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The central goal of description is to explore - that is to establish when, what, how and where something happened - and thereby prepare the groundwork explaining of why it happened. While social science methodology readily acknowledges this division of labor, it treats description as something without much structure that therefore cannot be as systematically evaluated as an explanation. This paper challenges this assumption by showing that description has a distinct structure that consists of five distinct elements: finding and recording of facts, selecting evidence, scaling, and reordering time and space. And given this structure, the quality of description can be evaluated just as systematically as the quality of explanations. The paper illustrates the elements of description and the criteria for its evaluation by drawing on the Goldhagen and Browning controversy from the late 1990s on what motivated ordinary Germans to participate in the Holocaust. This controversy is helpful because both scholars explored the very same documents but ended with very different analyses. The subsequent broader scholarly debate contained many interesting insights into the structure as well as quality of description that has broader implications for social science. In explicating these implications more fully, it is hoped that description will receive more systematic attention and will improve the development of testable hypotheses. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

this paper sketches a pragmatic analysis of diplomatic apologies and regrets. To conduct such a study, some points of Sil and Katzenstein's "analytic eclecticism" should be clarified. Adapting Railton's concept of "ideal explanatory text", the recent works by Førland, Van Bouwel and Weber help clarifying how various causal mechanisms may be complementary to the understanding of one specific problem: different frameworks of analysis are needed to answer different why-questions encompassed in this problem. Their works parallel Kurki's advocacy of a post-Humean conception of causation. These analyses will be presented and briefly applied to the study of diplomatic apologies and regrets, showing how liberalism, constructivism, game theory (and other theories) are complementary to understand such complex phenomena. The main purpose of this paper is to show why it is interesting to integrate Sil and Katzenstein analyses with Kurki, Førland, Van Bouwel and Weber's to conduct a problem-driven and complexity-sensitive research. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper proposes a partial reconciliation of realism, neoliberalism and constructivism by exploring the possibility of power optimization through combining hard power and soft power. The idea of soft power factors as phenomena which empower nations represents a significant break from a constructivist tradition that has tended to conceptualize such phenomena as being disempowering (i.e., serve to constrain the autonomy and actions of nations). Neoliberals too embrace soft power in a ways that emphasize restraint: i.e., an emphasis on cooperation for mutual gains and against concerns for relative power. It is argued that only through including such soft factors in a national power nexus can nations truly optimize their power. Indeed, strategies that do not embrace soft power elements, but rely exclusively on hard power, may very well have the counterproductive effect of weakening a nation. This "weakening effect" or "power curse" builds on the idea of "power illusion" (Gallarotti 2004). Hence, realism needs constructivism and neoliberalism for the realization of one of the fundamental goals it ascribes to nations: the optimization of national power. This paper proposes an intergrated paradigm which synthesizes these three paradigms with respect to power: Cosmopolitik. The logic herein is consistent with both relative and absolute power optimization. This reconciliation is carried out systematically and formally by developing the idea of soft power (Nye 2004) in a relational power context. Soft power is systematically analyzed as a manifestation of metapower. Developing the idea of soft power in this context leads to a conceptualization of the process of power illusion. Formally, both soft power and power illusion are modeled using portfolio diversification theory and a theory of optimal factor allocation in the production of influence. Moreover, the idea of empowerment through emulation is explored in the historical context of modern dollarization and late 19th century trade and monetary policy. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The proliferation of new institutionalist scholarship has, perhaps unremarkably, led to a corresponding proliferation in the adjectives used to characterise its variants. In 1984 James G. March and Johan P. Olsen spoke quite comfortably of the new institutionalism in the singular. By 1996 Peter A. Hall and Rosemary Taylor eventually settled on three new institutionalisms (having toyed, in earlier iterations of the same now classic article, with four). And by 1998 B. Guy Peters identified no less than seven new institutionalisms. Yet none of these authors made any reference to constructivism, far less to a distinctive constructivist variant of institutionalism in its own right. Indeed, until recently, there has been little if any reference to what is now variously described as an ideational, discursive or, as here, constructivist institutionalism. This is for three good reasons - constructivist institutionalism is by far the most recent addition to the family of institutionalisms, it arises out of an engagement with the limitations of the others, and, as a consequence and in contrast the others, it is still very much in its inception. It is, nonetheless already highly distinctive (ontologically, analytically and methodologically), and it poses a series of challenges to extant institutionalisms. The aim of this paper is quite simple - to outline the distinctiveness of constructivist institutionalism, to identify the nature of the challenge that it poses, and to discuss the problematic treatment of the concept of interests in constructivist institutionalist research to date. The paper proceeds in three sections. In the first, I consider the origins of constructivist institutionalism in the attempt to grapple with the limits of pre-existing institutionalist scholarship to deal with post-formative institutional change, particularly that associated with disequilibrium dynamics. In the second, I consider the ontological and analytical distinctiveness of constructivist institutionalism's turn to ideas and the associated nature of the challenge its poses to existing neo-institutionalist perspectives. In the third and concluding section, I establish the tendency of constructivist institutionalist research to fall back on an essentially materialist conception of self-interest, documenting the potential pitfalls of such a move. I argue that a more consistently constructivist perspective, which sees interests as social constructions, rather than as materially-given is in fact far better placed than any other variant of the new institutionalism to provide insights into the determinants of the rapid institutional and ideational change that other perspectives tend merely to endogenise. I illustrate this by showing how such a perspective might deal, rather differently than existing work, with the origins and rise of monetarism. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper explores the implications of constructivism for the growing literature that investigates the relationship between ethnic diversity and economic growth. Accepting that ethnic identities are multidimensional and situation-dependent has three principal consequences for studies in this area: it raises concerns about how a country?s ethnic diversity is measured; it introduces the possibility that a country?s diversity may be endogenous to its growth rate; and it suggests the need to be on the lookout for variables that affect both a country?s fractionalization and its economic performance. The paper identifies these potential pitfalls and assesses the extent to which they undermine existing estimates of the effects of diversity on growth. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Scholars of ethnopolitics generally agree that ethnopolitical identities are constructed and re-constructed through strategic choices in the course of social, economic and political interactions. This paper describes a dataset on ethnopolitical groups and cleavage patterns in Africa that is motivated by this combination of constructivist and rationalist approaches to ethnopolitics. The paper first clarifies the logic of ?constrained constructivism? and how it informed the theoretical foundation of the dataset and the methodology employed to specify 375 ethnopolitical groups at three levels of inclusiveness in 43 African countries. It then (a) presents comparative data on two measures of ethnopolitical cleavages at each of these levels? an index of ethnopolitical fragmentation and an index of ethnopolitical concentration ? derived from this dataset, (b) explains the conceptualization and calculation of these measures, and (c) elucidates, with illustrative examples, their theoretical implications and explanatory significance for comparative analysis. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Russia's national interests have not been defined on the basis of conventional cost-benefit assessments, perceptions of material threat, or the identities projected onto Russia by other countries. Aspirations to regain the international great power status that Russians believe their country enjoyed during the tsarist and Soviet past were critical to the creation of its present national identity and national security interests. This paper asks how Russian elites came to have these national interests in social competition for great power status. In trying to explain how national interests are created, I present a novel aspirational constructivist approach that draws heavily on social psychology to answer three fundamental questions: What are the sources of national identity? Why do multiple identities come into contention? How does one of these candidate national identities come to dominate the others and become "social fact," acting as "the" national identity that defines a country's core national interests? In developing the answers, we gain a better understanding of how foreign "others" enter into the definition of Russia's national identity and the formation of its interests. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Three currents in the political science literature propose hypotheses on policy learning. First, rational choice, in its purest version, treats beliefs as epiphenomena: beliefs are always subordinated to interests and change only when interests change. Second, and in a similar way, historical institutionalists relate beliefs to institutions and therefore consider changes in actors' beliefs most likely when institutions change. In both theoretical strands, rational choice and historical institutionalism, change is often related to sudden events that are external to the network of policy-making participants. Some rational choice and historical institutionalism, however, depart from the original forms, drawing from social psychology. Social psychology and recent constructivist perspectives have made significant contributions to knowledge about learning, offering an alternative to sudden external events to explain belief change. Unlike institutionalists, constructivists acknowledge the fluidity of relationships policy-making participants develop and sustain with other network actors outside the boundary provided by their organization. Unlike rational choice, social psychologists argue that beliefs are constructed through relationships among actors, influenced by norms of trust and deliberation. This paper tests these hypotheses with an online survey sent to individuals who participated in biotechnology policy development, in the human genetics and agri-food sectors, in four countries: the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom and France. Potential respondents were invited to participate in June 2006 and the survey was closed in December 2006. 270 individuals involved in human genetics and agri-food biotechnology policy development responded to the survey. The survey indicates that a significant proportion of policy-making participants have changed their beliefs. Learning, this analysis suggests, is most frequent among actors who belong to wide scope networks and who have a trusting attitude. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines three aspects of the political thought of Thrasymachus of Chalcedon -- his moral constructivism, critique of craft analogies of politics, and populist satire -- and the role they play in two varieties of democratic theory, Hobbesian radical democracy and Aristotelian democratic constitutionalism. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines public attitudes and participation in the Niger Delta of Nigeria, a major site of contentious ethnic mobilization and conflict. The data is drawn from three Afrobarometer surveys, providing a time series from a large and uniquely representative sample of citizens from the Delta region. There are three preliminary findings, based upon descriptive statistics and partial event analysis. The pattern of attitudes in Niger Delta, when situated within events, is consonant with constructivist accounts of identity formation. Subjective identities are volatile, and shifts in identity can be explained with reference to political opportunities and economic inducements. Second, with regard to the discourse of grievance in the Niger Delta, parochial ethnic identities are predominant, rather than an overarching regional identity. Ethnic identities are animated by a combination of political challenges and economic interests. Third, regime type does not adequately account for changes in identity and behavior. Democratic governance can reduce communal polarization when the political system furnishes desired collective goods. When citizens perceive that the system has failed to provide essential political or economic goods, they are more likely to gravitate to communal identities and to pursue contentious mobilization. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Political scientists, whether of a materialist or idealist bent, have usually treated rhetoric as epiphenomenal. More recently, constructivists have brought new attention to rhetoric as shaping political outcomes through the mechanism of persuasion. This paper suggests a new way of understanding the role of rhetoric in accounts of politics, as a form of coercion, and thus lays the groundwork for what we call ‘coercive constructivism’ in contrast to the Habermasian versions so popular today. We subsequently illustrate our model’s relevance through two ‘hard’ cases: (1) the efforts of Druse Arabs in Israel to garner full citizenship rights by framing them as the just desserts of their battlefield sacrifice, and (2) the campaign to forge an American commitment to the reconstruction of Europe after World War II by framing it as essential to the defense of ‘Western civilization.’ We maintain that these outcomes are not entirely explicable without close attention to the competing rhetorics put forward by the opposed parties and that our model of rhetorical coercion helps make sense of these puzzling and important cases. We contend that thinking about rhetoric in such terms avoids the naïveté of the Habermasian perspective, the crudeness of vulgar materialism, and the reductionism of ideational approaches. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, I begin the process of determining and explaining state death rates. Specifically, I present new data on conquest, union, disintegration, and collapse in Europe and the Middle East from 1800-1994 and test the ability of realist, liberal, and constructivist theories to explain historical trends in conquest rates. In doing so, I dispel two myths. First, contrary to the conventional wisdom, historical state death rates have been quite high. Second, contrary to liberal and constructivist claims, relative capabilities, polarity, great power decline, the offense-defense-deterrence balance, and prevailing economic technologies are better predictors of conquest than democratic, juridical, statist, or collective norms. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How can we explain an international agreement that fall outside of the win-set of one of the key players? This article surveys the US-EU Open Skies agreement signed in 2007 and asks why Europeans accepted the agreement after having rejected a comparable version three years earlier. Theoretical approaches that explain time inconsistency in international negotiations tend to focus on reasons why states can be constraint to accept suboptimal solutions. In multi-level bargaining, principal-agent theories focus on loss of control and constructivists suggest that governments can become trapped in rhetoric. This article shows that paradoxical agreements can be voluntary and explains them by adding a time dimension to classical multi-level bargaining analysis. In doing so, the case narrative thus provides an actor-centered account for the observation that flexible international agreements lead to greater commitment than rigid ones. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article examines the theories that the Realist, Liberal and Constructivist frameworks might offer to assess the probability of achieving Israeli-Palestinian peace. It discusses the Realist assumptions with regard to Israeli-Palestinian peace. It explains why Liberalism cannot determine whether and when there will be a peace agreement between Israelis and Palestinians. It relates the insight of Constructivism into the possibility of a two state solution, and the possible nature and timing of a peace agreement.

The article examines four different versions of constructivism that practicing scholars use. It provides an overview of the similarities and differences among the versions of constructivism. It relates the factors that scholars must consider in selecting a variant of constructivism. Information is presented on insight constructivism. It discusses how reality is perceived under the strong or complete constructivism. It describes the uncertain, indeterminate, agnostic or moderate constructivism. It examines policy constructivism.

The article emphasizes the importance of social facts in understanding the causes and consequences of capital mobility and highlights the impact of understanding the social context in which policymaking is situated. It explores the views about structure and agency within rationalism and constructivism. It describes the importance of the social context.

Political entrepreneurs reside at the core of constructivist theory. Structures might constrain agents, but entrepreneurs can remake and transform these structures, contesting norms, shifting identities and creating space for significant political change. Despite this, constructivists themselves note that key questions about entrepreneurs remain under-theorized. Under what conditions are political entrepreneurs likely to emerge? Who is likely to succeed as an entrepreneur, and how do entrepreneurs produce structural change? I argue constructivists could strengthen their answers to these questions by drawing from the growing program of social network theory. Using network analysis, constructivists can identify whether or not a political system is stable, or if conditions are ripe for entrepreneurs to emerge in international politics. Similarly, network position endows certain actors with resources, ideas and flexibility unavailable to others, and thus more power to effect change. Finally, network theory posits three structural mechanisms—mobilization, polarization, and yoking - to explain political change. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Over the past decade and a half, qualitative methods have been the subject of renewed analytical attention by researchers working within the field of international relations. In response to the frequent criticisms—from both within the paradigm and without—that they were only interested in metatheory, constructivists responded with a slew of empirical studies documenting the causal and constitutive role of norms and ideas. Ranging from process tracing to discourse analysis, almost all of these works employed qualitative methods exclusively. The relative success of constructivist labors to move beyond the initial philosophy of science debates that framed the paradigm have ensured that constructivism is now one of the primary approaches in IR. Yet amidst this mainstreaming of the "middle ground" as Emmanuel Adler presciently termed it, in one sense constructivists have effectively punted on the question of the ontological and epistemological importance of such concepts as the counter-factual nature of norms, the double-hermeneutic, and the reflexivity of all social actors. Emerging in International Relations (IR) from a protracted attack upon the unreconstructed positivism espoused by Waltzian neorealists and neoliberal institutionalists, constructivists argued for the primacy of ideas over material factors and interests in the international system. From its origins in work external to IR in the structurationist sociology of Giddens and the sociology of knowledge of Berger and Luckman, constructivism has always had a problematic relationship with positivism. It should thus come as something of a surprise that much work in contemporary constructivist theory advances a more traditional positivist methodology. In this essay I challenge the claims by many "liberal constructivists" that the Wendtian blend of scientific realist ontology and positivist epistemology is the best approach for the study of international politics. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Colin Crouch recently chided the proliferation of institutionalisms (e.g., historical, normative, ideational, discursive, constructivist) as a growing cottage industry more focused on creating intellectual fiefdoms than extending political theory. In this vein, we can assess the recent "constructivist institutionalism" developed by Colin Hay out of the ideational and discursive institutionalism efforts of himself, Mark Blyth,Vivian Schmidt, J.L. Campbell and Ove Pedersen. This constructivism reproduces all of the weaknesses of the sociology of knowledge without heeding the contributions of critical theory, poststructuralism, interpretivism (e.g., Mark Bevir), polycontexturality (e.g., Gunther Teubner) or recent economic theory. We are challenged to represent a polycontextural sense of complementarity: as a framework within which seemingly incommensurable and colliding discourses can be regulated if not reconciled (e.g., Robert Boyer). Beyond the constructivists' focus on policy-makers' application of ideas, there is a need to test the warranted assertions and truth claims inherent within the practices of an institutional regime or legacy, along with the institutionalizing trajectory. This is an unfolding of categorical analysis whose immanent predicate logic within a context of situated agency provides the basis for critique. A more critically oriented institutionalism journeys into the interior of institutions beyond "interestedness" toward "commitedness," toward the endogenous emergence of the argumentative logic of a mode of legitimation.There is a need to align institutionalist analysis with a theory of legitimation grounded in actors' valuation of what is right. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Despite the divide in ethical theorizing between deontological and consequentialist traditions, I argue that for most international relations scholars concerned with ethical argument, the deontological and the consequentialist concerns are intimately linked. One reason that many constructivist norms scholars have focused so clearly on careful empirical research is that we believe (at least implicitly) that we need to know something about the empirical consequences of norms in order to judge their ethical desirability. But we lack more explicit and systematic guidelines about how to link principles and consequences in ethical argument. My discussion examines related questions of consequences, comparison, and counterfactuals to try to offer some insights for normative thinking from the realm of empirical constructivism. I illustrate my arguments with reference to two current human rights issues: the debate over the U.S. use of torture and the debate over the impact of the increasing use of global human rights trials. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Is Kant's approach to moral and political judgment constructivist? John Rawls argues that constructivism is central feature of Kant's approach. According to this view, Kantian constructivism generates moral principles from a model that is drawn from a particular conception of the person in combination with a conception of the public role of moral precepts. Critics, including Onora O'Neill, Larry Krasnoff and Barbara Herman, object that Rawls's interpretation distorts various aspects of Kantian moral judgment. In particular, such critics argue that Kant's approach: (i) does not describe a particular conception of the person, but rather pictures individuals facing moral questions in the actual world; (ii) provides only a shared method for evaluating individual maxims, and not a method for identifying a shared set of principles; and (iii) focuses on the possible endorsement of maxims, not on the hypothetical choice of principles. I will argue that these three objections fail. The first objection reflects a misunderstanding of the role played by a conception of the person in a constructivist procedure; and the second and third objections reflect an unnecessarily constricted view of Kantian moral judgment. The constructivism of Kant's approach, moreover, reflects Kant's commitment to clarity in moral argument. The clearly defined structure of moral argument and the transparency that such a structure produces are designed to ensure that the reasoning is accessible and to lay the contents of the arguments open to critical review. I will argue that this commitment to clarity, combined with the approach's implicit commitment to intersubjective justification of moral and political judgments, constitutes a particular virtue for an account of political reasoning for societies characterized by pluralistic disagreement. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The notion that important elements of political action may be "socially constructed" has received growing attention in political science since the 1980s. Meta-theorizing and empirical work on culture, ideas, norms, and identity has garnered increasing space in top journals. "Constructivist" theorists of various types have won book contracts from university presses and faculty positions at prestigious universities. Despite rising recognition of ideational or constructivist scholarship, however, its status in the discipline remains ambiguous. Instances where empirical claims by non-ideational theorists entertain ideational alternative explanations are the tiny exception rather than the rule. Empirical ideational arguments, by contrast, still achieve high-level mainstream publication only given elaborate and explicit competition with non-ideational claims. Much of their apparent rise has also come not in old mainstream venues, but in the emergence of newer journals which are less insistent that constructivists engage elaborate contests with non-ideational theories along orthodox methodological lines. This is probably a typical pattern for new schools of thought that attempt over decades to be admitted to central disciplinary debates (at least in the post-1945 world of proliferating journals). But if we turn from publication patterns to the internal logic of competition between ideational and non-ideational scholarship, it becomes clear that we are not just looking at the slow movement of a new approach into mainstream debates. On both sides of this line-and especially amongst constructivists themselves-we find scholars arguing that the appropriate end-result will not be engagement and competition but the consolidation of separate-but-equal realms of inquiry.Two related notions suggest that constructivists and non-constructivists are most interested in distinct discussions. The first traces most famously to Max Weber, who taught that arguments that invoke meaning engage something other than explanation. Weber posited a difference between an argument's "adequacy on a causal level"-its explanatory force-and the kind of understanding, or "adequacy on the level of meaning," to which ideational scholarship aspires. He thought we could capture causality in action (being confident that under certain conditions, certain people would do certain things) without understanding the significance of what people were doing as they saw it. Later scholars expanded on Weber to put ideational work in its own interpretive or "hermeneutic" category, setting it off from the causal dynamics that non-ideational explanations of action ostensibly share with the natural sciences.This move is tied to the notion that much ideational scholarship asks "how" or "what" questions in a "constitutive" mode, creating a division of labor with the "why" questions posed by explanatory work. Culture, norms, ideas, identities, and other socially-constructed elements define certain realities and imbue them with meaning in inseparably constitutive ways. Explanatory scholarship plays out the more mechanistic causal workings within that context. We need constitutive scholarship, for example, to see how the norm of sovereignty constitutes the state. In constructivist claims this is not a separable, temporally-sequential, causal-explanatory relationship. The very minute that people accepted norms of sovereignty they looked around and saw states. Explanatory approaches can analyze cause and effect dynamics within that socially-constructed reality.This article argues that neither rationale for separate realms of inquiry stands up to scrutiny. Weber created the "understanding" category by defining explanation as a purely correlational exercise... ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

x ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We develop a framework that explains the choice of institutions to address international cooperation problems. We begin with boundedly rational actors who make institutional choices based on the properties of the cooperation problem they face and the menu of international institutions available to them. If the institutional status quo offers an appropriate venue for the prevailing cooperation problem, then actors will either use a focal institution or select a readily available alternative; if no suitable venue is available in the institutional status quo then costlier and riskier strategies of institutional change and creation will be pursued. The framework further allows us to incorporate international organizations as actors affecting the choice menu of states, to combine elements of rationalist and constructivist instructional accounts, and to address distributional and power considerations inherent to the choice of international institutions. A set of empirical articles follow and build on this framework to advances our understanding of the choice of institutions in different international issues. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Presents an argument to support a claim that ancient Greek historian Thucydides is not a realist but a constructivist. Nature of political culture demonstrated by his work; Aspects of Thucydide's book "The Peloponnesian War" which makes it as constructivist work; Views of Thucydides on Hellenic culture.

In this study we examine the capacity of competing international relations theories to explain the quality of relations that develops between allied former military rivals. Consideration is given to explanations derived from neoliberal institutionalism and constructivism as well as to our proposed alternative realist-based model. We argue that alignment interconnections best capture and explain variations in cooperative relations overtime and ultimately the quality of peace that results between allied former rivals. Alignment interconnections render relations within a former rival dyad a function of their relations to a common third party security provider as much as to their shared or competing bilateral interests. In an effort to test these competing arguments, we examine the case of Greece and Turkey. Through an investigation of various episodes of cooperation and non-cooperation since 1955 we found in general that cooperation tended to occur when mutual abandonment fears were high and complex abandonment fears were low or when alternative exit options were limited. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Combines the insights of constructivist theory with the growing recognition that ideologies are important to the constitution and behavior of U.S. political parties. Assessment of the connections between ideology and foreign policy, parties and foreign policy and partisanship and ideology in the U.S.; Theoretical implications of the growing ideological partisanship in the U.S.; Suggestions of the terms ideology and worldview.

There is an abundant literature on globalization and the state, with particular attention paid to whether the state is being undermined by globalization. Yet in much of this literature, there is minimal attention paid to adopting and articulating a theoretically strong, analytically nuanced, theory of the state. Globalization scholars need to adopt more articulate theories of the state in order to more fruitfully address the important questions of the state and globalization. Two examples of state theory, constructivism and pluralism, are applied to the question of globalization and the state here, with the hope that the divergence and nuance that result in such preliminary pairings will encourage more careful attention to state theory in future work on globalization. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]