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The COVID-19 pandemic has been a major public governance issue in the United States since 2020. Public officials at all levels of government have provided important policies to control the spread of the pandemic and reduce its impact to society. This paper examines public value and ethical challenges that are related to the government's pandemic responses. The paper first provides a review of value and ethical studies in public administration and public health crisis. It then examines value concerns and ethical challenges in COVID management and policy cases and the influence of political polarization to the value challenges. The paper concludes with discussions about the pandemic's comprehensive challenges to the traditional professional management and suggestions of public value studies and trainings. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Times of national and international crisis are often unifying events which lower levels of division within the public and between political elites. Yet, COVID-19 pandemic responses in the United States have been viewed as markedly polarized. Using a comprehensive dataset of over four million social media posts sent by local, state, and federal level political officials between January 2020 and September 2022, this paper explores the extent to which the COVID-19 pandemic was a rhetorically unifying or divisive event, and whether rhetorical responses differed across levels of government. The results show that federal level officials were less likely to message about COVID-19 and were more likely to do so in a polarizing fashion compared to state and local officials. Temporally, in the early stages of the pandemic there was indeed a collective rhetorical de-polarization across all levels of government. However, as the pandemic progressed, COVID-related messaging became more polarizing, especially among Republicans. Evidence also emerges of dynamic responsiveness from elected officials, with relativeness attentiveness to COVID increasing and polarizing rhetoric decreasing during time periods when local case counts were relatively high. These findings suggest that rhetorical unity is still possible, even in times of high political polarization, but that this unity is also short-lived and tempered by political and electoral considerations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Ideological divisions in the United States have become increasingly prominent in daily communication. Accordingly, there has been much research on political polarization, including many recent efforts that take a computational perspective. By detecting political biases in a text document, one can attempt to discern and describe its polarity. Intuitively, the named entities (i.e., the nouns and the phrases that act as nouns) and hashtags in text often carry information about political views. For example, people who use the term "pro-choice" are likely to be liberal and people who use the term "pro-life" are likely to be conservative. In this paper, we seek to reveal political polarities in social-media text data and to quantify these polarities by explicitly assigning a polarity score to entities and hashtags. Although this idea is straightforward, it is difficult to perform such inference in a trustworthy quantitative way. Key challenges include the small number of known labels, the continuous spectrum of political views, and the preservation of both a polarity score and a polarity-neutral semantic meaning in an embedding vector of words. To attempt to overcome these challenges, we propose the Polarity-aware Embedding Multi-task learning (PEM) model. This model consists of (1) a self-supervised context-preservation task, (2) an attention-based tweet-level polarity-inference task, and (3) an adversarial learning task that promotes independence between an embedding's polarity component and its semantic component. Our experimental results demonstrate that our PEM model can successfully learn polarity-aware embeddings that perform well at tweet-level and account-level classification tasks. We examine a variety of applications—including a study of spatial and temporal distributions of polarities and a comparison between tweets from Twitter and posts from Parler—and we thereby demonstrate the effectiveness of our PEM model. We also discuss important limitations of our work and encourage caution when applying the PEM model to real-world scenarios. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of World Medical & Health Policy is the property of Wiley-Blackwell and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Policy Studies Journal is the property of Wiley-Blackwell and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Some studies show that people with friends of different races also have lower levels of implicit racial bias. Yet, other studies do not replicate this finding. The omission of political parties from this research may explain its contradictory results, given the central role that race has played in the polarization of US society. Recent scholarship shows that political partisanship influences whether intergroup friendships improve explicit (i.e. conscious) attitudes. However, no studies have asked if friendships with African Americans have differing effects on white Democrats' and Republicans' anti-Black implicit bias. This paper examines this question by analyzing Race IAT and survey responses from 1,868 white Americans. Results reveal that white Democrats and Republicans maintain friendships with African Americans at similar rates. Yet, having Black friends only predicts weaker anti-Black implicit bias among white Democrats. This finding suggests that partisan differences in interracial friendship dynamics may shape implicit racial attitudes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Although political parties are not mentioned in the U.S. Constitution, the two-party electoral system is wellestablished in American elections and gerrymandering naturally occurs to benefit the party that controls both a state's legislative chambers and the governor's office. Tracing the evolution of partisan gerrymandering and examining the gerrymandering practices, this research finds that redistricting manipulation enabled by two-party electoral system, is a tale as old as time and it has continued for over two hundred years, rising or falling depending on the intensity of partisan politics. In 21st century, political polarization and gerrymandering have been feeding off each other. When the redistricting process is manipulated by entrenched partisan gerrymanders, it has become counterproductive to fair representation, competitive election, and translating public will into policies. As long as the foxes are allowed to guard the hen houses, partisan politicians will continue to abuse "one person, one vote" principle and pick voters. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Revista Española de Sociología is the property of Federacion Espanola de Sociologia and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

In this paper, we analyze trends in Americans' immigration attitudes and policy preferences nationally and across partisan and racial/ethnic groups. In the 1990s and early 2000s, Democrats and Republicans shared similarly negative attitudes toward immigrants and high levels of support for restrictionist immigration policies. Beginning in the 2010s and continuing through the early 2020s, however, Democrats' aggregate immigration opinions liberalized considerably. We observed increasingly liberal immigration preferences among Democrats of all racial and ethnic backgrounds after 2016, but this trend was especially pronounced among white Democrats. Among Republicans, opinion on immigration remained mostly stable over this period, although in some cases it became more conservative (e.g. border security) and more liberal on others (e.g. amnesty). The marked liberalization in immigration opinion among Democrats has left partisans more divided on immigration than at any point since national surveys began consistently measuring immigration opinion in the late twentieth century. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The continual rise of affective polarization in the United States harms trust in democratic institutions. Scholars cite processes of ideological and social sorting of the partisan coalitions in the electorate as contributing to the rise of affective polarization, but how do these processes relate to one another? Most scholarship implicitly assumes period effects—that people change their feelings toward the parties uniformly and contemporaneously as they sort. However, it is also possible that sorting and affective polarization link with one another as a function of age or cohort effects. In this paper, I estimate age, period and cohort effects on affective polarization, partisan strength, and ideological sorting. I find that affective polarization increases over time, but also as people age. Age-related increases in affective polarization occur as a function of increases in partisan strength, and for Republicans, social sorting. Meanwhile, sorting only partially explains period effects. These effects combine such that each cohort enters the electorate more affectively polarized than the last. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Polarization and participation are often connected in the political science literature, though sometimes the causality runs participation to polarization and sometimes the causality runs in the reverse direction. In some accounts there is an expectation that increasing participation and increasing polarization generate an ongoing spiral effect. In this paper we evaluate the over-time relationships between polarization and participation by assessing evidence in existing panel and aggregate data. We find that people with more extreme attitudes are more likely to participate in politics. However, only one particular form of participation—persuading others—appears to predict later levels of polarization. Therefore, only persuasion has the necessary correlation and temporal ordering for a feedback loop with more extreme ideology. The implication is that the discipline should pay more attention to interpersonal persuasion as a form of participation in American politics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

What drives affective polarization in American politics? One common argument is that Democrats and Republicans are deeply polarized today because they are psychologically different--motivated by diametrically opposed and clashing worldviews. This paper argues that the same psychological motivation--authoritarianism--is positively related to partisan extremism among both Republicans and Democrats. Across four studies, this paper shows that authoritarianism is associated with strong partisanship and heightened affective polarization among both Republicans and Democrats. Thus, strong Republicans and Democrats are psychologically similar, at least with respect to authoritarianism. As authoritarianism provides an indicator of underlying needs to belong, these findings support a view of mass polarization as nonsubstantive and group-centric, not driven by competing ideological values or clashing psychological worldviews. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The form of political polarization where citizens develop strongly negative attitudes toward out-party members and policies has become increasingly prominent across many democracies. Economic hardship and social inequality, as well as intergroup and racial conflict, have been identified as important contributing factors to this phenomenon known as “affective polarization.” Research shows that partisan animosities are exacerbated when these interests and identities become aligned with existing party cleavages. In this paper, we use a model of cultural evolution to study how these forces combine to generate and maintain affective political polarization. We show that economic events can drive both affective polarization and the sorting of group identities along party lines, which, in turn, can magnify the effects of underlying inequality between those groups. But, on a more optimistic note, we show that sufficiently high levels of wealth redistribution through the provision of public goods can counteract this feedback and limit the rise of polarization. We test some of our key theoretical predictions using survey data on intergroup polarization, sorting of racial groups, and affective polarization in the United States over the past 50 y. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper offers a unified political economy explanation of political extremism and moderation regarding income redistribution. Unlike the standard spatial voting model, the explanation herein recognizes that extremists are distinguished not only by their political positions, but also by the intensity with which they hold them. The paper uses an extension of Aumann and Kurz’s (Econometrica 45(5):1137-1161, 1977) bargaining model to endogenize moderation and extremism in the context of democratic voting. The extension shows that low-income voters tend to be bolder in their redistributive demands and high-income voters tend to be more tenacious in defending them. These hypotheses are evaluated empirically using the Political Action Panel Study. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Even after two decades of intense research, social scientists are still in disagreement over whether the American public is polarized. Starting from the premise that disagreement is multifaceted, this paper attempts to clarify how and which aspects of ideological disagreement have changed over the past few decades. Three major structural features of ideological disagreement that have been discussed under the umbrella term "polarization" are identified from the literature--polarization, partisan sorting, and dimensional alignment--and redefined into analytically distinct and non-overlapping concepts. Two different scaling methods are applied to the American National Election Studies from 1980 to 2012 in order to examine changes in how citizens organize their attitudes regarding concrete political and social issues (operational ideology) and their self-identifications with the ideological labels "liberal" and "conservative" (symbolic ideology). Results show at best mixed evidence of growing polarization. Partisan sorting has increased over time on both symbolic and operational ideology. However, it is mainly the symbolic side on which disagreement across partisan lines is most pronounced. Finally, contrary to the popular notion of a culture war dividing the United States, the public has become less polarized on moral issues, and the moral dimension of citizens' operational ideology has become dealigned from the economic and civil rights dimension over the past decade. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We study learning via shared news. Each period agents receive the same quantity and quality of firsthand information and can share it with friends. Some friends (possibly few) share selectively, generating heterogeneous news diets across agents. Agents are aware of selective sharing and update beliefs by Bayes's rule. Contrary to standard learning results, we show that beliefs can diverge in this environment, leading to polarization. This requires that (i) agents hold misperceptions (even minor) about friends' sharing and (ii) information quality is sufficiently low. Polarization can worsen when agents' friend networks expand. When the quantity of firsthand information becomes large, agents can hold opposite extreme beliefs, resulting in severe polarization. We find that news aggregators can curb polarization caused by news sharing. Our results hold without media bias or fake news, so eliminating these is not sufficient to reduce polarization. When fake news is included, it can lead to polarization but only through misperceived selective sharing. We apply our theory to shed light on the polarization of public opinion about climate change in the United States. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper argues that our increasingly polarized politics has led to political stalemate and policy gridlock in Congress which, in turn, have contributed to a change in the balance of power between the executive and legislative branches of government; specifically, executive power has increased at the expense of a diminished legislature. The paper will trace the extent to which Congress has become increasingly polarized and how this increased polarization has reduced Congress's capability and productivity while simultaneously increasing policy gridlock resulting in the expansion of executive power (and judicial authority) relative to legislative authority. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The mass public has become affectively polarized—ordinary Americans increasingly dislike and distrust those from the other party, with negative consequences for politics. Drawing on work in political and social psychology, this paper tests two mechanisms for reducing this discord, both of which have been shown to reduce similar biases in other settings: heightening partisan ambivalence, and using self-affirmation techniques. A population-based survey experiment shows that neither strategy reduces affective polarization in the aggregate. But this null finding masks an important heterogeneity: Heightening partisan ambivalence reduces affective polarization for ideological moderates, but increases such discord for those with more extreme ideological identities. Efforts to depolarize the electorate can make it more deeply divided, with important implications for our understanding of contemporary politics and the durability of affective polarization. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper develops an extension of Poole’s (Polit Anal 8(3):211-237, 2000) Optimal Classification (OC) scaling procedure to the analysis of polytomous or ordered choice data. This type of data is regularly encountered in public opinion and expert surveys, legislative and judicial bodies where abstention is relevant, and measures of policy that are coded along ordinal scales. OC is nonparametric and requires only minimal assumptions about voters’ utility functions and the error term. As such, Ordered Optimal Classification (OOC) provides a flexible modeling strategy to estimate latent ideological spaces from ordinal choice data. OOC is also easily estimated in multidimensional space without identifying restrictions. After describing the OOC procedure, we perform a series of Monte Carlo experiments and apply the method to analyze survey data from the 2015 Cooperative Congressional Election Study. We then conclude with a discussion of how scholars can utilize OOC in future work involving multidimensional spatial models of choice. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How do political identities shape seemingly non-political behaviors, such as consumption activity? This paper explores the extent to which political divisions impact apolitical behaviors, focusing on the case of voluntary donations to charitable organizations. Drawing on recent work showing partisans' differing use of 'conspicuous consumption,' we develop and test expectations as to how charitable activity may differ for Democrats and Republicans. Using three national surveys, including an original two-wave panel study, we find sizable differences in overall giving between partisans, with Republicans giving more to charity on average. We show that partisan differences in religiosity, and not differences in beliefs about government spending or desires to signal economic status, explain partisan gaps in giving. Our findings contribute to our understanding about the broader consequences of political fragmentation in the United States and provide further evidence for the social, as opposed to ideological, roots of political identity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Research indicates that affective polarization pervades contemporary democracies worldwide. Although some studies identify party leaders as polarizing agents, affective polarization has been predominantly conceptualized as a product of in-/out-party feelings. This study compares levels of party affective polarization (PAP) and leader affective polarization (LAP) cross-nationally, using data from the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems. Applying like–dislike scales and an identical index to both concepts, we reveal that while the two strongly correlate, LAP is systematically lower than PAP. The United States emerges as an exceptional case, being the only country where LAP significantly exceeds PAP. Drawing on regime input/output and institutions as theoretical building blocks, we explore cross-national variations and show that the relative strength of LAP vis-à-vis PAP is increased by presidential regime type, poor government performance, and low party system fragmentation. The findings of this study contribute to the thriving research on affective polarization and personalization of politics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Beliefs and attitudes form the core of public opinion about climate change. Network analysis can reveal the structural configuration of these beliefs and attitudes. In this research, we utilize a belief system framework to identify key psychological elements, track change in the density of these belief systems over time and across political groups, and analyze the structural heterogeneity of belief systems within and between political groups in the United States. Drawing on fifteen waves of nationally representative survey data from 2010 to 2021 (N = 16,742), our findings indicate that worry about climate change is the most central psychological element. Interestingly, we find that among politically unaffiliated individuals, the connections between psychological elements have strengthened over time, implying an increase in the consistency of belief systems within this group. Despite the political polarization in beliefs about climate change between Republicans and Democrats, our findings reveal that the ways these two groups organize and structure climate change beliefs systems are not markedly different compared to those of other groups. These findings provide theoretical and practical insights for climate change experts and communicators. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Affective polarization, or relative dislike of opposing partisans, is associated with several negative outcomes for democracy. However, a number of studies argue that affective polarization has one positive democratic consequence: it spurs political participation. However, political participation, especially voting, is habitual, and the factors that spur people to start participating are not the same as those that sustain participation once it is initiated. Existing work does not address this distinction. Leveraging large-scale survey data linked to validated measures of turnout as well as panel data, this paper shows that affective polarization mainly serves to sustain existing habits of turnout. In contrast, there is little evidence that affective polarization motivates people who did not previously participate to begin doing so. These results indicate that instead of improving democratic outcomes, affective polarization exacerbates existing inequities in political participation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Wealth inequality has been sharply rising in the United States and across many other high-income countries. Due to a lack of data, we know little about how this trend has unfolded across locations within countries. Examining the subnational geography of wealth is crucial because, from one generation to the next, it shapes the distribution of opportunity, disadvantage, and power across individuals and communities. By employing machine-learning-based imputation to link national historical surveys conducted by the U.S. Federal Reserve to population survey microdata, the data presented in this article addresses this gap. The Geographic Wealth Inequality Database ("GEOWEALTH-US") provides the first estimates of the level and distribution of wealth at various geographical scales within the United States from 1960 to 2020. The GEOWEALTH-US database enables new lines of investigation into the contribution of spatial wealth disparities to major societal challenges including wealth concentration, income inequality, social mobility, housing unaffordability, and political polarization. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The spatial distribution of income shapes the structure and organisation of cities and its understanding has broad societal implications. Despite an abundant literature, many issues remain unclear. In particular, all definitions of segregation are implicitely tied to a single indicator, usually rely on an ambiguous definition of income classes, without any consensus on how to define neighbourhoods and to deal with the polycentric organization of large cities. In this paper, we address all these questions within a unique conceptual framework. We avoid the challenge of providing a direct definition of segregation and instead start from a definition of what segregation is not. This naturally leads to the measure of representation that is able to identify locations where categories are over- or underrepresented. From there, we provide a new measure of exposure that discriminates between situations where categories co-locate or repel one another. We then use this feature to provide an unambiguous, parameter-free method to find meaningful breaks in the income distribution, thus defining classes. Applied to the 2014 American Community Survey, we find 3 emerging classes—low, middle and higher income—out of the original 16 income categories. The higher-income households are proportionally more present in larger cities, while lower-income households are not, invalidating the idea of an increased social polarisation. Finally, using the density—and not the distance to a center which is meaningless in polycentric cities—we find that the richer class is overrepresented in high density zones, especially for larger cities. This suggests that density is a relevant factor for understanding the income structure of cities and might explain some of the differences observed between US and European cities. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper explores the way that British Parliamentary Debate teaches collaboration to students and critics. In an effort to address rising polarization in the United States, BP debate is offered as a way to teach, and practice, collaboration. The paper explores the ways these skills are used by debaters and critics throughout the debate round, looking specifically at cooperation and consensus as tools to achieve collaboration. British Parliamentary offers distinct characteristics and rules, in contrast to other forms of debate, which lend itself to teaching these concepts throughout the debate. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

To secure his reelection, President Richard Nixon tried to dismantle the New Deal coalition and form a new Republican majority; to do so, he attacked the monopoly Democrats had on racial and ethnic votes. Nixon's racial and ethnic politicking represented a rupture with past Republican ignorance of minorities; it was going to be one of his key legacies to his party. This article shows that, driven by consecutively defined electoral goals, his administration systematically favored group-specific measures over universalistic policies addressing common ethnic claims, and that these measures were accompanied by a divisive rhetoric and implemented in an antagonistic fashion. It argues that Nixon broke his promise to reunite the country, and used racial and ethnic politics as an instrument of electoral engineering rather than as a way to correct legacies of past discriminations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article examines the differences regarding the perception of reality in areas including social mobility, inequality, immigration and public policies across the political spectrum in the U.S. Topics discussed include conceptualization of the polarization of reality, differences in perceptions among Republicans and Democrats, and the conflict between reality and political orientation.

Polarization in the United States and around the world is of growing concern. Polarization is about more than just differences in opinions in society. It occurs when groups increasingly diverge in either actual or perceived differences in opinion and can involve both disagreements about issues and negative views of other groups. Since most environmental problems are collective action problems, polarization may interfere with the kinds of deliberation and collaborations needed for effective environmental decision-making. In this review, we examine how polarization influences environmental decision-making and what strategies could be useful for preventing or reducing the negative consequences of polarization. Evidence about the extent of polarization among citizens suggests the current situation may be less severe than is sometimes assumed. The coevolution of individual views, network interactions, and social media that cause polarization is complex and subject to rapid change. However, there are interventions that seem to be effective at reducing polarization. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The insurrection at the United States Capitol on January 6, 2021, was the most dramatic contemporary manifestation of deep political polarization in the United States. Recent research shows that violent protests shape political behavior and attachments, but several questions remain unanswered. Using day-level panel data from a large sample of US social media users to track changes in the identities expressed in their Twitter biographies, we show that the Capitol insurrection caused a large-scale decrease in outward expressions of identification with the Republican Party and Donald Trump, with no indication of reidentification in the weeks that followed. This finding suggests that there are limits to party loyalty: a violent attack on democratic institutions sets boundaries on partisanship, even among avowed partisans. Furthermore, the finding that political violence can deflect copartisans carries the potential positive democratic implication that those who encourage or associate themselves with such violence pay a political cost. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Politics & Policy is the property of Wiley-Blackwell and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

While dislike of opposing parties, that is, affective polarization, is a defining feature of contemporary politics, research on this topic largely centers on the United States. We introduce an approach that analyzes affective polarization between pairs of parties, bridging the US two-party system and multiparty systems in other democracies. Analyzing survey data from twenty Western democracies since the mid-1990s, first, we show that partisans' dislike of out-parties is linked to elite policy disagreements on economic issues and, increasingly over time, also to cultural issues. Secondly, we argue and empirically demonstrate that governing coalition partners in parliamentary democracies display much warmer feelings toward each other than we would expect based on elite policy (dis)agreements. Third, we show that radical right parties are disliked much more intensely than we would expect based on policy disputes and coalition arrangements. These findings highlight the policy-based and institutional underpinnings of affective polarization. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

States are engaging in brute force (anti) federalism, where both sides of the political spectrum push agendas that extend beyond the Founder's early ideal of balanced federalism, using popular support and special interest groups' interests as their springboard. These trial‐and‐error tactics increase vertical and interstate horizontal frictions, create political and economic challenges for businesses, and increase American polarization. However, they also allow states the opportunity to force an increasingly stalemated federal government into action. This article introduces the concept of brute force (anti) federalism by first examining the evolution of modern federalism. It then offers a sampling of state brute force efforts, analyzes the effect of popular momentum and special interest groups on state political activity, advances broad‐based perspectives surrounding brute force (anti) federalism, and poses additional questions to be considered. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Discourse around school choice often is divisive. Less understood is the effect polarization has within advocate groups. The Narrative Policy Framework (NPF) approach offers a systematic approach to understanding how political actors use narratives to affect policy debates. Because NPF assumes bounded relativity, the approach requires a theory of political ideology that can explain why narratives stick within certain ideological boundaries. Because Kling's three-axes model provides non-mutually exclusive character identification, it can help illuminate in-group overlap and conflict. This essay uses NPF and Kling to examine how narratives are used by various subgroups within the school choice advocacy coalition. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Is political violence and support for political violence more prevalent in democratic societies with high levels of affective polarization? This study argues that affective partisan political polarization fosters dehumanization of opposing partisans, lends a moralistic and zero-sum nature to political life, and facilitates group mobilization. These all produce an environment in which political violence is both more socially acceptable and more frequent. The study tests this assertion using two sets of empirical tests: an original survey of 1,899 US residents and a cross-national time-series analysis of eighty-three democracies. It finds that in the United States, Democrats who express aversion toward Republicans are 8% more likely to express support for the use of political violence, whereas Republicans who express aversion toward Democrats are 18% more likely to endorse political violence. Furthermore, in the cross-national analysis, democracies characterized by higher levels of affective partisan political polarization are 34% more likely to experience frequent political violence. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study examines whether rising polarization in Americans' partisan judgments has positive implications for political participation. Drawing on cross-sectional and panel survey data, we find evidence that polarized judgments are related to pre-election intent to vote, as well as to post-election self-reported voter turnout. Polarized evaluations also predict greater reporting of participation in campaign activities beyond voting. Polarization in candidate evaluations consistently has more of an impact than affective polarization. However, our results suggest that polarization in evaluations of both parties and candidates includes an expressive component that does not necessarily translate into political action. Roughly one-quarter to one-third of the actual change in turnout can potentially be attributed to polarization in evaluations of Republican and Democratic presidential candidates. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This piece contains slightly revised remarks made at the conference honoring Keith T. Poole held at the University of Georgia in May, 2017. Poole’s major contributions are summarized. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Many Americans associate themselves with their political party in a deep, visceral way. Voter identification with a political party has powerful implications for not just how voters behave, but how there are exposed to and receive information about the world. We describe how this tying of one's self-concept to a party, which can be analogous to die-hard sports fandom, plays a central role in political cognition. It leads voters identifying with the two parties to perceive the political (and even seemingly apolitical) world in dramatically different ways. We detail the psychological mechanisms by which this party identity produces these distortions and offer examples of the bias that emerges. We conclude by discussing the implications of these phenomena for perpetuating our current hyperpolarized political discourse. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Over the course of the twentieth century, American conceptions of rights became more global. This development—usually described as a move from "civil rights" to "human rights"—was especially acute in American Christian communities. The role of Christianity deserves our attention because of the religion's important role in the conceptualization, popularization, and practice of human rights in the United States and, thanks to Christians' overseas networks, to every corner of the world. The increasingly global understanding of rights, however, did not lead to the liberalization of rights for American Christians. True, human rights talk contributed to important milestones in religious pluralism and the Civil Rights movement, and often served as a gateway to democratic liberalism for some groups resistant to the American liberal tradition. Human rights, however, were not only a liberal project. Conservatives also embraced human rights but in starkly different ways. The divergent interpretations of human rights were not merely a reflection of the growing political divide in the second half of the twentieth century. Christian activists' adoption of human rights helped forge new alliances and exacerbated the divide between liberal and conservative Christianity, and between political liberalism and political conservatism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Protest against containment policies in U.S. states is fueled by two drivers: the stringency of containment policies and the partisan control over the governorship and legislatures in each state. In our analysis of the period from March 2020 to March 2022, we find more protest events in states fully controlled by Democrats than in Republican controlled states both in a sample consisting of all states and a balanced sample in which we constrain observations to those red and blue states with on average similarly stringent containment policies. Protest was therefore politicized, and we find that partisanship exerts a roughly equal substantive effect on the number of protest events as the stringency of containment policies. If we assume no direct effect of partisanship on protest but allow for causal heterogeneity along partisan lines in the effect of containment policies, we find that the same increase in the stringency of policies evokes a stronger protest response in blue states than in red states. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Social scientists have observed a sharp rise in affective polar-ization in many societies, particularly the United States. Since it is widely agreed that this poses a threat to democracy, finding solutions to this predicament is essential. One prominent proposal to depolarize the electorate holds that citizens need to exercise their capacities for empathy with the political opposition. However, defenders of the empathy response to affective polarization have yet to fully specify the range of mechanisms through which empathy can counteract polarization. Recent proposals focus on empathy's role in finding common ground and humanizing others. Drawing on the wider empathy literature, we identify several additional ways empathy might counter affective polarization. We show that the resultant account has important implications for the sorts of empathetic engagement with cross-partisans that is likely to reduce polarization. Our aim is to contribute to a deeper understanding of the potential of different kinds of empathetic engagement to counter polarization as well as the limits of empathy as a response to polarization. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article presents evidence from American National Election Studies (ANES) survey which showed that correlations among ideological identification, issue positions, and party identification in the U.S. have increased dramatically within the electorate over the past half century. Topics discussed include partisan-ideological polarization among members of the public, the rise of partisan-ideological consistency within the American electorate, and consequences of partisan-ideological consistency. Also mentioned are issues that affected the ability to analyze partisan-ideological consistency over time.

Conformity and polarization are two reactions to pathogen threats like the Covid-19 pandemic. This article discusses the dilemma between protecting public health as well as preserving the democratic dialogue and constitutional rights. I compare two countries which reacted very differently to the pandemic. While Germany was marked by high social conformity levels, in the United States political polarization was predominant. The analysis focuses on the time between March and November 2020. I show, first, the differences and interactions between conformity and polarization. Second, societies seem to be more aware and concerned about polarization than about conformity. Third, I show that both reactions, high conformity and polarization levels are detrimental for the democratic dialogue and constitutional rights. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The events in the year 2020, especially the ravaging coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic has further exposed the vulnerability and connectedness associated with human health and the global economy. In the United States, amid the COVID-19 pandemic, the recent political polarization, especially the sharp divide between the Republican and Democrat party has further demonstrated the heightened partisan conflict in the country. From this basis, the current study examines the time-varying Granger causality between pandemic-related health emergency, partisan conflict, and economic policy uncertainty (EPU) in the United States over period January 1996 to June 2020. While there is an evidence of common time-varying Granger causality between August 2005 and September 2006 from pandemic-related health emergency to partisan, the evidence of Granger causality from partisan conflict to pandemic is common in the period of January to May 2009. In addition, the Granger causality between partisan conflict and EPU is obviously common between February and May 2020. As a policy concern, we are of the opinion that mechanism toward diffusing the heightened political divide in the United States is essential and be pursued for the country's economic and health sector challenges. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article examines how the increasing polarization and nationalization of state supreme court elections in the U.S. held from 2016 to 2021 affects the flow of information to the electorate. Topics include an analysis of the competitiveness of these elections, examples of the kinds of partisan frames and partisan-tinged information flowing to voters in various elections, and how the character of contemporary elections may affect judicial legitimacy.

In the current study, a mixed‐method research design was used to explore how team members' transformational leadership and effective followership relate to teamwork quality. Data were collected from 10‐student project teams (N [team] = 10; N [individual] = 84 team members) in a leadership class at a large‐sized public university in the United States. As a follow‐up, focus group interviews were conducted with two teams (n = 13 team members) to explore how team members' transformational leadership and effective followership work during team interactions. Correlation results showed that team members' transformational leadership was positively related to teamwork quality (r (82) =.84, p <.01). In the qualitative phase, findings showed that the team exhibiting centralized transformational leadership also exhibited passive team followership and low‐quality teamwork. Low‐quality teamwork was described as social loafing and polarization. In contrast, the team exhibiting shared transformational leadership also exhibited proactive team followership and high‐quality teamwork. High‐quality teamwork was described as conflict resolution and team synergy. The findings have important implications for leaders, followers, leadership educators, teams, organizations, and researchers. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on understanding American politics, especially the polarization that led to the rise, election, a failed insurrection, and potential rebirth of ex-President the of U.S. Donald Trump and Trumpism, a unique American expression of reactionary populism that perhaps shades into neofascism. It highlights the growing political polarization of the U.S. that began in the late 1960s; and trend of progressive movements and change that continued, in the early years of the 21st century.

Many recent studies consider the overlapping nature of major political identities. Drawing on this research, we posit that partisanship and race are so enmeshed in the public mind that events which independently trigger one of these identities can also activate the other. We find support for this in three behavioral game experiments with 5496 respondents. These studies reveal what we refer to as the "parallel updating" of out-group affect. Shifts in racial affect are accompanied by simultaneous movement in attitudes and behavior towards members of the other political party. Conversely, changes in partisan affect co-occur with movement in views of racial out-groups. Our results speak to the inseparability of racial and partisan affect in the United States and suggest an important link between studies of racial animus and partisan affective polarization. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]