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The trajectory of the Chinese nuclear program over the last decades of the twentieth century presents a puzzle that nuclear deterrence theory is ill-equipped to explain: Despite a strong commitment to a deterrent strategy and ample economic and technical abilities to build the necessary forces, China allowed its nuclear program to stagnate dangerously â€" perhaps beyond the point of second-strike survivability with respect to the major nuclear arsenals of the world. To explain the pattern of Chinese nuclear development, a richer understanding of the context â€" both domestic and international â€" is necessary, including improved (though still tense) superpower relationships, a shifted focus toward economic growth (for its own sake and as a source of power), and a reduced voice of military actors in policy-making. While not changing the fundamental implications of deterrence models, this context reduced the willingness of the Chinese leadership to make trade-offs when pursuit of nuclear modernization would have compromised objectives in other arenas. This paper suggests that deterrence theory must be broadened to incorporate a wider range of factors, both to reflect the decision-making process and to accurately predict outcomes. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper critically examines four theorists who argue (explicitly or implicitly) that the power of one necessarily comes at the expense of the power of another, and who model the exercise of power on the practice of war. The paper argues that the descriptions of power offered by Machiavelli, Hobbes, Clausewitz, and Foucault ring true in many respects, but all encounter difficulties in basing power relations on pure conflict when most actual power relations blend common and conflicting interests. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How is it possible to foster cooperation between nations having strong divides? Common mechanisms for cooperation and conflict resolution such as confidence-building measures or negotiations mediated by brokers are not always successful, as exemplified by the 2000 Camp David attempt to solve the Israeli-Palestinian divide. Environmental issues are often presented as causes for conflict. Thomas-Homer Dixon exemplifies the work in this research tradition, asserting that “environmental problems can trigger or exacerbate localized conflicts along existing social cleavages such as ethnicity, class, region, or relative deprivation, and that these conflicts can in turn spill over to more widespread violence” . However, a emergent contending view, environmental peacemaking, is suggesting that environmental concerns can serve as catalysts in conflict resolution. Many studies in the field of ecological security have been trying to predict conflict, assuming that chiefly conflict is predicted by environmental issues. In contrast, the present study argues that environmental issues can play a role in conflict resolution and thus proposes to predict a different dependent variable, conflict resolution, using environmental problems. This study investigates whether environmental concerns fostered cooperation and conflict resolution in the case of the 1994 Agreed Framework which aimed at easing nuclear tensions in the Korean peninsula. An international consortium negotiated the 1994 Agreed Framework with North Korea, such that Pyongyang would no longer use its nuclear power plants and, in exchange, would receive two light-water reactors to account for the subsequent loss of power. Even though the consortium is currently in breach of the Agreed Framework, as the terms of the agreement have not been fulfilled, the focus of the paper is on the events, actors, negotiations, circumstances and motives preceding the signature of the Agreed Framework. After fleshing out the ecological security debate and the environmental peacemaking proposals, the paper will test two hypotheses concerning the manner in which environmental peacemaking could operate. The first hypothesis proposes that environmental issues change the strategic climate between contending parties, and the second hypothesis argues that the strengthening of a post-Westphalian governance involving transnational actors and civil societies is conducive to environmental peace-making. The paper will present a survey of the existing literature on ecological security as well as a case study, examining the relationship between conflict resolution and environmental concerns on the Korean peninsula. Individual statements as well as communiqués from the contending parties will be studied in order to extract environmental issues. A careful study of Korean and foreign nongovernmental organizations related to the Agreed Framework will also be undertaken. Notes: 1. Homer-Dixon, Thomas. Environmental Scarcities and Violent Conflict: Evidence from Cases. International Security, vol. 19, no. 1 (Summer 1994) pp 5 - 40. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper will revisit the existing international sanctions literature, offering new answers to outstanding questions. The paper will propose a new game theoretic treatment of the sanctioning game and probe its empirical relevance on a dataset. The outstanding questions are whether sanctions work, whether positive incentives work better than sanctions proper, and when is war preferable to sanctioning. The new answer is the contractual theory approach to adverse selection, which, to my knowledge, has not been applied to the study of sanctions, or to any IR topic at large. The paper begins justifying the assumption that most sanction situations can be analyzed as games of information asymmetry, in which the sanctioner does not know the target’s resolve. Information asymmetry is a cause of inefficiency in standard sanction models, as the sanctioner has to guess the type and will sometimes guess it wrong. I characterize such models as models in which sanctions are modeled as a reservation value. Instead, I offer to think of sanctions as contracts along the ways of contractual theory. In this game, the sanctioner confronts the target with a menu of contracts, as many as there are different possible “types” of target. The alternative to the menu—if the target turns down every contract—is war. The menu is structured so that each “type” participates and selects the contract that is destined to its type, thereby leading to the revelation of all private information and removing the main source of inefficiency. Assuming two types, the “pragmatic” type takes the contract with the positive incentive, whereas the “rogue” type takes the sanction contract. The advantage of this formulation is that it allows us to identify the conditions in which sanctioners will prefer to threaten war rather than provide positive inducements to target states. It is the case when the sanctioner’s expected value for offering a full menu (featuring a contract with a positive incentive for the pragmatic type and another with a sanction for the rogue type) is lower to the sanctioner’s expected value of offering a “menu with shutdown,” featuring a single, zero-incentive, contract for the pragmatic type and war for the rogue type. In a second part, I will use the comparative statics of the model to test the empirical relevance of the model. I will use a variation of the now-standard Hufbauer, Schott and Elliot’s dataset expanded to include cases of war, such as the recent US-Iraq war. The test will involve creating new variables coding the type of the menu—the presence of positive incentives, the threat of sanctions, the threat of war—and testing if the variation in these variables correlates or not with the parameters of the model (distribution of types, sanctioner’s cost of war, degree of dissimilarity between types, etc). I do not have the results as of yet (October 2003). The paper would easily fit in two categories of panel: a panel on international sanctions or a panel on new developments in applications of game theory to IR. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Scholars of Latin America have recently begun to apply the bellicist approach to state building to the region, the central claim of which is that wars are a great stimulus to centralizing state power and building institutional capacity. This paper argues that current applications of these models of state building are too narrowly specified to be of much use in Latin America or elsewhere in the developing world. Replacing the focus on interstate war with the more general phenomenon of interstate rivalry, alongside the consideration of intrastate rivals, allows us to account for the impact of both external and internal forces on the development of the state. The paper demonstrates the utility of this approach through several time-series analyses that provide evidence that external and internal rivals affect the Latin American state in a manner consistent with the general nature of bellicist theory. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper assesses contending theoretical claims regarding state responses to globalization through empirical analysis of nonproliferatione export controls. Globalization theorists claim that technological advances and increased interdependence are bringing about the end of the Westphalian world order of sovereign states. Transgovernmentalists counter that states are disaggregating into their functional components and developing international governance through transnational networks of government regulators. Traditionalists assert the continued relevance and vitality of the state. Export controls lie at the center of this debate, and are a concrete manifestation of states’ efforts to reassert control over borders and boundaries in the face of transnational flows and technological diffusion. Export control regulations face precisely the challenges highlighted by theorists of globalization and world order, and offer a window into the capacity of states to respond to the challenges of globalization. They also constitute a strong test of contending theories. If neomedievalists are correct and the state is being displaced by networks of international institutions and non-state actors, then national export controls should be increasingly inadequate to deal with global technological flows. Export control cooperation occurs through the transgovernmental networks heralded as the basis of the real new world order. And as a policy response to the threat of WMD proliferation, export controls are a crucial test case for realist claims of the continued efficacy of states in managing security threats. This paper will interrogate the claims of these contending theories regarding twenty-first century world order through an empirical analysis of national export control systems and post-Cold War cooperation in multilateral nonproliferation export control regimes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Japan does not have any official relation with its neighbor North-Korea. With the end of the Cold War Japan has started to assume a greater political role in East Asia has started to engage in a foreign policy approach that is more independent from the security ties Japan has with the United States. North-Korea does play an important role in Japanese Foreign Policy and Security making. North Korea’s likely possession of nuclear weapons and its willingness to use them poses a big security threat to Japan that cannot be ignored. Several Missile tests in 1993, 1994, 1998 and 2003 have demonstrated to the Japanese government that North Korea is a problem that needs to be taken seriously. During the same time (1990-present) Japan has undergone major political changes on the domestic level. In1993 the dominance of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) ended and was succeeded by differing coalition governments, that put the LDP first into opposition and then into the status of a coalition partner. The Japanese Socialist Party (JSP), a former major opposition to a more independent approach to foreign policy has collapsed completely after it had provided the Prime Minister from 1994-1996. This opened up the possibility for a turn towards a more militaristic, nationalistic driven foreign policy approach that is more independent from the United States. This has gone as far as Defense Minister Shigeru Ishiba announcing that he did not rule out a pre-emptive strike if Japan felt that North Korea was about to launch a missile at Japan. This author argues that this change in foreign policy has been significantly caused by the domestic changes mentioned above. This paper hence wishes to contribute to the research of the influence of domestic factors on foreign policy making and rejects the realist assumption that changes in the International System cause change of foreign policy approaches. Realist theory is not able to explain the change of Japanese foreign policy sufficiently. In its analysis the paper will look at the issues that have influenced the relations between Japan and North Korea. The two most dominant issues will be the Security issue and the abduction issue. The security issue is important as it demonstrates how the different administrations reacted to missile tests by North Koreas. Since those tests happened at different points of time (1993, 1997, 1998, 2003) they are effective in demonstrating the different reactions of Japanese policy makers. The abduction issue is important because it demonstrates that the changes on the domestic level, namely the end of the dominance by the LDP and the need to engage in coalition governments have made the Japanese governments more dependent to public opinion. Due to that, issues like the abduction issue, that raises emotional responses by the Japanese public, cannot be ignored or dealt with silently by the Japanese government. It may require a strong response instead. This then demonstrates, that the domestic factors (changing government set-up, dependence on public opinion) influences Japanese Foreign Policy making towards North Korea. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The purpose for this research paper is to investigate the reasons behind the Chinese Nationalist Party (Kuomintang) initiation of democratization in Taiwan in using the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) of Mexico as comparison. The KMT should be consider as one of the rare hegemonic ruling party in the world to survive democratic transitions intact, even though the nature and structures of the party have been changed tremendously through democratization. The PRI possess the same qualities. However, the reasons for initiating liberalization of the two parties were somewhat different. Ultimately, four explanatory factors (two internal, two external) emerged as the main contributors to the democratization process in Taiwan. They are: first, the development of Taiwanese identity different from that of the Chinese; second, the political demands and activism of a growing middle class due to the economic success; third, the changes in United States foreign policy towards the encouragement of democratization; and fourth and most importantly, the competition with China for support and the recognition from the international community and the need for the Taiwanese government to enhance its appeal to international supporters, particularly the United States. In addition, while the four factors mentioned above all contributed to the KMT-led democratization in Taiwan, the influence of the United State’s foreign policy in the Fast East and its support of democratic states should be considered the most significant factor contributing to the democratization in Taiwan. In sum, the hypothesis proposed by this research paper is that the accumulation and interaction of all four factors made democratization in Taiwan and the end of the KMT one-party dominance inevitable, with the external pressure from the U.S. essentially playing the most significant role in impelling the KMT elites’ decision to liberalize, adopt electoral reform and stop the persecution of the opposition. The theoretical approaches of the paper are as the following: this paper will adopt the definition of “democracy” provided by Linz and Stepan (1978) to serve as guidelines for whether there is democracy in both Taiwan and Mexico. The definition from Linz states that the criteria of democracy are: “ [The] legal freedom to formulate and advocate political alternatives with the concomitant rights to free association, free speech, and other basic freedoms of person; free and nonviolent competition among leaders with periodic validation of their claim to rule; inclusion of all effective political offices in the democratic process; and provision for the participation of all members of the political community. Practically, this means the freedom to create political parties and to conduct free and honest elections at regular intervals without excluding any effective political office from direct or indirect electoral accountability” (Linz, 5). The paper will also posit that Lipset’s take on modernization theory (1959) holds valid in the case of Taiwan. The economic success in the 1970s and 1980s created a large, well-organized middle class that in turn demanded more political freedom, equality and liberalization. In addition, the paper also addresses Linz and Diamond’s (1989) claim that the genesis and maintenance of democracy is ‘greatly facilitated by values and behavioral dispositions, particularly at the elite level, of compromise, flexibility, tolerance, conciliation, moderation and restraint” (Linz, 12). The methodology use by the paper will be comparative analysis on both the KMT and the PRI’s initiation to liberalize. The paper will also provide historical analysis on the nature of the KMT and its 50-year dominance on Taiwan. Lastly, the paper analyzes voter turn-outs and the results of the 2000 presidential election, which validated the consolidation of democracy in both Taiwan and Mexico. Maybe it is because of the geographic distance; Taiwan and Mexico are not often compared and studied together. Even though there are great differences between the KMT and PRI authoritarian regime, the end result of democratization and the eventual ousting of both parties from power were the same. The paper hopes to shed light on the reasons behind an elite-led liberalization by comparing two difference cases with the same end results. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

By focusing on recent manifestations of popular opposition to European integration in Britain, Ireland, and Denmark, this paper will explore the question of why many Europeans oppose further European integration. In Britain, the Blair government, fearing defeat, has delayed a referendum on the European Monetary Union (EMU) indefinitely, In Denmark, the EMU was defeated in a referendum in 2000. Finally, in Ireland, the Treaty of Nice was surprisingly rejected in a 2001 referendum (a result that was reversed in a second referendum in 2002). By focusing on three specific cases where opposition to European integration has been mobilized, we will be able to examine both the individual and institutional factors that have contributed to the success of efforts to mobilize public opinion against European integration. Our three cases have been chosen for this paper because of their differences rather than because of their similarities. Britain has always been a reluctant participant in Europe, and, due to Britain’s history as a great power, the British people may be particularly reluctant to cede sovereignty to institutions dominated by former rivals. Opposition to European integration in Denmark may be motivated by more concrete fears that integration will jeopardize social welfare programs and impose inordinate costs on the wealthier states of Europe, of which Denmark is one. Finally, Ireland is a country considered to be among the most supportive of efforts at European integration, and its participation in Europe has coincided with a period of economic growth. Nevertheless, it is clear that even in Ireland, opposition to Europe can be mobilized if the circumstances are right. Previous research suggests several possible explanations. First, opposition to European integration reflects the continuing strength of national identities and the corresponding weakness of attachments to a larger Europe. Second, many Europeans fear that any benefits accruing from greater economic integration will be outweighed by economic costs, such as higher taxes, the loss of government subsidies, or the loss of employment. Third, opposition to European integration results from dissatisfaction with political elites, either at the national or European level. Finally, the importance of political parties in mobilizing opposition to European integration has been widely noted. We propose to test these hypotheses on two levels. First, using Eurobarometer surveys, we will consider these hypotheses at the individual level. Which social groups oppose European integration and what other values and opinions tend to coincide with such opposition? Second, we will consider the institutional actors, such as political parties, that have worked to mobilize opposition to European integration within these countries. What are the social bases of these parties or interest groups, and what are the primary arguments that they use against Europe? Our working hypothesis is that both the fear of economic costs and anti-elite sentiments can be used to mobilize opposition to Europe by parties and groups; however, such opposition can be mobilized only when national identities are strong and broader European identities are weak. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Turkey and the U.S.: NATO members on divergent paths?The long term political ramifications of the U.S./U.K. deposition of Saddam Hussein in early 2003 are unclear. What is clear is the stress that such an action had on direct U.S.-Turkey relations and U.S.-Turkey relations vis-à-vis NATO. The ‘alliance politics’ that took place prior to the U.S. invasion of Iraq are key in understanding the changing nature of the relationship between the U.S. and Turkey as well as the larger U.S.-Turkey-NATO picture. This paper provides a better comprehension of pre and post-war ‘alliance politics’ by examining Turkey’s domestic politics, the decisions made by its policymakers and the potential reasons behind those decisions in the face of intense U.S. pressure to allow the stationing of its troops on Turkey’s southern border with Iraq. A combination of interviews with Turkish MP’s, reviews of pertinent pre & post-war literature and official U.S. action/reaction will prove to be an adequate means to enhance the aforementioned comprehension. Furthermore, the paper will not only demonstrate the ‘looseness’ of the NATO alliance in the current era it will also address the degree to which the U.S.-Turkey relationship has shifted to a realm somewhere between an alliance and an alignment. This will be most easily accomplished with an examination of the ‘systemic context of alliance’ as outlined by Glenn Snyder (1997), in which the structure, relationships, interactions and units are all taken into account. This will open the door for future research into the ‘alliance politics’ of NATO in general and U.S.-Turkey in particular, in the wake of the second Gulf War as issues of entrapment and abandonment continue to cloud U.S. relations with its allies. Keywords: alliance politics, Turkey-U.S. relations, NATO Contact information: Nick L. Beatty Balkan Devlen E-mail: nlbfgd@mizzou.edu E-mail: bdff5@mizzou.edu Phone: 573-815-9813 Phone: 573-771-4264 Affiliation: Department of Political Science University of Missouri – Columbia phone: 573-882-2843 fax: 573-884-5131 [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the last two decades of the twentieth century, interactions among Taiwan, Hong Kong, and mainland China have undergone extensive change, moving from intensified confrontation to closer economic exchange. After Taipei legalized travel to the mainland in November 1987, new economic opportunities were opened up to both sides of the Strait. This change aroused plenty of discussions, with the main discussion centered around the possibility of an economically integrated Greater China . The great volume of trade across the strait and the huge amount of investments on the mainland by Taiwanese entrepreneurs have created a dense economic relationship that is potentially beneficial to further integration. In view of this, many scholars and political elites in the region have expressed their optimistism on the formation of Greater China through many of their discourses. The usages of terms such as “Greater China,” “Chinese Economic Area,” “Common Chinese Market,” or “South China Economic Sphere” all reflect these scholars’ eager expectation. However, the concerns for each side’s security, sovereignty, and domestic politics hinder such development, and the expected spillover from economic corporation into a higher level of integration has not yet appeared. In this paper, I would try to answer why the economic integration is unlikely in Greater China. And I would like to argue that the current economic interaction and given cultural similarity cannot lead to economic integration in the absence of political understanding. On the surface, comparative advantages come from complementary economic development on both sides of the Strait , geographic proximity (reducing transportation costs) and cultural affinity (reducing transaction costs in investment and technology transfer). However, fundamental sovereignty and identity differences remain. In the first part of this paper, I would like to apply Keohane and Nye’s framework, interdependence, to argue that the growing trade and investment volume flowing across the Strait does not imply interdependence. Since interdependence is a necessary antecedent to economic integration, integration is unlikely without any interdependence. Even if the ongoing trend can lead us to cross the threshold of interdependence, the political concerns are still able to undermine further institutionalization. In the second part of this paper, I would like to focus on the concept of cultural affinity which is supposed to be a plus for integration. However, given current political considerations, what we have are perceived hostility and alienated identification, and these factors reverse the plus to a minus for integration. In the third part, I would like to emphasize contested sovereignty, identity, and security tensions which can be seen as the prerequisites for the progress of economic integration. According to Joanne Gowa, security matters, however, enlightened by David Laitin’s study on leadership, I argue that the government/leader’s political concerns towards sovereignty and identity can play the most important role in hindering the progress of negotiation, furthermore, the future process of integration. I would like to conclude that since the political issue, especially sovereignty and identity issues, is not settled yet, it is too optimistic to expect the spillover effect that brings the current thriving economic interaction into a more institutionalized economic integration in the Greater China region. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper studies the impact of public opinion on presidential decision-making in foreign policy. Although a good deal of research looks at this general question, beyond the broad distinction between crisis and non-crisis decisions, the literature is largely inconclusive. We begin from this central distinction, utilizing the International Crisis Behavior Project’s criteria as the starting point for case selection. To observe in detail how differing patterns of public attentiveness influence foreign policymaking, we compare four cases: the 1991 Gulf War; the 1999 U.S. intervention in Kosovo; the U.S. response to Ethiopian famine in the mid-1980s; and U.S.-Japanese economic relations between 1988-1992. To move beyond the broad question of “public opinion and foreign policy,” we propose a more precisely specified analytical model, conceptualizing foreign policy decision making as a five-stage process: problem representation, option generation, policy selection, implementation, and policy review. At each decision stage, the question is asked: How influential was public opinion on a president’s decision? The model generates several testable hypotheses. For instance, foreign policy crises tend to produce a public that is highly attentive throughout all stages of the decision process. While strategic imperatives often overwhelm domestic political considerations in the early stages of a crisis, the relative importance of public opinion as a decision premise tends to increase during later stages, with presidents apt to sacrifice strategic effectiveness to pacify a highly attentive domestic audience during the implementation phase. Conversely, salient non-crisis foreign policies produce a selectively attentive public, whose greatest influence is likely to be on the president’s selection of policy rather than the manner in which that policy is implemented. Freed from the constraints of an attentive public, presidents are afforded considerable autonomy in implementing non-crisis policy in a manner consistent with their vision of the national interest, even if the general public does not share that same vision. This paper outlines the model and provides a brief overview of each of the cases, then assembles data on aggregate public opinion from a wide range of surveys and polls, and analyzes the resulting time series to compare the pattern of public involvement to the model’s predictions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper approaches the analysis of the environmental policies with the concept and view of international political economy. This paper, with the question of which elements determine the making of the environmental foreign policy?, has tried to analyze two cases in the period of Reagan administration of the United States; the ozone layer depletion and acid rain. These two cases have similar features, that is, both of them are long-range air pollution phenomena and were under spotlight contemporarily. However, the policies of the administration for these environmental problems were totally different. Therefore, this paper tries to analyze the cause which has brought about different outcomes in similar policy areas. This paper presents a hypothesis as follows: in the process of forming the environmental foreign policy in the Reagan administration, the decision makers focused on the relative economic gains. In the 1980s, the CFCs industry of the U.S. was in trouble as a result of the ban on the use of CFCs for the aerosols in 1979. The profit decreased and competitiveness in the international market was weakened compared with its rival in Europe. Reagan administration wanted to stop the steady decrease in the competitiveness of CFCs industry and make European CFCs industry share the burden for protecting the ozone layer through the international regulation on the production of ozone layer-depleting materials. Furthermore, through the regulation on the de facto worldly CFCs production, Reagan administration wanted to offer to U.S. CFCs industry the economic incentive to develop and commercialize the alternatives to CFCs. U.S. chemical firms had an advantage in the development of alternative materials for CFCs, having continued researching for alternatives since 1970s in order to prepare for coming regulations. As a result, the international regulation on CFCs could be more profitable for U.S. firms than European firms. For these reasons, the United States advocated the international regulation on the production and use of CFCs, and succeeded in reaching an agreement with Europe and making the Montreal Protocol in 1987. In the acid rain problem between the U.S and Canada, the recognition that the materials from the U.S. was damaging Canadian atmosphere seriously and causing acid rain there pervaded the decision makers of two states. This recognition was due to the economic size of the U.S., its thermal power generation-dependant economic structure, and the prevailing westerlies. Therefore, Canadians came to the conclusion that the pollution of their atmosphere could be accounted to the U.S. largely, and argued that the U.S. must take appropriate action. However, those in the U.S. knew that the U.S. must pay more costs than Canada if the U.S. cooperates with Canada for solving the acid rain problem. Furthermore, there was concern about the competitiveness of power generation industry and the industries which are dependant on the use of electricity to a great extent because thermal power stations were the main emitters of sulfur dioxide, the principal cause of acid rain. Consequently, the Reagan administration has not made and implemented any substantial policy for acid rain problem. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Modern liberal and democratic theory derives its de- or prescription for the setting of justice from the work of David Hume, particularly the third book of A Treatise of Human Nature. In short, Hume posited that justice is based on the existence of concrete relations between individuals forming a more or less discrete society, in which notions of what is right could develop and in which these would gain force from the sympathy growing around relations of necessity. Hume and his contemporaries thus naturally identified the nation-state as the proper setting for justice; and modern political theory has followed in that track. Charles Beitz’s extension of John Rawls’s Theory of Justice demonstrates, however, that the growing volume, intensity and importance of inter- and transnational relations (economic or otherwise) implies claims to a kind of international justice: interdependence creates a claim to distributive justice between nations. The argument of this paper resumes this theme in the context of a further intensification of transnational relations, namely globalization. In this paper I begin by contrasting Hume’s description of society (as a discrete entity) with current discussions of globalization, asking in particular whether Hume’s description still applies to our situation. I then proceed to inquire after the meaning and growth of sympathy according to Hume’s account, and ask whether our contemporary global scene can or does provide for its emergence. What occassions this paper is the common characterization of “anti”-globalization protesters as humanitarian idealists: I argue, on the contrary, that this movement, or collection of movements, embodies the sympathy growing around concrete relations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Although investigations of the domestic politics of international relations have proliferated in the past decade, studies of the use of force in American foreign policy regularly overlook the partisan struggles that regularly erupt between presidents and Congress. In this paper, we examine whether two government functions -- writing laws and coordinating military ventures abroad -- have common domestic institutional linkages. Specifically, we explore the possibility that partisan alignments between executive and legislative branches simultaneously promote the production of laws and the president?s discretion to respond militarily to foreign crises; or, alternatively, whether inter-branch dynamics reverse course when presidents move away from advocating their legislative agenda, and towards contemplating the exercise of military force abroad. This paper illustrates how International Relations research can usefully adapt theories developed in American Politics and suggests ways in which separation-of-power theories might incorporate other empirical investigations of inter-state relations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper explores the origin of economic sanctions failure. While there have been many studies that show the cases of sanctions failure outweighs those of success, the formal circumstances under which sanctions failure occurs were not well specified. Moreover, the empirical studies collapsed two qualitatively different subsets of sanctions failure (i.e. Deadlock and Back-down) into one category. Since both outcomes are shown frequently in practice, there need be some explanations why these outcomes should occur. Using a game theoretic model with two-sided incomplete information, this paper focuses on one of two failed outcomes: Back-down. The results suggest that under certain conditions, there exists a perfect Bayesian Equilibrium in which the weak sender, after the strong target’s resistance, backs down, lifting sanctions immediately. The credibility of sanction and uncertainty on both players are critical in understanding this equilibrium. While the credibility of sanction is necessary to prevent such outcomes, uncertainty explains why incredible sanctions occur in equilibrium. Sanctions credibility is not necessary to achieve compliance, however, since even incredible sanctions can make the weak target comply in equilibrium. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

There is now a large literature on the international non-response to Rwanda’s genocide. The position of Germany has, however, received virtually no attention. My paper examines the German position, its actions and omissions, in light of the fact that Germany and Rwanda shared colonial ties, and, more recently, a dense network of aid programs following Rwandan independence. Most of the aid programs were government-sponsored. In addition, a number of German NGOs had links to Rwandan local governments, health and education institutions. Further, Germany’s strong commitment to human rights in its foreign policy also suggests that it would not remain passive when a human rights catastrophee unfolded. However, this is exactly what happened. I attempt to offer an explanation for this outcome. After establishing the parameters of German foreign policy in the early 90’s, the paper proceeds to an exploration of German-Rwandan relations in the 80’s and early 90’s, up to the genocide. The next section assesses German media coverage of the genocide in the spring of ‘94. How attentive were the German media, and how did political elites contribute to the coverage? A fourth section turns to parliamentary and executive actions regarding Rwanda in the crucial months of April,May and June of l994. How did Rwanda play on the political agenda? A final section introduces Hasenclever’s moral-sociological framework for the explanation of humanitarian intervention/non-intervention. With its focus on media, political and NGO actors, the framework seems to fit the German case. It generates hypotheses that can be tested in the German Rwanda debate. And if offers an explanation of Germany’s bystander role which seems to contradict the lessons of history that German elites often evoke. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Toward A Coherent Global Economic Governance Strategy Globalization is at the center of public debate throughout the world. It reflects the growing interdependence of economies, which goes far beyond the expansion of international trade and capital flows, to the diffusion of technology, culture, even democracy. It has also become entwined with the policy agenda of deregulation and liberalization in which governments have retracted from their legitimate and necessary roles to regulate markets at the national and international levels to ensure that economic development does in fact lead to social progress. The strategy of sustainable development allows these issues to be discussed coherently from a public management perspective. Unfortunately, efforts to make free trade and sustainable development policies more compatible have faced significant obstacles over the years: the two communities have distinct goals, traditions, operating procedures, and languages; the ultimate goods for advocates of sustainable development (equity, environmental protection) have often been the consummate bad for advocates of free trade. A divergence in the value systems between proponents of free trade and sustainable development would occur in the absence of world trade and investment; however, ethical questions have become more difficult and urgent in an international context as economic decisions in one country impinge on environmental, health, and labor conditions in other countries. Ethical questions also arise in allocating the costs of development in an intergenerational context. Who is to bear the cost of employee health and safety? Will market regimes shift more significant costs of environmental protection to future generations? Are such regimes more effective than government regulation? Are they more equitable? The need to collapse efficiency, equity and the related issue of stewardship may be most acute in discussions revolving around the issues of climate change, species decline, population growth, immigration and other problems in which the international and intergenerational distribution of costs and benefits is central. Economics and politics cannot answer purely ethical questions associated with these and the growing number of issues with global implications, but a public management perspective can greatly help in sorting out the issues, identifying more or less efficient and effective trade measures, and tracing through the equity implications of development, trade, environmental and labor policies. The central theme of this study is that the current economic paradigm supporting free trade and multilateralism needs to be viewed in the broader context of trade-economic growth-environment and sustainable development. In the absence of such integration trade is unlikely to be sustainable. Moreover, the greater awareness of the tradeoffs in this regard, the greater will be the potential for a sustainable world trade system. The paper proceeds as follows: First, a discussion of the role of trade liberalization in promoting current global development patterns is presented. This is followed by a discussion of the general approach of trade law to environmental and labor issues, noting the most important shortcomings in this regime. Based on the above, what are the implications of this for the public sector? The paper suggests that the erosion of effective public regulation or “governance” results in high social costs that pose the most serious threat from globalization. Moreover, the erosion of public authority reflects the shortcomings of the present paradigm of international economic governance (i.e. a growing “governance-gap”). Finally, an alternative model for reconciling trade, labor, environmental, and other developmental concerns is presented which is more sensitive to unique economic, social, political, and administrative conditions in developing regions. Its deployment suggests that supranational organizations, not free trade agreements, are the most viable structures for reconciling global trade, development and environmental needs. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

During the last ten years or so since 1992 Rio Earth Summit,there has been a virtual explosion of regional activity for environmental protection in Northeast Asia (NEA). Environmental cooperation has been institutionalized at both bilateral and multilateral levels and various projects to curb regional environmental problems have been adopted and implemented. The environment became reformulated as a regional political issue. Environmental cooperation in NEA shows an interesting characteristic in progress. Countries have developed formal cooperation at bilateral level by concluding either environmental treaties or agreements and setting up joint committees for implementing cooperation. Although less formal then bilateral cooperation, cooperation at the multilateral level also has shown a steady progress. Norms for collective action were firmly established and institutional arrangements were agreed. However, overall, environmental cooperation in NEA has been progressing into non-binding cooperation without clauses clearly describing official commitments for compliance and legal restrictions for non-compliance at either bilateral or multilateral cooperation. Adopting conventions or protocols has been avoided or rejected in negotiations. Why environmental cooperation in NEA is non-binding? This paper is an attempt to answer the question by exploring the progress of environmental negotiation in the region. Considering that environmental cooperation is a foreign policy issue of countries, the non-binding cooperation in NEA are policy choices of countries. By exploring political, economic, and environmental interests behind positions of countries in environmental negotiation, the paper concludes that the non-binding commitment for environmental cooperation could be a rational policy choice of countries in the region. In exploring countries’ interests in environmental politics in NEA, archival research, document analysis, and particularly, extensive elite interviews were applied to collect qualitative data. Elite interviewing was in particular an excellent form of data collection for this paper since the behavior of interests can be best described and explained by those who are deeply involved in policy-making processes. In this research, the validity of interviewees’ statements was determined by examining their plausibility, checking for internal consistency, referring to documents and reports from the government, research institutes, and environmental NGOs, and corroborating with other interviewees. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper is based on the understanding that the making and implementing of foreign policy is an ongoing process of choosing among competing options rather than any finalized decisions. In handling the recent North Korean refugee problem, both Chinese and South Korean central decision-makers are constrained simultaneously by how North Korea will react, how the relationship between China and South Korea will be affected, and how international actors will respond. This paper uses two-person, non-zero-sum game model to explain and predict the best resolution for the both countries. China and South Korea play a ?cooperate-defect? game. The outcome of the model shows that the both players are always better of choosing to cooperate. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

By looking at the role of nationalist political parties, this paper makes a twofold contribution. First, it explores competing theories about the domestic sources of international conflict. While multiple works advocate either the hard-line nationalist leader theory or the societal forces theory, there have not been significant efforts to determine the situations in which one is more useful than the other. This paper presents an argument based on the idea that if the chief executive is a hard-line nationalist, he or she will represent a nationalist political party. Thus, it is possible to test the hard-line leader theory by determining if a state is more likely to engage in conflict when its chief executive represents a nationalist party. This paper’s second contribution is that it serves as a large scale quantitative test of the role nationalism plays in war proneness. While there are numerous case study analyses of the role of nationalism in intrastate conflict, a quantitative examination of the role of nationalism in interstate conflict has not been undertaken. Statistical analysis of states in the years 1975 to 1997 finds limited support for the hard-line leader theory. In states that are newly transitioned democracies, nationalist leaders do increase the war-proneness of states. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Political Dissent and Practices of Security: Repression and Regulation of Anti-globalization Movements in North America This paper applies a critical Security Studies reading of anti-globalization movements in North America as new objects of security. This departs from realist concepts of security as informed by systemic constraints that are restricted to interactions between states and domestic factors are treated as the purview of foreign policy analysis. Non-state actors that work both within and across state borders are rendered invisible to the analytical precepts of traditional Security Studies. As the state is treated as the primary locus of security, the security concerns of citizens are identified with those of the state. Yet, convergences of dissent against globalization disrupt realist conceptions of the state as a unitary political community. While this problematic is only found in the interstices of conventional Security Studies, the realist paradigm is unable to address this dynamic shaping contemporary security practices. My research concerns two areas of inquiry that address the treatment of anti-globalization protest in North America, first as a threat to state security and subject to repression, and second, as an object of which to securitize through practices of regulation. New security practices posit anti-globalization movements as objects to be treated with both mechanisms of surveillance and repression, and as objects of regulation and self-regulation by constituting anti-globalization movements as internal to liberal democratic politics and as responsible civil actors in North American liberal democracy. This paper, through its consideration of contemporary state security practices, will address the central importance that anti-globalization assumes in the evolving nature of security in North America in the context of liberal democracy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The political inclusion of minorities has rarely been studied cross nationally and when it has it is most often used as an independent variable. Most often political inclusion is assumed as a component of democracy. This paper explores those factors that increase the probability of minimal political inclusion for minorities. We aggregate the treatment of Minorities at Risk to the state level and examine the causes of minimal political inclusion at the state level. In this paper we examine the impact of democracy on both the international and domestic level on states minimal political inclusion of their minorities. Controlling for a countries wealth and the international security environment. We find that democracy both as an international norm and as a regime have a positive impact on a state having minimal political inclusion for its minorities. The other variables, were not significant. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The structure of beliefs, the role of ideology as an influence on policy preferences, and the connections between foreign and domestic beliefs have motivated analyses of public and elite opinion. To this point the findings of empirical research in this area have been limited largely to American survey data. There has been little cross-country and cross-region comparative research to examine the generality of American findings. In this paper, we will report the findings of an analysis of foreign policy beliefs of technically sophisticated elite communities drawn from the member countries of the European Union and the United States. To what extent do elites in other countries display a similar organization of belief systems and arrive at similar policy preferences? Are policy preferences influenced by ideology and situational differences, even among a group internationalized by training, professional socialization, and to a large extent by language, and even within technically sophisticated issue areas? To answer these questions we administered an identical survey in sixteen different national settings (translated into French, German, and Italian) to scientific elite subsets of the population in 2002. The paper will explore the role of ideological constraints and geopolitical context in models of foreign and domestic policy preferences toward nuclear weapons and energy respectively. We examine the Atlantic divide and compare superpower United States with European Union responses. Second, we examine national samples for the United States, United Kingdom, France, and Germany, and “other EU” countries. Preliminary analysis of the data suggests strong support for the general hierarchical pattern of beliefs, with important cross-country differences within a hierarchical pattern. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper is about variation in the form and scope of international commitments. Traditional studies emphasize credibility as a solution to bargaining and enforcement dilemmas. Because flexibility is commonly thought to cut against credibility, it is often believed that commitments should be firm and transparent. Why then are states’ observed commitments often flexible in the sense that the terms are left ambiguous or unspecified, obligations are qualified and sometimes weak, and provisions often leave the possibility for escape? Recent studies explain commitment flexibility by focusing on transaction costs of unforeseen contingencies, domestic political and organizational pressures, and bounded rationality. This paper argues that under certain conditions flexibility is deliberately introduced into the form and scope of international commitments in order to improve states’ chances of benefiting from cooperation. Specifically, the study identifies three important factors that often give rise to the optimality of flexible commitments including multiple player dynamics, the relative increase in bargaining capability, and the verifiability of performance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper tests the proposition that material interests played a decisive role in shaping national preferences over the design of the Kyoto Protocol, the world?s first global CO2 emissions control regime. That states act to defend their material interests when negotiating international regimes has long been a bedrock assumption of international relations scholarship, and is also a widely held belief among analysts of climate politics. This paper tests whether the preferences of national governments over a global climate treaty are correlated with measures of the material interests that may have been at stake. States should oppose a stringent climate treaty if their economic output is highly dependent on fossil fuel consumption; if the real and opportunity costs of curbing CO2 emissions are relatively low; and if their vulnerability to climate change related damages is relatively small. The empirical evidence offers only limited support for these hypotheses. At best, material interests favoring emissions abatement may be a necessary, but not sufficient, condition of support for a strong climate treaty. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Scholars of international relations have examined systemic influences on domestic politics and the need to bridge the gap between international relations and comparative politics (Coleman and Perl 1999; Keck and Sikkink 1998; Caporaso 1997; Putnam 1988; Gourevitch 1978; Keohane and Nye 1977). One of the systemic influences on states? behavior is the establishment of regimes (Haggard and Simmons 1987; Krasner, 1983; Young 1983; Haas 1980). In the early 1960s, two major reports ? the 1962 report of the Royal College of Physicians in the United Kingdom and the 1964 Surgeon General?s report in the United States ? about the hazard of cigarette smoking had dramatic impact on domestic politics of the US and countries of the Commonwealth. Tobacco control has gradually bubbled up as international concern and on May 21, 2003, a convention known as the FCTC was unanimously adopted among 192 countries, bringing into being an international tobacco control regime. Adopting a neo-liberal ? constructivist perspective, this paper seeks to examine the evolution of the FCTC between 1993 and 2003 using event history and document analyses. The paper aims to explore two main issues: (1) what accounted for the emergence of the tobacco control regime? (2) What role(s) did non-governmental actors play in the emergence of the regime? Similar to Meyer et al. (1997), the paper finds the spread of norms and activities of non-governmental actors as critical in the emergence of the regime. These answers help us to better understand the contemporary global system and the behavior of states within them. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper is a working version of a dissertation that examines the thesis that war among major powers is in decline. That thesis challenges both our understanding of security dynamics in world politics and many of the assumptions of core international relations theory. This effort builds upon and adds to the work of John Mueller, who has offered a particularly persuasive and generally accepted argument that likens the decline of war to that of the once pervasive institution of slavery. This historical analogy implies both that major state institutions can become obsolete and that such change can come about through changes in ideas, beliefs, and norms. The completed paper will critically assess the historical record of slavery to examine whether it represents an analogous case and process as Mueller and others have implied. By determining if the slavery-major power warfare decline analogy is valid, this effort serves as a foundational piece in a larger research agenda on modern warfare. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper aims to explore the overall role of the U.S. Foreign Policy's consequences for democratization in Latin America, in an era when Latin America has democratically elected left presidencies, and when new-born democracies (in most cases at least) are supposed to become consolidated. After a historical overview of the U.S. foreign policy towards Latin America during the 20th century; showing that doubts consistently could be raised on the issue of U.S. democratic assistance and Latin America; the paper moves into three main parts. In the first part cases when the United States promoted democratic development and liberal democracy with capitalism is explored. In the second, cases when the United States defeated democratic left-wing rule with strong anti-capitalism is explored. Finally, the third part deals with the question that this paper conclusively attempts to address - what implications the U.S. historical democratic record toward Latin America might have for democratic development and democratic setbacks when the region once more is facing the reality of democratically elected left presidents? ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The proposed paper will attempt to study an intuitively obvious but long neglected role of identity in power transition in international politics. It refines and tests the claim that the level of identity formation in international politics determines the amount of violence (Adler 2001) and extent to which certain actions of states are interpreted as friendly, inimical, or rival in the system (Wendt 1999). Such varying levels of identity between rising and hegemonic states during power transitions determine the level of agreement between them over the nature and the extent of revisionism of the international system under given conditions. Thus, a dyad made up of rising and hegemonic states with high levels of mutually shared positive identity will react to power transition in a pacific manner. In contrast to such fairly high pacific case of power transition, dyads that possess fairly low levels of mutually shared positive identity are more likely to adopt adversarial strategies toward each other in international politics. The proposed paper will include a dataset about types of behavior of rising states from different regions of the world. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The first three post Cold War presidents, George H.W. Bush, Bill Clinton, and George W. Bush occupied the Oval Office during times of international transformation. All faced dangers and sometimes used force to achieve their objectives and this paper investigates the relationship between personality characteristics, especially conceptual complexity, and willingness to choice force instead of other policy options. The project relies on Margaret Hermann’s leadership trait analysis and at-a-distance measures. The paper compares scores of seven explanatory variables, e.g., conceptual complexity, distrust of others, etc., on leadership and world orientation for George H.W. Bush, Bill Clinton, and George W. Bush against the scores for every American president since Harry Truman. The comparative analysis helps demonstrate the role of individual of individual level traits in creating and implementing foreign policy. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES) presents a uniqueresource for comparative research on political attitudes and behavior.From the beginning, country components of the CSES have contained eachat least three items concerned with political information and knowledge.These items vary considerably across countries in terms of questionformat and question content. Using methods of Item Response Theory(IRT), the paper examines how these aspects impinge on the discriminanceand difficulty of the items, both important aspects of their validity asindicators of political knowledge. It shows that the question content isespecially important for the items difficulty: Notwithstanding thepolitical context, items that ask for numbers (e.g. of federal states orEU member countries) are much more difficult to answer, given the levelof political knowledge. Further, notwithstanding the political context,questions about foreign policy matters have a higher discriminance, thatis, can better distinguish between different levels of politicalknowledge, than other items. The paper concludes with a discussion onhow cross-national equivalence of knowledge questions can be enhanced. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Studies of elite cues rarely consider the effect of emotion on how persuasive cues are to citizens. This paper explores how emotions influence the acceptance of elite cues, focusing on foreign policy. To test how emotion affects the acceptance of foreign policy cues, I ran an experiment through Time Sharing Experiments in the Social Sciences that manipulated the type of foreign policy cue, the cue giver's partisanship, and the emotional power of the cue. By examining how emotional appeals influence the acceptance of elite cues, I test an alternative mechanism by which elites influence the public. The findings show that fear increases the persuasiveness of cues only when the cue-giver and cue-recipient come from the same political party. However, fear may also lead citizens to adopt opinions contrary to elites’ arguments. This paper reveals that fear is most effective when communicated by a trusted elite who shares citizens’ partisanship, even if the foreign policy cue is incongruent with the party’s usual stance. By considering how fear interacts with the type of foreign policy argument as well as the political identity of cue-givers, this paper complicates our understanding of when elites can persuade citizens on foreign policy. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since the US-NATO intervention in Afghanistan in 2001, the member-states of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) have rapidly expanded their multilateral military-security cooperation. This has led some observers to suggest the SCO is developing into an anti-US "NATO of the East." This paper deals with the question of whether SCO multilateral military-security cooperation is aimed at balancing against the US and its allies. The paper fits into existing IR literature on balancing behavior, and also aims to provide a heretofore missing IR-theory driven account of SCO activities..x000d..x000d.This paper argues that the SCO is not currently a multilateral alliance aimed at balancing against the possible threat posed by the US or NATO, but rather it is aimed at countering the very probable threat posed by Central Asian "terrorists" and "separatists." This paper evaluates the existing record of SCO multilateralism against a neorealist hypothesis and a postclassical realist hypothesis. The results provide strong evidence in favor of the latter hypothesis. This has major policy implications for the US and its allies, since these results provide an IR theory-based rationale for existing SCO multilateralism. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

China’s hosting of Olympic Games has caused great controversy. Facing criticisms and pressure from international community, Chinese government must defend China’s national interests on the one hand and demonstrate its respect for human rights and democracy, its commitment to the improvement of human rights conditions and the promotion of democracy, and its responsiveness to international public opinions on the other hand. Chinese government assigns different priorities to different national interests and adopts different foreign policies accordingly. This paper is aimed to explore the foreign policies taken by Chinese government toward issues of different importance. Yet Chinese government is by no means the sole actor on the arena. Driven by patriotic enthusiasm, Chinese people not only exert great pressure on Chinese government to make it take hard-line foreign policies, but also take action to defend China’s national interests themselves. Consequently, Chinese government must react to domestic demands when making foreign policies. This paper is also designed to investigate the interaction between Chinese government and Chinese people in “Olympic Diplomacy”. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Achieving cooperation is difficult in international politics. However, cooperation sometimes occurs. Multilateralism is based on the WTO agreement, regionalism is based on regimes, and bilateralism is expressed by Free Trade Agreements (FTA) even if legislative confirmation by both sides is still pending left. South Korea agreed to a FTA with Chile and Singapore in 2004 and in 2006. This paper draws attention to the interesting point that the negotiation process and its result can be explained by the logic of two-level games. It is now well known that preferences and strategies of domestic actors, political structures, strategy of negotiator, the character and level of political issue have great effect on the process and result of negotiation. Considering the South Korea-Chile, and the South Korea-Singapore FTAs, the former was faced with radical opposition by domestic interest groups while the latter had almost no objection. It is quite interesting that there was a great distinction between them. Analysis structure will be proposed in this paper through combination of Putnam's logic of two-level games and its subsequent various theories. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This research identifies sources of interpersonal trust in Latin America by exploring why the most developed countries in the Americas, namely Canada and the United States, show higher levels of interpersonal trust than their neighboring countries. The findings of this paper suggest that Latin America's high economic inequality poses a challenge to democracy because it triggers interpersonal mistrust. This paper also finds that in Latin America interpersonal trust, rather than civic participation, ideology or trust in government, promotes citizens' support for the implementation of public policies aimed to close the gap between rich and poor. Taken together, the results suggest a vicious circle between Latin America's historically high economic inequality, low interpersonal trust, and low support for redistributive policies within certain segments of the population, especially the well-off. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper will argue that throughout its existence ASEAN has gradually deepened and broadened its institutional structure in tandem with a slow but steady change of many of its fundamental norms. It should be emphasized that these changes have been mostly rhetorical and have had very little de facto impact, nevertheless they have served to gradually build an institutional framework in which member states and global actors have become embedded through interaction and perceived benefits . Indeed, the crux of this paper's argument suggests that it is the painfully minimal nature of these adjustments that have been instrumental in securing such long-awaited changes in a region that has historically been so resistant to liberalisation. Consequently, now tied into an increasingly complex institutional framework, member states and global actors have become more committed to change ASEAN in order to maintain global and regional relevance. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper makes a historical approach of how nationalism effects on regional integration inEast Asia. The specific real event in this paper will be reviewed. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines Turkey's relations with the European Union from December 1997 to December 2004 to understand the major dynamics behind the recent democratization and human rights reforms in Turkey. For this purpose, the study focuses on three factors: (1) the impact of EU, particularly the Copenhagen conditionality (2) the government structure (coalition vs. majority government) (3) the governing party's/parties' commitment level to the EU membership goal. The comparison across three periods of Turkey-EU relations (1997-1999, 1999-2002, 2002-2004) makes it possible to identify the relative significance of each factor for the reforms. In combining the international and domestic origins of Turkey's political reforms, the paper emphasizes the central importance of the domestic-international linkages for theoretical and policy purposes.The study uses (comparative) case study method to observe whether the theoretical framework proposed in this paper successfully applies to the cases. A temporal comparison across the three different periods of Turkey-EU relations is expected to show the relative salience of each explanatory factor to understand the development of Turkey's democratization and human rights reforms. In doing so, the paper looks at how EU conditionality has affected the Turkish political elite (government and parties) in realizing the reforms. In other words, how the Turkish elite have taken EU conditionality into account in handling the reforms. For this purpose, the study uses the statements made by prime ministers, party leaders, and the members of parliament. Also, it draws on the European Council decisions, and the European Commission reports. To measure the explanatory factors and the dependent variable, the following sources will be utilized: the EU harmonization law packages, the adoption of civil and penal code, the constitutional amendments, the establishment of new institutions regarding the EU membership process, the statements by Turkish officials, the Commission reports, the views of Turkish columnists, party programs, government programs, Turkey's National Program for the adoption of EU acquis, and the Freedom House ratings for civil liberties and political rights. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines US hegemonic endurance within the liberal international postwar order through an analysis of the impacts of the functioning of the World Trade Organization (WTO) into world politics. The analysis aims to determine whether the WTO contributes to locking in the US-centered postwar order or produces relative gains that implicate shifts in economic might that may eventually unsettle such order for changing the distribution of power within it. The findings indicate that the functioning of the WTO produces bases for relative economic gains unfavorable to the US, thus setting grounds for shifts in the distribution of power that may unsettle the existing international order. Such findings are consistent with neorealist approaches to hegemonic decline regarding the erosion of hegemony and with a neoliberal institutionalist reading of the endurance of the US-centered postwar order. Findings are inconsistent with the neorealist understanding that the international order mirrors the distribution of power and is prone to be challenged if the hegemon experiences relative decline. Contemplating the first stage of a four-stage framework of analysis, this paper sets the basis for continuing research by assessing whether the WTO distributes evenly the effects of its functioning. The analysis is based on WTO data on trade disputes. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The shift in U.S.-Indian relations around the turn of the twenty-first century provides an ideal opportunity to test competing explanations of global power relations. Through examination of primary and secondary source materials, this paper investigates the timing of and justifications for the rapid changes in the relationship between the United States and India. This evidence is used to test the utility of explanations based on political regime type, extent of economic liberalization, global and local balance of power considerations, and nuclear proliferation concerns in light of changes in U.S.-Indian relations. Although the United States currently has friendly relations with China, this paper finds that the U.S. government is engaging India as a balancer against Chinese power. This suggests that the United States' role as a regional hegemon encourages it to promote a balance of power in Asia, even if the immediate threat of China is arguably minimal, implying that U.S. foreign policy decision-makers feel compelled to intervene in order to remain the sole regional hegemon. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The importance of trade and its significance to national power and state survival has always been well appreciated and studied. While much attention has been lavished on the possible correlation between interdependence and conflict, unfortunately, an important variable has been largely left ignored. This "ignored" variable centers on the dependence countries possess not with one another, but with "third party markets." How does trade competition over third party markets factor in a country's cost/benefit calculations regarding the likelihood of war? Can this variable play a role in creating disincentives for conflict, as many argue interdependence can? Or do trade rivalries over markets create fears of vulnerability when the competition becomes asymmetrical? Consequently, by simply examining the levels of interdependence between states and its relationship between war and peace, scholars are missing an important element in the study of trade and conflict. Rectifying this omission is the central theme of this paper. The Genoese-Venetian rivalry of the 12th and 13th centuries and the Anglo-Dutch rivalry of the seventeenth century offer important insights into the exploration of how and why competitions for markets create the conditions for war or peace. This paper will argue that Trade Expectations Theory provides a more complete understanding of trade competition over third party markets and its casual relationship to conflict can be obtained. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The aim of this paper is to lay the foundations for conceptualizing a normative conception of "the political" in a manner that is consistent with the prospects for the democratization of transnational organizations. In order for theories of transnational justice to establish themselves as critical theories concerned with issues of political justice, they must contain an explicit theory of the political. Without a coherent conception of the political that takes into account transnational relations, claims for political justice lodged on transnational levels cannot be adequately defended. This leaves theories of transnational justice open to criticism by statist theories that privilege a conception of the political that is bound to the sovereign nation-state alone. In this paper, I will argue for a concept of the political that is decoupled from the concept of the sovereign state. This does not mean to say that the sovereign state is not political, but that within the contemporary context, the sovereign state is no longer, if it ever was, the sole site of political struggle. Such a concept of the political would have normative implications for democrats. If the political exists with relation to transnational organizations, democrats must inquire into the condition and prospects for democratic politics beyond the frame of the nation-state. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Scholars of international relations and comparative politics examine the various determinants of democratization. The international aspect of democratization is mostly perceived as a state to state process while Intergovernmental Organizations' (IOs) role on this process is disregarded. This paper attempts to empirically show the association between IOs and democratization. It concludes that IOs play a significant role in democratization process of authoritarian regimes and nascent democracies. In this paper, potential role of IOs over democratization is discussed theoretically. Second, an alternative way of measuring IOs democracy leverage is suggested. The major conclusions are threefold; Duration of membership in democratic IOs increases the levels of civil liberties but not political rights. The democratic leverage of IOs is prevalent for both political rights and civil liberties; and, there is no evidence that the trade with democratic IOs have indirectly promoted democratization in the member states. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Public opinion and foreign policy in Latin America has been sparsely studied in its own right. This paper seeks to test hypotheses drawn from the study of American and comparativist politics. Since the 1920s the impact of public opinion on American foreign policy has been a point of both optimism and dismissal. Liberals have argued that public opinion has the potential to promote peace while pessimists have questioned the stability of public opinion and the ability of the public to make decisions toward foreign policy. Within Latin America, the study of public opinion and foreign policy has been largely overlooked as the emergence of the scientific study of public opinion occurred during a period of authoritarian rule. The rebirth of democracy and liberal economics in Latin America began within the "lost decade" of economic crises of the 1980s. Democratic and structural adjustment reforms since the 1990s have changed the region dramatically making issues of trade a potential touchstone for every citizen. This makes the present the opportune moment to study the public opinion and foreign policy nexus within the Latin American context. Specifically, this paper asks whether public opinion toward economic integration can be predicted by established hypothesis. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Contrary to a long held belief in post-authoritarian Taiwan in the omnipotence of democracy to ensure the island's autonomy in the face of China, this paper argues that toward the end of the second Chen Shui-bian administration the 'marginal utility' of Taipei's use of democracy in garnering international sympathy has been drastically decreasing; recent examples include its failure to persuade major members of the 'liberal democratic community', the United States in particular, to support or at least acquiesce in its proposed referendum on joining the United Nations under the name of Taiwan held alongside the presidential election in March 2008. The underlying reason, however, is not found in the blame game between Taipei and Washington as to whether the United States is bowing to Chinese pressure at the expense of Taiwan's democratic deepening, or Taiwanese ruling elites' tactic of mobilising mass support is unnecessarily provocative which could end up drawing the US into an unwanted conflict with China. Rather, this paper suggests that the quarrel is indicative of the emergence of a new standard of civilisation based on the degree of democratic-ness in world politics. While mainstream security discourse in Taiwan has been deeply embedded in the binary structure of a democratic, peace-loving Taiwan versus an authoritarian, war-like China, in urging Taiwanese leaders to 'responsibly' strike a balance between promoting their political values and protecting their people's vital interests, senior US officials too unwittingly reproduce the rhetoric of democracy as civilisation. Unable to comprehend the operation of this civilised/barbarian trope in which Taiwan as a 'maturing' democracy (meaning potentially trouble-making) has been located between the West and the rest for the purpose of strategic appropriation, Taipei mistakenly believes that it has occupied the moral high ground vis-a-vis the great powers to 'go it alone' as seen in the UN referendum. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Conventional wisdom holds that governments matter. That a new government, particularly one of a different political party, will make substantial changes to the policies of the state they were elected to lead. The focus of this paper is on whether party affiliation matters in determining Canada's priorities and policies in its trade relationship with the United States (US). It will compare policy statements and performances of Liberal, Progressive Conservative, and Conservative governments from 1968 to the present and it will argue that party affiliation has had little impact on Canada's US trade policy over this period. The analysis will proceed in four parts. In the first part, the role of political parties in Canada will be outlined briefly. This will be followed by an overview of Canada's exports to the US. The third section of the paper will examine the economic priorities of Canadian governments concerning the US from 1968 to present as gleaned from major policy statements (e.g. white papers and speeches). The final part of the paper will set out some of the reasons why party affiliation has had little substantive impact on Canada's trade policy with the US over the last forty years. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper I investigate claims that the forces of globalization undermine individuals? attachment to nation-states by combining cross-national survey data and indicators of globalization in a multi-level modeling framework. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article assesses U.S. neoconservative policy prescriptions for democratizing and empowering political Islam and considers the sources of the neoconservative understanding of the Arab world. The analysis of the Middle East is almost exclusively normative, arguing what U.S. policy toward the region should be. Neoconservative aims are ambitious and inherently controversial. The paper examines what various neoconservatives have said and written about Islam and its democratic prospects.