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The escalation of the Ukrainian crisis in February 2022 marked a new series of challenges for all key actors in international relations, including the states of the European Union. The largest EU countries France and Germany faced with a set of external and internal crisis phenomena chose different ways to build a strategy to overcome them. The German leadership attempted to use the Ukrainian crisis as a reason for launching previously postponed reforms in Germany and as a source of explanation for economic and social difficulties. Rising inflation, a reduction in industrial production from expensive energy resources, difficulties in migration policy and other problems were explained by Berlin as part of the price for the necessary support for Ukraine. At the same time, the reform of the Bundeswehr, which initially received broad public approval against the backdrop of the start of the Special military operation, faced criticism due to the half-heartedness of the proposed measures. As a result, the German government faced an unprecedentedly low approval rating for its performance, which only exacerbated Germany’s overall state of crisis. On the contrary, the French leadership, faced with a series of internal crises, the central plot of which was pension reform, chose not to tie them to the foreign policy dimension and, in particular, to the events in Ukraine. As a result, the French domestic political discussion did not become dependent on the logic of the development of the situation in Ukraine and was not radicalized at the expense of external participants. The difference in the choice of anti-crisis strategy has strengthened the contradictions within the Franco-German tandem as the economic and political core of the European Union.

October 7, 2023, the day of the Hamas extremist attack on Israel, marked the beginning of powerful upheavals in the Middle East region. They echoed in the form of large-scale demonstrations in many cities of the European Union and in the Euro-Atlantic countries, having a noticeable impact on the domestic political balance of power there. Having become one of the significant factors in changing the existing domestic political balances there, the Middle East upheavals noticeably affected the results of the elections to the European Parliament, as well as to the parliaments of France and Great Britain. The article focuses on the analysis of the impact of the Middle East events on what is happening in France. It is emphasized that for the first time since the time of de Gaulle, they led to a short-term crisis at the interstate level between France and Israel. The echo of the Middle East battles also resonated in the EU in the form of a surge in anti-Semitism, clearly manifested, in particular, in the anti-Israeli pogroms in Amsterdam on November 7, 2024. The author comes to the conclusion that under the influence of dramatic events in the Middle East, the alliance between Islamists and European left and far-left organizations is strengthening, which increases the likelihood of polarization and division of political elites there.

The authors analyse the beginning of a period of limited ability of France and Germany to act and the reasons for this. They present the distinguishing features of this period. The article is timely because the two countries are searching for a new, joint and more in-depth strategy for the future of the tandem. In the authors' view, this strategy will include a reform agenda for the European Union and will be based on a possible convergence of socio-economic models. The first part of the article «Macron’s autonomous initiatives and the Meseberg compromise» provides examples where President France has damaged the tandem’s search for a common strategy. Documents signed by the two governments in the areas of security, defence and ensuring the competitiveness of the EU during Macron's state visit to Germany are also analysed. The authors concluded that the partners allow a differentiation between their tasks in NATO and the Common Defence and Security Policy. In the second section, «The elections to the European Parliament and the dissolution of the National Assembly», the results were compared and their impact on the beginning of the period of limited capacity for action of France and Germany was shown. In the third section, «The elections to the National Assembly and their consequences», the authors draw attention to little-known facts and connections, including the help of some German parties in the formation of the «democratic coalition» in France. In the fourth section, «Signs of the period of limited capacity for action», seven signs were described. The authors believe that these signs mean that France and Germany should be deeply interested in normalizing cooperation with Russia. They also reflect on how partners intend to overcome asymmetry and objective differences and urge to monitor and analyse Franco-German tandem developments to clarify the resources necessary for the successful implementation of Russian national programs.

The article addresses internal political factors that may influence the search for a new common strategy for the Franco-German tandem. The relevance of the article is determined by the lack of alternatives for in-depth cooperation between partners, who are currently forced to develop a joint approach towards the EU reform and clarify the prospects for acceptable convergence of their own socio-economic models. The first part of the article (“France at a crossroads”) analyses the features of the modern development of France and draws a conclusion about the limited freedom of maneuver for President E. Macron to implement his declared reform program. The second part (“The Beginning of a New Transformation in Germany”) argues that Germany has entered a stage of large-scale transformations. Politicians and citizens do not know the completion dates of the transformations, the results and the amount of expenses. In the third part (“Strategic Seminar in Hamburg”) the authors show why France and Germany are returning to the concept of shared responsibility. They also reflect on how partners intend to overcome asymmetry and objective differences and urge to monitor and analyse Franco-German tandem developments to clarify the resources necessary for the successful implementation of Russian national programs and adjust the timing of their implementation.

The article examines the social schisms existing in French society and the impact that these divisions had on the social climate and political processes in the country. The factors contributing to the formation of these imbalances are analyzed. It is shown that although the ruling circles have smoothed out the social consequences of numerous extraordinary events that took place during Macron’s rule, they have not been able to mitigate the fundamental social divisions. The author comes to the conclusion that the abundance of deep social divisions in society leads to social instability, fragmentation of the political space and a significant increase in the influence of populist movements. Special attention is paid to the problems of increasing the degree of radicalism in the political arena and the degree of aggression and violence in society.

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This article covers the period of November 2023-June 2024 of the internal developments in Armenia, the foreign dynamics shaping the international relations of Armenia, the ongoing process of signing the Peace Agreement with Azerbaijan and the bilateral relations of Türkiye and Armenia in the light of the process of normalisation of their relations. The period under review has been a time frame where acts have been put into motion that can be qualified as a breaking or turning point both internally and externally. The administration of the Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan has undertaken some courageous and risky steps, breaking with established taboos. However, words and promises have not necessarily been carried out to deeds, at least not during the period under review. With a view to overcoming past bigoted concepts, the initiatives encouraged or condoned by the Pashinyan administration to make changes or amends in the Constitution, national hymn and symbols, school curriculum, and genocide narrative, which help cement the past and cause rupture with the present, has led to reactions. Internal reactions have come from partisans of the former government, extreme nationalists and most importantly the Church, while external reactions have come from the militant organizations of the Diaspora who perceive their survival and livelihood in provoking radical and militant nationalism, and third party states wishing to use this as a vehicle to put political pressure on Türkiye. On the other hand, Christian fundamentalism that appeared in the West has endeavored to project Armenians as a symbol of Christian solidarity, thus to base assistance to Armenia on ideological grounds. Some states, allowing the tail to wag the dog, have seen political advantages in fulfilling these initiatives and demands. Anachronistically and in total disregard of separation of church and state, the Apostolic Church of Armenia took the lead for the opposition in the person of an archbishop, who announced his candidacy for replacing Pashinyan as Prime Minister. The support of the diaspora in the West for the opposition continued undiminished, raising the spectre for the West, running with the hare and hunting with the hounds. Following the termination of the occupation of Karabakh, the major obstacle to achieving a lasting peace with Azerbaijan has been removed, limiting the issues for negotiations to border demarcation and transport connections and facilities. Türkiye has shown support for the negotiations. This has been confirmed during the period again at the highest level, in a communication between Turkish President Erdoğan and Prime Minister Pashinyan. Distancing itself from Russia to align with the West as Russia was not in a position to open a second front as the war with Ukraine was going on, Armenia has come to realize the necessity to normalize its relations with Türkiye, the neighbor to provide its connections with the West. Türkiye had been sincerely supporting the process of normalization of relations from early on. However, Türkiye has considered this in a regional perspective, to coincide with the normalization of Armenia's relations with Azerbaijan, within the regional stability with Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article covers the period of November 2023-May 2024 of the internal developments in Armenia, the foreign dynamics shaping the international relations of Armenia, the ongoing process of signing the Peace Agreement with Azebaijan and the bilateral relations of Turkiye and Armenia in the light of the process of normalisation of their relations. The period under review has been a time frame where acts have been put into motion that can be qualified as a breaking or turning point both internally and externally. The Nikol Pashinyan administration has undertaken some courageous and risky steps, breaking with established taboos. With a view to overcoming past bigoted concepts, the initiatives encouraged or condoned by the Pashinyan administration to make changes or amends in the Constitution, national hymn and symbols, school curriculum, and genocide narrative, which help cement the past and cause rupture with the present, has led to reactions. Internal reactions have come from partisans of the former government, extreme nationalists and most importantly the Church, while external reactions have come from the militant organizations of the Diaspora who perceive their survival and livelihood in provoking radical and militant nationalism, and third party states wishing to use this as a vehicle to put political pressure on Türkiye. On the other hand, Christian fundamentalism that appeared in the West has endeavored to project Armenians as a symbol of Christian solidarity, thus to base assistance to Armenia on ideological grounds. Some states, allowing the tail to wag the dog, have seen political advantages in fulfilling these initiatives and demands. Following the termination of the occupation of Karabakh, the major obstacle to achieving a lasting peace with Azerbaijan has been removed, limiting the issues for negotiations to border demarcation and transport connections and facilities. Distancing itself from Russia to align with the West as Russia was not in a position to open a second front as the war with Ukraine was going on, Armenia has come to realize the necessity to normalize its relations with Türkiye, the neighbor to provide its connections with the West. Türkiye had been sincerely supporting the process of normalization of relations from early on. However, Türkiye has considered this in a regional perspective, to coincide with the normalization of Armenia’s relations with Azerbaijan, within the regional stability with Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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Politicians and scholars generally agree that the UK’s withdrawal from the European Union (‘Brexit’) is a unique phenomenon caused by a specific combination of domestic political, economic and social factors, which cannot recur in any other EU country, at least in the foreseeable future. The paper challenges these assumptions by advancing two hypotheses. Firstly, the author argues that Eurosceptic sentiments are almost as common in France as they once were in the UK, and, secondly, that it exactly in France where the next referendum on membership in the European Union could take place. In order to support these hypotheses, in the first section the author examines the main causes and the background of Brexit. The author identifies four key factors: 1) growing discontent of the local population with social and economic issues, which the supporters of Brexit ascribed to the inflow of cheap labor from Eastern Europe; 2) concerns about the possibility of losing national sovereignty as the power of EU supranational bodies increases; 3) support for Brexit on the part of certain political elites; 4) post-imperial syndrome. The second section shows that similar objective trends and public sentiments are developing in France, although can take different forms. As in the UK, certain segments of the French population show growing concern about the prospect of losing national sovereignty given the country’s declining influence within the EU, and call to curb immigration (mainly from North Africa). Additionally, what makes France’s case really unique is that both rightand left-wing eurosceptics are consistently strengthening their influence in the Fifth Republic. All this imposes greater demands on the current president-euroenthusiast E. Macron: his failure may provoke a systemic crisis within the EU, which it might not endure.

L’Intelligence artificielle questionne la sémantique de corpus. En prenant en compte l’axe syntagmatique (CNN, convolution) et l’axe paradigmatique ou « rapport associatif » (RNN, transformer), l’architecture que nous présentons fournit une aide à l’interprétation, pour une sémantique de corpus augmentée. L’algorithme implémenté dans le logiciel Hyperbase est ici appliqué au corpus d’Emmanuel Macron (2017-2023), qui cultive, par son discours, la dimension thaumaturgique de son pouvoir : soigner, protéger, prendre soin

En el presente artículo analizamos el hiperliderazgo del reelegido presidente de la República Francesa, Emmanuel Macron, en su red social preeminente Instagram. Nuestro objetivo es demostrar la presencia de desplazamientos discursivos en el discurso político como consecuencia de la personalización, el enfoque sensacionalista de los medios y la desideologización de las audiencias. A partir de un corpus de 196 publicaciones y aplicando la metodología semiótica (Semprini, 1995), sociosemiótica (Kress y van Leeuwen, 2006) y el análisis textual del discurso (Gallardo, 2018) demostramos que el político se utiliza a sí mismo para construirse una determinada imagen de marca (self-branding) ante sus votantes-espectadores.

This article on Emmanuel Macron’s speech at his presidential meeting on April 2, 2022 at the Arena Paris Défense analyzes the various stage and rhetorical strategies used to captivate and engage the audience. Résumé Cet article sur le discours d’Emmanuel Macron, lors de son meeting présidentiel du 2 avril 2022 à l’Arena Paris Défense, analyse les diverses stratégies scéniques et rhétoriques utilisées pour captiver et faire adhérer l’auditoire. Mots-clés: meetings; analyse de discours; performance; éthos; super héros

The Russian invasion has profoundly changed major power relations in which Paris was actively involved to the benefit of the latter, mostly at three levels. The first level, probably the most significant in Macron's mind, is the European one. Not only did the economic and energy-related repercussions of the conflict put down the eternal German rival, shaken internally due to its historical ties with Moscow and not even sparing the European 'Mutti,' but Macron's France also had the incredible timing of the French Presidency of the Council of the EU to assert a certain French advantage in Europe, and over Germany. The EU seems no longer governed by a duumvirate; the French presidency has unprecedentedly reinforced the French leadership in Brussels, despite various visions of the war between Western and Eastern Europe. Better yet, Macron has finally been able to seize the opportunity and advocate for his dearest project of a 'European Defence.' Strategic areas for French-privileged diplomatic spheres remain at the second level. International consequences of the war have transformed the French project. On the one hand, it has been quite disappointing that few have correlated the end of the Barkhane operation in Sahel with the ongoing conflict in Caucasia. On the other hand, it is certainly impossible not to notice the renewed French diplomatic efforts with the Gulf States, clearly shifting in a direction different from the one prior to the war and in favour of a closer rapprochement with country leaders who are not properly aligned with the belligerents in the Ukraine war. Finally, the Ukrainian war has enabled Paris to revive its relations with Washington, not to mention an attempt to stand at the same power level. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article presents an analysis of the results of the parliamentary elections held in France in June 2022 and analyzes the program positions of the leading political forces of France that took part in them on pan-European topics. It is shown that the ruling coalition, which unites parties that were loyal to the incumbent President E. Macron, expressed full support for a united Europe in their election program. The coalition of leftists, socialists and environmentalists led by J.-L. Melenchon regarding the European Union is divided. Melenchon’s left-wing radicals took a rather critical position on this issue, while socialists and environmentalists remained moderately skeptical, generally supporting the need to preserve the European Union. M. Le Pen’s National Unification party was extremely disapproving of united Europe, but at the same time refused to form a coalition with the right-wing party of E. Zemmour, who was most negatively disposed towards the EU. It is noted that the 10 factions formed in the French Parliament following the results of these elections represent the entire spectrum of possible relations to the European Union: from full support to sharp denial, which will undoubtedly make it difficult for E. Macron to pursue a proEuropean policy based on the French parliament, which he constantly declares.

Copyright of Akofena is the property of Universite Felix Houphouet Boigny and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

During the 2022 presidential race in France, left-wing groups and leaders were systematically accused of "Islamo-leftism," by opponents, in other words of being complicit in what is generally described as a radical Islamist project that is endangering the French Republic. In recent years, accusations of "Islamo-leftism" against groups or individuals associated with the left wing of the political spectrum have become commonplace in France. This term, initially coined by Pierre-André Taguieff in 2002, has a broader history, stretching back to the Cold War and the Colonial Era. After discussing what the narrative of Islamo-leftism encompasses, the debates surrounding it, and its social functions, this article will explain how President Emmanuel Macron and his allies have used it to impede progressive forces from significantly mobilizing against Islamophobia [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In recent years, both inside and outside France, scholars and policymakers have emphasized a small and declining French influence on European politics and the political direction of the European Union (EU). By contrast, in 2022, at the end of President Emmanuel Macron's first term in office, the EU increasingly follows French preferences and ideas. We argue that this renewed French clout is due to the interplay of factors located at different levels of government: a centralized political system and careful preparation of policy objectives at the domestic level, together with a more balanced bilateral relationship with Germany and several exogenous shocks hitting the EU, enabled the French President to upload national policy priorities to the European level. We combine a longer-term perspective, which considers the formulation and pursuit of national strategies, with moments of crisis altering the EU's status quo and leading member states to promote change. We demonstrate France's influence on EU politics based on developments in three policy fields, namely fiscal policy, competition policy, and defense industrial policy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this article we aim to make an analysis of the public relations techniques used by Emmanuel Macron's staff in the presidential election of April 2024. We refer to the techniques of positioning distinct from the other competitors and especially from the competitor in the second round, Marine le Pen. We elucidate the context in which the campaign took place - the w ar i n U kraine and the French presidency of the European Council. We also reflected on President Macron's working visit to Romania and Moldova and the perception of its opportunity, including for personal image consolidation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Cet article explore les imaginaires sociaux autour de la technologie, en analysant les discours du président français Emmanuel Macron ayant pour thème l’innovation. L’objectif est de comprendre quelle place occupent l’innovation et la technologie dans l’imaginaire macronien. Nous montrons que les discours étudiés (période 2017-2021) sont traversés par une dimension de « nécessité » : l’innovation y est présentée comme un élément incontournable pour résoudre des problèmes de nature diverse. L’évocation de scénarios indésirables devient l’occasion pour réaffirmer la nécessité d’une accélération de l’innovation. En prônant une adaptation de la société à un certain modèle d’innovation, ces discours semblent renouveler le slogan thatchérien « TINA – there is no alternative ».

The novel Coronavirus is the most serious pandemic the world has faced in the last century. The political leaders have been forced to adapt their public discourse to this new situation and many have ended up communicating on social media on this subject on a daily basis. Twitter has become the social media platform the most frequently utilized for spreading information and keeping updates on the current worldwide issues and phenomena. This research focuses on the main topics of the French presidential online discourse during the COVID-19 pandemic. Using a multidisciplinary approach grounded in critical discourse analysis, it attempts to decipher the promoted social and political values behind the discourse. A total of 52 tweets of Macron’s tweets were collected from February 2021 to July 2021, and Foucauldian Discourse Analysis was applied to decoding the political strategies concerning the pandemic crisis, and their constructed meanings on social media.

Tohutō (macrons) or long vowels when used in te reo Māori assist with the correct pronunciation and spelling of words and in providing their meaning. When te reo is used in the formation of botanical names, the International Code of Nomenclature rules state that diacritical signs are to be transcribed into Latin letters; therefore, the long vowel 'ā' would become the double vowel 'aa'. Critique of 180 te reo botanical epithets used in the naming of the Aotearoa / New Zealand flora shows that 30 epithets are based on words with long vowels and in one case only has a double vowel replaced the tohutō. In 29 cases the tohutō has been replaced by a single vowel, with the potential to make the te reo epithet meaningless or with a different meaning from that intended. To ensure te reo words are treated appropriately in botanical nomenclature, it is recommended that tohutō are replaced with long vowels prior to being Latinised as nomenclatural epithets. A case study examines a proposal submitted to the International Botanical Congress to conserve 'Pomaderris kumarahou', based on the te reo vernacular name kūmarahou, as the correct name for P. kumeraho A.Cunn., whose possible meaning is considered vulgar. Tohutō are an important component of these names. The proposed name to be conserved 'P. kumarahou' has not used a long vowel to replace the tohutō, and the transcription of kūmarahou that reflects the Māori name would be 'kuumarahou'. The epithet P. kumeraho combines kūmera with ho, and if correctly transcribed would be kuumeraho. The suggested vulgar word kumeraho combines kume and raho, lacks tohutō, and following recommendations of the Māori Language Commission, can be spelt as kume raho. It is concluded the evidence presented in support of conserving the species epithet 'P. kumarahou' is insufficient. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]