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This paper develops and applies a methodology of qualitative inquiry that equips researchers to capture how social actors produce and contest accepted forms of knowledge at the margins of mainstream globalizing discourses in times of crisis. Standing at the intersection between conceptual and empirical research, our methodology builds on the common epistemological premises of 'narrative', as stories constructed and enacted in social life, and 'practice', as tasks and projects composed by 'doings' and 'sayings'. Overcoming the dualism between 'action' and 'discourse' in traditional social theory, this methodology integrates narrative theory and practice theory into a joint framework for fieldwork and interviews. The use of the narrative-practice methodology in ethnographic case studies – such as interpreters' experience of the COVID-19 pandemic in Qatar – allows researchers to gain analytical granularity on participants' storied practice and practiced stories of the crisis, to harness 'peripheral' knowledge and refashion public discourse. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Robust metanormative realists think that there are irreducibly normative, metaphysically heavy normative facts. One might wonder how we could be epistemically justified in believing that such facts exist. In this paper, I offer an answer to this question: one's belief in the existence of robustly real normative facts is epistemically justified because so believing is indispensable to being a successful inquirer for creatures like us. The argument builds on Enoch's (2007, 2011) deliberative indispensability argument for Robust Realism but avoids relying on an overly pragmatic account of the sources of basic epistemic justification. Instead, I suggest that the sources of basic epistemic justification are those belief-forming methods which are indispensable for zetetically indispensable projects, that is, projects which are constitutive of being a successful inquirer for embodied, agential creatures like ourselves. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

To understand why a phenomenon occurs, it is not enough to possess a correct explanation of the phenomenon: you must grasp the explanation. In this formulation, "grasp" is a placeholder, standing for the psychological or epistemic relation that connects a mind to the explanatory facts in such a way as to produce understanding. This paper proposes and defends an account of the "grasping" relation according to which grasp of a property (to take one example of the sort of entity that turns up in explanations) is a matter of recognitional ability: roughly, a property is grasped to the extent to which the would-be understander is capable of recognizing instances of the property. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Given the significant exculpatory power that ignorance has when it comes to moral, legal, and epistemic transgressions, it is important to have an accurate understanding of the concept of ignorance. According to the Standard View of factual ignorance, a person is ignorant that p whenever they do not know that p, while on the New View, a person is ignorant that p whenever they do not truly believe that p. On their own though, neither of these accounts explains how ignorance can often be a degreed notion—how we can sometimes be slightly ignorant, quite ignorant, or completely ignorant that p. In this paper, I will argue that there is a route for advocates of the Standard View and the New View to accommodate the gradability of ignorance. On the view I defend, 'ignorant' picks out everyone that is ignorant to some degree, making it possible that ignorance can be both degreed and characterized as a lack of knowledge or true belief. Even though we can be ignorant to a greater or lesser extent, the only way to avoid being ignorant that p is to know or truly believe. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper aims to explore the two contradictory debates about the educational philosophy of universities in the context of Ethiopia. It also explores how the understanding of the philosophy of university is shaped by environmental factors and exacerbates the marginalisation of youth. On the one hand, universities are perceived as places where knowledge, that can solve a certain problem. On the other hand, universities are places where knowledge is produced and disseminated irrespective of its immediate use value. This study found out that the understanding of the philosophy of education varies across time and place. In the Ethiopian context, there is neither a disinterested pursuit of knowledge nor the instrumentalist epistemology, nor a synthesis of the two. It disregards the value of knowledge altogether and overly simplified the philosophy of instrumentalist epistemology to extent of buying and selling certificates even in the absence of formal training. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The digital humanities have developed in concert with online systems that increase the accessibility and speed of learning. Whereas previously students were immersed in the fluidity of campus life, they have become suspended and drawn-into various streams and currents of digital pedagogy, which articulate new forms of epistemological movement, often operating at speeds outside the lived time and rhythm of human thought. When assessing learning technologies, we have to consider the degree to which they complement the rhythms immanent to human thought, knowledge, investigation, and experimentation. In this paper, we examine learning from a humanities perspective, arguing that reading, writing, and thinking are ways of learning underscored by various genres of movement that segue with or diverge from the movements inherent to digital technologies, especially those deployed in learning systems. Using the work of thinkers such as John Dewey and Michel Serres, we examine the importance of movement in dialogue, where to truly learn involves embedding oneself in the flow of thought, accepting the flexibility of concepts, and aligning oneself with a community of thinkers. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper explores the epistemological affordances of Islamic ethics as alternative knowledge within intercultural education. Despite the calls for epistemological plurality in intercultural education that centre epistemologies of the South, educators may find it hard to reaffirm their situated knowledges and practices because they may have been overwhelmed by the wide endorsements of the mainstream literature. Drawing on in-depth interviews with 25 EFL teachers, this study aims to (a) unpack educators' perspectives around the adoption of alternative knowledges anchored in local epistemologies and sensibilities, (b) foreground educators' epistemic positioning around alternative knowledges and how they are perceived as sites for cognitive and pedagogical renewal to account for local particularities and conditions and (c) examine inter-epistemic tensions within educators' reasoning in terms of how they navigate (in)congruencies between the mainstream and Islamic philosophy at the conceptual, pedagogical and practical levels. Findings reveal that educators acknowledge the legitimacy of Islamic ethics and their epistemological/pedagogical significance in intercultural education. However, some factors may problematize educators' attempts at making use of Islamic ethics including the additional burden of reflecting alternative knowledges while attending to contextual factors (class size, the course's orientation, exams, time constraints, etc.) and the lack of sufficient training in intercultural education. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Statistical text analyses appear at the borderline of quantitative and qualitative research, raising epistemological questions in the field. This paper focuses on a specific method of text analysis: the Reinert method. It aims to address the role of interpretation and subjectivity in the construction of the results using this kind of analysis. To this end, this manuscript presents a dual interpretation of a same corpus and software outputs highlighting the convergences and divergences in both researchers' interpretations. It discusses how the use of statistics on qualitative data may provide a false sense of objectivity and sweep the questions of interpretation and epistemology away. Finally, it offers clear guidelines regarding individual and dual interpretation to those who wish to start using the Reinert method. We argue that this type of analysis is adaptable and can be applied across a variety of epistemological stances and research questions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

"Excited Delirium Syndrome" (ExDS) is a controversial diagnosis. The supposed syndrome is sometimes considered to be a potential cause of death. However, it has been argued that its sole purpose is to cover up excessive police violence because it is mainly used to explain deaths of individuals in custody. In this paper, we examine the epistemic conditions giving rise to the controversial diagnosis by discussing the relation between causal hypotheses, evidence, and data in forensic medicine. We argue that the practitioners' social context affects causal inquiry through background assumptions that enter inquiry at multiple stages. This analysis serves to better understand the wide usage of the controversial diagnosis of ExDS. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

It might initially appear impossible to inquire into whether p while trusting someone that p. At the very least, it might appear that doing so would be irrational. In this paper, I shall argue that things are not as they appear. Not only is it possible for a person to inquire into whether p while trusting someone that p, it is very often rational. Indeed, combining inquiry and trust in this way is an epistemic balancing act central to a well-lived epistemic life. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper addresses Sufi writing in its contemporary third/ninth-fifth/eleventh century CE context, looking at how writing was shaped by other Sufi and non-Sufi forms. Beginning with an overview of the Sufi writing tradition in Arabic during Sufism's formative period, between the early third/ninth and the late sixth/twelfth centuries, the article goes on to discuss early Sufi piety and the ways it challenged common conceptions and epistemological paradigms of early medieval Islamic thought. Looking at the mid fourth/tenth century case of al-Niffarī shows how mystical piety interacterd with a deep-rooted tradition in Arabic literature to forge the unique dynamics of what we know today as Sufi writing. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper considers the process of professional becoming for an academic developer as a complex transition towards epistemological plurality. This is a necessary step to appreciate and support the lived experiences of teachers across the spectrum of academic disciplines. Viewed through an ecological lens, the complexity of the developmental journey becomes more achievable as it can be broken down into a series of adaptive cycles that move from 'dependence' to 'independence', and from 'epistemologically singular' to 'epistemologically plural'. We suggest that the descriptive power of the ecological lens may be helpful to academic developers to contextualize their own professional development. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Pretense imagination is imagination understood as the ability to recreate rational belief revision. This kind of imagination is used in pretend-play, risk-assessment, etc. Some even claim that this kind of hypothetical belief revision can be grounds to justify new beliefs in conditionals, in particular conditionals that play a foundational role in the epistemology of modality. In this paper, I will argue that it cannot. I will first provide a very general theory of pretense imagination, which I formalise using tools from dynamic epistemic logic. As a result, we can clearly see that pretense imagination episodes are build up out of two kinds of imaginative stages, so I will present an argument by cases. This argument shows that pretense imagination might indeed provide us with justification for believing certain conditionals. Despite this, I will argue that these are not the kind of conditionals that allow pretense imagination to play a foundational role in the epistemology of modality. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Bounded rationality gets a bad rap in epistemology. It is argued that theories of bounded rationality are overly context‐sensitive; conventionalist; or dependent on ordinary language (Carr, 2022; Pasnau, 2013). In this paper, I have three aims. The first is to set out and motivate an approach to bounded rationality in epistemology inspired by traditional theories of bounded rationality in cognitive science. My second aim is to show how this approach can answer recent challenges raised for theories of bounded rationality. My third aim is to clarify the role of rational ideals in bounded rationality. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper investigates the norm of presupposition, as one pervasive type of indirect speech act. It argues against the view that sees presuppositions as an indirect counterpart of the direct speech act of assertion and proposes instead that they are much more similar to the direct speech act of assumption. More concretely, it suggests that the norm that governs presuppositions is not an epistemic or doxastic attitude such as knowledge, justified belief, or mere belief; it's a practical attitude, most plausibly the attitude of rational acceptance. This view has important ramifications well beyond debates in philosophy of language and linguistics. It affects not only our view of which speech act sequences are fine and which are off; it bears on whether presuppositions can function as testimony, whether they can be lies, and whether they are ontologically committal, thus addressing central topics in epistemology, ethics, and metaphysics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Background and aim: The aim of the present article was to elaborate on a research approach and method called 'lifeworld hermeneutics'. Significant to lifeworld hermeneutics is that interpretation is the main methodological instrument for explaining and understanding existential research questions and lived experiences. From a caring science perspective, this often refers to research that aims to gain a deeper understanding of existential phenomena and issues, such as existential meaning of health, well‐being, homelessness, lostness, suffering and ageing, as well as what it means to experience unhealthiness and illness, the need for care, and caring that responds to such needs. Design: Theoretical paper. Result: The article briefly covers ontology and epistemology that clarifies the meaning and importance of a lifeworld hermeneutic attitude. This is followed by suggestions for how to perform a lifeworld hermeneutic study, expressed in relation to methodological principles for the interpretation, validation and structuring of interpretations. Thereafter, follow reflections on how to use theoretical or philosophical support to develop and deepen existential interpretations. The findings of lifeworld hermeneutic research consist of existential interpretations where the researcher, with an open and pliable attitude towards the phenomenon and the aim of the study, clarifies, explains and suggests new ways of understanding participants' lived experiences; the researcher should maintain such an attitude towards their understanding of the phenomenon as well. Conclusion: The lifeworld hermeneutical approach and method described in this article makes it possible to further deepen the understanding and knowledge about existential issues that is relevant for caring and caring science. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Aim: The aim of this article was to introduce Fairclough's critical discourse analysis (CDA) in caring and nursing science, to provide a guide on how to perform such an analysis, and to describe the wider context of discourse epistemology. Design: The article is designed as a methodological paper, including (a) epistemological roots of discourse analysis, (b) an overview of discourse analytical research within caring and nursing science which points out an increased trend, and (c) a guide to conducting a CDA. Analysis: It is important that discourse analysis is available and accessible to nursing and caring researchers. Through the process of encircling discourses, valuable insight is given into fields that otherwise would be lost or would not be available. Conclusion: Our summary stance is that discourse analysis as it is presented in this article is strongly advisable for use in nursing and caring sciences. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In recent years, popular interest in disinformation has coalesced around a series of high-profile events, starting with the Brexit referendum and the election of Donald Trump in 2016. While Facebook and Twitter drew the most scrutiny in the immediate aftermath of these events, attention has turned in recent years to YouTube as a source of right-wing disinformation and radicalization. While the bulk of the extant literature on this topic has focused on the supply of right-wing content on YouTube – including quantitative studies examining the impact of the recommendation algorithm and qualitative studies exploring the rhetoric and micro-celebrity practices of reactionary channels – few studies have examined what draws viewers to the videos they watch. This paper aims to fill this gap in research by analyzing interviews with 18 current and former fans of US-centric reactionary YouTube channels. Based on these interviews, I introduce the concept of bootstraps epistemology as a way of understanding right-wing approaches to accessing political truth and knowledge. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

When instructors assess students' laboratory reports to appraise the underlying scientific reasoning, they disclose their own concerns, epistemological assumptions and beliefs about science. The analysis of such assessments (i.e. rubric-centred scores and corresponding justificatory comments) offer a wealth of insights that can be re-engaged in further improvements of the assessment tool and procedure, and in developments in formative assessment more generally. Such insights include concerns exceeding the rubric's descriptions (about meaningfulness, exhaustiveness, implicitness, connectivity, true inquiry, relevance), while differences among assessors are exposed (regarding epistemic values, approaches to scoring, sensitivity). This contribution is part of a broader effort to promote students' conducive scientific thinking and deep-learning in science and engineering education. It addresses the question(s): what does the assessors' reasoning tell us about the ways in which formative assessment is conducted, and could ideally be? The empirical investigation connects to existing knowledge, and discusses issues of representativeness and granularity in formative assessment. The paper elaborates on the design and use of the assessment tool, and presents evidence supporting context-bound recommendations and general conclusions. It is proposed that developments in formative assessment will benefit from reconceptualisation of assessment criteria, as the result of a co-design activity that engages with the assessors' epistemological concerns. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Function-first epistemologists analyze epistemic concepts, norms, and practices by investigating their functions. According to the most prominent function-first account, the primary function of our concept of knowledge is identifying reliable informants. In this paper, I take for granted the function-first methodology to achieve three main goals: First, I argue against this prominent account: studying practices of knowledge attribution and denial related to epistemic dependence, coordination, and competition reveals that the primary function of our concept of knowledge is not identifying reliable informants. Second, I recommend that function-firsters accept an alternative account: the primary function of our concept of knowledge is identifying those who have eliminated all relevant alternatives. Finally, I diagnose the error that has led function-firsters to their account: they base their investigation into the nature of knowledge on the situation of inquirers seeking informants, a situation that does not reflect the complexity of our epistemic condition. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Common knowledge is ubiquitous in our lives and yet there remains considerable uncertainty about how to model or understand it. Standard analyses of common knowledge end up being challenged by either regress or circularity which then give rise to well-known paradoxes of practical reasoning, such as the Two Generals' Paradox. This paper argues that the nature and utility of common knowledge can be illuminated by appeal to Wittgenstein's Hinge Epistemology. It is argued that those things that we standardly think of as being common knowledge in our lives are the same as those that Wittgenstein identified as hinge certainties. This identification of common knowledge with hinge certainties allows us to resolve the regress problem for common knowledge and explain how the Two Generals' Paradox arises. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The purpose of this paper is to explore the potential of dialectical pluralism (DP) for nursing knowledge development. Nursing scholars have discussed ways of developing nursing knowledge, exploring the fit and relevance of various worldviews for knowledge development and examining the dynamic and perpetual processes of knowledge development. Scholars have argued that knowledge development occurs under a certain worldview to which the researcher adheres. Many nurses employ various worldviews, which can give rise to ontological and epistemological conflicts. DP can help nurses appreciate the diversity of worldviews and recognize the importance of implicit worldviews to generate more practical nursing knowledge. DP as a philosophical approach can enable nurses to communicate between diverse worldviews, become tolerant of conflicting differences, and develop an array of nursing knowledge. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

According to an increasingly popular view in epistemology and philosophy of mind, beliefs are sensitive to contextual factors such as practical factors and salient error possibilities. A prominent version of this view, called credal sensitivism, holds that the context-sensitivity of belief is due to the context-sensitivity of degrees of belief or credence. Credal sensitivism comes in two variants: while credence-one sensitivism (COS) holds that maximal confidence (credence one) is necessary for belief, threshold credal sensitivism (TCS) holds that belief consists in having credence above some threshold, where this threshold doesn't require maximal confidence. In this paper, I argue that COS has difficulties in accounting for three important features about belief: (i) the compatibility between believing p and assigning non-zero credence to certain error possibilities that one takes to entail not-p, (ii) the fact that outright beliefs can occur in different strengths, and (iii) beliefs held by unconscious subjects. I also argue that TCS can easily avoid these problems. Finally, I consider an alleged advantage of COS over TCS in terms of explaining beliefs about lotteries. I argue that lottery cases are rather more problematic for COS than TCS. In conclusion, TCS is the most plausible version of credal sensitivitism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How should we understand validity? A standard way to characterize validity is in terms of the preservation of truth (or truth in a model). But there are several problems facing such characterizations. An alternative approach is to characterize validity epistemically, for instance in terms of the preservation of an epistemic status. In this paper, I raise a problem for such views. First, I argue that if the relevant epistemic status is factive, such as being in a position to know or having conclusive evidence for, then the account runs into trouble if we endorse certain familiar logical principles. Second, I argue that if the relevant epistemic status is non-factive, such as is rationally committed to or has justification for believing, then a similar problem arises if we endorse the logical principles as well as a sufficiently strong epistemic "level-bridging" principle. Finally, I argue that an analogous problem arises for the most natural characterization of validity in terms of rational credence. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

It is widely agreed that ignorance of fact exculpates, but does moral ignorance exculpate? If so, does it exculpate in the same way as non-moral ignorance? In this paper I will argue that on one family of views explaining exculpating non-moral ignorance also explains exculpating moral ignorance. The view can be loosely stated in the following way: ignorance counts as an excuse only if it is not the result of a failure to meet some applicable reasonable epistemic standard—call this the Reasonable Epistemic Standards Thesis and call views that accept some version of this principle reasonable standards views. I argue that any plausible reasonable standards view ought to allow that moral ignorance exculpates, at least sometimes, and defend such views against the charge that they are susceptible to clear counterexamples. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

What grounds the facts about what is identical to/distinct from what? A natural answer is: the facts about what exists. Despite its prima facie appeal, this view has received surprisingly little attention in the literature. Moreover, those who have discussed it have been inclined to reject it because of the following important challenge: why should the existence of some individuals ground their identity in some cases and their distinctness in others? (Burgess 2012, Shumener 2020b). This paper offers a sustained defense of the view. The first half provides some positive motivations in terms of other natural principles involving ground. The second half considers various ways of distilling the challenge into a precise objection to the view, and argues that none of the resulting objections proves persuasive. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, I analyse Agrippa's trilemma, an old skeptical argument that questions the possibility of justifying any arbitrary belief p and its paradox about justification. Assuming that neither infinitism nor skepticism are satisfactory positions, the main alternatives available to face the problem (foundationism, coherentism and epistemic externalism) are outlined, as well as some central arguments that show the serious difficulties they face. In the case of foundationalism, these problems arise from two dilemmas, which work together with the trilemma to make our philosophical life even more difficult: the so-called Sellar's dilemma and Bergmann's dilemma--although the latter is a very general attack on internalism. The former calls into question the intelligibility of a key idea of standard foundationalism: the notion of justified basic belief. The second casts doubt on the rational sustainability of epistemic internalism, which is a usual presupposition of the presentation of the trilemma. I explore a Humean way out of the trilemma that also manages to escape such dilemmas. Like any position in this difficult territory the way out has costs. However, they do not seem unaffordable. Here I only intend to tentatively present the idea, as a possible way out of our difficulties, which deserves to be seriously discussed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Development discourses have been widely criticized for creating hierarchical dichotomies, such as "developed" (the global North) and "developing" (the global majority), with the former being the ideal standard to which the rest must catch up. The development paradigm has infiltrated academic spaces globally, including international research collaborations, creating various categories such as (non)scientific (local) expertise. We see such hierarchies as mechanisms of legitimation to maintain the ongoing subjugation of African scholars based on the historical and contemporary asymmetries in global knowledge production. Informed by the experiences of five female African doctoral researchers in the Netherlands, this paper problematizes and disrupts the concepts of "Expert" and "local expert". We question the relevance of these concepts in a context where global knowledge production continues to feed from coloniality and also question the old power relations that continue to enable knowledge inequalities between the global North and global South. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper aims to establish the problems of the Stoic concept of cognitive representation (καταληπτική φαντασία). So I intend to reconstruct the scholarly debate on this definition. For it, I state the debate around its two most conflictive terms: the participle ὑπάρχον and the preposition ἀπό. By analyzing the Stoic fragments in which these terms appear, I explore both textual and philosophical arguments in order to find the different senses of both. By doing so, my aim is highlighting the limits of those interpretations. My conclusion is proposing certain issues to constitute a research agenda on the Stoic definition of cognitive representation, in order to, to some extent, possible solutions might be discerned. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Evidence is a central concept in epistemology, and good evidence is essential for developing effective community development programs. There is a range of theoretical approaches for helping to understand and ensure program effectiveness, but none uses evidence as a central pivot, and they may be difficult for the managers of community development programs to apply. An evidence-focussed theoretical framework and tool could help build the evidence literacy of communities and their advocates, assist community groups and members that struggle to gain representation, and help ensure that community development programs are inclusive, efficient, and effectively improve health and wellbeing outcomes. This paper presents an eight-step evidence cycle conceptual framework for helping communities ensure evidence is foundational to all stages of their programs. The steps are recognize , gather , appraise, integrate , use , create, manage , and share evidence. Each step is described, and example approaches applicable to both descriptive and intervention evidence are provided. A tool (specifically, a rubric) for program managers to self-assess their work against the cycle, informed by UK-based development network, Bond's five principles for evidence use in community development (voice/inclusion, appropriateness, triangulation, contribution, and transparency), is also provided. The approach, which is applicable to all stages of a program, has the potential to not only increase managers' and participants' evidence literacy, but to also facilitate attention to evidence throughout the life of a program and beyond, leading to better results for community development. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Culture of peace and education work together to shape individual with knowledge, attitudes and behaviors focused on harmony, tolerance, respect, inclusion, and peace. This paper presents a systematic review whose purpose was to identify the lines of study of the culture of peace in secondary education globally during the last decade (2012-2022). The study was based on the PRISMA methodology; 367 articles were collected from the databases of ERIC, Education Source, Academic Search Ultimate, Web of Science and Redalyc. Based on inclusion and exclusion criteria, 27 articles were analyzed. The results obtained reflect that most of the articles focus on the of the peace component in the school curriculum, although scientific production focused on identifying the effects of culture of peace programs was also identified. It is concluded, the study of this topic provides a deeper understanding of how education contributes to the development of citizens committed to peace. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Recently, there has been a significant upsurge of interest in what has come to be known as the 'Adoption Problem', first developed by Saul Kripke in 1974. The problem purports to raise a difficulty for Quine's anti-exceptionalist conception of logic. In what follows, we first offer a statement of the problem and argue that, so understood, it depends upon natural but resistible assumptions. We then use that discussion as a springboard for developing a different adoption problem, arguing that, for a significant class of basic logical principles, there is indeed a difficulty in seeing how they might be 'freely adopted,' thereby vindicating something close to the spirit of Kripke's original claim. This first part of our argument will enforce a significant qualification of Quine's claim that basic logical principles can be empirically confirmed. In the concluding sections of the paper, we turn to the question, specifically, of the empirical revisability of logic, arguing that when proper attention is paid to the role of reasoning in theory revision, it does indeed emerge that anti-exceptionalism, in full generality, is untenable. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The idea of analogia entis has undergone a long intellectual development and gained unprecedented importance in the twentieth century with the elaboration of Przywara. It seems difficult to correlate the development of this classical theological idea with Thomas Merton (1915–1968). Nevertheless, in the face of the challenges of the modern world, Merton's way of thinking resonates with many of the connotations of analogia entis as articulated by Przywara. This paper attempts to argue that Merton, in his late works, alludes to the metaphysics, epistemology, and, by extension, the methodology of inter-religious dialogue that analogia entis entails by elaborating on the ideas of natural contemplation, symbolism, and metaphysical intuition. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Miranda Fricker's insightful work on epistemic injustice discusses two forms of epistemic injustice—testimonial injustice and hermeneutical injustice. Hermeneutical injustice occurs when the victim lacks the interpretative resources to make sense of her experience, and this lacuna can be traced down to a structural injustice. In this paper, I provide one model of how to fill the conceptual gap in hermeneutical injustice. First, I argue that the victims possess conceptual resources to make sense of their experiences, namely phenomenal concepts. Second, I show how one might work the way up in a two-step process from a subjective, phenomenal concept to a novel, public concept. Finally, I discuss the conditions that have to be met for this process to be successful. The resulting model shows a way how the victims might alleviate hermeneutical injustice by developing novel concepts, given that the dominant group does not care about their predicament. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Public reason views hold that the exercise of political power must be acceptable to all reasonable citizens. A growing number of philosophers argue that this reasonable acceptability principle (RAP) can be justified by appealing to the value of civic friendship. They claim that a valuable form of political community can only be achieved among the citizens of pluralistic societies if they refrain from appealing to controversial ideals and values when justifying the exercise of political power to one another. This paper argues against such accounts. In order to justify RAP, one must explain and defend a conception of reasonableness. Civic friendship is unfit to perform this task, rendering it unable to ground public reason alone. Meanwhile, pluralist views that combine civic friendship with other considerations in order to specify RAP either fail or make civic friendship a spare wheel in the argument for public reason. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Assertions have a curious relationship to certainty. On the one hand, it seems clear that we can assert many everyday propositions while not being absolutely certain about them. On the other hand, it seems odd to say things like 'p, but I am not absolutely certain that p'. In this paper, I aim to solve this conundrum. I suggest a pretense theory of assertion, according to which assertions of p are proposals to act as if the conversational participants were absolutely certain of p. I suggest that this explains why absolute certainty is not required to make assertions, while it is still problematic to voice your uncertainties once you have made an assertion. By voicing your uncertainties, you thwart your very own proposal to act as if everybody was absolutely certain. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

An attractive picture of the world is that some features are metaphysically fundamental and others are derivative, with the derivative features grounded in the fundamental features. But how do we have justified beliefs about which features are fundamental? What is the epistemology of fundamentality? I sketch a response in this paper. The guiding idea is that the same properties cause the same experiences. I argue that a probabilistic connection between epistemic fundamentality and metaphysical fundamentality is sufficient for justified beliefs about the metaphysically fundamental. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The actual or potential epistemic vices of a given discipline or field of study are its disciplinary vices. This paper identifies three actual or potential disciplinary vices of vice epistemology. Vice epistemology explains people's epistemic misconduct by reference to their supposed epistemic vices. Such vice explanations are contrasted with attempts to achieve Verstehen of people's epistemic conduct and understand it from their point of view. Although vice explanations do not preclude Verstehen, vice epistemology is in danger of overlooking alternatives to its preferred mode of explanation. In some cases, Verstehen calls into question the assumption that a person is guilty of epistemic misconduct. Vice explanations also risk attaching insufficient weight to politico‐strategic factors in the explanation of political action. Care needs to be taken by vice epistemologists to avoid intellectual myopia, political naivety, and overconfidence in attributing vices. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, I situate C.S. Peirce's theory of knowledge and action in comparison to Chinese philosophy. My argument is that the comparison makes it important to understand Peirce's abduction and his maxim as a much more potent force in comparative philosophy. Peirce's priority of practical effects over theory is similar to Confucian conceptions of truth and action. Jon Alan Schmidt has summarized sixty-one formulations of Peirce's maxim, from which I draw the four main expressions of the maxim here. According to Peirce, understanding the meaning of concepts in terms of actual effects is the core element of the maxim. This view can be seen as an echo in Wang Yangming's theory of the unity of knowledge and action. The theory is essentially a moral humanist philosophy. It integrates morality, ethics, and politics. It is similar to Peirce's pragmatic maxim, as James Liszka has explained. Finally, reflecting on the recent studies of Peirce's semiotics in China, I discuss the significance of Peirce's pragmatism in Chinese philosophy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study examines the discourse functions of BE expected to and BE supposed to in the genre of judicial opinion, providing insights into discipline-specific practices of epistemological positioning. Drawing on the 130 million words Corpus of US Supreme Court Opinions, it looks at how the two mindsay constructions were deployed in judicial writing over a period of more than 200 years, and identifies divergent frequency patterns associated with their use. As the findings reveal, in the opinions, on the one hand, BE expected to tends to co-occur with reasonably (can/could (not) reasonably be expected to) and is used to create a semblance of objectivity. BE supposed to, on the other hand, favors the present tense and third-person reference (which/it is supposed to) and serves as a distancing device. The paper also compares the frequency patterns involving BE expected to and BE supposed to found in the opinions with those attested in the Corpus of Historical American English, and it demonstrates that judicial writing exhibits trends which clearly differ from trends noted in non-judicial registers. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper explores how a teacher residency in the Southeastern U.S. worked through contact zones and third-space hybridity to better serve youth and communities. The research examined: what are the affordances, constraints, and challenges of implementing third-space hybrid working groups within a teacher residency? Critical ethnographic methods including interviews, analysis of work deliverables, and participant observations were utilized. The entanglements created opportunities for deeper cohesion, understanding, and collaboration for teacher preparation. The work was constrained by institutional commitments, time, and a lack of community representation. There were challenges surrounding epistemological divisions, feelings of ambiguity, and limited shared language. • Hybrid work created opportunities for deeper cohesion, understanding, and collaboration. • Third-space waymaking was constrained by institutional commitments, time, and a lack of community representation. • Epistemological divisions, feelings of ambiguity, and a lack of shared language were challenges to hybridity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Knowledge tracing (KT), in which the future performance of students is estimated by tracing their knowledge states based on their responses to exercises, is widely applied in the field of intelligent education. However, existing mainstream KT models explore the importance of knowledge relations but ignore the key role of cognitive factors. According to the knowledge construction theory, the human cognitive system performs both spatial accommodation and temporal assimilation to internalize knowledge. In this paper, we propose an innovative heterogeneous graph-based Knowledge tracing method with spatiotemporal evolution (TSKT), in which knowledge state evolution is traced along both temporal and spatial dimensions. We construct a heterogeneous graph with multiple exercise attributes, including content, concepts, and difficulty, to obtain a knowledge space with richer exercise representations through hierarchical aggregation. We design a spatial updating module in which each interaction updates the current node's state of the knowledge space and transfers its influence to its neighbors. We also design a temporal updating module to further update the knowledge state through short-term memory enhancing and long-term memory forgetting. Finally, we stack these modules to obtain deeper features by using alternate spatiotemporal updating. Extensive experiments on three datasets reveal the superiority of the proposed method and its variants in terms of future performance prediction. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This transdisciplinary research aims to propose one path, among multiple paths, to transcend the nature/society dichotomy in ecological economics, through an ecology of knowledge between Sumak Kawsay —an Andean indigenous cosmovision—and the epistemology of complexity. A qualitative methodology has been used, which includes a critical revision of scholarship on Sumak Kawsay , the definition of nature, complexity, complex systems, and the epistemology of complexity. This effort points to a critique of the conception of nature held by 'traditional science'; one that has also resulted in the nature/society dichotomy as an epistemic basis within ecological economics. Thus, an epistemic convergence between Sumak Kawsay and the epistemology of complexity is advocated not only to disregard the nature/society dichotomy in ecological economics but also to include ancestral indigenous principles and values in knowledge production. In conclusion, such a dialogue between Sumak Kawsay and the epistemology of complexity could transcend the nature/society dichotomy within ecological economics by including notions like Pacha Mama and socio-ecological systems. It also has the potential to influence science production by considering principles from ancestral knowledge that points towards community, inclusion, horizontality, complexity, interculturality, and trans-disciplinarity. • The paper discusses nature, Andean wisdom and science. • Explores the possibility of dialogue among complexity sciences and Andean Cultures. • The article proposes a confluence between the epistemology of complexity and Sumak Kawsay. • Confronts both social and ecological sciences boundaries and epistemology limits. • The article establishes a difference between Sumak Kawsay and Buen Vivir. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Medical distrust is often conceived of as a problem of misinformation or ignorance. In this paper, I depart from this framework, attributing distrust instead to epistemic divergence between lay people and experts. Using data from a contraceptive side effects Facebook group and in-depth physician interviews, I find that providers employ a "body-as-subject" lens informed by population-health goals, while group members employ a "body-as-agent" lens that privileges individuality and bodily autonomy. Provider epistemologies are privileged, creating epistemic injustice and harm for patients. Ultimately, this erodes trust in providers and the medical community more broadly. • OBGYNs take a population-centered approach to contraceptive counseling. • Dissatisfied IUD-users privilege individuality and bodily autonomy. • Failure to recognize lay epistemologies leads to epistemic injustice. • Epistemic injustice produces psychological, relational, and physical harms. • Ultimately, population-centered counseling erodes patient trust. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]