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Growing demand for natural resources has become an issue of primary importance in China's foreign policy, and has led many observers to argue that conflict with the United States and other states in Asia is growing more likely. This paper evaluates the historical record on that question: under what circumstances have the resource needs of previous rising powers led to conflict with other states? I propose two independent variables: the ability to extract natural resources at home and the openness of the international trade system. In cases where the rising power has a large domestic resource base, and can supplement domestic production with easy access to foreign resources through trade, rising powers are less likely to generate conflict. In situations where the rising power has a limited resource base at home and the international trade system is closed, on the other hand, are more likely to lead to war. The paper evaluates three cases. For the United States in the late 19th century, massive domestic reserves and the first great era of globalization led to a "peaceful" rise. For Japan in the 1930s, an extremely poor resource base and rising trade barriers contributed to conflict. Finally, the paper turns its attention to China and argues that this important contemporary case more closely resembles the rise of the United States than that of Japan. China's domestic resource base remains quite large, and the international trade system is unprecedented in its level of openness. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study on Japan's informal political actors and networks will not only provide a foundation for us to further understand Japanese politics and foreign policy but will also enable us to get a better idea of how networks function in a larger context, namely between Tokyo, Beijing and Washington. Social network is not only an important part of Japanese policy making but also a crucial factor in the China-Japan-U.S. triangular relationship. Instead of providing equal attention to each parties of this triangle, this paper will focus on Japan's informal political actors and networks by examining the process of normalization in its relations with China. In addition to detailed analysis of political actors in Japanese politics and society, it also provides an account of Beijing's reaction in this significant process. In the concluding part, this paper also provides some preliminary analysis in making international comparisons particularly with the United States. Thus, it will also assist us in understanding the networks between the three powers in the Asia-Pacific region. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

After fifty years of Cold War division, East Asia has gained greater coherence and substance as an emerging economic, even political, entity. This paper examines the role of hegemony in East Asia’s ongoing post-Cold War reorganization. In particular, where the US and Japan once claimed much of East Asia?s economic and political attention, long-term trends suggest an ongoing reorientation on the part of East Asian states around China?s growing economic and political presence and that China will increasingly become the center of gravity for East Asia I focus on the US, Japan, and China as the three powers that have or are most likely to assume the hegemonic organizing role detailed in international relations theory. The paper examines these major powers, with a particular focus on their shifting relations with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Though a coalition of weaker powers, ASEAN has played an important, if not unusual, role in defining and at times, leading regional processes. This was especially the case for much of the 1990s; however, financial crises, as well as ASEAN?s political and economic limitations, have also forced the organization to look outside itself for additional economic and political leadership. The paper begins with a brief discussion of the 1990-1997 period, a period characterized by much uncertainty about the post-Cold War priorities and policies of major powers. In particular, I describe how the United States as retrenching hegemon, Japan as reluctant hegemon, and China as rising hegemon set the stage for new thinking about intra-East Asian relations. Their shifting relations underscore political and economic interdependencies between Northeast and Southeast Asia that had been less apparent during much of the Cold War. It is during this period that we find ASEAN playing the important role of facilitator in negotiating changing relations. The second part of the paper then turns to a discussion of developments since 1997, addressing the roles played by 1) the 1997-9 financial crisis and 2) the US war on terrorism in shaping East Asia’s reorganization. This period is characterized by notable Chinese activity and Beijing?s intensified engagement of Southeast Asian states, individually and collectively. Taken together, the paper shows that major powers have shaped in critical ways the contours and organization of an evolving East Asia. East Asia has become more organized ? formally and informally, politically and economically ? but thus far, that process has been defined more by market forces and competitive dynamics between the major powers. In other words, if East Asia is becoming more coherent and organized, it is becoming so more by accident than necessarily by hegemonic design. Recent Chinese policies suggest that China may wish to assume a larger leadership role; however, the question remains whether the United States or Japan would accept China in such a role. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

With the increasing economic and strategic clout of China and the vulnerability of the American power in the Gulf, the US policy makers are searching for a new strategy in the Asia Pacific region. Their ultimate purpose is to neutralize the preeminence of China.Pentagon is trying to forge a new alliance of three well-established democracies-US,India and Japan. On April 16,2007 all the three nations began a joint military drill in the Pacific. More or less at the same time, the first India-US Defence Joint Working Group met in New Delhi.These two develpments have certainly raised the temperature in Beizing.Recently China has raised its defence budget by 17.8 percent and successfully tested its antisatellite ballistic missile.No doubt the Pacific military exercise by US, India and Japan has been taken as an alarming signal by China.The proposed paper will try to explore the evolving strategy of the US in the Asia Pacific region.One has to explore as to what extent such a three nation joint exercise is addressing the unprecedented rise of China in the politico-economic and strategic affaires of the region. We will also examine as to how far the existing American policy of strategic engagement with China is being reexamined. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper explores contemporary multilayered processes and the gradual development of shared norms, principles, and targets with regard to energy security among China, Japan and the United States, at both the bilateral and multilateral level, behind a seemingly worsening energy rivalry. It examines the degree to which the three powers have acquired knowledge of multiple aspects of energy security, yet still found common interests―for instance the diversification of energy sources and energy conservation―, and its implication for the future regional cooperation, regardless of their independent national energy strategies.Against the backdrop of widespread “resource nationalism” in major supplying countries and growing global concerns about the availability of hydrocarbon resources and volatile energy markets, it can be hypothesized that China, Japan, and the United States―three big energy consumers― would increasingly find grounds for cooperation simultaneously while they compete for energy equities in some cases. For example, technology transfers in the fields of energy conservation and environmentally-friendly use of energy have become one of mushrooming industries in Sino-Japanese business despite the virtually deadlocked East China Sea dispute. The United States and China have begun talks on the promotion of ethanol production, clean use of coal for power generation, technological assistance for nuclear power plant, etc. Energy dialogues among the three countries have also been bolstered by various multilateral frameworks, including the Asia-Pacific Partnership since June 2004 and the annual meeting of five energy ministers, involving India and South Korea since December 2006.Policymakers and scholars have debated whether the rise of China will pose a threat and destabilize the power configurations of the Asia-Pacific. (Neo-)realists assume that the increase in material capabilities would enable Beijing to seek hegemonic power more vigorously: a geopolitical zero-sum game would be likely to escalate between China on the one hand and Japan and the United States on the other. Neoliberal institutionalists suppose that establishing some form of institutional structure would ameliorate conflicts of material interests, leading to a positive-sum game.The author sheds light on the social construction process of ideas at both diplomatic and energy experts’ levels in the three countries, implying that reckless competition over energy resources would lead only to the advantage of supplying countries and cooperation would more effectively serve energy security as a whole. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the role of the United States in Sino-Japanese relations since the end of World War II. Special emphasis is placed on three major debates between China and Japan where the American role appears to have been critical: (1) the history issue; (2) the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute; and (3) the Taiwan issue. The central argument is that a series of institutional innovations, in Sino-Japanese relations introduced by the United States after the end of World War II, reinforced the U.S. alliance with Japan, and often rather indirectly accounts for the continuing tense relations between China and Japan. These developments, including the Tokyo War Crime Trials, the San Francisco Peace Treaty in 1951, the Okinawa reversion treaty in 1971, and the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, have had a major influence on Sino-Japanese relations that endures today. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses Pax Americana II, the period after the Cold War, and the strategic choices of Japan. It states that the transformation of the international system from bipolar to unipolar results in a more assertive U.S. policy. It cites the decision of the U.S. government to restore its alliance with Japan and initiate talks with China to prevent the financial market crisis. It offers an overview of the defense policy of the Japanese government.

That China has been politically and economically playing an important role in the world has great impact to regions all over the world, especially in East Asia. After the Cold War, Japan has gradually walked out of its past "one nation pacifism," actively participating in the international affairs under frameworks of "U.S.-Japan alliance" and the U.N. It is to fulfill its dream of becoming a "political great power." Therefore, Japan has also been playing an important role in the regional issues. On November 2002, North Korea decided to reactivate its uranium-enriching program. It has raised the tension in the region of East Asia; it has also disturbed international relations in the region. The U.S. expects China and Japan, two great powers in the Northeast Asia, intervene in the North Korea problem, hoping to solve the problem with multi-literal agreement. Can the North Korea nuclear crisis shorten the diplomatic distance between China and Japan, establishing the "military strategic partnership," or showing the radical paradox between the two countries? Examining interactions between China and Japan in the North Korea nuclear crisis can clarify the thinking of two countries' regional strategies and benefits of competition and cooperation in politic, security, and economy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

As a rising, regional, and very influential power, China is in the process of buttressing its military forces in the Pacific rim. Realist theory predicts a growing regional and international power, such as China, will more likely be propelled to attain regional hegemony. As the only superpower today, however, the United States will hardly relinquish its naval dominance in the Pacific. The balancing act Washington must pursue?in order to create a successful counterbalance against potential Chinese naval hostility?is to strengthen ties with United States allies in the Pacific region who may not feel comfortable with Beijing?s military presence expanding throughout the Pacific rim. Washington has recently begun to strengthen its military ties with Tokyo, and has started to encourage Japan to invest more in its military infrastructure. Japan, leery of its uneasy relationship with China, has made overtures to Washington as well. The difficulty for the White House, however, lies in crafting a relationship with Japan that is not simply seen to be some sort of anti-Chinese bloc. While it may be tempting for some in the Pentagon to forge a military relationship with Japan built on the premise that China?s military rise is harmful to both U.S. and Japanese interests in the Pacific rim, this paper will argue that a stronger Washington?Tokyo bond should attempt to establish a more cooperative relationship with Beijing rather than try to contain China?s influence throughout the region, which, for all intents and purposes, is inevitable. Although establishing a cooperative relationship will not be easy among the United States, Japan, and China, it is certainly a crucial project that will require great perseverance in order to lay the foundations for a more prosperous relationship advantageous to all three nations, as well as to the rest of the world. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

South Korea?s international position is a complex mix of pressures. Focused overwhelmingly on the last vestige of the Cold War ? its unresolved division of the peninsula into North and South ? South Korea must also manage its alliance with the United States, devise a modus vivendi with a massive and dynamic China, and resolve its relationship with Japan. To that end, over the past decade, a fairly clear South Korean grand strategy has emerged, one that emphasizes economic over military issues, accommodation rather than confrontation of China, and a slowly evolving alliance with the United States. The centerpiece of this grand strategy has been a strategy of engaging North Korea economically while downplaying the nuclear issue. This paper will make three main points. First, in terms of overall national security strategy, South Korea has committed itself to a strategy of interdependence and engagement with North Korea. As a result, South Korea?s engagement strategy will continue to have consequences for regional policy toward North Korea, for the U.S. role in the region, and for China?s influence. Second, South Korea?s development has depended on being deeply engaged in the regional and global economy, and this orientation has actually increased in the wake of the Asian financial crisis a decade ago. Indeed, South Korea ? as with many East Asian states ? has increasingly begun to look regionally for its economic partners, especially to China, and away from the United States. Third, South Korea firmly desires to continue its close relationship with the United States. However, South Korea?s national priorities are regional, and differ from Washington?s global priorities. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Exchange rate policy cannot be modeled as a simple product of domestic politics, as Jeff Frieden does in his recent work on this topic. Countries deciding whether or not to go on or off the gold standard may have been able to make these decisions separately based on domestic politics, without coordination or bargaining, and small countries may still be able to do so with regard to the dollar or euro in today's monetary regime. But big countries, including the United States, cannot make exchange rate policy on their own. It takes two to float, by which I mean that it is more accurate to model exchange rate policy as a two-level game in which two partners each seek an exchange rate regime and level that reflects domestic political interests and institutions, with the outcome determined by bargaining. The United States cannot make a decision to float vis-a-vis the renminbi without China going along. Japan has learned that it cannot devalue the yen without the United States blessing this policy. The paper lays out the two-level logic of exchange rate bargaining and illustrates it by examining several cases of United States - Asia exchange rate bargaining, including US-Japan since 1980 and US-China since 2000. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines China's changing perspectives on the evolving U.S.-Japan alliance from both the hard and soft power angles. Four sets of considerations affect how Beijing views the alliance. The first has to do with the alliance's scope and missions. While Beijing tacitly acknowledges the alliance's role in preventing Japanese re-militarization, it now sees it as an instrument for sustaining U.S. hegemony in the region beyond its original, limited missions of defending Japan. Second, China considers the U.S.-Japan alliance increasingly as a convenient cover for Tokyo to pursue ~ normal state ~ status, including the strengthening of the Japanese Self-Defense Forces (JSDF) and the dispatch of JSDF personnel overseas. A politically ambitious, militarily assertive, and economically strong Japan poses a serious challenge for China and for the region given the historical past and ongoing territorial disputes between Japan and its neighbors. Third, Beijing has serious concerns about the alliance's potential interference in what it considers as its domestic affairs, namely, the Taiwan issue. Finally, Chinese perspectives on the U.S.-Japan alliance must also be put in the broad contexts of the evolving and complex Sino-U.S. and Sino-Japanese relations. Stable and better relationships could mitigate the potentially negative impact of the alliance on China while tension and deterioration of ties heighten Beijing's concerns and worse-case assessments. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

ABSTRACT #1Japan's Post-Mahanian Maritime StrategyThis paper will assess the dynamics of maritime security in Northeast Asia using the theories of Alfred Thayer Mahan, the U.S. naval officer who, writing around the turn of the nineteenth century, contended that "sea power" was founded on the "three pillars" of international commerce, naval stations scattered along the sea lanes to support the operations of fuel-thirsty warships, and, most importantly for him, a powerful battle fleet. Mahan's works exhibited a strong geographical hue, urging the United States to build a fleet capable of defending the Caribbean sea lanes against the largest concentration of naval forces likely to be hurled against it. Only by securing the Caribbean basin, its "Mediterranean," declared Mahan, could the United States dig an isthmian canal and wrest away its rightful share of the Asia trade.We have unearthed considerable evidence suggesting that China will pursue a Mahanian maritime strategy as its diplomatic, economic, and military power waxes. Influential Chinese strategists talk of "absolute control" over China's littoral waters, through which the shipments of raw materials upon which the nation's economic growth has come to depend must pass. In so doing, they routinely invoke Mahan's writings. If indeed Beijing follows Mahan's path to sea power, it will regard the Yellow, East China, and South China seas much as Mahan regarded the Caribbean: as an expanse in which naval dominance is vital to national prosperity.If so, an increasingly assertive Chinese maritime strategy will intersect with that of Japan, which has been rethinking its own approach to the uses of sea power, in large part because it relies on the same sea lanes for its own imports of oil, gas, and other commodities. Whether Tokyo would entrust the safety of its seaborne commerce to a China jealous of its "Caribbean" is an open question. Also problematic for Sino-Japanese relations are conflicting claims to islands whose adjacent sea beds purportedly contain major oil and gas reserves.Yet few, if any, Japanese strategists look to Alfred Thayer Mahan for guidance. They do not quote Mahan; nor do they urge Tokyo to found its maritime strategy on Mahanian precepts or some distinctively Japanese derivative thereof. Why is that so? Was Mahan discredited by association with the Japanese militarism of the 1930s and 1940s? Was he simply forgotten during the postwar years, when large segments of the Japanese populace looked with revulsion on the use of military force? Upon what maritime theories will Tokyo base its emerging naval strategy, if not those of Mahan? With what effect?By venturing some answers to these questions, the study will show how Japanese strategy may evolve over the next decade and how the strategies deployed by Tokyo and Beijing may interact. Our findings and recommendations will be of immediate use to policymakers in Tokyo, as well as to policymakers and alliance managers in Washington, which, if recent events are any guide, will depend increasingly on the U.S.-Japanese alliance to sustain its East Asia strategy in the coming years. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The U.S.-Japan alliance has not only survived, but also strengthened in the post-Cold War era, against some realists? predictions otherwise. However, economic reality during the same period has been reduction of Japanese dependence on the United States market and increasing integration of Japan with the Asian markets including China. Unlike the Cold War years, when Japan-Soviet economic relations were nearly negligible, this new comprehensive security environment requires a careful balancing on the part of Japan. Success of such efforts is also subject to the political leadership that can overcome bureaucratic stalemates at home. This paper will review Japan?s domestic debates about China and Japan?s strategy to deal with rising China. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

With the evolution of domestic Taiwanese politics came a corresponding internationalization of the Taiwanese independence movement. The importance of Taiwanese independence not only impinges on the lives of 21 million or so Taiwanese living on the island, but also affects the strategic environment of the Asia Pacific region as China has declared that it would not hesitate to resort to force should circumstances dictate that it becomes necessary to do so. Taiwan is often cited to be one of the two potential flashpoints in the Asia Pacific, and a conflict between the PRC and Taiwan may more worrying for many countries evolve into one between PRC and the United States. While Taiwan’s role in Sino-US relations have been widely studied, the importance of Taiwan in affecting Chinese bilateral relations beyond its relations with US is a relatively unexplored field. This paper attempts an exploratory study of the evolving role Taiwan plays in Sino-Japanese relations. It attempts to under how the historical role of Taiwan in Sino-Japanese relations affect the island’s contemporary diplomatic dynamics with China and Japan. The role of Taiwan in Chinese and Japanese national security strategy will also be scrutinized to understand the possible divergence or convergence of China and Japan over the Taiwan issue. This is crucial as Japan’s stance is important as Japan is considered one of US allies within region but may not necessarily deem it in its best interests to go along with the US against China. This difficulty presents it with an extremely tricky choice. A slip either way will affect the regional stability and prosperity of the Asia Pacific as a whole. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Policymakers and analysts in many nations have long taken 'energy security' to mean reliable access to affordable oil and gas resources. In recent years, however, the concept of 'energy security' has been explicitly broadened in some policymaking contexts ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A dramatic transformation has occurred in India-US relations in the last decade. The interactions between the two democracies have expanded enormously and their impact is beginning to be felt beyond the bilateral realm. This evolving partnership holds the potential to shape not only the regional politics of South Asia but the international relations of the wider Asia-Pacific region. Some analysts project an even grander vision, claiming that this relationship may play a decisive role in determining the future global order. Taking these projections as a point of departure, and recognizing the impressive strides that have been made in Indo-US ties, this research focuses on the strategies, outputs and consequences of this foreign policy engagement. Its impact on Asian stability in the context of a rising China is also analysed. The research also studies the dynamics between the three major Asian powers, India, China and Japan, whose bilateral equations with the US are divergent and therefore of concern to the smaller powers of the region. How these major powers relate to one another and whether their mutual interactions can be autonomous are some of the questions that this research explores while charting the course of Indo-US relations. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

North Korea has pursued a nuclear weapons capability for about two decades. Many diplomatic efforts have been made to convince or cajole the Northern regime to give up this quest-and all have so far failed. Since 2003, a new multilateral approach-the Six-Party Talks involving the Koreas, China, Japan, Russia, and the United States-has raised hopes anew. These hopes are based largely on China playing an active role. China has the potential both to guarantee North Korea's security, and to impose and enforce a denuclearization agreement. We analyze China's changing grand strategy and its implications for China's Korea goals and policies. To Deng Xiaoping's emphasis on China's national interests, China's third- and fourth-generation leaders have added a greater reliance on foreign and military policies to maintain domestic political support and legitimacy. This discussion indicates that China is currently more concerned to preserve the North Korean regime and prevent a second Korean War than to eliminate the North's nuclear capability. Therefore, the Six-Party Talks are unlikely to succeed. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Chinese perspective is required to better understand the China?s foreign policies. China fundamentally changed its national strategy in early 1970s. During the Cold War era, the U.S. and Japan were enemies of China. However, China has acknowledged the U.S. as its strategic partner, and normalized its diplomatic relations with Japan in 1972. After the normalizations, China have developed its political and economic relations with the U.S. and Japan economically and politically. Recently, tension between China, and the U.S. and Japan have increased. On the other hand, after the open policy of Deng Xiaoping in late 1970s, China adapted capitalistic economic development strategy; it seems to be very successful. However, China still holds Marxism-Leninism as its fundamental national ideology with Maoism. On the other hand, Chinese Communist Party has officially opened its membership to Chinese capitalists.To understand and correctly explain the China's national behavior, a unique Chinese perspective based on a new Sino-centrism is required. The new Sino-centrism is a combination of Marxism-Leninism, Maoism, and traditional Sino-centric thoughts. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Classical Chinese military thought is undoubtedly a precious cultural heritage from the East. However, the US-led West has thus far a limited understanding of the true beauty of the strategic thinking in this treasure house. This study uses the world’s oldest board game, Weiqi (or Go), to bring out the essence of classical Chinese military and strategic thinking. The game of Weiqi bears striking resemblance to international relations and warfare. It also exemplifies the Chinese military classics to a remarkable extent. Weiqi has also been a national game of Japan for well over 1,500 years. It is currently very popular in China, Japan, Korea, and is spreading rapidly across the European and American continents (thanks to the development of internet). As the hegemonic United States seeks to maintain a strategic edge over a rising Pacific Asia, a little knowledge of this ancient board game will take US national leaders a long way in understanding Eastern strategic thinking and achieving the US foreign policy objectives. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]