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Manufactured finality is an umbrella term for the various ways that federal litigants try to create a final, appealable decision. And it has an uncertain future after the Supreme Court's decision in Microsoft Corp. 73 . Baker. Yet existing studies of manufactured finality have failed to appredate its nuances. Several different varieties of manufactured finality exist. Each applies in different contexts, implicates different interests, and has different prospects for future use after Microsoft. In this Article, I comprehensively detail the variables that go into manufactured finality, create a typology of the various forms of manufactured finality that appear in the courts of appeals, and address Microsoft's impact on each of those forms. In the course of doing so, I raise two larger issues. The first concerns how we define finality. The predominant conception of finality looks to the substance of a district court's decision, asking if that court has actually disposed of all claims in an action. The law of appellate jurisdiction might be improved by shifting the focus to asking simply whether the district court has finished with an action. The second issue concerns the role that litigants play in determining when they can appeal. As things stand, courts have essentially complete control over those matters. Experience with manufactured finality suggests that litigants should have some say in identifying proper opportunities for interlocutory appeals. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Compassionate release, guided by 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A), allows a district court to reduce a previously imposed criminal sentence if "extraordinary and compelling reasons" warrant a reduction. Congress delegated the task of describing what constitutes an extraordinary and compelling reason to the U.S. Sentencing Commission. Following the passage of the First Step Act of 2018, most circuit courts held the Commission's policy statement describing extraordinary and compelling reasons inapplicable, and that until the Commission updated its policy statement, courts enjoyed the discretion to determine what circumstances justify compassionate release. Many have celebrated this newfound discretion and its potential to expand individuals' ability to receive compassionate release. However, judicial discretion, though valuable in many ways, inevitably leads to disagreement and disparity. Perhaps unsurprisingly, circuit courts have disagreed on whether certain circumstances could, as a matter of law, justify a grant of compassionate release, causing geographic disparity in individuals' ability to receive compassion. In April 2023, the Commission updated its policy statement and included a catchall provision codifying judicial discretion and, unless the Commission acts, the disparity that discretion invites. This Comment argues that for judicial discretion to improve compassionate release, the Commission must take an active role in overseeing judicial discretion so that compassionate release can enjoy the benefits of that discretion without accepting the disparity discretion often creates. Specifically, it argues the Commission, through its statutory authority to describe what should be considered an extraordinary and compelling reason, can resolve current and future circuit splits over what constitutes an extraordinary and compelling reason by promulgating amended policy statements expressly including, or excluding, the disputed circumstance in its description of extraordinary and compelling reasons. In doing so, the Commission would effectively erase circuit courts' contrary interpretations of extraordinary and compelling reasons and thereby end the regional "droughts of compassion" the current approach to judicial discretion allows. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

On 24 March 2023, the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York issued its decision in Hachette Book Group, Inc. v Internet Archive. The Court held that the Internet Archive's practice of scanning print copyrighted titles and lending digital copies to patrons online was not 'fair use' under section 107 of the US Copyright Act 1976. The present analysis addresses whether the case forecloses other kinds of libraries from engaging in controlled digital lending. The academic law library is used to illustrate that Hachette is not the end of the line. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article focuses on Kevin Spacey's manipulative rhetoric in the YouTube video he posted on Christmas Eve in 2018 when he was facing a felony sexual assault charge in Nantucket District Court in USA. Drawing upon the notion of "double deixis" used for the second-person pronoun, this article questions the extent to which Spacey's use of the first-person pronoun could be called "doubly deictic". The findings show that Spacey's strategic use of deixis allows him to blur identities and conflate fictional and real worlds. Not only is he using deixis in a way that hampers easy interpretation and complicates cognitive projection but he assigns his audience an awkward double positioning (as fans and citizens). The article also tries to elucidate the complex effects of Spacey's manipulation on viewers. It suggests an addition to the notion of "double consciousness" that malfunctions here, as a "third consciousness" seems to be imposed onto the audience. This may explain why certain viewers are likely to experience some "cognitive dissonance" while watching this video that the media has defined as "creepy". [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Ordinarily, in federal court, only case-ending judgments can be appealed. The writ of mandamus is one exception to that so-called final judgment rule. Mandamus permits a litigant who is dissatisfied with a lower court ruling to obtain immediate reversal if, among other things, the ruling was indisputably wrong and the party seeking mandamus has no other way to get relief. This exacting standard stems from mandamus’s origin as one of the common law’s “extraordinary” writs. Federal courts of appeals typically issue mandamus once or twice per year at most. In patent cases, however, mandamus is a remarkably ordinary form of appellate relief. As the empirical study presented by this article shows, in the past thirteen years, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which hears all patent appeals nationwide, has issued mandamus sixty-one times, granting 22% of the mandamus petitions it has received in cases pending in the federal district courts (61 of 283). Crucially, the Federal Circuit’s high grant rate is driven almost entirely by mandamus petitions in cases from two judicial districts, the Eastern and Western Districts of Texas, on a single legal issue, transfer of venue. On transfer-related petitions arising from those courts, the Federal Circuit has granted the extraordinary writ of mandamus an astonishing 37.3% of the time (in 38 of 102 cases) since 2008. And this after having never granted a transfer-related mandamus petition before that year. The Federal Circuit, with its semi-specialized jurisdiction over patent cases and a few other areas, is often criticized for taking an “exceptionalist” approach to procedural issues in patent litigation. It is tempting to lob that critique at the Federal Circuit’s aberrant mandamus practice, too. We argue, however, that the court’s high grant rate actually stems from systematic flaws in the patent litigation system that the Federal Circuit has little power to fix—namely, rules of venue and judicial case assignment that encourage plaintiffs to shop not just for favorable district courts, but for individual district judges. Addressing the underlying problem of judge shopping—as the Western District of Texas has finally begun to do—would likely help bring the Federal Circuit’s mandamus practice into the mainstream. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since Chinese courts issued a spate of anti-suit injunctions ("ASIs") in licensing disputes between holders of standard-essential patents ("SEPs") and implementers, there have been growing concerns about the weaponization of ASIs in the global SEP licensing battles on fair, reasonable, and non-discriminatory ("FRAND") terms. This Essay will discuss how the aggressive use of ASIs by Chinese courts, along with their assertion of jurisdiction to set global licensing rates at abnormally low levels, contributes to this concern. It is not helpful, however, to cast the ASIs in purely geopolitical terms. More than anything else, ASIs are being used to gain an advantage in licensing negotiations, and they may perversely play a positive role in facilitating the settlement of FRAND disputes. Instead of trying to curb the use of ASIs per se, more attention needs to be paid to solving the forum shopping problem in global FRAND litigation that leads to the issuance of ASIs in the first place. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Following the line of cases asking questions such as what is a chicken, and is a burrito a sandwich, comes the next deep legal issue, what is beer? How do we determine this seemingly simple question? Do we simply know it when we see (or taste) it? Does it require a mix of specific ingredients or certain processes? Or, if we should rely on definitions, do we look to the dictionary, history, or statutes? In a dispute in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, the court is asked to resolve this question. Courts have long used tools of contractual interpretation to determine the meaning of terms to which the parties involved have agreed. Sometimes though, it is not always so easy to determine what the parties meant, even when they provide definitions in the contract. This is further confused when the terms in controversy have historical, scientific, social, industrial, and legal definitions. Through the history and science of beer, principles of judicial contract interpretation, and judicial contract interpretation case law we will explore how the courts determine these issues, and whether there are better ways to answer life's hard questions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on the Minnesota District Judges Association (MDJA) Law Clerk Committee hosting a law clerk admission ceremony to the U.S. District Court for the District of Minnesota, U.S. on May 7, 2024.

Using an original data set of around 70,000 civil rights cases heard by nearly 200 judges, we study the effect of presidential appointments to federal district courts. We provide the first causal estimates of whether lawsuits end differently depending on their assignment to either a Democratic or a Republican appointed judge. We show Republican appointees cause fewer settlements and more dismissals, favoring defendants by around 5 percentage points. We estimate a similarly sized effect for a sample of civil rights appeals heard in the Ninth Circuit, raising questions about the conventional wisdom that politics matters more at higher levels of the judicial hierarchy. We also find that the effect in district courts has increased over time. For cases filed during the Obama presidency, Republican appointees caused pro-defendant outcomes in 7.4% more cases than Democratic appointees. Our results suggest that district courts are an important—although neglected—subject of research for political scientists. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Moreover, defendants may claim that a plaintiff should not be entitled to the full measure of its lost profit even where the breach occurred before the onset of the pandemic by attempting to prove that the long-term effects of the pandemic will permanently impair future profitability. To be entitled to lost profits, the loss must have been caused by the underlying breach rather than some other cause or source of harm.[10] Lost profit damages will only be available to a plaintiff if that plaintiff can prove that the lost profits flowed consequentially from the claimed breach. The COVID-19 pandemic initially had a devastating impact on business worldwide, and franchised businesses and franchisors in the United States were not spared. For a claim that accrued during the pandemic, a plaintiff must articulate how the defendant's conduct caused a separate loss of profits distinct from the harms caused by the pandemic. [Extracted from the article]

On September 22, 2020, President Donald Trump issued Executive Order 13950: Combating Race and Sex Stereotyping. This order stopped federal agencies, federal grant recipients, and government contractors from conducting training in the workplace that involves "stereotyping" or "scapegoating" based on sex or race, specifically banning discussions of critical race theory and white privilege. The United States District Court for the Northern District of California issued a preliminary injunction on December 22, 2020, banning the enforcement of the order, and, on January 20, 2021, President Joe Biden, during his first day in office, revoked the order. However, this did not signify the end of Executive Order 13950's importance. While this executive order is atypical because it utilizes government procurement as a vehicle to enact socially conservative policies, it continues the troubling trend of presidents using executive orders to regulate government contractors. This Note will first analyze three problems with the defunct executive order: (1) the executive order was bad policy; (2) it violated the United States Constitution; and (3) most importantly, the executive order itself is the wrong mechanism to enact social change and regulate government contractors. Second, this Note will explain that the rise and fall of Executive Order 13950 exemplifies the turbulent nature of regulating government contractors through executive orders. Instead of relying on such orders, government officials should regulate labor and employment requirements on government contractors through legislation because such measures are longer lasting, give interested parties the opportunity for input, and undergo more deliberate considerations before enactment. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article examines the effect of the use of tolling orders by the U.S. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) on the due process rights of aggrieved landowners in natural gas pipeline eminent domain proceedings. Topics discussed include the procedures for the district court preliminary injunctions and approach of the FERC to rehearing applications, tendency of the orders to undermine the legitimacy of the system, and possible solutions of district courts and FERC to the issue.

Political corruption imposes substantial costs on shareholders in the U.S. Yet, we understand little about the basic factors that exacerbate or mitigate the value consequences of political corruption. Using federal corruption convictions data, we find that firm-level economic rents and monitoring mechanisms moderate the negative relation between corruption and firm value. The value consequences of political corruption are exacerbated for firms operating in low-rent product markets and mitigated for firms subject to external monitoring by state governments or monitoring induced by disclosure transparency. Our results should inform managers and policymakers of the tradeoffs imposed on firms operating in politically corrupt districts. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Town and village justice courts have been the center of municipal law, both civil and criminal, since the mid-nineteenth century. However, in the modern world, they have become corrupt, poorly managed institutions, creating issues involving procedural integrity and civil rights. In order to remedy these failures and modernize the New York State Unified Court System, state legislators must look to the district court model as it currently exists in Nassau and Eastern Suffolk Counties. The district court model offers several benefits, including the imposition of educational and experiential requirements for judges, the creation of internal and external oversight institutions, the expansion of jurisdiction for local judges, and increased transparency in records and court dealings. By creating such a centralized, professionalized system of municipal courts, oversight can be expanded, procedural uniformity can be promoted, and basic civil rights now left unguarded or outright denied by justice courts can be protected. Moreover, to preserve the spirit of democratically elected local judicial offices, the Vermont justice of the peace model may be adopted in New York, creating popularly elected positions responsible for handling key local functions, such as giving oaths of office, solemnizing marriages, and hearing tax appeals. By moving away from the unwieldy, outdated town and village justice court regime, New York can catch up with a growing number of similarly minded states, move forward with its efforts to reform the justice system, and ensure that fair local justice is guaranteed to all New Yorkers--not just those living downstate. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Thepandemic we face today poses unique challenges for courts. If a disaster Of the future brings similar challenges, we may be better equipped to face them based on the COVID-19 experience. At the United States District Court for the Northern District Of nlinois, our response has been halting but effectiue as we learn to issue rulings without the benefit of direct oral aduocacy and to conduct hearings by uideoconference. Changes underway before 2020 haue been accelerated. Our newer practices have advantages in ease and safety for litigants but also generate risks that parties will become less engaged and that we will not succeed in creating an atmosphere of confidence and dignity. The practice of pretrial discovery has changed rapidly, and questions of jurisdiction and venue may become tess salient. The dectine in the number of jury trials impticates constitutional rights and undermines an important avenue for public education. As a result, courts will need to find new ways to enhance public understanding of and confidence in, the ZegaZ process. Public health concerns dictate greater Bexibitity in the location and times when work is performed but will also require the courts to make anowances for sudden changes in the lives and capabilities of litigants and staff. New lawyers will likely be more able to make their way in the online world, but legal institutions wilt need to make particular efforts to connect and socialize them in the practice of law. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The current study aims to examine the joint effects of defendant race and gender on (1) downward sentencing departures (likelihood and length) and (2) upward sentencing departures (likelihood and length) in federal criminal courts. Using federal criminal cases sentenced between October 1, 2014 and September 30, 2016, a series of multivariate logistic and ordinary least squares regression models are used to isolate the effects of defendant race and gender (and their intersections) on departure decisions. Findings indicate that greater punitiveness for minorities in departure decisions are exclusive to Black males. Further, females of all race/ethnic groups examined are consistently advantaged in departure decisions when compared to White men. Findings regarding Hispanics indicate little difference in departure decisions compared to Whites, but where differences exist it is to the advantage of Hispanics. Findings and implications are discussed in light of focal concerns perspective and prior research. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Many states in the United States have recently implemented voter suppression policies, which make voting more difficult, particularly for members of marginalized populations (e.g. non-white and female voters). In this article, we examine how these policies and other measures of political climate influence criminal sentencing in US district courts. Using 2015 data from the US Sentencing Commission, alongside other district-level measures, we find both direct and conditioning relationships between political climate and extra-legal variables. Specifically, we find that, while voter suppression policies do not directly affect sentence length, racial threat effects are enhanced in districts governed by such policies. Conversely, districts without such policies see larger mitigating effects at high levels of ethnic diversity and gender equality. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Federal Circuit's jurisdiction is unique. Unlike the jurisdiction of all other U.S. courts of appeals, the Federal Circuit's jurisdiction is defined not by its geographical boundaries, but rather by the subject matter of the original claims and compulsory counterclaims. The court has appellate jurisdiction over final decisions from all U.S. district courts if a plaintiff's claim or a party's counterclaim arises under the patent laws. From this unusual jurisdictional grant, the Federal Circuit has concluded that, as a policy matter, it should apply and develop its own law only if the legal issue pertains to patent law. For all other legal issues, the Federal Circuit defers to the law of the court of appeals in which the case originated--i.e., it applies the procedural law and the non-patent substantive law of the regional circuits. This Article undertakes a thorough evaluation of the Federal Circuit's choice-of-law rule. It examines how the rule compares against the congressional objectives reflected in the court's enabling statute as well as against possible alternative rules. In addition, it considers how the court's rule causes the court to depart from the trans-substantivity principle of procedural law and a related principle of equity in a nontransparent manner, and, in doing so, engage in substantive lawmaking that may be beyond the court's authority. Finally, this Article contemplates solutions beyond a mere change in the court's choice-of-law rule. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article examines the applicability of the vertical stare decisis concept of the Appellate Jurisdiction Theory in the decisions of three-judge federal district courts in the U.S.

Magistrate judges function as a shadow judiciary, assisting U.S. district court judges--and sometimes standing in their shoes--in managing caseloads, resolving disputes, making law, and choosing winners and losers. Yet we lack basic knowledge about magistrates themselves, the rules that govern their activity, and the ways in which they execute their duties. To fill those gaps, this Article offers a detailed typology of the district-level local rules and standing orders that govern magistrate operations in civil cases. It also describes a case study of ten years of magistrate practice in a single federal district court, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Georgia, in resolving summary judgment motions. The case study reveals that the involvement of a magistrate makes a difference to the outcome, and that the way that a magistrate became involved (by automatic operation of court rules, by consent of the parties, or by the discretion of the district judge) matters as well. Further, case characteristics such as claim complexity and plaintiffs' pro se status amplify magistrate judge effects while others weaken it. We also observe the effects of district judges' race, age, and experience on the bench on case referrals and adoptions of magistrates' recommendations. These findings suggest multiple avenues for future research, nationwide, to understand the complexities of the interactions between magistrates and district judges, and the role of magistrates more generally. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article highlights final row of the U.S. District Court, Arizona District, with a legal pad and a draft copy of the calendar, on which judge wrote some comments related to illegal migrants in the U.S.

When duplicative civil suits proceed simultaneously in both state and federal court, a waste of resources is bound to occur. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has maintained that federal courts must typically retain jurisdiction over such concurrent litigation. Under the Colorado River abstention doctrine, only "exceptional circumstances," beyond the mere pendency of a parallel state case, will permit a federal court to relinquish jurisdiction in favor of the state action. How have the lower federal courts responded to this mandate to take jurisdiction, given the inherent waste and confusion engendered by concurrent litigation? And is there a more coherent and efficient way to manage this symptom of our dual federal-state court system? This Note seeks to answer these questions by focusing on the practical application of Colorado River "on the ground" in the lower courts, a subject largely unexplored by the otherwise voluminous scholarship on federal abstention. By surveying decades of cases involving Colorado River abstention in two federal courts of appeals and two district courts, this Note reaches a startling conclusion. Driven by a lack of guidance from the U.S. Supreme Court and a desire to rid their dockets of duplicative suits, the lower courts have taken wildly divergent approaches to Colorado River. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals, for example, has applied the doctrine rigidly, demanding that district courts retain jurisdiction in all but the most exceptional circumstances. Under pressure from this circuit precedent, judges in the Southern District of New York have frequently sought to "effectively" abstain via alternative means, simultaneously relinquishing federal jurisdiction and frustrating appellate review. When they instead attempt to proceed to judgement rather than effectively abstain, the result is typically (and unsurprisingly) a significant waste of judicial resources. On the other hand, the Seventh Circuit has taken a highly permissive view of Colorado River abstention, watering down the otherwise restrictive doctrine. Judges in the Northern District of Illinois have taken up this view with alacrity, abstaining pursuant to Colorado River in the vast majority of cases involving parallel state litigation, subject only to limited and deferential appellate review. This inconsistent doctrinal development could hardly be described as desirable--a combination of informal abstention and judicial waste in the Second Circuit compared with virtually unfettered discretion to formally abstain in the Seventh Circuit. Thus, this Note concludes with a comprehensive proposal to bring greater structure and coherency to the doctrine while avoiding both of these negative results. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

President Donald Trump repeatedly argues that appellate court appointments constitute his major success. The President and the United States Senate Republican Party majority have established records by approving fifty very conservative, young, and capable appellate court jurists. However, their confirmations have exacted a toll, particularly from the many federal district courts which address seventy-nine unfilled positions in 677judicial posts. One constructive illustration has been the three Illinois tribunals which confront five pressing openings. The Administrative Office of the United States Courts classifies three as "emergencies," because the vacant seats have been protracted and involve substantial caseloads. Despite this circumstance, Trump failed to nominate any Illinois district court candidate before June 2018, while the U.S. Senate only appointed a nominee more than one year later. All openings lacked nominees until recently, mostly because the White House did not resend the Senate three nominees whom Trump had proposed last year until May 2019. District judges comprise the Illinois federal justice regime's "workhorses" and resolve large dockets, while the ample vacancies pressure Illinois district courts and litigants, conditions that epitomize the nation. Thus, the efforts to fill the abundant openings by the President, the Senate, and Democratic lawmakers who represent Illinois--Senator Richard Durbin, the Minority Whip, and Senator Tammy Duckworth--necessitate assessment. Part II of this Article recounts the background of judicial selection, emphasizing the contemporary problem. Part III surveys the practices which Trump and the chamber deploy, detecting that both stress the rapid appointment of conservative, young, and competent appellate court jurists but downplay district level vacancies. He also limits venerable customs which presidents have implemented. The section then evaluates confirmation procedures, finding that the Judiciary Committee deemphasizes important traditions, especially "blue slips"--which stop nominee consideration, unless both home state senators approve candidates--and hearings' careful arrangement that prior committees had rigorously applied. Part IV considers numerous selection practices' effects, determining that until November 2019 there were more open district court slots than upon Trump's inauguration. The emphasis on speedily appointing conservative appellate court judges and deviations from important precedents that had long effectively served White Houses, Senates, and federal courts are undercutting both discharge of the President's constitutional duties to nominate and confirm accomplished district court judges and fulfillment of the Senate's constitutional responsibilities to advise and consent on nominees. The massive number and prolonged nature of vacancies concomitantly undermine the judiciary's responsibility to promptly, economically, and fairly treat significant numbers offilings. However, assiduous executive branch consultation with the Illinois senators, who astutely collaborated, directly fostered the expeditious appointment of two preeminent Seventh Circuit jurists and the careful nomination, although rather lengthy confirmation, of three able, moderate district court nominees. The last section proffers suggestions for the future. Now that President Trump has renominated those strong, mainstream district nominees--who easily won confirmation--he should meaningfully consult with the Illinois senators and revitalize numbers of efficacious concepts from which presidents and senators have gleaned much benefit, to fill every Illinois vacancy. The Senate ought to re-vive venerable measures, robust hearings, rigorous committee discussions, and vigorous confirmation debates. These efforts and successfully filling the Illinois empty district positions could supply instructive guidance for judicial selection across the United States, particularly by showing how ample White House consultation of home state senators and careful collaboration by these politicians can promote the smooth nomination and appointment of highly qualified mainstream appeals court and district court jurists. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Government transparency is a key component of democratic accountability. The U.S. Congress and the president have created multiple legislative avenues to facilitate executive branch transparency with the public. However, when the executive branch withholds requested information from the public, the federal judiciary has the power to determine whether agencies must release documents and information to requestors. When enforcing standards of executive branch transparency, judges must balance concerns of executive autonomy and judicial intrusion into administrative decisionmaking. While much judicial scholarship focuses on the decisionmaking on high courts, in the U.S. context, federal district courts play a key role in adjudicating transparency disputes. In this article, I examine case outcomes in disputes involving agency claims of deliberative process privilege over internal agency documents litigated between 1994 and 2004. I find that U.S. federal district courts largely defer to administrative agencies in transparency disputes. However, factors such as agency structure and the congruence between judicial and administrative agency policy preferences influence whether federal judges require executive branch officials to release requested information. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article informs about several court cases with emergent trends in federal practice and legal profession of Minnesota lawyer. Topics include court case Servotronics, Inc. v. RollsRoyce PLC, which claims for discretion afforded district courts to render assistance in gathering evidence for use in a foreign or international tribunal; and court case Sunlight Logistics, Inc. v. County Hall Ins. Co, claims for litigants were parties to an insurance contract that contained benfit for policyholder.

The article examines the reasons why Florida's appellate courts have collectively issued few en banc opinions per year since 1982. Topics discussed include a brief history of the U.S. federal and Florida en banc history and several reasons why there are very few en banc opinions including each district court of appeal issuing a large number of per curium affirmed opinions.

The article announces several appointments, awards and hirings which include Raymond E. Patricco, Jr. for appointment as a U.S. Magistrate Judge for the District of Idaho; Andrew Brassey awarded for Carl P. Burke Award and appointment of attorney Kyle Brekke for Hawley Troxell & attorneys .

The article offers law news brief from Idaho, America. A joint admissions ceremony held by The Idaho Supreme Court and the United States District Courts, District of Idaho. Allie Schiebout appointed as associate attorney at Foley Freeman. Four new associates appointed at Givens Pursley, Boise.

The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit ("Federal Circuit") has long relied on active appellate review to bring uniformity and clarity to patent law. It initially treated the PTO the same as the federal district courts, reviewing its factual findings for clear error and its legal conclusions de novo. Following reversal by the Supreme Court in Dickinson v. Zurko, the Federal Circuit began giving greater deference to PTO factual findings. But it continued to review the PTO's legal conclusions de novo, while coding an expansive list of disputed issues in patent cases as legal conclusions, even when they rest on subsidiary factfinding. Congress expanded the role of the PTO in adjudicating challenges to patent validity in the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act of 2011 ("AIA"), authorizing new adjudicatory proceedings before the Patent Trial and Appeal Board ("PTAB") as an alternative to federal district court litigation. The AIA provides for Federal Circuit review of PTAB decisions, without specifying standards of review. The scope of review could determine the success of these proceedings as a quicker, cheaper, and more expert alternative to district court litigation of patent challenges. The Federal Circuit applies the same standards of review to PTAB decisions in AIA proceedings that it applies to other PTO rulings, reviewing legal conclusions de novo and factual findings for substantial evidence. It also follows the same characterizations of issues as legal or factual that it has long used in the context of court/court review. In the past, by maximizing the scope of appellate review, these characterizations allowed the Federal Circuit to exercise greater quality control over generalist trial courts with limited competence to resolve patent matters. The net benefits are more dubious as applied to decisions of expert PTAB panels in AIA adjudications. Yet reversal rates at the Federal Circuit are essentially the same for PTAB decisions as for decisions of district courts in patent cases, threatening to frustrate a system designed to improve patent quality while limiting litigation costs. This Essay reconsiders the proper scope of judicial review of PTAB rulings on two issues that the Federal Circuit codes as legal conclusions with factual underpinnings: nonobviousness and claim interpretation. Drawing on a functional approach to judicial review of mixed questions of law and fact, it argues for more deferential review of PTAB rulings on nonobviousness and claim interpretation given the expertise of the administrative tribunal and the case-specificity of the rulings. The Federal Circuit would do better to confine de novo review to generalizable legal rulings that provide guidance in future matters rather than replicating the work of the PTAB from the appellate bench on routine case-specific rulings. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The doctrine of forum non conveniens was developed as a pragmatic response to an evolving judicial economy. This sense of pragmatism has continued to define application of the doctrine in the United States. Yet, in the international context, the Supreme Court last outlined the contours offorum non conveniens analysis in 1981 but, in the decades since, technological advancement has significantly altered the litigation playing field. For example, discovery is less burdensome now that documents are digitally transferable. And, even if relevant evidence isn't digitizable, shipping costs have decreased significantly. Echoing these facts, critics argue forum non conveniens has lost the pragmatism that once defined the doctrine. The doctrine of forum non conveniens was developed as a pragmatic response to an evolving judicial economy. This sense of pragmatism has continued to define application of the doctrine in the United States. Yet, in the international context, the Supreme Court last outlined the contours offorum non conveniens analysis in 1981 but, in the decades since, technological advancement has significantly altered the litigation playing field. For example, discovery is less burdensome now that documents are digitally transferable. And, even if relevant evidence isn't digitizable, shipping costs have decreased significantly. Echoing these facts, critics argue forum non conveniens has lost the pragmatism that once defined the doctrine. This Comment examines how United States district courts make forum non conveniens decisions in cases involving foreign plaintiffs and domestic defendants. Specifically, by examining published forum non conveniens opinions, this comment hopes to shed light on the importance of globalization when courts make a forum non conveniens ruling. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

When a state utility wishes to cross land located within a Native American reservation, but the landowners refuse to allow it, the utility in most circumstances may exercise eminent domain over the land. Under the authority of a federal statute, 25 USC §357, states may generally condemn allotments, plots owned by individuals that lie within the sovereign boundaries of a tribal reservation. Courts have long recognized that the state authority to condemn these allotments under § 357 arises from the principle that individually owned allotments are no longer "tribal" land and, as a result, they are not protected by tribal sovereignty. Congress's failure to transition away from the allotment system has resulted in an ownership structure for certain plots of reservation land that it did not anticipate when it enacted § 357. Today, not all allotments are held entirely by individuals, and many now contain fractional, undivided interests that belong to tribes themselves. This status of joint ownership between individuals and tribes, which this Comment refers to as "partially tribal," leads to considerable complications with respect to the scope of § 357. Courts have routinely held that land owned by a sovereign Native American tribe is not subject to state condemnation and that this principle protects tribal interests in allotments. Unresolved, however, is whether a tribal interest in an allotment-which can be as small as a fraction of 1 percent-should immunize even the nontribal interest in the plot from state condemnation proceedings. In other words, should a fractional tribal interest place an entire parcel out of the state's reach? This Comment argues that it should. The courts that have attempted to allow condemnations to proceed against partially tribal allotments run into the problem that all ownership interests in an allotment are undivided; each owner holds an undivided share of the whole parcel. This means there is no way to divide the tribal interests from the nontribal ones without effecting some kind of incursion on a tribal land interest without the tribe's or Congress's consent, a result that principles of tribal sovereignty squarely reject. This Comment recognizes that Congress's intent when it passed § 357 was to eliminate tribal landholdings, but it argues that Congress has since changed course such that courts should disregard that original intent. This Comment also concedes that diminishing eminent domain power may lead to holdout problems, though it argues that protecting tribal sovereignty is the more important interest. Consistent with the principle that states may not diminish any tribal sovereignty without Congress's consent, this Comment concludes that a state utility has multiple avenues for seeking access to a partially tribal allotment, including opportunities for negotiation with the tribe and the federal government. Courts should not permit states to use § 357 unilaterally to divest a nonconsenting tribe from its interest in land. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Historically, the debate over the judicial role has centered on the constitutional and administrative law decisions of the United States Supreme Court, with an occasional glance at the Federal Courts of Appeals. It has, moreover, been concerned solely with the "in-court" behavior of Article III appellate judges as they carry out their power and duty "to say what the law is" in the context of resolving "cases and controversies." This Article seeks to deepen the discussion of the appropriate role of Article III judges by broadening it to trial, as well as appellate, judges; and by distinguishing between an Article III judge's "decisional" activities on the one hand, and the judge's "hortatory" and other activities on the other. To that end, the Article focuses on a cohort of deeply respected federal district judges-many of whom, although not all, experienced Clinton appointees in the Southern and Eastern Districts of New York-who, over the last decade, have challenged conventional norms of judicial behavior to urge reform of fundamental aspects of the federal criminal justice system. These "new" judicial activists have made their case for reform in the pages of their judicial opinions, often in dicta; in articles and speeches; and through advocacy within and beyond the judicial branch. This Article summarizes this activity, places it in historical context, and assesses its value as well as its risks. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the article, the author discusses the key role played by career clerks or term clerks in judicial decision making, as well as how U.S. district court judges choose their staff by carefully analyzing the pros and cons of employing term and career clerks. Other topics include the workload of district court judges, a comparison by Chief Justice John Roberts of the responsibilities of judges and baseball umpires, as well as the role of the courts in constitutional democracy.

The article discusses the methods used in the selection and appointment of members of the magistrate judge bench in the U.S., as well as the efforts to increase the diversity of the court. Other topics include the efforts by various U.S. presidents like Barack Obama, Jimmy Carter and George W. Bush to appoint minority judges, a relative diversity comparison of district court bench and magistrate judge bench, as well as the effect of diversity on judgment quality in the courts.

This essay examines the demographics of federal district court judges in the 10th Circuit. Consistent with the literature regarding the glass-ceiling effect in positions of power and influence in the legal profession, the study finds that women judges are under-represented on the 10th Circuit bench compared with their numbers as lawyers in the jurisdictions of the Circuit. However, the study finds that ethnic minority judges are over-represented in the Circuit. The essay next explores the relationship between under-representation, over-representation, discrimination and judicial "catch up": addressing historical and contemporary under-representation by means of temporary over-representation of qualified under-represented groups on the bench. It argues that under-representation that cannot be explained in terms of merit criteria or informed opting out strongly suggests the lingering effects of past discrimination, as well as the current effects of implicit bias. Such past explicit and present implicit discrimination ought to shift the burden of addressing under-representation to the institutional players involved in the judicial commission process, who should temporarily deploy over-representation to break through the glass-ceiling and catch up the disparity. The feasibility of such a judicial catch up is evidenced by the over-representation of ethnic minority judges in the 10th Circuit. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article presents information on developments in class action cases involving consumer finance in the U.S. It discusses a debate in the district courts on whether courts may exercise jurisdiction over a nationwide class action asserting state-law claims against a nonresident defendant, and a court ruling stating that the pendency of a class action suit tolls the statute of limitations applicable to the indivial claims of members of a putative class.

The article discusses the Minnesota Supreme Court's adoption of a rule governing the recognition and enforcement of tribal court orders and judgments in the state's district courts, and it mentions judicial deference and the sovereignty and jurisdiction of tribal courts. According to the article, state legislatures in America should amend their state constitutions to give full faith and credit to tribal court orders.

The article offers a case law of Capitol Records, LLC v. ReDigi Inc., a case from the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York concerning copyright infringement of digital music. Topics include record label Capitol Records claimed copyright infringement against ReDigi, a service that allows resale of digital music tracks; district court found that resale through ReDigi were infringing and concluded that ReDigi infringed the Plaintiffs' copyrights.

This Note discusses 28 U.S.C. § 1782, which authorizes district courts to issue orders compelling discovery of evidence located within their district for use in a proceeding in a foreign tribunal. For a district court to grant a § 1782 application, it must find that the requested evidence is "for use in a foreign or international tribunal." This Note addresses whether, to satisfy the § 1782 "for use" requirement, applicants must show that they possess some procedural right entitling them to participate in the foreign proceeding or otherwise describe the procedures through which the applicant intends to inject the requested discovery into the foreign proceeding. After reviewing the evolution of § 1782, this Note describes transnational bankruptcy proceedings in less-developed legal systems involving Islamic finance. The Note posits that, in such a context, a narrow reading of the "for use" requirement would contravene the principal Supreme Court decision construing the statute, Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., and its purpose by unnecessarily limiting U.S. judicial assistance to lessdeveloped legal systems. To support that conclusion, this Note surveys federal court precedent interpreting the "for use" requirement. With a focus on Second Circuit decisions, federal court precedent is analyzed against the transnational bankruptcy context, Supreme Court precedent, and the text and "twin aims" of § 1782. This Note rejects a narrow reading of the "for use" requirement as supra-textual, inconsistent with Supreme Court precedent, and unfaithful to § 1782's twin aims. Understanding that participation rights are an important factor in § 1782 analysis, this Note suggests that a § 1782 applicant's participation rights are properly assessed not within the "for use" requirement, but under the discretionary factors outlined by the Supreme Court. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Punishment scholars acknowledge the fundamental importance of both prosecutorial discretion and jurisdictional variation in punishment; yet, little is known about the extent to which charging practices vary across court contexts. This is especially true in the federal criminal justice system. This research investigates this issue by linking four years of charging data from the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts (AOUSC) to corresponding data from the U.S. Sentencing Commission (USSC). It incorporates unique information on district court contexts from a variety of sources to investigate jurisdictional variation in charge reductions. Findings provide evidence that federal charging practices vary across district courts. In particular, several structural court characteristics are significantly related to the likelihood of charge reduction for similarly-situated defendants. Results from this study are interpreted through the lens of contemporary legal perspectives on court communities and suggest several fruitful directions for additional research on the social contexts of criminal prosecution. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the jurisdiction of district courts in some offenses committed by juvenile delinquents in Utah. Topics discussed include the general rule for the jurisdiction of juvenile courts under state law, ways for prosecutors to transfer jurisdiction from juvenile to district court, and the state's failure to set a minimum age for delinquency.