's people are determined to maintain their autonomy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The recent rapprochement between China and Taiwan cannot be understood if our conceptual apparatus is unable to cope with the distinctive new quality of cross-Strait relations. A critical framework provides a transnational account of cross-Strait dynamics. An analysis of the KMT-CCP Forum through the lens of the neo-Gramscian notion of hegemony sheds light on the Forum's strategies, mechanisms, practices and instruments to secure consent for cross-Strait rapprochement. While this mode of governance has broadened the KMT's strategic options, it has also compromised Taiwanese democracy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Jeremy Lin was largely unknown prior to the phenomenon known as ‘Linsanity’ in February 2012. This piece compares and contrasts the ways in which Lin's story – and in particular his cultural, political and national identity – has played out in the USA, Taiwan and China, and also shows how the identities created for Lin in each of these three places constitute his ‘three bodies’. The USA, China and Taiwan all lay some claim on Lin's identity. Answers to basic questions about Lin diverge in each place. The US story focuses on issues of race and overlooked ability. In China, much attention is given to Lin's intellectual and athletic abilities, as well as his ‘Chineseness’. In Taiwan, broadcasters and politicians alike highlight his Taiwanese identity, and emphasise how Lin's success shows the value of non-academic training. Writers in all three countries have focused on lessons to be learned from Lin, with humility, team spirit, hard work and family values taking prominent place. In cross-strait relations, the long-time Cold War enemies remain diplomatically isolated yet economically and culturally intertwined. The Lin story displays the curious moment in People's Republic of China–Republic of China relations in which celebrities can treat the divide between the countries as permeable. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Despite the substantial advances made in cross-Strait relations during Ma Ying-jeou's (Ma Yingjiu) first term, the ROC president's rhetoric varied considerably as he grappled with the difficult reality of implementing campaign and inauguration pledges to establish better relations with China while striving to maintain national respect and sovereignty. In this article, we put forward a framework for measuring, analysing and explaining this variation in President Ma's first-term discourse. Analysing a very large number of Ma's speeches, addresses, etc., we provide empirical assessments of how the content of Ma's public pronouncements has developed over time, how his rhetoric varies according to the strategic context and timing of a speech, and how his discourse compares to that of his predecessor, Chen Shui-bian (Chen Shuibian). In addressing these questions, the article contributes a quantitative perspective to existing work on political discourse in Taiwan and to the growing methodological and applied literature on how to systematically analyse Chinese political text. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The new policy platform in Taiwan of economic liberalization toward the Chinese mainland which was inaugurated by President Ma Ying-jeou (Ma Yingjiu) in 2008 has been the source of both expectation and anxiety. While some observers believe that this policy of rapprochement will usher in an era of cross-Strait prosperity and peace, others are concerned about Taiwan's de facto sovereignty as well as the negative economic impacts that the liberalization policy might entail. In particular, it has often been claimed (or feared) that the liberalization process will lead to some form of political integration between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait. In this article, I wish to offer some insights into the current state of cross-Strait interactions derived from the European integration process. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

China's Taiwan policy has been one of coupling intimidation (the "stick" approach) with coercion (the "carrot" approach), a policy mix which, in the near term, is not likely to change, as is evidenced by the passage of the "Anti-Secession Law" in March, 2005. However, under Hu Jintao, the focus has been on pragmatism. The warm atmosphere that presently reigns in the Taiwan Strait area is unprecedented. Further talks are expected before the two cross-Strait leaders are slated to step down, simultaneously, in 2012. An era of reconciliation and negotiations has dawned. For the first time there is consensus regarding norms of interaction between the two sides. Cross-Strait relations have stabilized after years of tumult. More open, stable and predictable cross-Strait relations are in the interests of both sides. Difficulties surely lie ahead, but they will be dealt with in a different manner than what has been witnessed in the past. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

While few Chinese observers currently suspect that Washington seeks formal Taiwanese independence, a sizable majority believes the United States is striving to preserve Taiwan's de facto separation to check China's rise. This view is both unduly pessimistic and destabilizing. Accordingly, Washington should work to correct it. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Emboldened by the ascendance of economic issues on the global agenda and the erosion of security-driven bipolar structures, Taiwan in the late 1980s decided to use its economic advantages for diplomatic gain. Examination of changes in three phases of Taiwan's initiatives indicates that its inter-governmental organization strategies and targets correlate well with domestic politics and external factors. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]