Search

Advocates of a related series of ideas termed as "network centric warfare," "rapid decisive operations," and "effects based operations," see the combination of long-range precision strike, information dominance, and networked information technologies as elements changing the nature of war, from a series of sequenced battles and campaigns towards a continuous battle of shock and dislocation. However, this emphasis on the importance of time and speediness ignores the reality that time is a culturally dependent conception that has differing implications for different cultures. This paper explores cultural interpretations of time and their influence on military strategy. Analyzing national security strategy and military doctrine, this paper suggests that the U.S. conception of time leads to an overly offensive national strategy. This paper offers a vignette from the Cuban Missile Crisis to demonstrate how to escape the offensively oriented time conception. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper develops four main arguments designed to clarify the nature and purpose of ESDP. First, it engages specifically with the American IR literature which detects in ESDP signs of balancing against US power. The paper argues that such an analysis is flawed. Secondly, it argues that the true drivers behind ESDP have been the recent shifts in the tectonic plates both of history and of geo-politics. Thirdly, it analyses the recent European Security Strategy document, which it presents as a new normative approach to security policy. Finally, it argues that the distinctiveness of ESDP also derives from the peculiarities of institutional interplay within the European Union - that the policy has been generated by years of complex negotiations and compromise between and within EU institutions. Given this institutional labyrinth, any form of "heroic" strategic ambition vis-à-vis the United States would be impossible to articulate. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

As we await a final report from the commission investigating the terrorist attack on the US in September 2001, we know enough now to determine whetehr or not the failure to detect and thwart the surprise was the fault of America’s multi-billion dollar intelligence system or something else. The purpose of this paper will be to evaluate the intelligence activities surrounding 9/11, determine what failed and why, and draw lessons for the future from this extraordinary event. The paper will comment as well on the steps that have already been taken to prevent such surprises in the future and the laws that have been passed to protect national security, perhaps at a great cost to human rights and personal freedoms. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Although the preferences of major political factions are likely to influence policy choice on security issues, the origins of these preferences remains unclear compared to those on foreign economic policy. This paper examines efforts to explain preferences on security issues using data on congressional roll call voting. A large body of quantitative research in this area concludes that ideology drives these preferences, and that constituency economic interests have little or no effect. Unfortunately, this literature conceives of economic interests in an unrealistically narrow way, and does not consider the possibility that these interests may shape the ideology of members of congress. Using data on Senate voting on foreign policy from 1947 through 2000, this paper presents evidence that Senators’ home states’ stake in the international economic order, as well as their stake in military spending, played an important role in shaping foreign and defense policy. Although liberal-conservative "ideology" also matters, its effects are more consistent with an interest-based vote trading arrangement than with a coherent set of ideas. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Terrorism becomes a fatal factor to annihilate global security in danger and the U.S. requires strategic responsibili ty and policy as a global leader which takes charge of international security. Especially, national stage of terrorism c an challenge overall U.S. security policy so that it would cause war to eradicate terrorism like the Afghanistan War a nd the Iraq War. After two wars, the U.S. seriously highlights North Korea's military attacks influencing overall regi onal security in Northeast Asia. Even after the U.S. removed North Korea from the terror list, its military attacks have become more aggressive an d tricky. North Korea indignantly declared "Sacred War" based on its nuclear deterrent against military drills of the U.S. and South Korea after the sinking of South Korean warship, Cheonan. North Korea is likely to expose itself to further attacks. I will discuss two ways in this paper to defeat North Korea's military attacks which will be the Obama Administra tion's heavy duty in 2011. One is direct military policy to abolish North Korea's military terrors. The other is tension policy through variable routes. North Korea has shown two cards of military provocations and dialogue gestures. I will find out the fundamental winning policy to terminate North Korea's military attacks. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The United States maintains two distinct armies: an active duty, or force under federal control, and a National Guard nominally under state control with the option of being federalized. This bifurcation of the American military remains largely unchanged since the nation's founding. Given the inclination of policymakers to centralize power under conditions of existential threat or disaster, this continued division of the armed forces is puzzling. What explains the durability of the two armies and their ability to adapt to new or qualitatively different roles over time? This paper develops a conceptual framework that seeks to explain agency adaptation and durability. I theorize that when faced with new or qualitatively different demands from policymakers, agencies bargain with their overseers for resources and institutional changes that facilitate adaptation and mitigate stressors. The agency's political environment, particularly institutional arrangements and ideational factors, mediates agency adaptation by expanding or curtailing an agency's range of response, further influencing the nature of the principal-agent bargain. I briefly consider cases that illustrate this conceptual framework as it relates to the durability of the two armies and propose avenues for future research. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

An enduring pressure for U.S. foreign policy makers has been upholding and promoting the values of the United States while often necessarily working with dictators and authoritarian regimes for national security concerns. This paper examines the ways in w ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Although the Bush administration has labeled as pre-emption both the policy called for in its National Security Strategy and its action in invading Iraq, under previously accepted standards both would have been labeled preventive war. The justification offered by the administration and its defenders is that technological change together with the hostile intentions of America’s adversaries, justify a much more expansive conception of pre-emption. This paper asks whether we can still clearly define a boundary between preventive war and pre-emptive self-defense, and whether we can find a single standard that will serve both legal/moral as well as explanatory functions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The placement of North Korea on the Axis of Evil and the articulation of the national security strategy of proactive counterproliferation have only served to heighten tensions in Northeast Asia and to further derail diplomatic efforts to dismantle the North Korean nuclear program begun under the U.S.- North Korea Agreed Framework. The Bush administration has asserted that current the North Korean crisis should be handled on a multilateral basis. However, multilateral seems to mean forcing its partners to accede to a harsh and punitive policy toward North Korea rather than genuine multilateral discussions and consultation. This paper intends to examine the how the Bush administration applies its national security policy toward resolving the North Korean nuclear crisis through the analysis of the two rounds of multilateral six-party talks. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

With the Bush Administration’s National Security Strategy and the war in Iraq, the common argument that democracies do not fight preventive wars against rising adversaries loses much of its plausibility, and the more important question is the conditions under which democracies do and do not initiate such wars. This paper proposes a number of hypotheses to explain such outcomes, and explores these hypotheses through a series of mini-case studies of situations in which democracies faced with military rising adversaries 1) take military action (Israel vs Egypt in 1956, Israel vs. Iraq in 1981, U.S. vs. Iraq in 1991 and 2003), 2) seriously consider but do not take military action (U.S. vs. North Korea in 1994), and 3) do not seriously consider taking military action (France vs. Germany in the 1930s). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper will draw on research conducted under an IBM Center for the Business of Government grant to study collaboration in US national security organizations. The proposed paper will review case studies, present collaboration myths and realities, and ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Two seemingly different security policiesâ€"the US national security strategy (2002/2005) and the European Security Strategy (2003) make similar claims about security or the lack thereof. According to these akin, yet also distinct, narratives, the world has become a more dangerous place. The ‘new’ dangerous world necessitates the securing of spatial borders that separate political communities as well as distinguish friend from foe. Additionally, both danger and safety are written through and in time as well as space; security, the texts convey, implies temporality, in intimate and inseparable relation to its spatial dimensions. Different notions of time (relationship of past, now and future) structure the strategies into stories which seemingly makes sense, and which establish the subject of security (The ‘US’, and ‘Europe’) as knowable and securable into the future. They thus ensure a semblance of order and inevitability, and pave the way for seemingly ‘sure’ security strategies and futures. Perhaps most strikingly, the ways in which security has been inscribed in the US and European security strategies in the wake of the September 11th (2001) terrorist attacks raise questions about the politics of commemoration, the making of history, the narratives written to ensure safety, the identities inscribed through those stories, and the futures implied in their plots. In light of these considerations, this paper aims to engage with questions of security, identity and timeâ€"specifically, the gendered politics of writing security in time, or ‘spacetime’ (Weston). In particular, the paper will query into the temporalities which inform the US National Security Strategy (2002/2005) and the European Security Strategy (2003). It addresses how the (arguably impossible) securing of a subject is promised through a gendered narrative of the subject as already existing and known, ontologically stable throughout time, and securable. Importantly, looking closely at two similar yet distinct security strategies, the paper will show how modern security narratives rely on the inscription of memory and the writing of a reliable and knowable temporal trajectory, in part, through the markings of gender. It explores how through particular discursive moves in both of these strategies, the ‘subject of security’ is formed, ‘remembered’, and thus gains presence in space-time. This presence is projected into the future and particular strategies, as well as the certain subjects these strategies shall protect, emerge as both inevitable and possible. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The United States National Security Strategy states that failing states have emerged as an important threat to the security of the United States. Yet international theory related to failing states is still being developed and policy recommendations for intervention remain elusive and crisis-specific. This paper introduces a historical dataset, analyses and policy implications of State Failure for autocratic states for a 43-year period ranging from 1960-2003. Analyses and propositions using this original dataset are presented to form the underlying basis of a general theory of State Failure. Focusing on indicatorsâ€"not predictorsâ€"of state failure, this paper addresses issues critical to foreign policy related to intervention in autocratic failing or failed states. Key issues that are addressed include: what are the indicators of state failure?; what percent of states are in strong, weak, failing or collapsed stages compared to 10, 20 years ago?; what percent of states degrade from weak to failing?; what is the point of “no return” for a failing state?; and what are the foreign policy implications of this trend for future decades? ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The United States National Security Strategy states that failing states have emerged as an important threat to the security of the United States. Yet international theory related to failing states is still being developed and general policy recommendations for intervention remain elusive and crisis-specific. This paper formulates a general model of the deteriorating state by examining existing empirical and case study data and constructing the foundation for a general theory of the Life-Cycle of Deteriorating States. This model is then used to define the optimal points when it is in the United States? strategic interest to intervene. This paper begins by examining the dynamics of state failure, the endogenous and exogenous causal factors, and key variables that indicate the level of decline. Then specific phases of deteroriating states life-cycle are identified. Next, at each stage of the life-cycle threats to the United States are defined, and redefined as they carry over to the next stage. Finally the implications to US national security, at each stage of the deteriorating life-cycle are identified, and conditional recommendations for intervention are presented. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the emergence of the Department of Homeland Security in a historical comparative perspective, and argues for the utility of using a ?second-image reversed? perspective to examine the impact that systemic level changes have on domestic institutional development. The paper thus brings together literatures from international relations and American political development to explain the origins of institutional change in domestic security institutions. A punctuated equilibrium model is used to understand four critical junctures in the emergence of new ?homeland defense? policies in the United States. The first period examined is the late 19th century and the US domestic response to the rise of transnational anarchist networks in North America and Europe. Secondly, the US domestic response to domestic security concerns raised by the Russian Revolution is examined through a discussion of the 1917 Espionage Act and the 1918 Sedition Act, and the subsequent Palmer Raids of 1919-20. The third case study examines the expansion of a national security state in the aftermath of World War II, focusing particularly on institutional development during 1947-51 in response to the early Cold War period. Finally, we examine the emergence of a Department of Homeland Security bureaucracy, and employ Lowi and Hacker?s work on policy layering to understand the nature of the bureaucratic apparatus that is currently materializing. In the conclusion of the paper, we discuss the theoretical and policy implications of our case studies ? arguing for the necessity of integrating international systemic and domestic institutional perspectives for understanding the nature of US internal security responses, and, from a historical comparative perspective, discussing the efficacy of current policies as responses to the post-9/11 international security environment. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Many believe that the greatest current threat to U.S. national security stems from terrorism, especially terrorism involving WMD. The current strategy for defeating such attacks is both deep and broad. This paper first systematically sets forth America's approach to defeating a WMD attack, including strategies aimed at preventing profliferation of WMD and precursor materials. The paper then examines whether deterrence still has a role to play in preventing WMD attacks upon the United States. Although the general consensus is that deterrence is ineffective against terrorists, this paper posits that deterrence can play a secondary role in preventing WMD terrorism. This is particularly so if one adopts the RAND view of terrorism as a "systems" problem. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

An emerging priority for U.S. national security in the 21st century is defending the global commons. These include outer space, the operating environment of assets critical to navigation, communication, and observation for commerce and defense. Prospective strategies include space control, space avoidance and space deterrence. The budget expense for space control and the political concessions necessary to implement space avoidance mean that U.S. space defense is likely to rely on deterrence, at least in the near future. However, select tactics normally associated with space control or space avoidance may ameliorate the most severe drawbacks of deterrence, defined here in terms of a punishment so drastic that the defender must "leave something to chance" in order to be credible. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article presents an analysis of diplomatic and military policies of the U.S. and their impact on the EU-NATO-U.S. relationship. One of the innovations in the National Security Strategy of 2002 (NSS02) document is its implied recognition that states are not the only actors that exercise power in the world. Also discussed are interrelated issues and trends affecting the relations between the U.S. and Europe, including the unpopularity of American policy in the continent.

The article examines the policies adopted by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) in response to the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks. It addresses the question of internal and homeland security institutions in the broader literature. It proposes a modified punctuated equilibrium framework to explain the emergence of homeland security policies. It compares the institutional development of civil defense policies in the early Cold War period with the policy responses to 9/11 that have been articulated through the emergence of the DHS.

The ongoing campaign against foreign terrorist groups has presented a number of key issues for members of the intelligence community in their support of diplomatic and military operations. Although most attention by analysts has been paid to necessary changes to the intelligence community in support of homeland defense, foreign intelligence operations in support of what might be called offensive counterterrorism also require assessment and analysis. Particular areas of attention include the desirability of direct intelligence agency counterterrorism missions versus support of military special operations forces; restructuring intelligence support for non-traditional missions; US intelligence support for foreign nations facing a terrorist threat (including some countries with less than stellar human rights records); and intelligence coordination of a highly complex series of new missions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the levels of military force implemented by the United States when initiating a militarized interstate dispute. The militarized record shows variation in the initial level of force and this level of force directly affects the outcome of the dispute. In light of the relationship between the initial level of force and the dispute outcome, the issue is why the United States would choose to substitute levels of force in a dispute. Based on the previous research, the United States acts differently than other states when initiating a dispute in the sense that domestic factors are expected to have the greatest influence on the level of force; however, this has not been tested on the initial level of military force (Meernik 2000; Mitchell and Moore 2002). Using a model that consists of state level variables and a combined model that incorporates system level variables, the empirical results provide some evidence for this theory as well as the effect that system level variables have on the initial level of military force used by the United States when initiating a dispute. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The conventional wisdom about post-9/11 American foreign policy is that it was captured briefly by a band of neoconservative ideologues, who pursued an aggressive new Middle East agenda to the detriment of older, time-tested orthodoxies. While there is much to recommend this view, it places considerable emphasis on an odd assortment of individuals determining U.S. policy. Was the Iraq war, as the most consequential projection of American power in a generation, a result of the machinations of a small political faction allied with the Bush administration? If so, how could so few people?none elected or appointed to the highest offices?have such power? If not, what exactly was the place of policy intellectuals and activists in shaping the administration?s approach to the Middle East?This paper uses a Constructivist approach from political science to examine the role?and theoretical place?of policy intellectuals and activists in the run-up to the Iraq war. Building on new work in this area, I use an agent-structure heuristic to locate the relative importance of policy entrepreneurs in explaining the American drive to war in 2003. Such individuals operated in a permissive political environment that gave them an exceptional opportunity to transform the dominant ideational structures constraining or enabling an American invasion of Iraq. As important as these activists were, however, it was a set of policy ideas more than the individuals themselves that precipitated the war. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Constructivist readings of the ?culture? of national security have done much to account for national variations in military strategy. However, such accounts tend to focus on the norms themselves, rather than the particular conditions of norm creation, or their actual institutionalisation. Drawing on contemporary approaches to state theory, The paper will examine the development of the US ?national security state? in the post-World War II period as means to looking at these broader concerns. The centralising tendency of improved civil-military coordination may not have amounted to a ?garrison state?, as some have argued, but it certainly did go against prevalent anti-statist tendencies within US political culture. The institutionalisation of the national security state, therefore, was an important moment in postwar state identity formation. The institutionalisation of the national security state, by its very success, also led to the durability of both its formal and informal manifestations within the US government, as a form of reproduction of institutions. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Contemporary security policies seem to be primarily issue-driven, with transnational terrorism dominating a menu of choices that includes state failure, access to economic resources, energy, health, migration, and the environment. Security policy of the Russian Federation, in particular, has embraced and elaborated the centrality of such non-traditional issue-based threats to Russian security for nearly a decade, and paid attention to terrorism as both a global and national threat long before the attacks of September 2001 and the U.S. military actions in Afghanistan and Iraq made global terrorism a central feature of global security issues.Yet despite the attention to terrorism as a threat in Russian thinking and policy, traditional structural factors ? such a geopolitical competition and systemic balance of power ? never disappeared from Russian analysis and policy. In fact, as global terrorism became a predominant issue in global politics because of U.S. policy and actions, structural sources of threat (primarily U.S. power) re-emerged in Russian policy.Presumably, global terrorism and structural balance/imbalance as sources of threat are not consistent, so their coexistence and perhaps even mutually reinforcing effects require careful analysis and explanation. In particular, the behavioral and policy implications of terrorism-as-primary-threat and U.S.-as-primary-threat should be very different for Russian analysis, and therefore for Russian security policy and defense planning. This paper will address whether these sources of threat assessment are contradictory or reinforcing, and what Russian foreign, security, and defense policy should look like as a result. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the conditions under which the United States employs large-scale military power to build democratic institutions abroad. Despite its centrality to US security policy, there is very little rigorous research scholarship on the causes of American democracy promotion, or forcible regime imposition more generally. I argue that US policies attempting to re-order the national political structures of other states through coercive force can be attributed to the confluence of expanding material power and changes in domestic political culture, which create expectations about the viability of liberal change and the efficacy of American power in achieving it. These arguments will be assessed against evidence from two twentieth-century cases studies. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

During the Gulf War South Korea and Japan had to solve a dilemma that they faced. As important allies of the United Stated in Asia they were expected to assist the US in the War in Iraq. Their dilemma was should they assist the United States and accepts its request to send military troops to Iraq and by doing so they will support their ally. Or should they limit their commitment to the alliance with the US only to Asia and not to support the US in the War in Iraq. By doing so, they might reflect on the alliance with the US and they would undermine the alliance and might even expect some kind of retaliation from the US.The security alliance with the US is an important element in the defense policies of both Japan and South Korea. Without the alliance, both states would have to change their defense policies and they might need to increase their defense budget. In the Japanese case, the modification to its defense policy would be even greater then the one that South Korea would have to do.The alliance with the US carries a ?price tag?. In previous years that included the support of the US against the communist block and financial support as well. The first Gulf War (1990-1991) summand both states with the question if they should assist the US in the war against Iraq. Japan decided not to send any forces to assist the US in the war in Iraq due to constitution limitations on using forces outside the Japanese territory. Later on Japan send few sweeping mines ships to the area after the war ended. Japan was criticized by the US and other states for not participating in the war. Japan paid 13 billion $ for the war and later was accused for trying to buy her part in by using a "checkbook diplomacy". Korea's very limited involvement in the first Gulf war was not criticized, as Japan was.This paper analyzes the decisions of Japan and South Korea to send their forces to Iraq in the second Gulf War. Both allies were asked by the US to support her in the war in Iraq. The US forces are stationed in both states for the purpose of defending them against any attack from hostile states such as North Korea for example. The US expected that both allies will cooperate and supports its mission in Iraq. Both allies had to make the decision if the alliance with the US is limited only to the East Asian region or the alliance includes other areas outside the East Asian parameter. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

What accounts for congressional assertion or lack thereof in national security policy after World War II? The author argues assertion is a function of the degree of congressional access to critical intelligence. Two case studies have been chosen to illuminate this poorly theorized issue area: The covert CIA operation in Angola which Congress shut down in 1975 and the 2002 Resolution authorizing President Bush to use force against Iraq. Furthermore, this paper seeks to test the waters for a more encompassing theory of Congress and national security policy that looks at presidential prestige and its consequences for the legislative-executive power-ratio in foreign and defense policy. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Scholars and policymakers have long debated whether strengthening defensive alliances or engaging in preventive war is the more prudent strategy for states to implement in response to emerging threats. The emphasis on preventive war in the Bush Administration’s National Security Strategy, the ongoing preventive war in Iraq, and talk of preventive military action to counter suspected development of nuclear weapons in North Korea and Iran have greatly intensified this debate. In this paper I question whether the conventional differentiation between the formation of defensive alliances and the initiation of preventive wars conceals important commonalities in motivations and outcomes. Since the two world wars were the most devastating conflicts of the previous century, I review the motivations and effects of Germany’s decision to ally with Austria and issue it a “blank check” in July 1914 and Britain’s decision to extend a security guarantee to Poland in March 1939. Both Germany and Britain, facing negative power shifts and fearful of war at a later time under less favorable conditions, extended and strengthened alliance commitments that they recognized were more likely to lead to war than to deter rising threats. Whereas realists downplay alliances as “marriages of convenience” and liberals argue that defensive alliances obviate the need for preventive wars, these cases suggest that alliances matter but not in the manner articulated by liberals. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Being the first nation to develop, test and acquire nuclear weapons and most significantly the one and only nuclear power to ever use an atomic weapon, the United States has played the most significant role in the evolution and sustenance of the nuclear taboo or the tradition of non-use. Much of the discourse on the taboo ?both at the policy and academic realms -- has occurred in the United States. In the 21st century, in response to asymmetrical threats from regional challengers and terrorist groups the US has also been taking the lead in circumventing the tradition by inventing usable mini-nukes. It is important to trace the evolution of the tradition by looking at the key turning points and events that shaped it. By using a path-dependency approach I will argue that the evolution was influenced by both ideational and material factors. The tradition fitted well into the national security calculations of US policy makers both in the area of the cold war conflict with the Soviet bloc and in the context of preventing the spread of nuclear weapons to additional states. The paper goes through the historical record under each of the presidencies in order to understand the evolution of the taboo against nuclear use. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper analyzes the Bush Administration's 2002 National Security Strategy of the United States as a means of highlighting the crucial ideas behind such innovations as "preemption" and "regime change." [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

On September 12, 2001, there was hasty speculation in many circles that the tragic events of the previous day had transformed an otherwise ordinary Tuesday into the day that changed the world. Many IR scholars have echoed this assessment about the weight of these events, the implications of which continue to resonate around the world. Vladimir Putin was the first Head of State to offer his condolences to President George W. Bush, and many believed that this symbolic gesture was a harbinger of a brand new era in Russia-US relations. This paper hypothesizes that despite early indications in support of this view, relations between the two nations have indeed not changed significantly. The Russia-US relationship is arguably the most important strategic relationship of the post-Cold War era and it is imperative that the apparent warming of Russian attitudes toward America be properly understood for what they are: a self-interested Russia seeking to advance its immediate interests and not a paradigm shift toward an Atlanticist world view. This hypothesis will be based upon the following three arguments: (1) President Putin’s overtures toward the United States in the wake of 9/11 were not representative of a new foreign policy consensus in Russia; (2) there have been no changes made to the Russian National Security Concept of 2000, which categorically rejects unilateralism and supports the United Nations as the paramount institution for international security; and, (3) the much heralded Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT), of May 2002 fails to stipulate the kind of meaningful reduction of offensive weapons necessary for the maintenance of Russia’s deteriorating strategic nuclear deterrent. Each of these three areas poses a serious challenge for Russia-US relations today and into the future. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

US presidents resorted to use of force 144 times from 1789 to 1945. In 22 of these cases, the military action was embedded in a multilateral context; in other words, it was coordinated with armed forces of other countries. This article examines why such v ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How important will Africa be to United States national security in the coming decades, and howâ€"if at allâ€"should the U.S. armed forces prepare to protect and promote U.S. interests there? In establishing AFRICOM, the U.S. government asserts that Africa wi ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Bush 43's foreign policy views have evolved over time, from the "humble" realism of Governor Bush to the assertive idealism of President Bush's Second Inaugural. Arguably, the Bush Doctrine has evolved through three phases, from September 2001 through the 2006 National Security Strategy. That evolution is reconstructed through an examination of Bush's speeches and writings. A brief speculation is then offered on whether the Bush Doctrine will survive the Bush Presidency. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

One of the most debated issues in the field of International Relations is how to define security. Some scholars favor a conventional interpretation focused on the military while others prefer a broader definition that encompasses topics such as environmental degradation and human security. Ole Waever, in his work on security, suggests that language and the way in which policies are framed determine which issues become securitized; this in turn establishes the definition of security. In an attempt to shed light on the process of securitization, we offer an empirically driven evaluation of existing United States policy. By analyzing the texts of policy documents like the National Security Strategy of the U.S., we can reveal how different administrations prioritize security issues. Combining methods from the field of Comparative Politics and previous studies of framing, we create a rubric of security issues with which to assess the content of National Security Strategies ranging from the late 1980s to the present. We code references to issues throughout the text and then calculate the frequency of word usage. This method is used to rank rates of occurrence, and high rates of recurrence indicate which issues take precedence in an administration?s security agenda. Our findings allow us to draw comparisons between administrations and to chart how different issues have been securitized over time. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

You may edit this abstract at any time. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

To anchor an evaluation of the recent Republican party-dominated Congress requires a longer lens, looking back to other periods like it. On a scale of political cynicism, how does the Congress of 2001 to 2006 stack up against these prior wartime Congresses? The most appropriate prior periods are both to be found in the Cold War period up to 1968, as this covers wartime responsibilities assumed by both wings of the political establishment. This includes the last elected branch monopoly the Republican party achieved, and the lead-up to it. That monopoly took until 1953 to build, and that quickly burned itself out by 1955. The last wartime Democratic monopoly on elected branches lasted from John Kennedy's inauguration in 1961 up until Lyndon Johnson's decision not to compete in the 1968 election. The low-points are well known - McCarthyism and the Tonkin Gulf Resolution - but the details are worth revisiting with parallels in mind.As to the Bush Congress, most commentary has split between two camps of opinion: Either the current Congress has abdicated on oversight, or Congress is exercising restraint appropriate to wartime. When it comes to answering the question, "How does oversight work?," the critics say, "It doesn't," or, "There isn't a straightforward answer." But a closer look at the pressures that have led to some oversight leadership by Congress during the Bush years suggests a stronger answer to that question: Oversight's path can rarely BE straightforward. Congress has few available means of piercing the veil of bureaucratic secrecy crafted around national security operations, and the oversight issues that legislators can make stick just ARE serendipitous. But as in previous legislative "insurgencies" during single-party dominant eras, there is a pattern to effective oversight: Just as important as the scandal that gives traction to oversight is accumulating over time a public trail of evidence about what oversight jurisdictions are being stonewalled on the President's behalf by fellow members in Congress. The President's party works hand in hand with a number of gatekeepers around Congress, and the legislative opposition has difficulties bringing to the public's attention the record of those responsible within Congress for ongoing stonewalling. That is to say, the opacity of the Presidency is crucial to understanding the limits of legislative oversight of national security matters, but so is the opacity of the oversight process itself. This essay furnishes a short case study from the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]