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This paper examines how international education (IE), as an important tool of public diplomacy (PD) and soft power (SP), faces unique challenges as issues of national security (NS) become more prominent in this era of new geopolitics. It presents a model to understand the relationship between PD, SP and NS and then applies this model to a comparative study. The contrasting histories, approaches and perspectives of IE as it operates as a component of foreign policy and at the nexus of PD, SP and NS in both the U.S. and Canada are analysed. The paper concludes with three challenges faced by IE in the contemporary context: first, the diminishing role of the university as a distinct and valued non-state actor; second, the weakening of foreign policy as an outward looking, distinctly international investment; and third, the problem with choosing isolation over engagement as a strategy.

Growing polarization among the US electorate has in recent years attracted considerable attention from academic and non-academic observers. This paper examines some of the ways in which polarization affects US foreign and security policy in the post-Trump era. In particular, the paper offers an account of why bipartisan agreement over the so-called "rise of China" has prevailed in the face of powerful trends towards increased polarization, while domestic opinions over US aid to Ukraine have become much more contested. Drawing on a constructivist understanding of foreign policy as performative of a certain vision of the domestic self, this paper shows how US aid to Ukraine has become entangled with competing visions of the US, while domestic opinions of China have remained stable. While such a constructivist understanding does not necessarily challenge rationalist accounts, it is helpful in unravelling the link between national identity, domestic polarization, and foreign policy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper considers a messaging strategy to shift immigration preferences, arguing that if citizen attitudes in this issue-area build from several dimensions, then a positive message related to each dimension should move attitudes in a more favorable direction. It tests the first part using original survey data with directly comparable questions about whether immigration hurts/helps American culture/the economy/national security, providing evidence that all three dimensions currently support the preferences of voting-age citizens. It tests the second part by randomly presenting another sample with different messages about how labor immigration strengthens national security, creates new jobs, or enhances culture, finding that all three reduce anti-immigration attitudes with significant effects even within groups that are more opposed to immigration (namely, white Americans, those with less education, and partisan Republicans). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper critically examines China's national security review regime of foreign investment and compares it with that of the United States. Over the years, China has gradually established a comprehensive legal framework for national security review of foreign investment. Recent efforts were made to refine the public enforcement mechanism of the review in tandem with a new "pre-establishment national treatment plus negative list" system under the 2020 Foreign Investment Law. The United States also enacted the Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act of 2018 to enhance its national security review regime. By analyzing the law and practices of China and the United States, this paper finds that the national security review regimes of the two jurisdictions have functional convergences despite some formal divergences caused by diverse political-economy landscapes. Their functional convergences are highlighted by China's local practices, such as the de-facto national security screening in the name of anti-monopoly review. There are many factors affecting China's national security review regime for foreign investment, including the ongoing (and escalating) US-China competition (or conflict) at the international level and the evolution of state or party capitalism at the domestic level. These research findings will not only contribute to the existing comparative law scholarship but also benefit multinational enterprises that seek to enter Chinese and the US markets. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The evolution of the 21st century international system towards a complex and chaotic system, due to the simultaneous global and regional transition of power between China and the United States, has made the seas more prominent in the process of order transition. Such a transition can be seen in Indo-Pacific maritime tensions, especially in the South China Sea. Such a multi-level transition has brought new challenges to the traditional model of power transition theory and it’s necessary to adjust it within the framework of complex systems. This paper examines the role do seas and oceans play in the transition of power in complex international systems? The author argues that competition to dominate the seas and oceans can be the point of transferring systemic pressures to the branches of the regional order and changing its security architecture towards a new maritime-based security order. The paper, using the multi-level power transition theory, contributes to a better understanding of the dynamics surrounding maritime competition and contestation between China and the United States in the process of power transition from a systemic perspective. The research method is deductive-inductive based on inference and synthesis. In this regard, at first the principles and rules of transition in complex and chaotic systems are extracted, then by combining them, the bifurcation transition model and comprehensive network control system is presented. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Larq Journal for Philosophy, Linguistics & Social Sciences is the property of Republic of Iraq Ministry of Higher Education & Scientific Research (MOHESR) and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The protection of critical infrastructure (water, energy, food supply, healthcare etc.) from cyberattack has moved from a hypothetical concern to a very real one for the United States. Unfortunately, the cybersecurity for such infrastructure is provided by a multiplicity of organisations, inside and outside the US federal government. In this paper, the authors address how the US Department of Homeland Security and US Department of Defense have evolved to address the cyber critical infrastructure protection (CIP) mission and the issues that have emerged in doing so. Presented here is a description of critical infrastructure's vulnerability to cyberattack, an assessment of relevant cybersecurity efforts by the US government, and consideration of the civilian–military issues involved in finding remedies to the problem of cybersecurity in critical infrastructure. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The purpose of this article is to present the results of an analysis of the content of strategic documents on national security adopted by the United States and Poland between 2001 and 2020. The choice of the research field was determined by the place these documents occupy in the hierarchy of strategic texts related to state security. Due to the cooperation between both states and the Polish perception of the United States as the most important ally, the research task is to determine whether there is a convergence in the content of strategic documents issued by the Rzeczpospolita in relation to US documents. Furthermore, the paper examines to what extent the links between the two countries are reflected in the form and content of official strategic documents and in the description of threats. The text consists of three parts. The first is theoretical and focuses on describing the hierarchy of strategic documents in both countries. The second section presents a comparative analysis of the formal aspect and, therefore, how documents are adopted in the United States and in Poland. The last part of the article contains the conclusions of the analysis of the threats identified in the documents of both countries. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

China and the United States host the world's largest digital platforms. Platforms are multisided markets that facilitate value‐creating exchanges among users, such as social media, e‐commerce, software QJ;application downloads, search, email, and cloud services. Internet access and the purely digital nature of many of the products and services make digital platforms potentially global in scope. This means that the rules and restrictions governing the flow of capital and information services among national markets strongly influence the economic and social potential of digital platforms. The paper conducts a sequential analysis of the rise of barriers to the United States–China trade in ICT and digital platform markets from 2000 to 2021. We find that China's thriving platform economy was relatively open, competitive and market‐driven in its early stages, and benefited from U.S. capital and the entry of U.S. firms. Since 2009, both countries have progressively restricted access to each other's domestic information services markets. In both cases, the primary stated rationale involved national security claims rather than trade policy concerns. Drawing on International Political Economy theory, we label the United States–China interaction pattern digital neo‐mercantilism. Digital neo‐mercantilism fuses the power and security of the national state with economic development in the digital economy. Policymakers represent information flows and digital technologies in domestic policy discourse as critical to the security and relative power of the state, and pursue various forms of industrial policy, data localization, trade protectionism, or exclusion of foreigners as a result. Both the United States and China are following this policy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

It is well known that in the wake of 9/11, the United States committed various extraterritorial human rights violations, that is, human rights violations against foreigners outside of its territory. What is less known is that the United States has gradually introduced safeguards that are, at least on paper, meant to prevent its counter-terrorism policies from causing harm to foreigners abroad or, at least, to mitigate such harm. Based on three case studies on the development of safeguards related to torture, targeted killing, and mass surveillance, we show that two mechanisms, coercion and strategic learning, deployed either on their own or in combination, can account for the development of such safeguards. By contrast, we found no evidence of a third mechanism, moral persuasion, having any direct effect. In other words, US policymakers opt to introduce such safeguards either when they face pressure from other states, courts, or civil society that makes immediate action necessary or when they anticipate that not introducing them will, at a later date, result in prohibitively high costs. We did not find evidence of US policymakers establishing safeguards because they deemed them morally appropriate. From this we conclude that, although the emerging norm that states have extraterritorial (and not just domestic) human rights obligations may not have been internalized by key US policymakers, it nevertheless has a regulative effect on them insofar as the fact that relevant others believe in the norm restricts their leeway and influences their cost–benefit calculations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The use and exploration of outer space is, according to the Outer Space Treaty (OST), to be carried out for the benefit and interest of all parties. Outer space is critically important to the defence and national security interests of many nations, none more so than the United States. Over time, a significant space junk problem has emerged. There is growing recognition of this problem and reason to believe that it will only get worse if current activities continue. Space junk presents a threat to the national security interests and economic interests of spacefaring nations. Various solutions are being proposed and developed. This paper presents an economic perspective and, in a particular, a behavioural economics perspective, on the space junk and national security problem. As various potential technological solutions emerge, we are interested in the obstacles that may stand in the way of an optimal prioritisation of the alternatives. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Infrastructures are central to processes of state formation. The revival of materialism in International Relations has made an important contribution to our understanding of states through careful analysis of the politics of infrastructure and state building. Yet, to date, engagement with the state-theoretical tradition associated with the work of Antonio Gramsci, Nicos Poulantzas, and Bob Jessop has been absent. Through comparison with the external-relational ontology of Bruno Latour and actor-network theory (ANT), this article argues that state theory and its internal-relational ontology avoids reifying the state while providing an analysis of infrastructure and state formation sensitive to the historical reproduction of social orders over time. Developing Gramsci's concept of the 'integral state', it emphasises the necessary interpenetration between civil society, the state apparatus, and the creation of infrastructure. These conceptual arguments are illustrated through an analysis of the United States' development of nuclear infrastructures during the early Cold War period, in the internal relations between infrastructure and the integral state are explored through Civil Defense Education programmes. Clarifying the internal relations of past, present, and potential future forms of socio-technical order is an important task for rethinking the politics of technological design in International Relations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The state secrets privilege is the most formidable evidentiary privilege available to the United States government. Available only to the executive branch, it is used to protect national security information from disclosure during litigation, and is habitually acquiesced to by courts. Once invoked, the privilege prevents covered material from being put into evidence that touches sensitive matters of national security. It is apparent that this privilege is subject to abuse by the executive branch to shield activities and personnel from judicial scrutiny and legal inquiries for reasons other than to protect national security. The privilege derives from British and Scottish doctrines of Crown Privilege that allow government to withhold evidence from legal proceedings to protect the public interest. The derivation of the state secrets privilege from the tradition of Crown Privilege has never been thoroughly explored. This article traces the influence of Crown Privilege in the development and evolution of the state secrets doctrine in the United States. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

International economic regime has been interrupted by recent disputes involving national security exception under article XXI GATT. Along with the spirit behind the establishment of WTO, the Panel conclude that it has jurisdiction on the matter as well as the matter is justiciable. Nonetheless, this decision is opposed by two big economies, Russia and United States. Against this background, this research aim to consider whether this approach is justified from trade liberalization perspective using normative research method. Furthermore, it proceeds to analyze a proposal to build National Security Committee as solution to contemporary ineffectiveness of the implementation of WTO litigation process. This research shows that WTO's Panel approach to exercise its jurisdiction regarding the invocation of article XXI is indeed the best approach to protect a stable and predictable trading system. However, the establishment of National Security Committee will not resolve the enforcement problem of WTO's decision towards this matter. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This Comment argues that the U.S. restrictions on the export of semiconductors and other AI technology to China do not violate the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 (GATT 1994). Instead, such measures are legitimate expressions under GATT 1994's Article XXI national security exception, which allows a country to break other articles within the agreement if necessary to protect the country's essential national security interests. Given the national security risks associated with the rise of AI technology and the likelihood that such technology will be supplied to a military enterprise, the current trade restrictions qualify for the exception. However, this Comment ultimately argues that while valid under GATT 1994, these trade restrictions are not a permanent solution. Such trade restrictions hurt international trade agreements and multilateral trading systems and do not remedy national security concerns. Ultimately a multilateral agreement regarding the safe trade and use of AI technology is needed to relieve the national security risks and prevent future disruption to trade. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the shifting dynamics of industrial policy in the context of geopolitical tensions between the U.S. and China, examining whether national security concerns are driving this policy shift. Topics include the influence of climate policy on industrial policy, the impact of great-power competition on green technology development, and the implications of these changes for Global South countries' economic development.

As the United States has made great power competition a central tenet of its national security strategy, the primary mission of the U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF) has shifted from counterterrorism to great power competition accordingly. SOF's capabilities in the information domain, and its relationships with sub-state and non-state partners are major advantages in the "gray zone." Three branches of SOF are major actors operating in the gray zone: psychological operations forces that conduct information and psychological warfare in remote regions; civil affairs soldiers who gather intelligence and carry out influence operations in remote and politically sensitive regions; Special forces that motivate and advise local forces to conduct proxy operations for the United States. SOF's pivot to great power competition can threaten China's overseas interests, destabilize its periphery, and challenge its territorial integrity. In response, some Chinese private security companies (PSCs) are developing information capabilities and cultivating relationships with sub-state and non-state actors to compete for influence with SOF. The potential rivalry between SOF and Chinese PSCs may turn countries along the Belt and Road Initiative into playgrounds for great power competition and increase the possibility of armed conflicts between the two great powers. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

As China's ascendancy in Artificial Intelligence (AI) potentially surpasses that of the United States in specific dimensions, this research article critically assesses the existing and proposed AI policies of the United States, incorporating recommendations from the U.S. National Security Commission on AI (NSCAI). The research uses dual-scoring metrics based on the NSCAI-proposed AI stack and an original stakeholder metric to provide quantifiable variables to assess the potential impact of a policy, capturing feasible policy proposals. This analysis creates a practical tool for policy analysts and researchers to evaluate AI policies, which includes a tiered policy structure based on overall scores from the dualscoring metrics. Given the significance of AI in future national development, our model aims to aid policymakers in discerning the merit and feasibility of specific AI policies, thereby facilitating informed policymaking and development. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Although there is widespread agreement among U.S. experts that the United States must protect its technological advantage, there is disagreement about how best to do so. The related debate reveals tension between maintaining an unrestricted federally-funded research and development enterprise, on one hand, and countering foreign governments seeking to exploit it, on the other. Although lawyers have engaged with this debate in academic scholarship and in strategic ways like influencing national- level law and policy, legal practitioners have often been absent at the operational level. By way of facilitating such engagement, this Article provides a primer on National Security Decision Directive 189, an executive order issued in 1985 that established national policy favoring openness with respect to federally-funded fundamental research. The Article also considers the legal force the order continues to hold given recent legislative and executive action designed to strengthen the federally-funded research and development enterprise against foreign threats. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The United States, its Allies, partners, and other space powers are increasingly relying on dual-use satellites for national security and defense, raising questions about the implications for targeting such assets as part of current and future warfare. Three case studies of terrestrial attacks on dual-use targets extrapolate strategic, operational, and legal issues that could arise from attacks on dual-use satellites in space. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The COVID-19 pandemic has exposed some of the problems in the current pattern of global trade, particularly with respect to supply chain disruptions. To understand the current status of global trade, it is helpful to understand the confluence of four seemingly disparate developments: (1) Ricardo's theory of comparative advantage in the early 1800s; (2) the rebuilding in the late 40s and 50s of our former adversaries--Japan and Germany--into export based economies; (3) the modification of capitalism in the 1980s to focus upon maximizing shareholder value; and (4) the rise of China as an economic and military powerhouse, facilitated initially by a low-wage manufacturing base. Ricardo's concept of comparative advantage discusses: (1) how each country would be in a more advantageous position if it manufactured products that it is most efficient at producing, and (2) that allowing each country to specialize in the products it efficiently manufactures would be mutually beneficial to all countries involved when it comes to trade. However, disciples of Ricardo paid little attention to the two conditions that he articulated in order for his theory to work, both of which are no longer true today. Namely, that capital is loyal to the country of origin, and that currencies move to balance out trade deficits. With respect to maximizing shareholder value, this focus, coupled with cheap labor in China and other nations, led to American companies to outsource our manufacturing sector. The interests of other stakeholders, such as employees, customers, suppliers, and communities, were minimized. During the Bush 43 administration, the U.S. economy lost about 5 million manufacturing jobs, or about one third of the previous total. However, the major impetus for this blow to American workers came from President Clinton and his "free trade" philosophy, which led to the "most favored nation" status for China and, ultimately, the admission of China to the World Trade Organization. Unfortunately, China has never observed WTO principles regarding state-sponsored enterprises or policies against direct or indirect piracy of other countries' technology. Today, the United States has lost its dominance in manufacturing, private sector labor unions have been greatly diminished, the economic situation of the middle class has stagnated for 40 years, and America's free-market economic and political philosophy has led to governmenta impasse and rising inequality. China is now expected to supersede the United States as the world's number one economic power. This article asserts that, in order to provide high quality jobs for American workers, to protect American businesses against supply chain disruptions, and to ensure national security, the United States needs to adopt an industrial policy. Creating an industrial policy is something that many other advanced economies have already accomplished, as opposed to relying on the blind hand of the market to determine public policy. The mantra of free trade in the United States has hinged on giving away low-tech jobs and diverting our resources and workers into hightech jobs. Conversely, China does have an industrial policy, and it is determined to be a leader, not just in low-tech manufacturing, but also in high-tech industrial and military activities. Unless we focus our attention on maintaining a manufacturing base, we are going to be second to China in many high-tech industries, and from a military standpoint, will lose much of our leverage to ensure peace in the world. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The discourse around the bridging the gap debate is seen to a unique sub-set of the social sciences in the United States as applied to a unique American approach to security. This article looks beyond US National Security and the practices of the discipline of political science at US universities to address, and expand on, some specific ideas in Michael Desch's volume The Cult of the Irrelevant. We offer that an integrative assessment of how scholarly work can best inform security policies and practices requires more critical examination in four domains: consideration of how different disciplines frame key issues and speak to each other; understanding the dynamics of the policy marketplace; assessments to alternate ways to frame security and national security; and requirements to critical challenge the privilege academics have awarded themselves as the purveyors (and gatekeepers) of 'knowledge' and the 'truth'. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

As the United States has progressively become more involved globally since World War II, the U.S. military is being stretched beyond the professional military competency straining civilian control of the military. To remedy this, it is again time to revisit our national security structure, and adopt a General Staff in place of the Joint Staff. Following World War II and the destruction of the German General Staff by the Nazi Party, the General Staff as an institution has been emotionally rejected in the United States without a careful historical and legal examination of how that institution operates under varying forms of government and without an understanding of how it would operate under the United States' peculiar constitutional form of government. Exploring the historical and legal roots of the General Staff demonstrates that replacing the Joint Staff with a General Staff subordinated into the chain of command will act as a check on the ever-expanding influence of the military, while at the same time strengthening the military's ability to decisively defend U.S. national interests. Further, a General Staff will clarify the constitutional separation of military powers in a way that mitigates the politicizing effects of the separation of powers doctrine restoring balance to the constitutional division of military powers. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Journal of Political Sciences is the property of Republic of Iraq Ministry of Higher Education & Scientific Research (MOHESR) and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Wartime dominates the 21st century. The term is ubiquitous in contemporary politics, providing an intuitive trope for narrating foreign relations, grappling with intractable policy problems, and responding to shocking events. Such pervasion makes it easy to forget that wartime is a relatively recent political invention. It began as an instrumental and somewhat stylized concept that authorized exceptional violence by promising to contain it within strict temporal boundaries. Yet in the same era that wartime achieved international prominence, war itself became an increasingly ordinary and extended dimension of politics. Today, 'wartime' refers to a number of unconstrained and often self-perpetuating violent practices that have changed global politics and national security policies in deep and enduring ways – nowhere more so than in the United States. To introduce the special issue, this article presents wartime as a neglected and paradoxical topic at the heart of International Relations. It sketches the concept's historical emergence, from innovative Presidential discourse through expansion in World War II and the Cold War, to 21st century entrenchment in daily life and habits of foreign relations. We also make the case for why US wartime marks an especially apt example of a global phenomenon, and one worthy of increased scrutiny within International Relations (IR). Finally, we provide synoptic summaries of the articles that comprise the special issue, showing how they work together to interrogate key aspects of 21st century wartime. We conclude with reflections on how the study of wartime may be extended to better understand its impact on historical and contemporary global politics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A cacophony of protest greeted President Biden's withdrawal of U.S. forces from Afghanistan following a 20-year deployment, implemented and overseen by four different administrations, both Republican and Democrat. For all the criticism of the final withdrawal's implementation, however, strategic ambivalence was always present in U.S. operations in Afghanistan. The bi-partisan decisions that defined the Afghan mission can best be seen in the National Security Strategy documents produced by successive administrations as they sought to address the evolving situation on the ground and the perceived level of threat to the United States. The utilization of discourse analysis to examine these official policy documents allows for an understanding of the comparable attention that was paid to Afghanistan by successive administrations, as well as for an appreciation of the tone and language used regarding the nation. Doing so reveals that despite the duration of the mission and the associated costs, a deep-seated strategic ambiguity existed towards Afghanistan, as it languished as a sideshow for U.S. grand strategy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In recent years the United States has placed the Indo-Pacific at the centre of its foreign policy and national security strategy. While the Trump administration introduced the United States' first strategy for the Indo-Pacific, the administration fell short of implementing an effective policy that catered to the regional realities on the ground. The Biden administration has improved upon its predecessor's shortcomings in the diplomatic domain but has yet to implement a comprehensive economic strategy for the region. This article compares the distinctive diplomatic, economic and security characteristics of the Trump and the Biden administrations' Indo-Pacific strategies and argues that the latter administration crafted a more effective, albeit incomplete, strategy for advancing US interests. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The rhetoric leaders use to speak to domestic audiences about security is not simply bluster. Political agents rely upon stories of enmity and threat to represent what is happening in the international arena, to whom and why, in order to push national and international security policy agendas. They do so for the simple reason that a good story is a powerful political device. This article examines historical 'calls to arms' in the United States, based on insights from archival research at US presidential libraries and the United States National Archives. Drawing on narrative theory and political psychology, the article develops a new analytic framework to explain the political currency and staying power of hero–villain security narratives, which divide the world into opposing spheres of 'good' and 'evil'. Shifting the conceptual focus away from speakers and settings towards audience and affect, it argues that the resonance of hero–villain security narratives lies in the way their plot structure keeps the audience in suspense. Because they are consequential rhetorical tools that shape security policy practices, the stories political agents tell about security demand greater attention in the broader field of international security studies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Jones Act, which mandates that coastwise trade between points in the United States be conducted by U.S.-built and flagged vessels, is a controversial piece of legislation. The century-old Act reserves the construction, crewing, and operation of all vessels engaged in domestic oceangoing shipping for American nationals and companies, shutting out foreign competition and making it an important "Buy American" law to U.S. shipping interests. Those who have called for its abolition point out the higher shipping costs it imposes upon industries facing vessel shortages and outlying regions of the United States, like Puerto Rico and Alaska. Its defenders argue that it plays an important role in making U.S.-flagged sealift available in times of war and that the already-struggling American shipping sector would face collapse without protection from lower-cost foreign shipping. This Note argues that a compromise solution is possible: a limited and reasonable waiver process should be available on a showing of serious hull shortage. Burgeoning markets like offshore wind and liquefied natural gas should not be subject to years-long delays when specialized vessels to meet their needs are simply not available. The status quo does not serve the Jones Act's purpose in making vessels available for wartime sealift, and only serves to impose arbitrary costs on U.S. industry. Similarly, under the status quo, areas affected by natural disasters are subject to delays in critical aid supplies. A rational system for waivers, beyond the current requirement of necessity to national security, could meet these needs while still supporting the purposes of the Jones Act. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses how the mandatory technology readiness assessment (TRA) will allow the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) to successfully implement its middle tier of acquisition (MTA) programs to achieve the goals mandated by the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for fiscal year (FY) 2016. Other topics include the 2017 National Security Strategy of the U.S., and the challenges facing the DoD in program implementation like cost overruns and delays.

A new 'digital generation' of insider threat has emerged within the US intelligence community. Edward Snowden's mass leaks were not the first transparency-driven digital challenge to the United States Intelligence Community (USIC). Three years before, then U.S. Army Private Bradley Manning provided 500,000 classified documents to WikiLeaks, which published them to great fanfare for transparency advocates while causing much concern in Washington. These are not isolated cases; the tempo of such mass public disclosures seems to be increasing. In what ways is this new breed of insider threat akin tomore traditional counterintelligence breaches such as those of the Cold War? One central point of comparison is the relative damage caused by each, since it would be difficult to sustain the thesis that a new type of insidious threat has emerged if the damage caused bymass leaks was of little consequence when compared to traditional espionage cases. And 'damage' must be evaluated within the social history of the breaches themselves. A systematic approach to the comparison of breaches has remained elusive. This article offers such a framework using the Snowden leak as a case study in contemporary self-tasked digital breaches and the Cambridge Five spy ring as a case study in traditional externally-tasked breaches. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]