Search

In the discourse on Human Security, it has been said that security should be considered not in the context of state-state relations, but in that of individual security. To a certain extent, this argument is convincing. However, it has rarely been understood that this argument is constructed on the basis of a modern understanding of universalized human development. This comprehension of humanity has often resulted in colonial occupation with a justification that the home country's colonization would contribute to the colonized nation in terms of health and sanitation. In this paper, I will investigate recent discourses in Japan regarding the bird flu epidemic, a disease allegedly prevalent on the Asian continent, and I will compare it to what was said in the case of Japan's colonization of Taiwan, and in the context of the narratives of health and sanitation that were used in this case in particular. In doing so, I will argue that the recent discourses on Human Security regarding contagion are ironically re-generating the state-centered perception towards world affairs by presenting contagion in a light that is similar to traditional threats presented by so-called Others. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The state-centeredness of intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) reinforces the prevailing Westphalian international system. International organizations privilege cooperation among nation-states so as to ameliorate anarchy. However, events like the establishment of international human rights regimes and the advancement of globalization since the second half of the twentieth century have called into question whether this hegemonic form still represents the best route to global governance. When national governments lack accountability, serious inadequacies may develop. What happens when governments, through which the rights bestowed on individuals by international human rights covenants, are themselves violators of human rights, especially against those of ethnopolitical minorities? What happens when governments, which are entrusted to provide the best care to the well-being of their people, hide information and obstruct international assistance? These glaring gaps are in plain view in the way China initially responded to the crisis of Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) of 2003. The World Health Organization (WHO) and China both went through a learning curve.In the era of globalization, the traditional state-centered approach is further inadequate when disputes over sovereignty hinder the rights to which a significant population is entitled under international law. A well-known anomaly in conventional international law and organization is the contest over Taiwan?s (or formally, Republic of China?s) international legal status and its consequent impact on the rights of the people of Taiwan and the benefits that the international community might have enjoyed with the participation of a significant player in global trade, technology, and democracy.This paper seeks to break some new ground in this theoretical and policy lacuna by presenting a sui generis model for Taiwan?s IGO participation that might simultaneously assure China?s concerns, enable Taiwan to play a part commensurate with its global importance, and permit the international society to benefit from the contribution of a key player and improved cross-strait relations. This model is grounded on the recognition that global governance in the era of globalization mandates the inclusion of all functional competent entities and will require adjustments in mindsets and practices. Its key elements are: (1) decoupling the issues of Taiwan?s IGO membership and diplomatic recognition; (2) amending charters or constitutions of those IGOs that allegedly only admit sovereign states so that they can also admit a functionally competent entity (for a particular issue area); (3) stating on Taiwan?s accession documents that admission into a given IGO does not have any impact on that body?s position on China representation or imply sovereignty for Taiwan; and (4) stipulating that Taiwan will automatically lose membership if it declares independence after its entry into the IGOs. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper overviews sophisticated triangular relations among Taipei, Beijing and Washington after 2000. Then, it scrutinizes the development of US mediation as a form of third-party intervention in such complicated dynamics in the Taiwan Strait. The pattern of contemporary US mediation is studied in an analytical way. Then, it analyzes the role and approaches (strategies) of the US in mediating between the ROC and the PRC, as well as evaluates preliminarily the future of US mediation. Some key findings include, for example: the US is gradually moving towards the role of real mediator in the cross-strait dispute, the characteristics of the US itself and the environment are positive forces driving further effective US mediation, as well as the US will continue to play a mediating role throughout the George W. BushÂ’s presidency but has to be cautious of the effectiveness of its mediation and the differences between Taipei and Beijing in order to find a useful way to enhance the understandability and acceptability of its official position on the peaceful resolution of the cross-strait sovereignty dispute. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, we will examine U.S. policy toward the Taiwan Strait under the Bush Administration. Much empirical evidence showed that the policy toward the Taiwan Strait slightly changed during Bush?s first term. After elaborating the subtle change of U.S. policy, we will attempt to interpret such change from the modified structuralism perspective. Different from neo-realist?s assumption of international anarchical status, we adopt neoliberalist?s view of international institutions existing in the international system. However, we don?t agree with the neoliberalist?s assumption that states seek their absolute interests. Instead, we accept neorealist?s survival prerequisite for states. Therefore, we identify the world as a hierarchical system and states seek their relative gains in this system. We further set the hierarchical system into two levels, the higher one and the lower one. According to Waltz?s structural theory, we claim only strong powers can have the capability to play on the higher level, while weak states are staying on the lower level of the international system. Any great power is gaming with other great powers on higher level and with weak states on lower level. Through such interactions on two levels, the great power can get interests from both. However, if the interests from the higher level are in conflict with those from the lower level, the great power, weighing its great power counterparts over the weak states, will discard the interests from the weak states. Our testing scenario centers the U.S. policy toward the Taiwan Strait under the Bush Administration. To fit this model, the U.S. and China are two powers staying on the higher level and Taiwan stays on the lower level. Previously, the U.S. were trying to get interests from both levels and keeping the ?double track? policy. However, two events change the balance among the three players: 9/11 attack and Taiwan?s independent referendum. These events lead to a conflict of the interests from China and Taiwan and the previous ?double track? policy does not work well. Thus, in order to keep interests from the higher-level partner -- China, the U.S. chooses the strategy to sacrifice its lower-level interests from Taiwan by stopping Taiwan?s willing of independence behind the referendum. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In East Asia, Taiwan and North Korea had been two most striking sources of Sino-American security contention. In Taiwan Strait, the key issue is whether Taiwan would go independence, despite China?s flagrant threat of using military forces to deter it. In case of North Korea, whether the North gives up its nuclear program and adopts reform and open door policy or it finally faces internal/external collapse serves as an incessant debating menu. But in both cases, the US and China pose contending positions. In Taiwan, the US at least supports status quo in the Taiwan Strait, if not Taiwan?s independence; while China believes the case as the last thing that they can accept. The US expects North Korea?s Kim Jong-il regime to collapse in the end, while China struggles to help surviving moribund Kim?s regime.Although these two security issues had thus far been two major security issues relating to the Sino-American relations, these had strangely been analyzed and studied in separate fashion. In other words, many pundits, scholars, and politicians had widely dealt with the Taiwan issue and North Korean issue per se, but this study attempts to link both issues in causal relations and to evaluate its influence over the Sino-American diplomatic relations. Based on this assumption, this paper plans to review the Sino-American relations regarding Taiwan and North Korea, and then to find out any meaningful co-relationship between the two cases. In order to produce consequential research outcomes, this study will apply game-theoretic model and event data analysis. Also, this study will cover the period from 1990 to now. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Why is China friendly towards Taiwan in the realm of trade but hostile in the political and diplomatic arenas? Objectives. This paper is to examine the significance of TaiwanÂ’s economic development to ChinaÂ’s economy, and to explore the extent to which the economic interdependence of the two sides affects the level of tension across the Taiwan Strait. My arguments are that China does not use economic means to sanction or attack Taiwan because TaiwanÂ’s economic development, based on a large amount of trade and investment in China, has great implications for ChinaÂ’s economic growth. The increase of ChinaÂ’s economic growth because of the salient economic interactions between Taiwan and China contributes to lowering the level of tension between the two sides. Methods. Using data derived from Monthly Statistics of Exports and Imports, Ministry of Finance, Taiwan, the Republic of China (ROC), I test my hypotheses using one multivariate regression model and an ordered logistic model with twenty-five observations for each variable, which are based on a time series analysis ranging from 1979 to 2003. Results. For the regression model, the findings, based on GDP indicators, demonstrate that TaiwanÂ’s economic growth has positively significant influence on ChinaÂ’s economic growth. The findings of the ordered logistic model show that ChinaÂ’s GDP and GDP ratio are negatively significant to the tension level, meaning that the increase of ChinaÂ’s GDP and GDP ratio respectively decrease the level of tension between the two sides. However, TaiwanÂ’s regime change to democracy has positive effect on the increase of tension. The statistical results support the long-standing liberal hypothesis that trade ties facilitate interstate peace. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Despite repeated U.S. claims that its policy toward relations across the Taiwan Strait is ?consistent? and ?clear,? in actuality its policy has long been one of ?strategic ambiguity.? It is widely recognized by scholars and policy-makers alike that the so-called Taiwan question is the most potentially explosive issue in U.S.-P.R.C relations.What is the strategic ambiguity policy all about? What role has it played in influencing the equilibrium outcomes of cross-Strait relations in the past three decades? How are the dynamics of the ?strategic triangle? consisting of the United States, Mainland China and Taiwan to be understood? How effective in preserving peace across the Taiwan Strait is U.S. policy of strategic ambiguity likely to be in the future? Few studies, if any, have provided theoretical answers to these questions. This paper tries to develop a game theoretic model which may provide tentative answers to these interesting, unresolved questions. Supporters of the ?strategic ambiguity? policy argue that it has successfully kept the Strait free of conflict: on the one hand, Mainland China always has to take into account the possibility that the United States might intervene if it were to attack Taiwan, and on the other hand, Taiwan always has to think twice before ?going too far? (such as declaring formal independence from the mainland). The policy, it is said, has served U.S. national security interests and has effectively accommodated changes in cross-Strait relations in past decades. There are opposing opinions, however. The dissolution of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War have rendered one of the major imperatives for a U.S.-China rapprochement and compromises on Taiwan?the basis of the strategic ambiguity policy?obsolete. Moreover, the democratization of Taiwan and the increasing military threat if faces, such as the deployment of missiles by Mainland China aimed at Taiwan, have brought new variables into the equation. Taiwan?s thriving democracy has added ideological values and moral imperatives to the U.S. commitment of defending the island. The increasing military threat from Mainland China, meanwhile, seems to have strengthened the argument for an increasing commitment to Taiwan?s defense, either in the form of more military sales or coordination between U.S. and Taiwan militaries. A continuing ambiguity in U.S. policy, so the arguments goes, will encourage PRC militancy and frustrate Taiwan?s determination to resisting aggression, and may be prone to disrupt the delicate equilibrium. Above all, it seems to compromise the U.S. moral imperative of defending democratic values.Our model shows that the policy of strategic ambiguity helps preserve the status quo and maintain peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait. The strategic ambiguity policy is a defensive strategy in nature, well-suited at deterring both Mainland China and Taiwan from deviating from equilibrium strategies. In the long run, the strategic ambiguity policy, however, needs to be supplemented, if not replaced, by more imaginative policies in order to successfully manage the Taiwan issue. For example, the United States could be more forthright in proposals that help to eliminate potential conflicts of interest, such as proposing that Mainland China renounce the use of force to resolve the Taiwan issue in exchange for Taiwan?s pledge not to pursue independence. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The year of 2008 has witnessed the historical and significant moment of the first cross-Strait official interaction between two incumbent parties (the KMT of Taiwan and the CCP of China), which has been frozen for over six decades. Particularly, with Pres ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Beijing and Taipei experienced an uneasy and even turbulent period of bilateral relations after the mid-1990s, particularly during the period 2000-08 when the pro-Taiwan independence party, DPP, was in office. With the KMT, which has a very different perc ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Many recent studies find that international political conflictâ€"operationalized in a variety of waysâ€"harms trade. Well-known cases help to underscore these general findings. For example, Cold War tensions helped to undermine East-West trade, and trade between India and Pakistan slowed sharply in the years after partition. On the other hand, however, trade between adversaries also appears to vary substantially across cases. Indeed, trade can sometimes flourish despite intense political rivalry. In the current relationship between mainland China and Taiwan, for example, China has become Taiwan’s largest trading partner despite persistent political tension across the Taiwan Strait.How can we explain variation in the extent to which states trade with their adversaries? Building on existing literature, I develop a framework through which to understand how domestic coalitions concerning trade with an adversary are likely to form. While some actors are likely to favor or oppose trade for purely economic reasons, those without a direct economic stake in the relationship are likely to focus more on the political and security consequences of trade with the adversary. In this framework, two variables emerge as central in determining a country’s trade policy with an adversary: the relative political strength of internationalist versus protectionist economic interests, and whether those concerned primarily with politics believe trade will have positive or negative political and security externalities. I use the framework to develop several testable hypotheses, and evaluate them via short case studies of three contemporary rivalries: China/Taiwan; India/Pakistan; and North Korea/South Korea ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on economic interdependence and growing Taiwanese identity in cross-strait relations. It notes since the mid-1990s, the cross- strait relationship between the Republic of China on Taiwan (ROC) and People's Republic of China (PRC) has been marked with turmoil with periodic crises in which the possibility of an outbreak of armed conflicts appears to have been significant. Also described are the economic and social processes that are increasingly connecting Taiwan to the Chinese Mainland.

In Taiwan, since the early 1990s, Taiwanese identity has rapidly supplanted Chinese identity. This has pushed all the main political parties towards the new identity, and brought the Democratic Progressive Party to power. Rising Taiwanese identity has also affected military strategies. It has accelerated the cross-strait arms race by alarming Beijing and supporting an offsetting build-up in Taiwan. It has also strengthened Taiwan's will to retain her independence, and thereby led to newer, more unconventional defense strategies. One such strategy is to enhance ideological legitimacy in the US and Japan. Another is to embrace economic integration with China--a development hitherto seen as threatening. A third is to deter a Chinese attack by credibly committing to a more dogged fight to preserve independence, even under conditions where such a fight seems hopeless. Last, a strong Taiwanese identity makes it more likely that China's increasing conventional military predominance will ultimately call forth a Taiwanese nuclear deterrent. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article analyzes regional governance perspectives in Greater China. It explores the micro governance among the People's Republic of China (PRC), Taiwan and Hong Kong to show the modes of development shaped by their daily economic, trade, human and knowledge interactions. The author shows the catalyst of changes based on integration, interdependence, indifference and independence. The author argues that the deterioration of relations between Taiwan and the PRC was caused by many political as well as institutional factors.

The article focuses on the military threat facing Taiwan, whose status as a sovereign state is weakly supported in the international community. It cites the threat posed by the determination of the People's Republic of China (PRC) to unite Taiwan with the mainland. It notes that China is determined to prevent Taiwan from declaring independence and to return the island to the mainland's governance. It mentions the significant problems posed by Taiwan Strait for the conduct of amphibious warfare.

The article focuses on a study that attempts to understand American military posture in East Asia within the context of a U.S.-Japan-China-South Korea-Taiwan pyramid, where the U.S. plays the role of benign leader at the apex. It explores some military arrangements contemplated by the U.S. It examines five official documents made to the public since the inauguration of U.S. President George W. Bush including the "Quadrennial Defense Review Report."

The author claims that exercising sovereignty is no easier in a globalized world than it used to be. She argues that globalization has not eroded that traditional system because the role of powerful states still outweighs the desires of less powerful states to try to shift the power of the international system. She cites the reason why Taiwan ought to have a stronger ability to exercise sovereignty than virtually any other non-recognized entity.

The article looks at the future of cross-strait relations after the election of fourth-generation leaders in China in 2002. It cites that China has adopted a cool dealing strategy toward Taiwan after Chen Sui-bian was elected President in 2002 and condemned the defensive referendum proposed by the president. It argues that maintaining status quo in Taiwan Strait is the key to pursue the stability and peace in the strait. It explains the factors that resulted to the conflict in Taiwan Strait and the role played by the U.S. concerning the issue.

While the relationship between economic interdependence and military conflict remains the subject of debate, recent research has begun to focus more on the micro-foundations underlying any such relationship. At least three arguments are commonly used to link economic integration with a reduced likelihood of military conflict: economic ties act as a constraint by raising the costs of conflict; economic ties facilitate communication and hence reduce the likelihood of dangerous miscalculations; and economic integration transforms state goals, making them conflict less with the goals of other states. Because all three causal mechanisms posit a similar outcome--economic interdependence reduces the likelihood of military conflict--testing them against each other is difficult; as such, the use of detailed case studies would seem a promising approach, since this mode of analysis allows for a close examination of the dynamics driving observed policy changes in particular countries. After summarizing the logic of each of the three arguments, I test them against each other using a case study of the relationship between Mainland China and Taiwan. While I do not find unambiguous support for any of the three causal mechanisms, I find the evidence, on balance, to be more consistent with the informational and transformational arguments than it is with the constraint argument. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article offers legal perspective on the conflict and compatibility in the cross-strait relations between Mainland China and Taiwan. It notes that the government of the People's Republic of China (PRC) was eventually recognized in 1971 by the United Nations General Assembly as the only lawful representative of the entire China in the organization. Also compared and discussed is the legal framework created for both the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (SAR) and the Macao SAR.

The article focuses on preventing tension in the Taiwan Strait. It cites that an outbreak of military conflict in the channel would have consequences for regional stability and the global economy. The first security priority for the second term of U.S. President George W. Bush will be preventing the conflict due to changing status quo as well as increasing urgency. One of the reasons why Taiwan is of considerable significance to the U.S. is that U.S. support for Taiwan is closely tied to U.S. interests in fostering newly established democracies.

Determining the impact of information and communication technologies (ICTs) on economic growth is part of a process of understanding the relationship of technological change and economic growth more generally. Like the several technological revolutions before it, the ICT revolution generates economic growth through increasing investment and productivity generated by large changes in relative prices and the resulting positive feedback, autocatalytic effects, and increasing returns on products, processes, and institutions throughout the economy. The ICT revolution is distinctive because of the knowledge intensity of the technology, which generates exceptionally high levels of externalities, spillovers and positive feedback on a global scale. Economic growth is a result of the ability of national and local institutions repeatedly to generate and/or capture the resources from the processes of positive feedback produced by technological change. Technology and institutions co-evolve as new resources are captured and used strategically in economic and political relationships. The most successful institutional form (to this point) for developing nations is a partnership of states and firms, able repeatedly to capture and use knowledge resources to amplify the productive and competitive capabilities of nation and firms. These ideas are demonstrated through a brief review of the processes of increasing returns in previous technological revolutions, a detailed examination of the successes of Singapore, Taiwan, Korea, and Malaysia in the electronics industries, and a discussion of new opportunities in business process outsourcing, especially in India. The conclusion is that ICTs offer significant opportunities for states ready to create institutions able to utilize the resources now flowing from global production and outsourcing networks. NB: This version contains case studies only of Korea and Malaysia. The remaining cases of Singapore, Taiwan, and India are forthcoming. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Most of the contemporary policy debate regarding the interdependence of trade and conflict has been preoccupied with devising responses either in favor of or in opposition to the long prevailing notion that trade is positively and unconditionally correlated with peace because trading partners fear that conflict will result in the loss of welfare gains from trade. The realist response implies that political foes trade willingly only when relative gains are equivalent, and the liberal position implies that trade promotes peace because trade partners prefer gains from trade to conflict. The China-Taiwan security conflict provides a counter-example to each argument. Through the advantages of non-cooperative game theory, we model a trade-conflict interaction to discover the conditions under which trade and conflict will occur between trade partners. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the post-Cold War era, China, Japan and Taiwan entered the new phase of their relationship and were forced to reconsider their security and political dialogues. Despite of the US presence in East Asia, they are becoming more active players in the regio ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In recent year, there have been significant developments in the peace and stability in cross-Strait relations, which is critical to the international relations in East Asia. At the same time, economic interdependence links mainland China with the US and T ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In alliances, the weaker more dependent ally should act according to a logic of deference and non-confrontation vis-à-vis its stronger ally due to power and material asymmetries. However, alliance theory is under-specified in why or when weaker players c ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

China’s resumption of the exercise of sovereignty over Hong Kong (HK) in 1997 under the One Country Two Systems (1C2S) concept which allowed HK’s capitalistic system and way of life to continue while China would keep its socialist system (with Chinese cha ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The increasing economic and social interaction between Taiwan and China has posed a huge challenge to government regulation on cross-Strait activities. Nonetheless, there is no consensus about whether the government should pursue an advanced opening or not among people in Taiwan. The dispute over whether the current restriction on the cross-Strait activities should be cut down and the extent to which the government should open its economy and society to China have always been highly contesting issues. As one of the major actors in the policy-making process, legislators play a very important role in this dispute. Accordingly, this essay aims to examine the determinants of legislators' position on further cross-Strait opening over time. Our empirical study shows that although the liberal perspective in international relations theory argues that the increasing economic and social interaction between both sides of the Strait will gradually create a more positive attitude toward China among Taiwanese political elites, domestic politics play a more important role in Taiwanese legislators' consideration about further cross-Strait opening. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Structurally, it is always argued that the overlapping of cultural differences and discriminatory practices have contributed to the crystallization of group identity in Taiwan, be it ethnic or national one. Mobilized by the elites, the mass begin to realize their collective destiny under the ethnicized state and rise to claim their fair share of the state or even to take over the whole state machine. On the other hand, some have pledge to disentangle cultural attributes and political, economic, and social distribution, in the hope that color-blind based programs is more conduced to conflict reduction, if not resolution, of ethnic cleavages. It is recognized that well-tailored crosscutting between ethnicity and distribution may abate group solidarity. Nonetheless, when it comes to the question of historical consciousness, the above wisdom will have difficulty in dealing with the diffusing ethnic antagonism over historic traumas. Leaving aside historical justice, there is no guarantee that fair distributions would mitigate differences in national identity among ethnic groups. Constructurally, the three-pronged processes of nation-building, state-building, and state-making may go hand in hand. However, for the ruling Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), democratization is amount to regime change. As a result, the stepwise discourse of ?Republic of China to Taiwan, Republic of China on Taiwan, and Republic of China being Taiwan? is nothing more than reinforcing the legitimacy of this alien regime. It is no wonder that there is no well-thought and coherent plan for institutional development. As the DPP is determined to interpret the task of state-making as nothing but changing the official name of country, it is predictable that the mission of state-making will be compromised as an self-serving instrument of the former only. What is worse, if democracy is arrogantly defined simply as majority rule whether in elections or in referenda, there is no reason why the alienated minorities would choose to take part in the project of nation-building. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

When do independent states choose to unify? We propose that unification agreements are most feasible when one of two conditions holds. The unification bargain does not independently erode the bargaining power of the weaker state, or the more powerful state can commit credibly not to utilize its increased bargaining power to restructure the agreement ex post. We demonstrate the argument's utility via two historical cases: 19th century Argentine and German unification. We then show that the argument helps to explain why the PRC has found it difficult to make progress on achieving a peaceful bargain with Taiwan, and we consider possible future scenarios in cross-Strait relations in light of the theory and case studies. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

China, claiming sovereignty over Taiwan, has dramatically changed its policies towards the island ever since Taiwan?s first democratic presidential election in 1996. While there is no doubt that China is strongly motivated to influence Taiwan?s democratic elections to try to prevent victory for pro-independence candidates in Taiwan, it is less clear why their strategies have changed dramatically from each Taiwan election to the next.For the 1996 election, China exhibited both military threats and rhetoric threats. For the 2000 election, China exhibited high rhetoric threats but no serious military threats. And for the 2004 election, China exhibited low rhetoric and low military threats. With the 2008 election nearing, will cross-straits relations rise to another crisis at the level seen in 1996, or will it be low-profile as it was in 2004?My research will not only explore the varying policies and strategies China employed during each of Taiwan?s presidential elections but also attempt to isolate explanatory factors that caused those variations.Focusing on China?s rhetorical and military policy towards Taiwan, I will collect my policy data by on sampling, and categorizing Chinese officials' statements, speeches, official commentators' articles, military exercises, military procedures, and military statements, published in China's key indicator newspaper. The research span will focus on the three Taiwanese election periods, each roughly from eight months before the election to three months after the election. After categorizing, these newspaper reports will be translated into comparable statistical charts so that the variations in China's rhetoric and military threat will be clearly visible and facilitate comparing and contrasting. No analysis of Cross-Strait relations can be understood without considering the impact of the United States and its relations with China. The three presidential election time periods will be examined under the context of the US-China-Taiwan trilateral relationship. The meaningful questions here are when, which, and why certain rhetoric and military policies are taken under the trilateral interactions. By exploring these questions, we can try to understand China's intentions and predict its policies towards future elections in Taiwan, and security in general for the East Asia region. My research will conclude that: 1) there is a strong feedback function in China's policy toward Taiwan. In other words, China's policy making system learned and adapted through Taiwan's three presidential elections by trial-and-error; 2) China's policies, in spite of the variations, are still highly consistent to state rationality (realism). Other realist considerations include China's interesting deterrence-behavior patterns, in particular bluffing; 3) and predictions of possible Chinese policies towards Taiwan for the 2008 election and explanation for China's long term rationality. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Political life in modern Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan is traditionally characterized by a strong central government, influential economic elites, and a relatively homogeneous society. In such settings we would not expect to find much local democratic innovation, but the case of foreign workers in these countries challenges this assessment. Relatively unskilled foreign workers in present-day East Asia face a range of hardships, and existing governments? programs provide little support. Media portrayals of illegal workers ? as in several other industrialized democracies ? reinforce popular suspicion and fear of these foreigners. Yet, host countries? citizens themselves have formed numerous local associations aimed at assisting illegal foreign workers. I evaluate this trend in light of a pragmatic account of political motivation: associative activism. My account makes explicit the process through which some activists, who initially work in concert chiefly to solve specific local problems, eventually form broader political ambitions as they exert pressure on dominant features of the public sphere, especially processes of political representation and opinion formation. These associative efforts illustrate how civil society groups in East Asian countries can play an increasing role in redefining membership rules and state responsibilities for their residents. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Taiwan resists reunification with China because of a credibility problem, but the problem is typically explained in a misleading way. While China has an incentive to renege on any promises it makes to respect Taiwanese autonomy under a “one country, two systems” bargain, Taiwan might still choose reunification if it thought that reunification would not independently diminish its bargaining leverage with Beijing. Taiwan’s leverage, whether it chooses reunification or not, depends on its expectations about the extent to which reunification would uniquely erode its economic ties outside China and its military support from the United States in the event of a crisis. If it were to lose those things anyway, it might choose reunification despite the mainland’s general lack of credibility. Historical comparisons with two analogous cases in the 19th century – Buenos Aries negotiations over Argentine reunification with the litoral provinces and Prussia’s negotiations over German unification with Saxony and Bavaria – illustrate our argument. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Post-colonialism may be understood as a status of political oppression, economic dependence, and cultural subaltern even after a nation has obtained its formal independence. Alternatively, post-colonialism stands for disillusions over the above neocolonialism after the departure of the past colonist. Finally, post-colonialism represents a commitment to forge a new national identity while endeavoring to get rid of structural and cultural violence inherited by the native elites. After a brief recapitulating of the development of the Taiwan Independence Movement after the War, we will construct a conceptual framework of settersÂ’ society to understand the triple task of undoing the internal colonialism waged on the Austronesian indigenous peoples by the Han settlers, reconciling historical cleavages between the natives and the Mainlanders, and resisting irredentism from its fatherland, China. We argue that this is a three-pronged mission at the same time: while making all efforts to secure state-making in the international society, both nation-building and state-building are actively pursued. As a result, we shall first look into how the Taiwanese are withstanding military threats and economic attractions from China. Secondly, we shall examine how the native government is ready to make its way to replacing the regime of the Republic of China implanted by the Nationalist Chinese. Thirdly, we shall inquiry into how an inclusive national identity is imagined out of competing ethnic representations. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

PARTY POLITICS DURING THE DEMOCRATIZATION PERIOD AND THE FOREIGN POLICY CHANGE: THE CASE OF TAIWAN, 1986-2000 YU ZhenhuiDepartment of Politics and Public AdministrationFaculty of Social SciencesThe University of Hong KongE-mail: zhenhuiy@hkusua.hku.hkThis study aims to explore the impact of party politics within a democratizing state /political entity on its foreign policy change, based on a critical review of the recent hot debate on the ?democratic peace? theory. This study will develop a theoretical framework to analyze the correlations between party politics during the democratization period and the foreign policy change, and conduct an intensive case study of Taiwan during its democratization period to contribute to this research area. The ?democratic peace? theory basically argues that democracies do not fight against each other theoretically and historically, and thus the spread of liberal democracy globally will bring about more peace and stability in the international relations. However, if an authoritarian state /political entity is undertaking a democratic transition, i.e., from a one-party authoritarian rule to a more competitive multiparty system, will it consistently stick to a stable foreign policy making in accordance with the ?democratic peace? proposition? Will it make any irrational or risky foreign policy change due to the development of party politics domestically? If yes, under what circumstances? Through the analytical framework applied in this research and an intensive case study of Taiwan, it shall be assumed that party politics within a democratizing state /political entity may produce some radical foreign policy change toward its ?identified? opponent, which may lead to regional instability and even a possibility of war, under the circumstances that will be summarized and analyzed in this study. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In recent decades the financial market structure in Malaysia and Taiwan has undergone a dramatic shift away from a bank-based system towards a capital market-oriented one. These trends were well underway prior to the Asian financial crisis of the late 1990s but they were consolidated and accelerated by that event and its aftermath. Capital markets have played such a dominant role in transferring funds and mobilizing industrial financing in the two economies that their overall financial structures have now become more market-oriented than those in the UK and the US. Challenging both the hyper-globalization and the neo-statist theses, this article contends that the growing market-orientation of the Malaysian and Taiwanese financial architectures reflects neither the inevitable process of convergence on neo-liberal practices nor the helping hands of the developmental state. It attempts to advance an institutional explanation that locates the political sources of financial market changes within the national configuration of interest and policy alliances between state economic agencies and private financial communities. Such alliances, which create policy and regulatory environments conducive to the development of capital markets, have exerted shaping influence over the market-oriented transformation of the financial system in Malaysia and Taiwan. This research fills in an important analytical gap in the existing literature that tends to pay scant attention to divergent institutional responses, particularly in the area of financial sector governance, to the constraining effects of global capitalism in developing and emerging market economies. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]