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During the last decade the two largest democracies of the world, i.e., India and US have been constantly coming closer. Advent of satellite channels and beginning of economic liberalization program in India has generated a keen interest in U.S. affairs. US has become the hottest destination for Indian software professionals. Sociologists have been expressing deep concern regarding Americanization of Indian youth because of channels like MTV and Hollywood movies. 911 attacks on US and ensuing war on terror have been extensively covered and scrutinized by Indian media. Indian media has a love-hate relationship with US. On the one hand Indian media admires American democracy, entrepreneurship and rule of law, on the other it is portraying war on terror as hegemonistic design intended to turn international politics completely unipolar. While deepening commercial ties and joint military exercises between the two countries are being welcomed by all sections of media, certain quarters are vehemently critical of US attack and subsequent occupation of Iraq. The reason Indian government dithered, debated and ultimately decided not to send troops to Iraq can be attributed to media?s vociferous opposition. Bush administration?s unstinted support to Musharraf government in Pakistan is being termed by Indian media as the most glaring example of ?double standards? in war against terror. Indian media accuses that in spite of having full knowledge of terrorist camps in Pakistan, Bush administration has refused to take penal actions against Pakistan. This paper will deal with how media has covered America?s war on terror and what impact it has had on Indian public opinion and decision making process. The perception of Indian media regarding the burgeoning American hegemony in new world order will also be analyzed in this paper. The paper will make suggestions regarding what role media can play in bringing these two countries together in their mutual fight against terror. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

As immigrants and their allies confront the burgeoning culture of nativism in the United States, they face the problem of how to counter anti-immigrant hostility without re-entrenching the formations of state and capitalist power that have helped spawn antagonism against immigrants. Recent political theory suggests that activism in the mode of identity politics represents a particularly dangerous pitfall for immigrants, since politicized identity, according to these arguments, buttresses the authority of capitalism and the state. Wendy Brown, for instance, argues that the politicization of identity insulates from contestation the social forces generating the experiences of "injury" that today tend to form the basis of politicized identities, as well as legitimating the state in its supposedly impartial role providing compensation and retribution. In turn, William E. Connolly contends that failing to affirm the contingent character of identity, and denying its constitutive relation to difference, reinforces the essentialist assumptions of cultural unity perpetuating the inherited form of the nation-state, which, for Connolly, is unable to provide a democratic context for controlling global capitalism. In both these ways, a response to neo-nativism defining and celebrating specific identities for immigrants would seem likely to reinforce "hegemony," or the production of state and capitalist power through popular consent to authority generated by cultural identities and the everyday practices that give those identities vitality. Yet a sustained opposition to nativism would seem to demand challenging state policies that feed anti-immigrant sentiment, such as security operations that demonize "illegal aliens" and other "foreigners," as well as capital's efforts that exacerbate such resentments by weakening economic prospects for the US-born through de-industrialization and attacks on social welfare programs.Theories of the role played by politicized identity in the production of hegemony, however, may themselves be in need of critical re-thinking through more careful consideration of immigrants' experiences. This paper provides an inquiry specifically into the fructuous role that immigrants' personal life histories can play in bringing those experiences to light. Attending to these stories, I argue, makes it more possible not only to formulate a self-consistent, radically democratic response to the mounting hostility toward immigrants in US political culture, but also to refine the conceptions of hegemony and its sources in politicized identity that inform such a response. This paper, then, argues for a certain methodological approach to critical social theory in the present age of mass immigration, imperialist globalization, and a progressive politics geared largely toward the claims of identity. I draw on elements of Gramsci's thought regarding the crucial role played in the development of counterhegemonic projects by subaltern "common sense," or those conceptions of self and world that encode practically efficacious notions of how power works and contain at least an anticipatory sense of how to contest it. I also consult more recent theory regarding the politics of narrative. Hence, treating immigrants' life stories as a politically salient form of common sense, I outline a method of inquiry that would allow these stories to invigorate the critique of identity politics as a mode of hegemony today, and thus to sharpen an assessment of how certain strategies to counter neo-nativism might reproduce or genuinely challenge hegemony. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Because power defines relations among individuals and political communities, it is an important concept in the social sciences. If we accept Max Weber's suggestion that politics is essentially about allocation and distribution of power, then power is the concept of Political Science and International Relations discipline. But is power found in resources or in relationships? Is it located in structure or agency? In discussing the social nature of power, the paper will advance a conception of power based on the writings of Hannah Arendt. Understanding the nature of power in contemporary world affairs is crucially important both for the U.S. and the future of international order. The development of post-Cold War international relations, the process of European integration, and the inability of the United States to translate its material strength into desired political outcomes have put into question any conception of power based entirely on quantifiable material resources, whether military, economic, or technological. Although power is a 'contested concept', it had been absent from scholarly debate in International Relations for some time. This paper is a critical reflection of the paradox of American power and its implications for American security and global order. It focuses on the neo-conservative conception of American power that informs the foreign and defense policies of George W. Bush's Administration. According to this conception, U.S.' material preponderance coupled with America's universal values, give Washington the means and right to reshape world order. The paper argues that this view of power is deeply mistaken and can only lead to dysfunctional policies and practices. Material resources are not irrelevant to power but do not automatically produce political influence. Effective influence depends on more than military coercion. It depends on the degree to which a state's policies and practices are accepted as legitimate by other states and by international public opinion. The failure of neo-conservative policy-makers to grasp the social nature of power threatens to undermine the effective pursuit of American interests and national security, while gradually weakens the international society. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The premise of being the world?s only superpower that has animated U.S. foreign policy since the end of the Cold War is based on an illusion: the view that vastly superior military and economic capabilities among nations translates into virtually unchallengeable power. This paper elucidates how the United States in the presumed era of unipolarity is being challenged by polyarchic forces, and recommends an adaptive and constructive response. The emergent structure of world politics features the global hegemony of the United States within a polyarchic field of actors ? nation-states, subnational groups, terrorist networks, transnational religions, multinational enterprises, global and regional institutions. The cross-pressures to which countries are subject in this partially unipolar, partially polyarchic, system makes for fickle alignments and adversary relationships, in which today?s ally may well be tomorrow?s enemy, and one?s coalition partner on one issue may be one?s determined opponent on another issue. The United States continues to be the most influential actor, and often its cooperation or opposition can determine the fate of other nations? policies and programs. But as the twenty-first century progresses, the United States will hardly be in a position, even on matters affecting global peace and security, to call all the shots ? metaphorically or literally. As the United States, increasingly frustrated in its efforts to exercise the prerogatives of global hegemon, takes on a unilateralist mode of asserting and defending its interests, it will only exacerbate the polyarchic forces that are the sources of its frustration. A U.S. policy that combines ?modular multilateralism? with support of norms and structures of international accountability can reverse the decline in respect for U.S. leadership. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the diffusion of the Internet from the United States to the world at large. The Internet forms a Wallersteinian system with the United States as the core country and both a periphery and a semiperiphery. It is necessary to understand this situation in order to understand how to design policies to counteract situation like the international digital divide. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper addresses the law turn in American labor studies, which argues that a hegemonic judiciary now defines the boundaries of collective action in the United States. I argue that this ignores the impact of military suppression on collective action, as well as other institutional actors. I propose an alternative model that includes institutional facotrs (the presidency, party alliances, administrative capacities, and Congress), state interests (national defense and economic recovery), and societal pressures (labor insurgency and employer resistance). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

To meet the demands of a new war against terror that will be protracted in time and global in scope, the thesis of this paper is that the indirect, political approach to intervention is superior to the direct, military approach. Symbolically, this commends a more modest imperial post 9/11 foreign policy than a more arrogant hegemonic one. This point is illustrated by the relatively more successful "imperial" U.S. interventions in Laos during the Cold War and in Afghanistan during the current war againts terror versus the less successful "hegemonic" American interventions in Vietnam in the 1960s and 1970s and in Iraq today. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

While the perestroika reform movement that began in 2000 has shaken US political science, the virtual absence of methodological argument on any side means that the dispute is mostly political rather than intellectual. The discipline has been shaken but not stirred. The movement may change the balance of power within the profession, but otherwise leave the practice of political science unchanged. This paper is intended to help move methodological debate, with "methodology" taken in its broad sense of reflection upon the conduct of inquiry (so it also covers epistemology). The existing - now faltering - hegemony (usually identified with rational choice theory and quantitative methods) may be indefensible, but perestroika proposes only an empty pluralism in its place. Perestroika's heart may be in the right place, but its head needs to catch up. I discuss a critical disciplinary pluralism, not as an alternative program for the discipline, but as a way of making the best of existing political science practice. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

China's rise as a leading world power is among the most epic developments in the 21st century. While very few now still question the feasibility of China's rise, people widely disagree about the implications of China's rise for the world system and world order. Will China become an imperial challenger, as Imperial Germany and Imperial Japan had done in the 20th century, by dragging the world to warfare in order to assume a position of regional hegemon? Or will China behave benevolently, as what the United States had acted during its process of rising and leading the world, by accommodating itself to the institutionalized system of checks and balances without resorting to military confrontation to become a new core in the world? Simply put, whether China will be a benign or malevolent hegemon? This paper will make a preliminary exploration of this very critical question by taking the United States as a reference point. It argues that if one accepts that the United States is a benign hegemon, then there is no convincing reason why China cannot be the similar one. Not much in the Chinese cultural heritage and national characters that will inevitably make China a malevolent power. The authoritarian nature of China's political regime cannot be used as the only deterministic yardstick to judge and predict China's international behavior. It further argues that China's future foreign policy is also contingent upon how the predominant power treats it during its process of rising. How to deal with a rising power will be the ultimate test of the benign nature of American power. In the final analysis, the United States still holds the key to make China either a benign or not so benign power. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Argues that the degree to which countries have imported U.S. financial norms affects how they benefit from financial hegemony. Mechanics and cost of financial seignorage; Ways by which financial hegemony differentially benefits countries; Structural limits faced by the manipulation of the dollar.

America’s dominant position does not imply that it can do anything it wants. States that wish to constrain U.S. power can pursue strategies of balancing, blackmail, binding, asymmetric power, or "delegitimation.". These strategies cannot stop the US or even weaken it significantly, but they can make it significantly harder for the US to accomplish its objectives. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The United States is the world’s only superpower. By any economic or military measure, it enjoys vast supremacy over all other states, individually or in alliance. But the existence of a single superpower does not necessarily imply global hegemony. Regional structures can strongly diverge from the pattern of the global structure. Regional balance of power systems have coexisted with a single superpower at various times in history. Now, in the first half of the twenty-first century, a bipolar regional balance of power coexists with America’s global role as the sole superpower. The United States does not possess hegemony over East Asia, but shares with China great power status in the regional balance of power. As the weaker state in the regional balance of power, China is balancing U.S. power through both internal and external mobilization of resources. Domestically, it is prioritizing economic development as an instrument of great power competition. It is also emulating the United States, insofar as it has adopted a market economy and has stressed the technological sources of power. Internationally, it is relying on the international economy as a source of capital and technology. It also cooperating with Russia to enhance it military capability and to use Sino-Russian common interests vis-a-vis the United States to enhance its security. China and Russia have already developed an incipient counter-American alliance. They now lack the capabilities to enable their combined power to resist growing U.S. power. But neither country has to become America’s equal for their combined power to enable challenges to U.S. power. Rather, China and Russia each have to develop sufficient domestic stability and devote sufficient resources to military modernization so that they can draw confidence from each other’s capabilities and thus be able to engage in heightened tension and to risk war with the United States. When this occurs, U.S. global reach will once again confront global challenges, undermining America’s ability to focus its resources on one power in one region, thus restoring a global balance of power through the combination of a "partial rise" of China and Russia and a corresponding "stretch" of U.S. resources over multiple theaters. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article presents research studies on several world powers including Great Britain, U.S., and Germany, showing their international hegemony.

This paper examines how several of the classic debates over power are reflected in and influence our thinking of the central current debates in International Relations literature regarding the future of American hegemony and the issue of balancing. More specifically, I examine the relevance of the following issues: a.depicting power as a resource or as a relationship (-> unipolarity vs. hegemony); b.the relevance of the "three faces of power" (a-la-Lukes) to our understanding of the nature and challenges of American hegemony; c. the "essentially contested" nature of the concept of power, as it finds expression in the discussion of hegemony and unipolarity. Here I focus on the normative aspect of power, the political nature of the definitions, and the policy implications of using different power definitions. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Despite the wealth of literature available on historical and current African American political mobilization, there is a dearth in exploration of discrepancies between Black Evangelical culture and their failure to politically mobilize with White Evangelical counterparts on shared conservative moral values. By applying Antonio Gramsci's triangle, dialectically juxtaposing hegemony, ideology and culture, a successful means of analyzing the disunity among Evangelicals along racial lines emerges, in which competing ideologies of American Exceptionalism, Black Liberation Theology, and colorblind racism create spaces of resistance at the margins; these spaces are simultaneously occupied by expectations of supernatural unity as teleological ends to the Christian meta-narrative. Additionally, by using Wedeen's culture as "practices of meaning-makin" one can begin teasing out the relational tensions of belief, practice and community which work to distort effective communication and subsequent understanding within and between African American Christians and White Evangelical Christians in the United States. By shedding light on the anthropological complexity of this relational/dialectical dynamic at Evangelicalism's racial fault line, efforts can be made in earnest toward a dialogue characterized by clarity rather than overshadowed by cultures of silence, ignominy and invisibility. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How should we make sense of the geostrategic position occupied by the United States? Many view the United States as a unipolar power: a great power that lacks any "peer competitors" capable of directly challenging its position of preeminence. Others treat the United States as a hegemonic power that establishes and enforces broad "rules of the game" that govern relations among other states. Some describe the United States, in contrast, as an informal empire that shapes not only the interactions among other states but also their internal political organization. They argue that American policymakers "cannot ignore the lessons and analogies of imperial history" (Cohen, 2004: 56) and that "an understanding of America as an evolving, if reluctant, modern empire is an important analytic tool with profound consequences that American leaders should understand" (Simes, 2003: 93).I agree that attention to the dynamics of past empires sheds light on contemporary American foreign-policy dilemmas (see, e.g., MacDonald, 2006; Nexon and Wright, 2007). But I think we should exercise caution about what "lessons of empire" we identify for the United States. Three considerations motivate my concerns. First, historical empires display tremendous variation in their political structures, forms of rule, and legitimating principles. Second, some empires also operated as preeminent powers in unipolar systems, hegemonic political communities, or both. But others operated as one great power among many or even as decidedly minor players in international politics (see Howe, 2002). Third, although analysts provide a sharp analytical distinction between "hegemony" and "empire," the practices of hegemonic control almost invariably bleed into those of informal empire (Doyle, 1986: 38-45; Lake, 1996: 9).I start with a critical analysis of the American Empire debate. I next put forth an ideal-typical model of empires and their dynamics. I conclude by reflecting on the degree of American informal empire. However we resolve this debate, it calls attention to the broader task of understanding the "micropolitics of international hierarchy": how many of the strategic dilemmas of great powers involve the interplay between their asymmetric relations with other states and those states' "internal" political dynamics. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

After the cold war, U.S. strategists have suggested four strategies for the hegemon, hegemonic dominion, selective engagement, offshore balancing, and multilateralism. Rather than debating which strategy is the best for the U.S. all the time, this research focuses on examining which policy is more likely to be chosen by the hegemon—the United States—under different strategic conditions through a new neoclassical realist argument—a power-perception hegemonic model. I argue that (1) U.S. foreign policy depends on how U.S. policymakers perceive U.S. hegemonic status in the international system; (2) under rising and stable hegemony, selective engagement and hegemonic dominion are two possible power-maximization strategies given the weak security constraints from the system; (3) under declining hegemony, offshore balancing and multilateralism are more likely to be chosen by U.S. policymakers to pursue security because of resumed security imperative from anarchy. U.S. policy toward Asia after the cold war is a case study to test the validity of the power-perception hegemon model. I conclude that U.S. policymakers should be ready for life after Pax-Americana and the early implementation of offshore balancing and multilateralism may facilitate the soft-landing of declining U.S. hegemony. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The International Court of Justice is in many respects a microcosm of international politics. Crucial issues in international politics such as the Cold War, enduring rivalries, economic cooperation, and power politics have been played out in cases brought before the only permanent court of dispute resolution among nations. This research focuses on the issue of power in states' participation in the ICJ. The hypothesis tested in this article contends that international law has traditionally served as an instrument of powerful nations to maintain the status quo, but is increasingly being used as an alternative or counterbalance to power politics. Hegemonic stability theory provides a useful explanation of the initiations of cases brought before the International Court of Justice through the mid-1970's. With the decline of hegemonic control on the part of the United States, the profiles of participant nations also change. Hegemonic theories combined with the viewpoint of the principal and agent problem provide a theoretical framework for the case studies and quantitative analyses of states' participations particularly the United States and its post-war allies and the roles these states played in cases brought before the Court. Principal/Agent and judicial independence theories better inform the increase in number of states petitioning the Court and change in power relationships between initiator and respondent nations in later periods. The critical case of Nicaragua v. United States illustrates the changing policy of the United States toward the Court as well as introducing the issue of judicial independence. Analysis of cases shows that in more recent periods, fewer powerful states brought cases against smaller states while an increased number of smaller states used the Court to make claims against stronger states. The empirical evidence for this shift is very strong. This change indicates a shift from utilizing the Court as a reinforcement of major power influence to an alterative to power for dispute settlement. The changing utilization of the Court and participant profiles also indicates an expanding role for the ICJ in resolving international disputes. The empirical evidence also indicates that decisions of the Court follow a similar pattern. Decisions before the 1970's significantly favor the more powerful states. The shift from an instrument of power politics to a Court of equity for smaller states is strongly supported by the data. The implications of this research address issues of hegemonic power in organizing and managing the international system, the roles of power and justice in judicial politics at the international level, and prospects for international courts as an alternative to military force and power for resolving disputes among nations. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Some scholars argue that soft-balancing is a typical state behavior against the hegemon under unipolarity. Others contend that soft balancing against the hegemon is ineffective. We challenge both arguments and suggest that soft balancing is not only a product of specific configurations of power distribution in the system (e.g. unipolarity), but also a rational behavior under another variable-economic dependence. We argue that the interplay of power disparity and economic dependence shape a state's decision in choosing different balancing strategies. The higher the power disparity and economic dependence, the more likely a state chooses soft balancing to pursue its security. By using U.S. policy towards China after the Cold War as a case study, we suggest that a huge power gap and increasing economic interdependence between the U.S. and China shape U.S. soft balancing rather than hard balancing toward China after the cold war. Future U.S.-China relations depend on (1) whether the U.S. declines as a result of China's rise; (2) the degree of economic interdependence between China and the United States. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article examines how uniquely powerful hegemons behave in uniquely institutionalized environments. It proposes two additions to work on substitutability, suggesting that the sources of substitution derive from strategic interactions with other states, which may involve norm contestation. The author then applies this argument to developments in different sectors of maritime security since the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks in the U.S.