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This article attends to the conjuncture in the early 1970s of post-Cagean musical practice and poststructuralist theory associated with the journal Musique en jeu and the music department of the Centre universitaire expérimental de Vincennes. Reading the theoretical writing of figures including Daniel Charles and Ivanka Stoïanova alongside the music of Costin Miereanu, the article elaborates the account of the open work that emerges there, before turning to an LP by Miereanu, Luna cinese (1975), which grapples with the aporetic figure of the open record and in so doing takes the 'openness' of post-Cagean experimentalism in new directions. In conclusion, I begin to theorize what Miereanu's open record suggests about the listening that records call for and the fixity of records in general. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Purity is known as an ideal of proof that restricts a proof to notions belonging to the 'content' of the theorem. In this paper, our main interest is to develop a conception of purity for formal (natural deduction) proofs. We develop two new notions of purity: one based on an ontological notion of the content of a theorem, and one based on the notions of surrogate ontological content and structural content. From there, we characterize which (classical) first-order natural deduction proofs of a mathematical theorem are pure. Formal proofs that refer to the ontological content of a theorem will be called 'fully ontologically pure'. Formal proofs that refer to a surrogate ontological content of a theorem will be called 'secondarily ontologically pure', because they preserve the structural content of a theorem. We will use interpretations between theories to develop a proof-theoretic criterion that guarantees secondary ontological purity for formal proofs. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article provides an overview of the work and legacy of Edward Said, a well-known intellectual and activist. It discusses the lack of attention his work has received within academia and postcolonial journals, despite its widespread discussion in mainstream forums. The article explores various reasons for this, including a shift towards tribalism and a desire for more radical politics. It also delves into Said's philosophical claims, particularly regarding linguistic structures and the relationship between narrative and reality. The author acknowledges the complexity of Said's legacy and the criticisms he has faced, while recognizing the importance of his work. The article also addresses the tension between authorship and celebrity, as well as Said's rejection of certain aspects of Michel Foucault's ideas. It highlights the contradictions and influences in Said's work, including his engagement with Marxism and his negotiation of imperialism. The author expresses gratitude for the articles that contribute to the ongoing relevance of Said's work. [Extracted from the article]

In Siting Translation: History, Post-structuralism, and the Colonial Context, Tejaswini Niranjana argues that translation generates a 'conceptual economy' (2), or a systematization of colonial knowledge, about the colonial subject. (1) [...]

In Chapter 1, "The structuralist ascendancy in American linguistics", Newmeyer considers how structuralism of a particular kind came to dominate American linguistics. The most interesting in my view is Chapter 6, 'The European reception of early transformational generative grammar', which sketches the very different ways in which generative grammar was received in the various countries of Europe. Newmeyer turns to generative grammar in Chapter 4, 'Early transformational generative grammar: Some controversial issues'. This book is concerned with the evolution of American linguistics from the foundation of the Linguistic Society of America (LSA) in 1924 until the 1960s. [Extracted from the article]

The article focuses on proponents of structuralism and poststructuralism, especially emanating from France that had posited language as the most encompassing category for understanding culture. Topics include considered Martin Heidegger conceived of language as "the house of being," and a good deal of his adherents followed him in thinking of understanding as a fundamental and all-but-omnipresent activity.

Conceived 51 years after the global workers' and student revolt of May 1968, this Focus will break down the theoretical and literary legacy of May into three intervals of 17 years. In 1985, 17 years after 1968, Luc Ferry and Alain Renaut published a book, La pensée 68, in which they canonized the view that the theoretical underpinning of May '68 was provided by French structuralist thinkers, notably Michel Foucault, Jacques Derrida, Pierre Bourdieu and Jacques Lacan (see Ferry and Renaut 1985; for the English translation, see Ferry and Renaut 1990). Seventeen years later, in 2002, Kristin Ross's book May '68 and its Afterlives effectively replaced this canonical image with the notion that French structuralists were all either completely absent or showed at least great reserve during the events of May and that, moreover, the closest theoretical allies of the protesters and strikers were in fact the main philosophical targets of structuralist anti-humanists, namely Jean-Paul Sartre and Herbert Marcuse with their schools of humanist Marxism (see Ross 2002). Seventeen years after Ross's seminal book, it may be time to negate both the thesis from 1985 and Ross's antithesis from 2002, and ask the following simple question: why, despite the massive presence of Sartre and Marcuse, and the equally massive absence of Foucault, Derrida, Bourdieu and Lacan, but also Gilles Deleuze and Louis Althusser, has the memory politics of May '68 during the past half-century included the canonization of structuralism and post-structuralism at the expense of none other than humanism, be it Marxist or non-Marxist? [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

On September 27, 2018, Professor James G. March, a giant in our field, passed away at the age of 90 (1928–2018), just one month after his wife and high school sweetheart, Jayne, passed away. March's impact on the field of organization studies and beyond is profound and long-lasting. The advancement of the field is truly indebted to March's brilliance and dedication to the search of truth as a great scholar. March wrote the inaugural article for Management and Organization Review (MOR) (2005), 'Parochialism in the Evolution of a Research Community: The Case of Organization Studies'. This article not only provided a critical foundation underlying the editorial structure and philosophy of MOR but also argued eloquently for the salience of indigenous Chinese management studies as a necessary condition for building both contextualized and universal knowledge. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Interpreting Bernard Williams's ethical philosophy is not easy. His style is deceptively conversational; apparently direct, yet argumentatively inexplicit and allusive. He is moreover committed to evading ready-made philosophical "-isms." All this reinforces the already distinct impression that the structure of his philosophy is a web of interrelated commitments where none has unique priority. Against this impression, however, I will venture that the contours of his philosophy become clearest if one considers that there is a single, unchanging root conviction from which his ethical philosophy grows. Despite the perpetual motion of his philosophical thought—its erudition, originality, range, and unceasing forward momentum—still, I contend, there is something unchanging at the heart of it. I will show this by reference to three signature theses: internal reasons, the relativism of distance, and the porous borders of philosophy and history. I will argue that the root conviction of which these are the fruits is the conviction that the constraints of universal rationality seriously underdetermine how one should live. This, I believe, is the vision of the human ethical condition that constitutes the largely inexplicit yet utterly fundamental presupposition beneath Williams's ethical philosophy taken as a whole. I label the object of this root conviction ethical freedom, and thus portray Williams as a philosopher of ethical freedom. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper proposes an exploration of the films of Iranian director Asghar Farhadi. It employs a methodology based on textual analysis, focusing specifically on the structural design of his films and the focalization processes of his scripts. It shows how Farhadi's work can be understood as a coherent research project with a uniquely solid model based on chronological linearity as a way to explore the violent breakdown of different emotional communities: families, marriages, groups of friends, etc. At the same time, it considers how all the focalization processes in his films are oriented toward two main concepts: knowledge (of the characters, but also of the audience) and pain (of living in a [narrative] world afflicted by meaninglessness). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

I make a Quinean case that Quine's ontological relativity marked a wrong turn in his philosophy, that his fundamental commitments point toward the classical view of ontology that was worked out in most detail in his Word and Object (1960). This removes the impetus toward (a version of) structuralism in his later philosophy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Modal structuralism promises an interpretation of set theory that avoids commitment to abstracta. This article investigates its underlying assumptions. In the first part, I start by highlighting some shortcomings of the standard axiomatisation of modal structuralism, and propose a new axiomatisation I call MSST (for Modal Structural Set Theory). The main theorem is that MSST interprets exactly Zermelo set theory plus the claim that every set is in some inaccessible rank of the cumulative hierarchy. In the second part of the article, I look at the prospects for supplementing MSST with a modal structural reflection principle , as suggested in Hellman (2015). I show that Hellman's principle is inconsistent (Theorem 5.32), and argue that modal structural reflection principles in general are either incompatible with modal structuralism or extremely weak. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on a 1968 essay by Roland Barthes on the reality effect that addresses literary details that cannot be assimilated to character, atmosphere, or narrative function. Topics discussed include Barthes examples which are a barometer in Gustave Flaubert's novella "A Simple Heart" and a little prison-cell door in Jules Michelet's "History of the French Revolution" and the allergy to historical world as a function of Barthes's structuralism.

The Univalence axiom, due to Vladimir Voevodsky, is often taken to be one of the most important discoveries arising from the Homotopy Type Theory (HoTT) research programme. It is said by Steve Awodey that Univalence embodies mathematical structuralism, and that Univalence may be regarded as 'expanding the notion of identity to that of equivalence'. This article explores the conceptual, foundational and philosophical status of Univalence in Homotopy Type Theory. It extends our Types-as-Concepts interpretation of HoTT to Universes, and offers an account of the Univalence axiom in such terms. We consider Awodey's informal argument that Univalence is motivated by the principle that reasoning should be invariant under isomorphism, and we examine whether an autonomous and rigorous justification along these lines can be given. We consider two problems facing such a justification. First, there is a difference between equivalence and isomorphism and Univalence must be formulated in terms of the former. Second, the argument as presented cannot establish Univalence itself but only a weaker version of it, and must be supplemented by an additional principle. The article argues that the prospects for an autonomous justification of Univalence are promising. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, I propose and defend a structural ownership condition on moral responsibility. According to the condition I propose, an agent owns a mental item if and only if it is part of or is partly grounded by a coherent set of psychological states. As I discuss, other theorists have proposed or alluded to conditions like psychological coherence, but each proposal is unsatisfactory in some way. My account appeals to narrative explanation to elucidate the relevant sense of psychological coherence. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since Benacerraf’s ‘What Numbers Could Not Be,’ there has been a growing interest in mathematical structuralism. An influential form of mathematical structuralism, modal structuralism, uses logical possibility and second order logic to provide paraphrases of mathematical statements which don’t quantify over mathematical objects. These modal structuralist paraphrases are a useful tool for nominalists and realists alike. But their use of second order logic and quantification into the logical possibility operator raises concerns. In this paper, I show that the work of both these elements can be done by a single natural generalization of the logical possibility operator. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The goal of this paper is to determine whether a privileged class position operates similarly in shaping Blacks’ and Whites’ beliefs about the causes of racial inequality. Existing studies have established that socioeconomic variation drives intraracial differences in commitments to individualistic and structural attributions. However, scholars have yet to determine whether Blacks and Whites positioned at some of the highest levels of the American class structure report corresponding beliefs about the roots of racial disparities. Pooled data from the 1985–2012 General Social Surveys indicate that class-based attitudinal differences are more prevalent and pronounced among Whites rather than Blacks. However, a privileged class position often operates similarly in shaping commitments to select structural attributions. The implications of the findings are discussed, and suggestions for future research are offered. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

International legal structuralism arrived on the shores of international thought in the 1980s. The arrival was not well received, perhaps in part, because it was not well understood. This essay aims to reintroduce legal structuralism and hopefully pave the way for new, and more positive, receptions and understandings. This reintroduction is organized around two claims regarding the broader encounter between international lawyers and critical theory in the 1980s. The first was a jurisprudential claim about how the critics sought to show how international law was nothing more than a continuation of international politics by other means. The second was a historical claim about how the critics wanted to show that international law had never been anything but politics, and that it always would be. In the view of this essay, both of these claims about international legal structuralism were wrong, and they are still wrong today. For despite the tendency to think of it as a cover for postmodern nihilism or relentless deconstruction or both, legal structuralism offers international theorists an enriching and edifying method for rethinking the relation between law and politics on the one hand, and law and history on the other. It is in the effort to carry a brief for a reawakened legal structuralism that the essay brings focus to some of the early works of Koskenniemi and Kennedy, identifies the semiotic foundations of that work, and ultimately suggests the possibility of a second generation of international legal structuralism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A crisis of authority defines modernity. The crisis in the Christian West dates to the Reformation and the church-and-state conflicts based upon the question: whose Christianity? The crisis deepened during the Enlightenment as advances in science, reason, and technology changed the question: Christianity or not? By the 1960s, post-structuralism or postmodernity had posed the very question of authority and asserted competing authorities. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Although G. A. Cohen's work on Marx was flawed by a lack of gender-awareness, his work on Rawls owes much of its success to feminist inspiration. Cohen appeals effectively to feminism to rebut the basic structure objection to his egalitarian ethos, and could now appeal to feminism in response to Andrew Williams's publicity objection to this ethos. The article argues that Williams's objection is insufficient to rebut Cohen's ethos, inapplicable to variants of this ethos, and in conflict with plausible gender-egalitarian ethoses. The article also advocates an understanding of basic structuralism and publicity consistent with feminism, and argues that Rawlsians need not reject plausible domestic egalitarian ethoses on either publicity or liberty grounds. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Social class is a curious construct. In the discipline where it has traditionally been most at home, sociology, there has been a constant flow of commentary on its demise and, indeed, its death over the years. In applied linguistics, the situation is somewhat different in that there has been a degree of social class denial, but more importantly, there has been social class erasure in that the construct has tended to receive little or no attention in publications that deal with language and identity and social life. Where social class is introduced into research, it is almost always done in a very cursory, partial, and superficial way. Still, there has been some research examining the interrelationship between social class and language over the years, and in this article, I provide a review of that research, focusing primarily on the period 2000–2014. First, however, I include a discussion of what social class means in 21st-century societies and a short review of class-based research carried out from the 1960s to the 1990s, the inclusion of the latter being necessary to an understanding of research after 2000. I conclude the article with some thoughts about future directions. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This article locates Norton's foundational work on identity and investment within the social turn of applied linguistics. It discusses its historical impetus and theoretical anchors, and it illustrates how these ideas have been taken up in recent scholarship. In response to the demands of the new world order, spurred by technology and characterized by mobility, it proposes a comprehensive model of investment, which occurs at the intersection of identity, ideology, and capital. The model recognizes that the spaces in which language acquisition and socialization take place have become increasingly deterritorialized and unbounded, and the systemic patterns of control more invisible. This calls for new questions, analyses, and theories of identity. The model addresses the needs of learners who navigate their way through online and offline contexts and perform identities that have become more fluid and complex. As such, it proposes a more comprehensive and critical examination of the relationship between identity, investment, and language learning. Drawing on two case studies of a female language learner in rural Uganda and a male language learner in urban Canada, the model illustrates how structure and agency, operating across time and space, can accord or refuse learners the power to speak. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Had anybody told me at the beginning of my university studies that I would end up as a historian of science, I would not only have shaken my head in disbelief, I would in all probability not even have understood the prophecy. When I left high school, my interests ranged from literary writing to the life sciences. After an initial attempt to study biochemistry, which I aborted after a year, my early university education was in philosophy, with an emphasis on continental philosophy, from Descartes to Spinoza, from Kant to Hegel, from Nietzsche to Heidegger, pretty much the curriculum that would dominate the vast majority of the philosophical institutes in German universities in the mid-1960s. Having moved from Tübingen to Berlin, in addition I absorbed early on, as part of a group of students around Jacob Taubes, what came to be subsumed under the label of structuralism and post-structuralism: linguistics and semiotics from the Prague School through Noam Chomsky to Julien Greimas, grammatology from Ignace Gelb to Jacques Derrida, historical epistemology in its latest, Canguilhemian and Foucauldian versions, literary theory as practiced by Roland Barthes, to mention just a few names that formed the horizon of our student reading circles. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This article brings out inadequacies in structuralism as presented in the work "The Elementary Structures of Kinship" of anthropologist Claude Lévi-Strauss and contrasts it with the theory of family resemblances authored by anthropologist Ludwig Wittgenstein. Topics include transversality of anthropology, features of the theory of family resemblances and an epistemological understanding of structuralism and the inherent imperfectionism.

This article discusses the notion of implicit and explicit linguistic evident in the works of anthropologist Claude Lévi-Strauss such as 'The Elementary Structures of Kinship'. The affiliation of Lévi-Strauss with the functional structuralism of Russian Linguists Nikolai Trubetzkoy and Roman Jakobson is defined as 'explicit linguistics'. 'Implicit linguistics' is defined his accurate attention to lexical facts, questions of nomenclature and etymologies in the terminology of kinship.

Feferman (1977) argues that category theory cannot stand on its own as a structuralist foundation for mathematics: he claims that, because the notions of operation and collection are both epistemically and logically prior, we require a background theory of operations and collections. Recently [2011], I have argued that in rationally reconstructing Hilbert’s organizational use of the axiomatic method, we can construct an algebraic version of category-theoretic structuralism. That is, in reply to Shapiro (2005), we can be structuralists all the way down; we do not have to appeal to some background theory to guarantee the truth of our axioms. In this paper, I again turn to Hilbert; I borrow his (Hilbert, 1900a) distinction between the genetic method and the axiomatic method to argue that even if the genetic method requires the notions of operation and collection, the axiomatic method does not. Even if the genetic method is in some sense epistemically or logically prior, the axiomatic method stands alone. Thus, if the claim that category theory can act as a structuralist foundation for mathematics arises from the organizational use of the axiomatic method, then it does not depend on the prior notions of operation or collection, and so we can be structuralists all the way up. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The topic of this paper is markedness theory as initially developed in early works by Jakobson and Hjelmslev. The aim is to show how this early theory is (still) useful in the analysis of language-particular grammatical paradigms, and, further, to investigate which aspects of this early theory of markedness might still benefit from further refinements. One major point of this paper is to reinforce the notion of participation (a term originally suggested by Hjelmslev) as crucial in the understanding of markedness theory. Another major point is to show how the markedness relations of a paradigm depend not only on the members of the paradigm in question but also on the contexts in which the members of the paradigm are being used. Examples from Modern Danish grammar are given as illustration. The approach is functional-structural in the sense of Engberg-Pedersen et al. (1996). [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

In his award-winning contribution to the biannual PSA conference at Pittsburgh in 2008, Christian Wüthrich mounted an argument against structuralism about spacetime in the context of the general theory of relativity (GTR), to the effect that structuralists cannot discern space-time points: an "abysmal embarrassment" for the structuralist, Wüthrich judged. Wüthrich's characterization of spacetime structuralism is however incorrect. We demonstrate how, on the basis of a correct characterization of space-time structuralism, it is possible to discern space-time points in the GTR structures under consideration. Thus Wüthrich's argument crumbles. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article concerns the concept of background-structure in a classical field theory. I propose and evaluate three ways of fixing the extension of the concept, giving particular attention to the bearing of the Anderson-Friedman definition of an absolute object on that task. I attempt to show that, though that task cannot end with the Anderson-Friedman definition, that definition sharpens--and does not blur--the particular feature of general relativity that is the basis of nearly all attempts to fix the extension of the concept. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The aim of this article is to discuss some aspects of the nature of gravitational energy within the general theory of relativity. Some aspects of the difficulties to ascribe the usual features of localization and conservation to gravitational energy are reviewed and considered in the light of the dual role of the dynamical gravitational field, which encodes both inertio-gravitational effects and the chronogeometrical structures of space-time. These considerations will lead us to discuss the fact that the very notion of energy--gravitational or not--is actually well defined in the theory only with respect to some background structure. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Structural realism first emerged as an epistemological thesis aimed to avoid the so-called pessimistic metainduction on the history of science. Some authors, however, have suggested that the preservation of structure across theory change is best explained by endorsing the metaphysical thesis that structure is all there is. Although the possibility of this latter, 'ontic' form of structural realism has been extensively debated, not much has been said concerning its justification. In this article, I distinguish between two arguments in favor of ontic structural realism that can be reconstructed from the literature and find both of them wanting. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article presents and argues for modal structuralism, which is loosely derived from a position described by Wilfrid Sellars. Modal structuralism holds that a fundamental property is identified by the role it plays in the structure of possibilities. It implies necessitarianism about laws, which holds that at least some laws of nature are metaphysically necessary. The argument for these positions derives from the following assumptions: the principle of the identity of indiscernible properties and a modest antiquidditism. These assumptions are weaker than those of causal structuralism, which is a closely related view. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article is concerned with a particular debate in mediation literature, revolving around the merit and necessity of power as a strategy employed by third parties in their efforts to negotiate a successful resolution to conflict. We argue that by subscribing to a one-dimensional spectrum of pure-to-power mediation, students of mediation have neglected the development of how power is conceptualised and operates within the changing dynamics of conflict and its mediation.We therefore seek to redefine the concept of power mediation to project a closer fit between conflicting parties' understanding of their situation and the methods, aims and motivations of their mediators. Breaking away from the existing pure-power spectrum, we propose a heuristic framework that includes four distinct types of power mediation, defined here as real, made, critical and structural power. The contribution of our heuristic model is threefold. First, it assists us in asking the most basic question of social science research, ‘of what is this a case’, which in turn ought to lead to a more sophisticated observation of mediation instances. Concurrently, through the frame of ‘power’, it establishes common understanding of observable phenomena that makes the study of mediation more accessible to the wider audience beyond students of our modest literature. Finally, the synthesis of epistemological and ontological inquiry of conflict and power with the established International Relations (IR) approaches of realism(s), constructivism, critical discourse and structuralism, allows respective real, made, critical and structural types of mediation power to be tested. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The article discusses the argumentation addressing the relationship of empiricism or anti-realism and logical empiricism. It mentions that constructive empiricism, developed by philosopher Bas van Fraassen, has been the most influential anti-realist position in philosophy of science where van Fraasen agrees that all we know in science is structure. Moreover, van Fraasen suggests that the structure realist's identification of 'structure' must be post hoc and revisionist.

International norms are, by definition, a factor of stability in the international system. Nevertheless empirical evidence shows that norms are constantly changing, which raises questions on the ability of norms to regulate inter-states relations and prevent conflicts. This article analyses the cycle of norm diffusion, tracing the origin of norms, their diffusion, contestation and change. It investigates the relationship between interests and identity and between structure and agency in the process of norm diffusion, and discusses the implications of this process on international cooperation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]