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This paper explores the emerging 'triangle' in commercial relations between the EU, China and the United States, using the concepts of 'complex interdependence' and 'bi-multilateralism' as organising and evaluative devices. The paper argues that in the 'triangle' there are important areas of unevenness and variation reflecting differences of power, institutional factors and norms, but that nonetheless there can be discerned important elements of 'complex interdependence' as defined by Keohane and Nye. This can be observed in the bilateral relationships between the three parties; at the same time, however, the EU-China-US relationship is central to power, institutions and norms in the changing multilateral commercial system, centred on the World Trade Organisation. This means that many of the commercial policy negotiations between the three parties are essentially 'bi-multilateral': on the one hand, the management of bilateral relations creates externalities for the multilateral system, and on the other hand the evolution of the multilateral system creates new forces shaping the management of bilateral relationships. The paper explores two cases, China's entry into the WTO and the management of trade disputes over textiles, to illuminate the ways in which 'bi-multilateral' elements enter into the EU-China-US 'triangle'. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper attempts to understand how and why China has been portrayed as the primary military threat in Taiwanese security discourse through an examination of offence-defence theory. It is based on the premise that those events or factors that one identifies as dangerous come to be ascribed as such only through an interpretation of their various dimensions of dangerousness. The paper first introduces the protracted debate among the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) government, the 'Pan-Blue' opposition parties and US officials and analysts over the 2004 Special Defence Budget controversy. In defence of its arms procurement program, the Chen Shui-bian administration resorted to a particular mode of interpreting danger, that is, the military balance across the Taiwan Strait has been shifting in China's favour and thus it is imperative to correct the imbalance through fielding the weapons systems provided by Washington. The paper then explores the underlying assumption of that pervasive interpretation in the official articulation of Chinese military threat in Taiwan and the United States, which holds that offensive advantages make war more likelyâ??a principal hypothesis of offence-defence theory. Rather than questioning the methodological ambiguities about how to define and measure the 'offence-defence balance', the paper argues that it is precisely these ambiguities that make China's threat image in Taiwan possible. The special budget case is indicative as to how Taiwan's defence policy is better understood as a political practice central to the constitution, production, and maintenance of a peace-loving Taiwanese identity contrary to the belligerent Chinese than as an instrument to build and maintain a capable defence posture against potential attacks from the mainland. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since 1975, American foreign policy in Southeast Asia can be characterized as "benign neglect". After the 9/11 attack, the Southeast Asian region has become refuge of Al Qaeda members and a "second front" of US global counter-terrorism operation. The rapid rise of China presents new challenges to US foreign policy. China's growing influence comes at the expense of US power and influence in Southeast Asia, hastening US-China competition in the region and increasing the probability of the outbreak of conflict. In order to prevent the decline of US influence in the region and maintain its sole super power status in the world, the US has sought to enhance and promote its relations with ASEAN countries, this way, the US has taken steps to become re-involved in the region. The purpose of this paper is to clarify expectations of future US strategy towards Southeast Asia by exploring the causes of US re-involvement in Southeast Asia as well as strategies the Bush administration undertook. This paper analyzes US goals and interests in the region, influences of the development of terrorism on the US and the effects of the rapid rise of China. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Growing demand for natural resources has become an issue of primary importance in China's foreign policy, and has led many observers to argue that conflict with the United States and other states in Asia is growing more likely. This paper evaluates the historical record on that question: under what circumstances have the resource needs of previous rising powers led to conflict with other states? I propose two independent variables: the ability to extract natural resources at home and the openness of the international trade system. In cases where the rising power has a large domestic resource base, and can supplement domestic production with easy access to foreign resources through trade, rising powers are less likely to generate conflict. In situations where the rising power has a limited resource base at home and the international trade system is closed, on the other hand, are more likely to lead to war. The paper evaluates three cases. For the United States in the late 19th century, massive domestic reserves and the first great era of globalization led to a "peaceful" rise. For Japan in the 1930s, an extremely poor resource base and rising trade barriers contributed to conflict. Finally, the paper turns its attention to China and argues that this important contemporary case more closely resembles the rise of the United States than that of Japan. China's domestic resource base remains quite large, and the international trade system is unprecedented in its level of openness. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Within the EU-China strategic partnership, signed in 2003, closer security cooperation is envisaged, but progress in this field has been little in this field. If the two security strategies - the ESS and the Chinese Paper on the New Security Concept, as well as the papers of the three major Member States of the EU, are compared, a lot of common terminology can be found.However, the connotation of these terms differ due to the differences in paradigms regarding the nature of governance of their national entities and of the international system, including the role for the US. Cooperation will therefore be most likely in the new fields of security cooperation such as pandemics, environmental threats and disaster relief. Based on this analysis, the paper will outline the opportunities and limits for EU-China security cooperation, in particular in an US-China-EU triangle ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper presents a heuristic model for the international development of nonproliferation education programs. The paper draws on the examples of five nonproliferation education programs at U.S. universities, plus a program currently being developed at Fudan University in Shanghai, China. Three phases of the developmental process are studied for both international and domestic programs: program development, curriculum development, and sustainability. Lessons learned from each of the three phases are combined into a developmental model, intended to serve as a guide to the further development of these programs by practitioners. The factors that contribute to program development, where the focus is on creating a viable institution of learning, are much the same for domestic and international programs alike. The factors that contribute to curriculum development are different for domestic and international programs. For domestic programs, the locus of development is the organization. For international programs, the center of gravity is a collaborative network. In the latter, the central challenge is maintaining the commitment of multiple participants, all in the pursuit of a shared intellectual enterprise. As a curriculum matures and comes to be recognized as the hallmark of a program, the need for a robust international collaborative network diminishes. Domestic and international programs eventually converge in their developmental paths, with each facing similar sustainability issues. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The People's Republic of China has been the number one target of antidumping actions filed by the U.S. Commerce Department on behalf of various domestic industries. This paper examines U.S. antidumping (AD) actions against China from 1980 to 2004. Specifically, it addresses both the conditions under which U.S. industries apply for protection from regulatory authorities against China and the likelihood of their obtaining an affirmative ruling from the International Trade Commission. While our statistical analysis of U.S. antidumping actions against China affirms the importance of standard political economy explanations of U.S. antidumping decision-making, it also emphasizes how industries characterized by high levels of intra-industry trade has tended to generate more AD actions against China. In addition, the paper assesses the impact of China's membership in the World Trade Organization (WTO) on the pattern of initiation and imposition of AD actions by the United States against that country, postulating that China's WTO membership may not have had the effect of deterring U.S. protectionism via the antidumping instrument as the designation of China as a non-market economy under the WTO has led U.S. AD authorities to apply more stringent criteria in dealing with AD case against that country. This counter-intuitive finding suggests that under certain circumstances, the legal framework of the WTO can facilitate trade protectionism. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Scholars of Southeast Asia have paid increasing attention to the role of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in mediating the relations between the US and China. ASEAN has created a strong reputation for itself as a regional organization that embodies norms promoting respect for sovereignty and non-intervention. ASEAN scholars have argued that ASEAN norms have been adopted by China. This development has afforded ASEAN a more meaningful political institutional role in the region than its relative power merits. ASEAN is exercising a form of normative power in the Asia Pacific.This paper examines this argument from a critical constructivist perspective. ASEAN often does not function as a coherent bloc. The individual states of ASEAN have different perceptions of national interest and their behavior is described by a variety of theories. How do these differences affect the ability of ASEAN, the organization, to act in a coherent way? How is this potential incoherence perceived by the larger powers of the region and what are their respective approaches? China has decided to treat ASEAN as a coherent entity; the US has not. What are the long-term political consequences for these great powers of their respective strategies? This paper is based on field research conducted in the Asia Pacific in 2007. It examines the significance of the regional rhetoric around the ideas of shared norms and values. How credible are these claims and what are their strategic implications? ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study on Japan's informal political actors and networks will not only provide a foundation for us to further understand Japanese politics and foreign policy but will also enable us to get a better idea of how networks function in a larger context, namely between Tokyo, Beijing and Washington. Social network is not only an important part of Japanese policy making but also a crucial factor in the China-Japan-U.S. triangular relationship. Instead of providing equal attention to each parties of this triangle, this paper will focus on Japan's informal political actors and networks by examining the process of normalization in its relations with China. In addition to detailed analysis of political actors in Japanese politics and society, it also provides an account of Beijing's reaction in this significant process. In the concluding part, this paper also provides some preliminary analysis in making international comparisons particularly with the United States. Thus, it will also assist us in understanding the networks between the three powers in the Asia-Pacific region. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

After fifty years of Cold War division, East Asia has gained greater coherence and substance as an emerging economic, even political, entity. This paper examines the role of hegemony in East Asia’s ongoing post-Cold War reorganization. In particular, where the US and Japan once claimed much of East Asia?s economic and political attention, long-term trends suggest an ongoing reorientation on the part of East Asian states around China?s growing economic and political presence and that China will increasingly become the center of gravity for East Asia I focus on the US, Japan, and China as the three powers that have or are most likely to assume the hegemonic organizing role detailed in international relations theory. The paper examines these major powers, with a particular focus on their shifting relations with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Though a coalition of weaker powers, ASEAN has played an important, if not unusual, role in defining and at times, leading regional processes. This was especially the case for much of the 1990s; however, financial crises, as well as ASEAN?s political and economic limitations, have also forced the organization to look outside itself for additional economic and political leadership. The paper begins with a brief discussion of the 1990-1997 period, a period characterized by much uncertainty about the post-Cold War priorities and policies of major powers. In particular, I describe how the United States as retrenching hegemon, Japan as reluctant hegemon, and China as rising hegemon set the stage for new thinking about intra-East Asian relations. Their shifting relations underscore political and economic interdependencies between Northeast and Southeast Asia that had been less apparent during much of the Cold War. It is during this period that we find ASEAN playing the important role of facilitator in negotiating changing relations. The second part of the paper then turns to a discussion of developments since 1997, addressing the roles played by 1) the 1997-9 financial crisis and 2) the US war on terrorism in shaping East Asia’s reorganization. This period is characterized by notable Chinese activity and Beijing?s intensified engagement of Southeast Asian states, individually and collectively. Taken together, the paper shows that major powers have shaped in critical ways the contours and organization of an evolving East Asia. East Asia has become more organized ? formally and informally, politically and economically ? but thus far, that process has been defined more by market forces and competitive dynamics between the major powers. In other words, if East Asia is becoming more coherent and organized, it is becoming so more by accident than necessarily by hegemonic design. Recent Chinese policies suggest that China may wish to assume a larger leadership role; however, the question remains whether the United States or Japan would accept China in such a role. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Far from the realists? description, little has shown that China is taking a revisionist strategy against the American hegemony. Rather, China has taken a prudent policy to improve her global leadership while her comprehensive cooperation with the United States has never been excluded. China might not satisfy with the U. S. hegemony; however, China is far from the capabilities to overcome the strategic limits that her title of „Rising Power� has generated. Besides, China is not certain that the 2008 financial crisis has already speeded the decline of American hegemony. And finally, China has evaluated that she could not surpass American comprehensive power before the end of 21st century. This paper will describe firstly China?s evaluation on the relative global power distribution from the perspectives of China?s �low-profile� strategy. Then the focus will put on the dilemma that China has suffered from the global second rank. The final part will explore challenges that hamper China?s low-key rising strategy. It concludes that China is a second-tier global leader for she has neither intentions nor the capability to generate a Chinese hegemony in the coming years. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper proposes a theory of major state energy competition behavior and how such competition increasingly affects state foreign policies and potentially changes the status quo. In the context of US â€" China relations, the author will first establish an ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper investigates crises in which the Chinese government requested an apology from the United States, and the official and popular reactions to these incidents. Two contentious episodes are studied: the 2001 EP-3E airplane collision near Hainan Isl ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper explores how China's economic expansion, U.S. interests, and Latin American economic and political demands intersect with regards to energy politics in the Americas. After briefly outlining China's meteoric rise and its corresponding increase in energy needs, we examine the PRC's recent moves in Latin American energy sectors. A number of Chinese-owned energy concerns have struck deals across a host of Latin American states and at first glance Chinese-U.S. conflict over the region's energy reserves may seem likely. However, we also find that the size and scope of these agreements is actually quite limited. Furthermore, the technical demands of extracting Latin American energy resources, the difficulties involved in transporting energy largely located near the Atlantic to the Pacific coast, the limits placed on foreign involvement in most Latin American states, and the region's politics all reduce China's ability to exploit the region's energy reserves. A final complicating factor for China is that her industrialization threatens manufacturing in a number of energy-producing states in the region. In short, while China's energy interests in Latin America have increased as of late, there are a plethora of factors that will likely prevent a significant Chinese presence for the foreseeable future. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In financial regulation, the US and China along with other countries have accepted various new global norms. The paper asks what drives this apparent behavioural consistency with global norms in two areas, banking regulation and financial reporting. First ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How powerful has the nuclear non-proliferation norm been in shaping state behaviour? This paper examines this question in relation to the United States and China. In investigating the role that the United States has played in creating the non-proliferatio ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

“…American blacks, your struggle is our struggle! The people of the world stand together with our American black brothers!” [quoted from an article in the People's Daily (Renmin Ribao), 9/9/63] This paper challenges international relations' silence on race in the global order by examining the influence of transnational racial categories on globalizing governments and how they define themselves and their interests. I will argue that in the 1950s, the newly-liberated Chinese Communist government began to develop a radical orientation for its foreign policy and international relations in which the explicit recognition of race, racial identification and cross-racial solidarity, Third-worldism, was an important political discursive component. To support this argument, I will exam a process of racialization, the “…extension of racial meaning…” to something that most political scientists believe is devoid of such concerns - foreign policy initiatives and international relations by examining three major events that prompted the development and dissemination of a discourse of a racialized foreign policy orientation. These three events are â€"(1) the planning for the Afro-Asian Conference, Bandung, Indonesia, April 18-24, 1955; (2) the reportage in the CPC’s flagship newspaper, the People’s Daily (Renmin Ribao) on the African-American Civil Rights Movement, particularly the major events of the pivotal year, 1963; and (3) The construction of the TanZam Railway in the 1970s. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

With the increasing economic and strategic clout of China and the vulnerability of the American power in the Gulf, the US policy makers are searching for a new strategy in the Asia Pacific region. Their ultimate purpose is to neutralize the preeminence of China.Pentagon is trying to forge a new alliance of three well-established democracies-US,India and Japan. On April 16,2007 all the three nations began a joint military drill in the Pacific. More or less at the same time, the first India-US Defence Joint Working Group met in New Delhi.These two develpments have certainly raised the temperature in Beizing.Recently China has raised its defence budget by 17.8 percent and successfully tested its antisatellite ballistic missile.No doubt the Pacific military exercise by US, India and Japan has been taken as an alarming signal by China.The proposed paper will try to explore the evolving strategy of the US in the Asia Pacific region.One has to explore as to what extent such a three nation joint exercise is addressing the unprecedented rise of China in the politico-economic and strategic affaires of the region. We will also examine as to how far the existing American policy of strategic engagement with China is being reexamined. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Two papers will focus on creations of “new enemies/rivals” by the Westphalian logic of competition and anarchy: Banerjee and Ling will look at constructions of India and China by mainstream defense intellectuals in the US; Hwang and Chen will examine how defense intellectuals in Taiwan respond to such attempts at “triangulation.” ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper explores contemporary multilayered processes and the gradual development of shared norms, principles, and targets with regard to energy security among China, Japan and the United States, at both the bilateral and multilateral level, behind a seemingly worsening energy rivalry. It examines the degree to which the three powers have acquired knowledge of multiple aspects of energy security, yet still found common interests―for instance the diversification of energy sources and energy conservation―, and its implication for the future regional cooperation, regardless of their independent national energy strategies.Against the backdrop of widespread “resource nationalism” in major supplying countries and growing global concerns about the availability of hydrocarbon resources and volatile energy markets, it can be hypothesized that China, Japan, and the United States―three big energy consumers― would increasingly find grounds for cooperation simultaneously while they compete for energy equities in some cases. For example, technology transfers in the fields of energy conservation and environmentally-friendly use of energy have become one of mushrooming industries in Sino-Japanese business despite the virtually deadlocked East China Sea dispute. The United States and China have begun talks on the promotion of ethanol production, clean use of coal for power generation, technological assistance for nuclear power plant, etc. Energy dialogues among the three countries have also been bolstered by various multilateral frameworks, including the Asia-Pacific Partnership since June 2004 and the annual meeting of five energy ministers, involving India and South Korea since December 2006.Policymakers and scholars have debated whether the rise of China will pose a threat and destabilize the power configurations of the Asia-Pacific. (Neo-)realists assume that the increase in material capabilities would enable Beijing to seek hegemonic power more vigorously: a geopolitical zero-sum game would be likely to escalate between China on the one hand and Japan and the United States on the other. Neoliberal institutionalists suppose that establishing some form of institutional structure would ameliorate conflicts of material interests, leading to a positive-sum game.The author sheds light on the social construction process of ideas at both diplomatic and energy experts’ levels in the three countries, implying that reckless competition over energy resources would lead only to the advantage of supplying countries and cooperation would more effectively serve energy security as a whole. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The rapid ascent of China to great power status has caused much concern among politicians and academics alike. The prospect that China may eventually attain parity with the United States dramatically increases the likelihood of security challenges between itself and the West. There has been a great deal of attention given to this issue by policy analysts and media outlets; however, the rise of China has not received commensurate attention in the international relations literature. Power Transition Theory posits that states require not only the capability, but the willingness to overtake the system leader. While China’s ability to surpass the US is a possibility, our understanding of its willingness to take on systemic leadership is relatively indeterminate. In this analysis, we employ Power Transition Theory in order to address the following questions: is China dissatisfied with the status quo and, if so, will it be willing to assume the role of dominant power? Our paper attempts to answer these questions using conventional measures as well as participation in regional and supra-regional structures. In doing so, we hope to gauge China’s dissatisfaction with the status quo and its potential willingness to advance its preferences in the international arena. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The mainstream discourse on cross-strait relations tends to reproduce the "crisis" than transform it. Analysts in Taiwan are complicit by loyally following US concepts, prescriptions, and strategies for the region. Some, however, are beginning to contest this traditional subjugation of Taiwan's interests and identity to US and Chinese hegemony. Nonetheless, they still abide by the US paradigm of triangular relations. This paper notes a third, emerging discourse that reframes US-China-Taiwan relations through a postcolonial understanding of sovereignty, cross-strait relations, and Taiwanese subjectivity. We characterize these three options, in reverse order, in Hirschman's terms of "exit," "voice, and "loyalty." But we amend these with Ling's differentiation of "formal" and "substantive" mimicry for "loyalty" and "voice," respectively. Both reflect conditions of postcolonial hybridity that mature, eventually, into a paradigmatic breakthrough or "exit." ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Sino-U.S. relationship has evolved considerably since 1949. While the early days were characterized by direct conflict in Korea and Vietnam, China and the United States have avoided hostilities since the Nixon administration initiated normalization negotiations. Deng Xiaoping's Twenty-Eight Character Strategy, which advised that Beijing keep a low profile and avoid the limelight, exemplified the softer approach adopted by Beijing at the beginning of its economic reform. This concept remained a key element of Chinese policy into the 1990s, yet China found itself faced with a potential conflict with the U.S. by the middle of the decade. The purpose of this paper is to explore the Third Taiwan Strait Crisis of 1995-1996 to answer two questions. First, what were the atmospherics and contextual factors that explain how the crisis unfolded? An analysis of this event cannot stop at the surface, but rather it must examine the contributing factors such as domestic politics and the international structure. Second, what are the implications of the crisis on the Sino-U.S. relationship? This confrontation illustrated how easily the U.S. and China can navigate their way into a collision, even over interests that are peripheral to the core security of both states. Since this crisis was the only instance of Sino-U.S. use of force since the normalization of relations, U.S. decision-makers will reference these events and draw conclusions to inform future decisions in dealing with a rising China. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In previous work I argue for a connection between different military doctrinal cultures and the failure of coercive diplomacy. Different military cultures in the United States and China affected signaling, communication, perception, and assessments of the balance of power. This led to failures of deterrence and coercion during the Korean War. In this paper, I extend this idea into two additional naval cases: the deterrence of conflict in the Taiwan Strait in 1950 and today. I argue that Chinese naval doctrine today is, for cultural and organizational reasons, distinct from that of the United States. I assess the potential dangers this poses to the conduct of military diplomacy in the Taiwan Strait, and offer proposals to overcome or limit these challenges. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper analyzes U.S. policy toward China and Taiwan. I begin with an examination of Cold War foreign policy across the various presidential administrations. I then move to an examination of post-Cold War foreign policy concentrating on the Clinton and Bush presidencies. I focus on comparing various administration approaches to the Taiwan crisis and how and why policies varied within and between administrations. I discuss the numerous international and domestic factors that have contributed to U.S. policy toward Taiwan and China. Throughout, I attempt to capture the competing interests involved and how these actors and events have complicated both foreign policy processes and outcomes. I conclude with a discussion of policy implications for the present and future. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the role of the United States in Sino-Japanese relations since the end of World War II. Special emphasis is placed on three major debates between China and Japan where the American role appears to have been critical: (1) the history issue; (2) the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute; and (3) the Taiwan issue. The central argument is that a series of institutional innovations, in Sino-Japanese relations introduced by the United States after the end of World War II, reinforced the U.S. alliance with Japan, and often rather indirectly accounts for the continuing tense relations between China and Japan. These developments, including the Tokyo War Crime Trials, the San Francisco Peace Treaty in 1951, the Okinawa reversion treaty in 1971, and the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, have had a major influence on Sino-Japanese relations that endures today. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper describes the U.S.-China relations and its impact on the Korean Peninsula. It outlines the key motivations behind the making of Chinese foreign policy and then reports on the current stability and uncertainties between Beijing and Washington. As a result of its overall objectives in diplomacy, Beijing is seeking a shared strategic interest with the United States on the Korean issue. The PRC prefers the continued survival of the DPRK regime and develops ever-closer relations with the ROK; it's basic policy towards the Korean Peninsula remains pro-status quo and antinuclearization. However, the uncertainties and complications of the Sino-American relations profoundly affect China's strategic calculation about Korean Peninsula and indicate changes and problems in the Chinese Korea policy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In strategic contexts actors may costlessly renege on verbal commitments. Many analysts consequently reject negotiation talk as an empirical basis for examining political interaction. Practitioners likewise focus on deeds (e.g. missile deployments, troop movements, defense expenditures), which more likely than "cheap talk" signal sincere intent. Dialogical or pragmatic analysts, however, take a contrary view. They apply tools of linguistics and formal logic in systematic examinations of negotiation talk. They propose to finesse the problem of insincerity by imposing upon themselves the burden of showing the consistency of actors' possibly insincere utterance with their prior commitments and structural circumstances. This paper presents a dialogical analysis of the initial conversations between US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger and Chinese leaders Mao Zedong and Zhou En-Lai in February of 1973. The Chinese leaders test Kissinger's sincerity by attempting to trap him in contradictions or drive him into implausible conversational commitments. This practice lends support to the heuristic proposed by dialogical/pragmatic analysts for finessing the problem of insincerity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article presents the conference paper titled "Understanding Prospects for Cooperation and Competition in U.S.-China Relations: A Review Theory and Practice" prepared for the "Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association" held in Honolulu, Hawaii. It examines the volatility of the U.S. foreign relation toward China. It highlights the same assumptions of U.S. presidents Bill Clinton, George H.W. Bush and George W. Bush on the nature of the Sino-American relationship.

The article presents the conference paper titled "Modeling Cross-Strait Relations and Taiwan's Linkage Politics: Foreign Policy Implications for China-Taiwan-U.S. Relations" prepared for presentation at the "International Studies Association 2005 Annual Convention" in Honolulu, Hawaii. It emphasizes that China and the U.S. should avoid getting connected into any issues related to the Taiwan election.

The article presents the conference paper titled "The Linkage Between Domestic and International Conflict: The Case of Japanese Foreign Policy, 1890-1941" prepared for presentation at the "Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association" in Honolulu, Hawaii. It discusses the domestic politics and international relations of Japan with rival countries China, Russia, Great Britain and the U.S. It gives insights into the impact of domestic political unrest on the possibility that leaders will employ military policies in foreign relations.

On the basis of the English school concepts of balances of power, great powers and middle powers, the paper argues that the US and China advocate competing concepts of regional order in the Asia-Pacific. The US prefers an order based on the instruments of war, whereas China gravitates towards instruments of diplomacy. Sino-US policies produce an unstable pattern of balancing marked by fluctuating alliance and partnership commitments, a low level of predictability, and considerable freedom of action. This intermediate type of order leaves middle powers such as ASEAN, Russia and South Korea with extraordinary responsibilities for preserving the balance. It is engendered by China’s efforts to postpone agreement on permanent mechanisms of regional order, pending the realization of its development potential allowing it to influence regional order on a par with the US. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The dynamics and the impact of China's economic development are global in many perspectives, also in terms of its environmental consequences. The most dramatic expression of this, is arguably that China will soon surpass the US as the largest polluter in several categories including CO2 emissions.China is responding to this by developing a more elaborate environmental policy (cf. Mol and others) which is often studied form the perspective of its convergence with global environmental governance arrangements. In that sense China's domestic environmental policy is globalizing. In this paper we claim that one can also look at the domestic environmental policies as having a 'global' dimension. First, because of the size of the Chinese population and economy, any measure that results in cutting pollution will have a large impact on global pollution; second, because improvements in China will result in less 'down-stream impacts' (cf. SOuth East Asian countries and Mekong delta states); and third, because China is setting norms and setting down certain practices (for example in energy policies and in the fight against desertification) which are influential in global debates, regime formation and to other countries and actors.In the paper I will emphasize this 'domestic as global' approach as it fits in the conceptual debate on multilevel norm setting in global governance. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

China is increasingly becoming a focal point to policymakers and international relations analysts. In answering the challenge of a rising China posed to the United States, realists propound containment approach while liberalists back engagement approach. However, by positioning analysis from a kind of ideal-type thinking, scholars of both schools did not pay enough attention to the exact shape and content of the current Sino-US relations, particularly the increasing transnational interactions across the pacific, as well as their potential influence to the relationship between China and the United States. This paper intends to compensate the above drawback by probing the transnational relations between China and the United States as well as their possible implications to China’s foreign policy, especially China’s foreign policy to the United States, in a comprehensive way. More specifically, two related questions will be addressed in this paper. The first question focuses on the issue of how exactly interdependent the current Sino-U.S relations is. By following Karl Deutsch’s transnational communication thesis as well as Nye and Keohane’s case study of the relationship between the United States and Canada as well as Australia from the prism of complex interdependence ( Nye, Keohane 2000), this paper will look over a wide range of issues between China and the United States, striding from the most noticeable economic exchanges, to tourists across two countries, missionary, students exchanges in both official and unofficial way, as well as military, religious connections in an extensive way. Basically those issues will be examined in a comparative wayâ€"both historically and horizontallyâ€"to contrast the past with the present, to contrast the Sino-U.S. links with the historical Soviet-U.S. connections. By this comparison, we hope to get a relatively clear and comprehensive picture with regard to Sino-U.S. communications and transnational relations.Second, this paper will tackle the problem that to what extent, in which aspect, the increasing interdependence between China and the United States have affected or even changed China’ s policy choice or its approaches to Sino-US relations. Basically, this paper will argue that China’s increasing interdependence with the United States not only leads to the Chinese leaders to redefine China’s national interests, but also leads China to adopt more liberal elements in its foreign policy approach. In addition, China’s growing interconnections with the world also caused the Chinese foreign policy decision making to become more decentralized. All those new elementsâ€"we can further add the factor of the increasingly matured international institutions, might work together to challenge the doomed logic of security dilemma as articulated by realists and consequently lead to China’s peaceful rise. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper is part of an ongoing agenda to fill the current gap in studies of intelligence with regard to covert intervention. The paper posits a means-driven decision-making process, in contrast to ends-based approaches founded on rational models. A cybernetic approach finds that goals are hazily defined and, consequently, that matching desired outcomes to goals is problematic. Decision-makers do not construct maximising policies, but instead assemble policies that suffice from a repertoire of models of action. The paper traces the development of plans for US covert interventions in the cases of Tibet and Afghanistan. It surmises that in both cases, policies were not tailored to achieve identifiable long-term objectives. Extremely broad organizational goals imparted direction to policies but the policies were driven by the available means to intervene. Policies were therefore the result of configurations (and re-configurations) of instruments to hand and were judged according to sufficing rather than optimising criteria. The paper concludes with comments on the application of second-generation cybernetic approaches to covert intervention in general. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The rise of China as a regional and global power is once again a central foreign policy concern of the United States. Much of the scholarship on Sino-American relations focuses on China's continued rapid economic growth and its implications for the American economy and, more generally, America's preponderance of power on the world stage. This paper studies one aspect of the bilateral relationship - the dialogue between the two countries having to do with America's calls for China to be ?more open and transparent? about its internal affairs with the rest of the world. With reference to Chinese ?white papers? on foreign policy and U.S. government reports on China's military capabilities and intentions, the paper explores China's understanding of this Western concept and why America deems a more open and transparent China essential to a potential strategic partnership between the two countries in the years to come. The paper hypothesizes that, for America, transparency's importance has to do with encouraging the transformation of China toward pluralism and liberal democracy. Therefore, lasting peace between the two countries is, in America's perspective, closely bound with the end of authoritarian rule in China and China's accountability to its neighbors and the United States. Sensing a trap, China remains cautious about America's advocacy of transparency. It invokes instead the principle of sovereignty, which implies the non-interference of states in each other's internal affairs. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The pending rise of China has been one of the most debated issues in international relations during the last decade. This situation creates problems for surrounding East Asian states, the majority of which are currently allied with the United States. What happens if China becomes a regional or even world leader? Will East Asian states be forced to choose between two competing powers? This paper seeks answers to these questions by examining prominent realist theories in relation to small state behavior in the international system, and applying each to the context of China and its surrounding states in Northeast Asia. First, I begin with an overview of the literature dealing with the rising power of China. Second, I seek to correctly understand the fundamental basis of the small state debate by examining in detail Waltz?s balance of power theory. An analysis reveals a fundamental flaw in interpretation: Waltz?s balancing hypothesis pertains to situations of multipolarity, rather than the current situation of unipolarity in the international arena. Waltz?s theory, when applied, predicts states will automatically align with the rising power against the dominant power. Given this finding I offer some facts on small state behavior in East Asia that show this may not be the case. Next, I turn to Walt(1987)?s balance of threat theory and discover Walt, while often understood as prescribing balancing behavior for the international arena, is actually unable to provide predictions for either bandwagoning or balancing in East Asia. I analyze the limitations of Walt?s theory and conclude the ambiguity of his conditions of state behavior, problems in operationalization of state actions and the lack of recognition of the role played by credibility in threat perception, undermine the ability of his theory to fully explain small state action in the context of our situation. Finally, power transition theory is revealed to provide inadequate, albeit roughly accurate, explanations of events in East Asia because of its overwhelming focus upon major powers. This paper deals briefly with its limitations and offers suggestions for further research. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper compares internet regulation in the US, France, and China, and asserts that though regulation is different in form across these national contexts, authorities in all share a perception of the internet as threatening to their authority. That the internet would be perceived as threatening is not surprising because it is causing profound changes in social interactions, altering the ways in which societies communicate, form communities, and interact with the state. Some of these effects may be hidden because they are experienced more profoundly by individuals under the age of 30 than by other groups. More than other groups this age bracket has most extensively pushed the borders of their social communities out into the internet. For example, MySpace now boasts over 50 million members; Facebook has 11 million members; the online posting board system ign.com has over one million members; and with 6.5 million inhabitants across servers the online world of Azeroth in Blizzard?s videogame World of Warcraft recently became the first fictitious ?country? to boast a larger population than many real countries. As the high number of popular press stories in the US on the dangers of social networking sites such as MySpace illustrate, these e-communities offer a difficult regulatory challenge to authorities, largely because such communities have been invisible to people over age 30. In some countries, authorities? lack of awareness of the internet as an opportunity for communities to focus, organize, and channel resistance allowed protesters in France in fall 2005 to use posting boards and text messages to organize spot protests, and others to organize the immigration rallies in the US in spring 2006. In other places, as the expansion of Google into China shows us, the free flow of information is considered threatening, and governments have strictly restricted the sites and types of e-communities that are available to citizens. Consequently, this paper explores both the variation in state regulation of the internet, and subsequently e-communities, as well as the ways in which these e-communities provide a space for resistance to the state. I examine the laws regulating the internet in the US, France, and China, and argue that in places where there is a norm of freedom of the press regulation of the internet is occurring ?backward? in response to internet use. However, in places where information transfer has always been suspect, regulation of the internet is occurring ?forward? in anticipation of how cyber space can be used to challenge authority. Though this appears to be a pattern of behavior we could predict from regime type, all authorities share the perception of these e-spaces as threatening. In order to make this argument I also look at the ways in which these communities operate that make them challenging to authorities. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The expansion of health biotechnology and research into new health biotechnologies raise important questions for international governance. Health biotechnologies, in particular the "engineering" of human tissue, raise new and difficult regulatory issues. This paper focuses on the issue of regulatory arbitrage in the field of embryonic stem cell research. The first part of the paper focuses on the phenomenon of regulatory arbitrage itself. What are the political and economic drivers behind the variance in national regulatory frameworks, variance that creates the incentives for regulatory arbitrage? What is the impact of international arbitrage on the regulation of research in health biotechnology? The second part of the paper evaluates potential governance options for managing regulatory arbitrage: it sets out a typology of forms of international governance and evaluates recent efforts to build or utilise existing international structures to provide elements of governance for embryonic stem cell research. Regulatory arbitrage occurs because researchers and investors are internationally mobile, able to move between countries to capture the benefits of different regulatory regimes. Regulatory regimes for embryonic stem cell research continues to diverge sharply, even amongst those countries where such research is permitted: the paper compares the regulatory regimes in China, South Korea, the UK and the US. These differences reflect tradeoffs made at the level of the state, compromises between the drive to maintain global competitiveness via investment in the "knowledge-economy", of which biotechnology is a key component, and the complex cultural politics that determine the status of the human embryo in different societies. Societies with relatively permissive regulation may try to leverage their advantage by encouraging regulatory arbitrage, as illustrated by the example of the World Stem Cell Hub. Inaugurated by the Koreans in 2005, the Hub was intended to provide an institutional framework for the international exchange of research materials: scientists from the US and Europe would send human tissue to be processed for research purposes, tissue that had been harvested in jurisdictions where such work would be illegal. However, the fate of the ill-starred Hub underscores the need for regulatory frameworks to manage globalized research: it was effectively destroyed shortly after its inauguration, brought down by revelations about unethical research (and faked results) in the Hwang group, the world-famous South Korean research group at the centre of the Hub. Despite these problems, international initiatives in stem cell research continue: for example, there is widespread interest in "outsourcing" research to China, attracted by its relatively permissive regulatory regime and pool of low-cost skilled research staff. There is, however, increased awareness of the importance of good governance to underpin international cooperative efforts and manage regulatory arbitrage. The second half of the paper focuses on international governance options, outlining a typology of potential governance structures, characterised in terms of geographic scope (global, transnational, regional) as well as organisational remit (how far does it range beyond health biotechnology) and organisational type (formal or informal, centralised or network, public or private). This typology provides the framework for an analysis of efforts to create international governance regimes for embryonic stem cell research... ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The revisionist-status-quo dichotomy has been a dominant framework in analyzing the relations between a rising power and established great powers in general, and Sino-US relationship in particular. This paper intends to denaturalize this identity discourse and deconstruct its meaning in the first place. Although it is an effective heuristic cue for the established powers to manage a new entrant, it is not a value-free baseline for understanding the interactions between a rising power and the putative international society; it is even a biased standard for gauging the relations between China and the United States. In a great sense, this identity discourse is the source of misperception between these two great powers. The second part of this paper explains the rationale of China?s foreign policy by analyzing the "peaceful rise" discourse in Chinese academic and policy circles. This is a nationwide intellectual practice of conceptualizing China?s national interest and its future role in international society. This discussion reveals China?s rationale in dealing with two distinct sets of foreign relations: the relations between China and international society, as well as the strategic interactions between China and the United States. Almost all Chinese scholars? opinions confirm China?s desire to be a ?responsible major power?, and even a few hardliners express no more than ?defensive realist? concerns. Based on the above analysis, the third part of the paper further denaturalizes the socialized security dilemma between the US and China by analyzing their strategic interactions in East Asian area. Although the US, as the only superpower with the aim of maximizing influence in global and regional affairs, will naturally feel a threat from a newly rising power, the nature of the game between the two powers, in most situation, is cooperation and competition for providing public good to international society. Nowadays the transformative nature of international society as an intervening variable limits the chance that a state uses military force to solve disputes. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper focuses on Chinese foreign policies towards Taiwan, Japan and the Korean peninsula and the consequences of these policies for Asia-Pacific security. Northeast Asia is a strong-hold of the US alliance system and China's near abroad, thus affecting China's influence on global security. If China cannot accommodate the region into its overall foreign policy strategy, its suggestions for a post-Cold War security order are likely to appear unconvincing to the international community. The paper emphasizes the weaknesses inherent in China's contemporary foreign policy strategy, thereby pointing to the possibility that China might fall into the rank of secondary powers. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The episode of Chen Shui-bian transit diplomacy bypassing the United States and his earlier decision to put the National Unification Council and Guideline into abeyance in 2006 had put Beijing-Taipei-Washington relationship into serious tests. It remains to be seen if Taipei's most recent steps of renaming some state-owned enterprises may escalate into tensions as before. While Chen's New Year address and state visit to Nicaragua via US homeland in 2007 caused little problem for the State Department, the PRC's discontent remained evident. It was against this backdrop that the paper was proposed.This paper examined the role the US played in the institutionalization of the status quo across the Strait from a sociological new institutionalist perspective. My research questions are: In what way did the United States help institutionalize the peace and stability of the Taiwan Strait? And in the process, how did the US act through "cross-Strait peaceful co-development" institution to shape the interest or identity of Beijing and Taipei?It was maintained that there existed an ongoing institutionalization process through which the US constructed the status quo that was supported with varying degree by Beijing and Taipei. The three joint communiqués and the TRA could be seen as setting the first stage of institutionalization through formal codification which emphasized the peaceful process in any attempt for final resolution by both sides. Since the late 1990s, the construction and reproduction of the CSPCD institution by the Americans, which generally follows a pattern of "neither use of force nor de jure independence," has been undertaken primarily through policy statements or actions. They normally uphold such core values as "prosperity," "stability" or "peace," and help sustain the regulative, normative or cognitive elements of the CSPCD institution. The main purpose is to shape the policy discourses, preferences, interests or identity of Beijing and Taipei. It was also argued that although the detailed record of what the institution has achieved was certainly mixed, there appears to be an overall tendency for Beijing and Taipei not to incessantly challenge the status quo. As such, it might be concluded that the institutionalization of status quo was considerably effective, though not completely successful. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Like agriculture, trade in textile is a highly politicized sector in international trade negotiation. On January 1, 2005, the last stage of a four-stage phase-out of the quota system that has governed most world trade in textiles and apparel since 1974 ended. But there is an exception to that rule. Since January 2005 there have been alarming increases of certain categories of textiles from China to the EU and the U.S. Exports in the first 6 months to EU increased130% compared with the same period of year 2004. In the first eight months of 2005, China?s textile exports to the U.S. increased 50%. Beginning in March and April, both EU and the U.S. conducted investigations. The bilateral negotiation began in May respectively. China and EU reached agreement on June 11, 2005. It settled down the export quantities of 10 categories of Chinese products from June 11, 2005 until the end of 2007. With an agreed base quantity, the annual growth is set to be limited between 8 percent and 12.5 percent during the period. With a follow-up negotiation, on September 5th another agreement calls for roughly half the blocked Chinese textile goods due to the using-out of the quotas to be admitted unconditionally by the EU and the other half will count against China?s 2006 textile quota. This obviously became another victory of China side. The Sino-American negotiation was more difficult. After 5 months and seven rounds of negotiations, China and the US completed an agreement on November 9th, 2005. In Brief, this agreement lasts until through 2008 and covers more than 30 individual products and contains quotas that begin at low levels, but that grow over the next three years. Nineteen of the thirty-four products covered are currently covered by safeguards and the rest fifteen are not. This paper addresses two empirical puzzles associated with the process of international trade bargaining. The primary puzzle concerns the variable degree to which the EU and the U.S. succeed in terms of the terms of agreement reached respectively. The second puzzle questions the contrast between this episode and China?s accession negotiation when EU obviously got more concessions from China than the U.S. By examining the application of Putnam?s two-level game on this comparative case, this paper hypothesizes that stronger and more single-voiced domestic interest group lobbying as well as less political/security association are more likely to result in an agreement in favor of the developed countries. When extending Putnam?s theoretical framework to the case of China, it suggests that the lack of a credible ?tied-hand? domestically due to the unique pattern and functioning of interest group lobbying and the lack of a valid congressional constraints in China makes its negotiators more difficult to ask for more concessions from its democratic counterparts. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Through my study of the making of U.S. China policy from President Nixon through George W. Bush, it has been possible to isolate interaction patterns among central advisors in their advisory systems (discussed by scholars such as Alexander George, Graham Allison, Thomas Preston, among others) and to isolate three factors that affect foreign policy decisions: the structure or level of centralization, the level of cooperation, and the level of presidential involvement. First, it is safe to assume that all presidential administrations have a certain level of centralization and formal structure, but they differ in practice in the involvement of the traditional stakeholders in foreign policy such as the national security advisor and secretary of state. Second, the focus on group dynamics reflects the distinction between highly cooperative settings where consensus is the likely outcome versus situations where bureaucratic politics flourishes. Third, the level of presidential involvement and decisiveness (and indecisiveness) can be a decisive factor in controlling the level of cooperation within each advisory system. The purpose of this paper will be to explore how these three factors affected the group dynamics across these six U.S. presidents and ultimately affected policy decisions toward China. Given that I have already completed the in-depth case studies that serve as the data-set for this paper, this will be an unique opportunity to systematically explore how and when the group process shapes the policymaking process and decision outcome in comparative perspective. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Textbooks on IR theory proudly claim that they are lively, reader-friendly, and research-based. In the paper I am going to focus on the latter part of the claim, i.e., the claim that textbooks are research-based. First, I question the claim that textbook accounts of the IR discipline?s own history are based on research. It seems to me to be more common to reproduce traditional narratives than to take new research into account. Second, having substantiated the critical part of the paper, the follow-on task is to reflect on alternatives to the current state of affairs. Issues to be addressed include the following: If new research concludes that the ?great debates? story is largely unfounded, then how should we present the discipline?s development to students in an accessible and reader-friendly fashion? If IR theory has been cultivated outside the US, how should a textbook present the global cultivation of theory, including contending understandings of the term ?theory? itself and if understood in the same key, then contending theories as such? Furthermore, it has been claimed that ?ideas don?t flow freely?. One such idea is the theory of hegemonic stability which on the one hand is understood quite differently in the US and China, respectively. On the other hand, it could be seen as a theory that is ideally suited to make students think counter-intuitively about world politics. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

On the basis of Kissinger?s concept of balancing, the paper investigates whether ASEAN has contributed to the consolidation of coexistence in Southeast Asia. According to Kissinger, a stable order requires that balancing is embedded in a consensus as to what constitutes permissible aims and methods of foreign policy. Kissinger?s analysis of early 19th century European diplomacy emphasizes that comparatively weaker powers often play a crucial role in engendering stable orders because it is their only chance of obtaining determining influence on security arrangements in their neighbourhood. ASEAN can be viewed as an entity that has attempted to create a Southeast Asian order of coexistence to pre-empt attempts from external powers at imposing unilateral designs for regional order and that has tried to maintain a stable balance between the US and Chinese presence in the post-Cold War era. The paper argues that ASEAN?s apparent success in creating a stable balancing situation is conditioned upon the existence of a regional environment where great power interests has so far remained sufficiently separate that the US and China have been able to pursue competing versions of regional order without much disagreement. The endurance of ASEANs order of coexistence has therefore yet to be put to the test. If Sino-US security concerns come into conflict, for example over sea-lanes such as the Malacca Strait where their strategic interests intersect, this is likely to have a dampening effect on the efforts of indigenous powers at maintaining coexistence. The paper concludes that the US is a revolutionary power that does not base its Southeast Asia policy on the ASEAN principles of state conduct. US policy therefore constitutes the principal impediment to the preservation of a regional order of coexistence. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper will address a specific facet of the larger question of whether the U.S. will help manage a peaceful transition to a more powerful China. China?s capabilities, both economic and military, are rising rapidly and necessarily its resource demand is also increasing dramatically. Chinese efforts at resource security in South America and to a lesser extent Canada are causing the U.S. much consternation, particularly with respect to oil in Venezuela. This paper will investigate some of the more significant aspects of Chinese economic penetration into the less developed countries of the western hemisphere (eg., iron ore deals with Brazil and oil with Venezuela). The U.S.?s ability to maintain hegemony over South America has fluctuated since Franklin Roosevelt?s Presidency, but the beneficent relations of that time and the corresponding strategic benefits as interwar Japan and Germany encroached there have evaporated since the Bush administration took office. This paper will explore the strategic risks to the U.S. with greater South American economic ties to China. The paper will address whether the South American countries are balancing U.S. power, merely pursuing economic benefits from commercial competition and leverage vis a vis the U.S. and European customers, or beginning a fundamental strategic re-orientation away from the U.S. and toward China. For example, can Hugo Chavez really lead a coalition of Brazil, Argentina and Venezuela against the U.S. and its Colombian and Caribbean allies? ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Although there has been increasing attention paid to the triangular relationship between the United States (US), the European Union (EU), and China, the divergencies between the American and European approaches to China does not loom large in mainstream International Relations (IR) literature. Yet the inter-relations of these two developed powers and one developing power are of great significance for world politics, especially for the studies of North-South conflict and cooperation. Why does the US keep seeing a rising China as a threat while the EU increasingly views China as a potential partner? This paper seeks to explore the reason behind the EU and American divergencies over China. Unlike most IR theorists who impute the fundamental explanatory power to national interest, I put more emphasis on the identity issue of political actors. Applying a social constructivist approach, I examine how the US and the EU identify itself in the postwar period, e.g. as a unilateralist and a multilateralist respectively, give directions to how they perceive other countries such as China and how they then define their interest. This paper argues that the increasing divergencies between the US and the EU in their self-identities leas to their divergent policies toward China. The first section of this paper conceptualizes identity and its influence on state behavior, providing a theoretical background for the following discussion. In the second part, these considerations are applied to the explanation of the divergencies between the American and European approaches to China. I rely heavily on textual analysis to trace the development of identity. Major information sources include scholarly works and media reports. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper argues that an important trend in China?s foreign trade policy in recent years has been the shift from bilateral negotiation approaches to more aggressive use of legal trade remedies such as antidumping, safeguards, and the dispute settlement procedures of the World Trade Organization. In addition to describing China?s increasing use of these legal trade instruments, this paper analyzes the driving forces behind this shift. Specifically, it argues that large, state-owned industries in China have shaped the demand for a different trade strategy as they have pushed for negotiation tactics that would either shield import-competing firms from foreign competition or help advance export-oriented firms? advance into the international market. These interests coincided with the desire of Chinese trade officials to overcome the constraints imposed by earlier years of bilateral negotiations with the United States. Changes in the policy preferences of industry groups and trade officials therefore help account for China?s increasingly aggressive embracement of legalism in its trade policy in recent years. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The research question of this paper is: “Does economic growth make China a threat?” Bearing this question in mind, I review the “China threat” literature and its counter-arguments since the early 1990s. This paper examines the offensive realist theoretical basis for the “China threat” literature, and it outlines several oversimplifications that the “China threat” arguments often suffer. Moreover, it is argued that while the “China threat” literature tends to support its arguments by rejecting the liberalist interdependence peace hypothesis and democratic peace hypothesis in the China context, a Marxist dependency framework may be more relevant to explore China’s capabilities and intention to pose a threat to the United States. And, in order to fully assess the strategic implications of China’s economic growth, we need to place the economic growth in the background of economic globalization as well as to take China’s domestic social relations in the process of economic growth into consideration. My conclusion is that economic growth will not make China a threat. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]