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Within the EU-China strategic partnership, signed in 2003, closer security cooperation is envisaged, but progress in this field has been little in this field. If the two security strategies - the ESS and the Chinese Paper on the New Security Concept, as well as the papers of the three major Member States of the EU, are compared, a lot of common terminology can be found.However, the connotation of these terms differ due to the differences in paradigms regarding the nature of governance of their national entities and of the international system, including the role for the US. Cooperation will therefore be most likely in the new fields of security cooperation such as pandemics, environmental threats and disaster relief. Based on this analysis, the paper will outline the opportunities and limits for EU-China security cooperation, in particular in an US-China-EU triangle ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper presents a heuristic model for the international development of nonproliferation education programs. The paper draws on the examples of five nonproliferation education programs at U.S. universities, plus a program currently being developed at Fudan University in Shanghai, China. Three phases of the developmental process are studied for both international and domestic programs: program development, curriculum development, and sustainability. Lessons learned from each of the three phases are combined into a developmental model, intended to serve as a guide to the further development of these programs by practitioners. The factors that contribute to program development, where the focus is on creating a viable institution of learning, are much the same for domestic and international programs alike. The factors that contribute to curriculum development are different for domestic and international programs. For domestic programs, the locus of development is the organization. For international programs, the center of gravity is a collaborative network. In the latter, the central challenge is maintaining the commitment of multiple participants, all in the pursuit of a shared intellectual enterprise. As a curriculum matures and comes to be recognized as the hallmark of a program, the need for a robust international collaborative network diminishes. Domestic and international programs eventually converge in their developmental paths, with each facing similar sustainability issues. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper explores contemporary multilayered processes and the gradual development of shared norms, principles, and targets with regard to energy security among China, Japan and the United States, at both the bilateral and multilateral level, behind a seemingly worsening energy rivalry. It examines the degree to which the three powers have acquired knowledge of multiple aspects of energy security, yet still found common interests―for instance the diversification of energy sources and energy conservation―, and its implication for the future regional cooperation, regardless of their independent national energy strategies.Against the backdrop of widespread “resource nationalism” in major supplying countries and growing global concerns about the availability of hydrocarbon resources and volatile energy markets, it can be hypothesized that China, Japan, and the United States―three big energy consumers― would increasingly find grounds for cooperation simultaneously while they compete for energy equities in some cases. For example, technology transfers in the fields of energy conservation and environmentally-friendly use of energy have become one of mushrooming industries in Sino-Japanese business despite the virtually deadlocked East China Sea dispute. The United States and China have begun talks on the promotion of ethanol production, clean use of coal for power generation, technological assistance for nuclear power plant, etc. Energy dialogues among the three countries have also been bolstered by various multilateral frameworks, including the Asia-Pacific Partnership since June 2004 and the annual meeting of five energy ministers, involving India and South Korea since December 2006.Policymakers and scholars have debated whether the rise of China will pose a threat and destabilize the power configurations of the Asia-Pacific. (Neo-)realists assume that the increase in material capabilities would enable Beijing to seek hegemonic power more vigorously: a geopolitical zero-sum game would be likely to escalate between China on the one hand and Japan and the United States on the other. Neoliberal institutionalists suppose that establishing some form of institutional structure would ameliorate conflicts of material interests, leading to a positive-sum game.The author sheds light on the social construction process of ideas at both diplomatic and energy experts’ levels in the three countries, implying that reckless competition over energy resources would lead only to the advantage of supplying countries and cooperation would more effectively serve energy security as a whole. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper will address the following provocative puzzle: Why has China chosen to assure Southeast Asian countries during the past decade? Will China adhere to this assurance strategy in the coming decade? The author develops a dual pressure model to explain China’s assurance policy. This dual pressure model maintains that U.S. dominance and China’s domestic priorities have combined to compel China to assure its Southeast Asian neighbors. In the shadow of U.S. dominance, a rising China has no other choice but to assure its neighbors to alleviate strategic pressures against it. The assurance policy not only sends benign signals to the U.S., but also neutralizes China’s neighbors in the case of U.S. containment of China. At the domestic level, China’s top priorities lie in preventing Taiwan’s declaration of de jure independence and in maintaining social stability in the process of social transformation. These tremendous tasks require the cooperation of China’s neighbors. Therefore, it is in line with China’s interests to follow a policy of good-neighborliness and friendship. Based on the dual pressure model, the author is confident in predicting that China will continue to assure its Southeast Asian neighbors to foster an amicable, peaceful and prosperous neighborhood in the coming decade. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

China?s impressive economic growth has led to a surge in energy consumption, increasing Chinese dependence on foreign energy resources. US policy analysts disagree over whether China?s increasing dependence on international energy markets conflicts with US energy security interests. Thus far, these debates are occurring within the policy sphere and are not theoretically informed; this paper will improve on those debates by analyzing the energy issue against the backdrop of international relations theory. We argue that the security dilemma best models the emerging energy situation ? although both China and the United States are defensive status quo actors, uncertainty over one another?s intentions may lead to unwanted conflict. Recognizing the presence of security dilemma dynamics is critical for correctly determining which policy actions are most likely to lead to a cooperative outcome. The US must recognize that China is a status quo actor and follow a strategy of reassurance. If the US mistakenly treats China as a revisionist actor in the energy sphere, this may verify Chinese fears of US intentions and trigger avoidable spirals of Sino-US conflict. Maintaining US-China cooperation in the energy sphere is crucial because both the US and China view energy policy as an issue of national security. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

That China has been politically and economically playing an important role in the world has great impact to regions all over the world, especially in East Asia. After the Cold War, Japan has gradually walked out of its past "one nation pacifism," actively participating in the international affairs under frameworks of "U.S.-Japan alliance" and the U.N. It is to fulfill its dream of becoming a "political great power." Therefore, Japan has also been playing an important role in the regional issues. On November 2002, North Korea decided to reactivate its uranium-enriching program. It has raised the tension in the region of East Asia; it has also disturbed international relations in the region. The U.S. expects China and Japan, two great powers in the Northeast Asia, intervene in the North Korea problem, hoping to solve the problem with multi-literal agreement. Can the North Korea nuclear crisis shorten the diplomatic distance between China and Japan, establishing the "military strategic partnership," or showing the radical paradox between the two countries? Examining interactions between China and Japan in the North Korea nuclear crisis can clarify the thinking of two countries' regional strategies and benefits of competition and cooperation in politic, security, and economy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the effect of the increasing economic interdependence on the U.S.-China bilateral relationship since 1978. It argues that as dyadic trade interdependence increases, it is less likely that there will be high-grade conflict, which includes actions such as ending a diplomatic relationship or using military force. It explores the relationship between trade interdependence and conflict. It examines the impact of trade interdependence and dependence on cooperation.

How can the United States promote effective multilateral cooperation in a unipolar world? More specifically, how can the United States enlist the active cooperation of rising major powers such as China and Russia? The paper’s goal is to introduce an approach to promoting multilateral cooperative international order that does not rely on shared institutional affiliation, commitment to liberal democratic norms, or the logic of economic interdependence. Our approach emphasizes states’ quest for a positive international identity and, more specifically, the influence of status and prestige concerns on their foreign policies. We argue that, properly channeled and adequately recognized, rising states’ concerns for international prestige and status can motivate them to contribute to the dominant power’s global governance project and world order. Our argument is illustrated by parallel case studies of the extent to which Russia and China have cooperated in multilateral efforts. The results indicate that both countries are more likely to cooperate if treated with respect and accorded a distinctive role that recognizes their incipient great power status. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]