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Your search keyword '"Bullet voting"' showing total 22 results
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22 results on '"Bullet voting"'

1. Majority Efficient Representation of the Citizens in a Federal Union

Author

Dominique Lepelley, Marc R. Feix, Jean-Louis Rouet, Vincent Merlin, Laurent Vidu, Centre d'Économie et de Management de l'Océan Indien (CEMOI), Université de La Réunion (UR), Centre de recherche en économie et management (CREM), Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-Université de Rennes 1 (UR1), Université de Rennes (UNIV-RENNES)-Université de Rennes (UNIV-RENNES)-Université de Caen Normandie (UNICAEN), Normandie Université (NU)-Normandie Université (NU), Institut des Sciences de la Terre d'Orléans - UMR7327 (ISTO), Bureau de Recherches Géologiques et Minières (BRGM) (BRGM)-Observatoire des Sciences de l'Univers en région Centre (OSUC), Institut national des sciences de l'Univers (INSU - CNRS)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-Université d'Orléans (UO)-Observatoire de Paris, Université Paris sciences et lettres (PSL)-Université Paris sciences et lettres (PSL)-Institut national des sciences de l'Univers (INSU - CNRS)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-Université d'Orléans (UO)-Observatoire de Paris, Université Paris sciences et lettres (PSL)-Université Paris sciences et lettres (PSL)-Institut national des sciences de l'Univers (INSU - CNRS)-Université d'Orléans (UO)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS), Milieux Poreux - UMR7327, Université Paris sciences et lettres (PSL)-Université Paris sciences et lettres (PSL)-Institut national des sciences de l'Univers (INSU - CNRS)-Université d'Orléans (UO)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-Bureau de Recherches Géologiques et Minières (BRGM) (BRGM)-Observatoire des Sciences de l'Univers en région Centre (OSUC), ANR-08-GOUV-0054,SOLITER,Négocier la solidarité territoriale dans les intercommunalités(2008), ANR-09-BLAN-0305,ComSoc(2009), Institut national des sciences de l'Univers (INSU - CNRS)-Observatoire de Paris, Université Paris sciences et lettres (PSL)-Université Paris sciences et lettres (PSL)-Université d'Orléans (UO)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-Institut national des sciences de l'Univers (INSU - CNRS)-Observatoire de Paris, Université Paris sciences et lettres (PSL)-Université Paris sciences et lettres (PSL)-Université d'Orléans (UO)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-Institut national des sciences de l'Univers (INSU - CNRS)-Université d'Orléans (UO)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS), Université Paris sciences et lettres (PSL)-Université Paris sciences et lettres (PSL)-Université d'Orléans (UO)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-Institut national des sciences de l'Univers (INSU - CNRS)-Université d'Orléans (UO)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-Bureau de Recherches Géologiques et Minières (BRGM) (BRGM)-Observatoire des Sciences de l'Univers en région Centre (OSUC), Université de Caen Normandie (UNICAEN), and Normandie Université (NU)-Normandie Université (NU)-Université de Rennes (UR)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)

Subjects
Anti-plurality voting, Majority rule, Majority criterion, 05 social sciences, Public administration, Condorcet method, 16. Peace & justice, Penrose method, 0506 political science, Cardinal voting systems, [SDU]Sciences of the Universe [physics], Political science, 0502 economics and business, 050602 political science & public administration, Bullet voting, Econometrics, 050207 economics, Exhaustive ballot
Abstract

International audience; In federal unions, how many weights should be given to each state in a two-tier voting system, given that the majority rule is used at each level? We apply a majority criterion to evaluate these voting rules: An apportionment of the seats among the states is majority efficient if it minimizes the probability of electing the candidate who receives less than 50% of the votes in a two candidate competition over the whole union. Depending on the assumptions that we use to describe the electoral process, either the proportional or the square root rule can emerge as an optimal solution.

Published
2021
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2. How voters use grade scales in evaluative voting

Author

Herrade Igersheim, Antoinette Baujard, Frédéric Gavrel, Jean-François Laslier, Isabelle Lebon, Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon - Saint-Etienne (GATE Lyon Saint-Étienne), École normale supérieure de Lyon (ENS de Lyon)-Université Lumière - Lyon 2 (UL2)-Université Claude Bernard Lyon 1 (UCBL), Université de Lyon-Université de Lyon-Université Jean Monnet - Saint-Étienne (UJM)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS), Centre de recherche en économie et management (CREM), Université de Caen Normandie (UNICAEN), Normandie Université (NU)-Normandie Université (NU)-Université de Rennes (UR)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS), Bureau d'Économie Théorique et Appliquée (BETA), Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique (INRA)-Université de Strasbourg (UNISTRA)-Université de Lorraine (UL)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS), Paris Jourdan Sciences Economiques (PJSE), Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (UP1)-École normale supérieure - Paris (ENS-PSL), Université Paris sciences et lettres (PSL)-Université Paris sciences et lettres (PSL)-École des hautes études en sciences sociales (EHESS)-École des Ponts ParisTech (ENPC)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement (INRAE), Paris School of Economics (PSE), Groupe d'analyse et de théorie économique (GATE Lyon Saint-Étienne), Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-Université de Lyon-Université Jean Monnet [Saint-Étienne] (UJM)-Université Claude Bernard Lyon 1 (UCBL), Université de Lyon-Université Lumière - Lyon 2 (UL2)-École normale supérieure - Lyon (ENS Lyon), Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-Université de Rennes 1 (UR1), Université de Rennes (UNIV-RENNES)-Université de Rennes (UNIV-RENNES)-Université de Caen Normandie (UNICAEN), Normandie Université (NU)-Normandie Université (NU), Université de Lorraine (UL)-Université de Strasbourg (UNISTRA)-Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique (INRA)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS), École des Ponts ParisTech (ENPC)-École normale supérieure - Paris (ENS Paris), Université Paris sciences et lettres (PSL)-Université Paris sciences et lettres (PSL)-Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (UP1)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-École des hautes études en sciences sociales (EHESS)-Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement (INRAE), Paris-Jourdan Sciences Economiques (PSE), École normale supérieure - Paris (ENS Paris), Université Paris sciences et lettres (PSL)-Université Paris sciences et lettres (PSL)-Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique (INRA)-École des hautes études en sciences sociales (EHESS)-École des Ponts ParisTech (ENPC)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS), Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (UP1)-École normale supérieure - Paris (ENS Paris), École normale supérieure - Lyon (ENS Lyon)-Université Lumière - Lyon 2 (UL2)-Université Claude Bernard Lyon 1 (UCBL), Université de Lyon-Université de Lyon-Université Jean Monnet [Saint-Étienne] (UJM)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS), Normandie Université (NU)-Normandie Université (NU)-Université de Rennes 1 (UR1), Université de Rennes (UNIV-RENNES)-Université de Rennes (UNIV-RENNES)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS), Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (UP1)-École normale supérieure - Paris (ENS Paris)-Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique (INRA)-École des hautes études en sciences sociales (EHESS)-École des Ponts ParisTech (ENPC)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS), Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique (INRA)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-Université de Lorraine (UL)-Université de Strasbourg (UNISTRA), École normale supérieure - Paris (ENS Paris)-Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique (INRA)-École des hautes études en sciences sociales (EHESS)-École des Ponts ParisTech (ENPC)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS), and École normale supérieure - Paris (ENS-PSL)

Subjects
Economics and Econometrics, JEL: D - Microeconomics/D.D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making/D.D7.D72 - Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior, Scale (ratio), Presidential election, Calibration (statistics), media_common.quotation_subject, Evaluative Voting, JEL: C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods/C.C9 - Design of Experiments/C.C9.C93 - Field Experiments, Affect (psychology), Cardinal voting systems, Political science, Voting, 0502 economics and business, 050602 political science & public administration, Bullet voting, Positional voting system, Range voting, Approval voting, Voting behavior, 050207 economics, ComputingMilieux_MISCELLANEOUS, In Situ Experiment, media_common, Anti-plurality voting, 05 social sciences, [SHS.ECO]Humanities and Social Sciences/Economics and Finance, 0506 political science, Political Science and International Relations, Calibration, Psychology, Social psychology
Abstract

International audience; During the first round of the 2012 French presidential election, participants in an in situ experiment were invited to vote according to " evaluative voting " , which involves rating the candidates using a numerical scale. Various scales were used: (0,1), (-1,0,1), (0,1,2), and (0,1,...,20). The paper studies scale calibration effects, i.e., how individual voters adapt to the scale, leading to possibly different election outcomes. The data show that scales are not linearly equivalent, even if individual ordinal preferences are not inconsistent. Scale matters, notably because of the symbolic power of negative grades, which does not affect all candidates uniformly.

Published
2018
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3. Voting by Sequential Elimination with few Voters

Author

Yann Chevaleyre, Sylvain Bouveret, Jérôme Lang, François Durand, Spatio-temporal information systems (STEAMER ), Laboratoire d'Informatique de Grenoble (LIG ), Institut polytechnique de Grenoble - Grenoble Institute of Technology (Grenoble INP )-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-Université Grenoble Alpes [2016-2019] (UGA [2016-2019])-Institut polytechnique de Grenoble - Grenoble Institute of Technology (Grenoble INP )-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-Université Grenoble Alpes [2016-2019] (UGA [2016-2019]), Laboratoire d'Informatique de Paris-Nord (LIPN), Université Sorbonne Paris Cité (USPC)-Institut Galilée-Université Paris 13 (UP13)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS), Laboratoire d'analyse et modélisation de systèmes pour l'aide à la décision (LAMSADE), Université Paris Dauphine-PSL, Université Paris sciences et lettres (PSL)-Université Paris sciences et lettres (PSL)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS), Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS), Université Paris sciences et lettres (PSL), and ANR-14-CE24-0007,CoCoRICo-CoDec,Calcul, Communication, Rationalité et Incitations en Décision Collective et Coopérative(2014)

Subjects
Anti-plurality voting, Theoretical computer science, Computer science, media_common.quotation_subject, Rank (computer programming), 0102 computer and information sciences, 02 engineering and technology, 16. Peace & justice, 01 natural sciences, Cardinal voting systems, [INFO.INFO-AI]Computer Science [cs]/Artificial Intelligence [cs.AI], Identification (information), 010201 computation theory & mathematics, Voting, 0202 electrical engineering, electronic engineering, information engineering, Bullet voting, 020201 artificial intelligence & image processing, Axiom, Preferential block voting, media_common
Abstract

International audience; We define a new class of low-communication voting rules, tailored for contexts with few voters and possibly many candidates. These rules are defined by a predefined sequence of voters: at each stage, the designated voter eliminates a candidate, and the last remaining candidate wins. We study both deterministic (non-anonymous) variants, and randomized (and anonymous) versions of these rules. We focus on a subfamily of these rules defined by ``non-interleaved'' sequences. We first focus on the axiomatic properties of our rules. Then we focus on the identification of the non-interleaved sequence that gives the best approximation of the Borda score under the impartial culture. Finally, we apply our rules to randomly generated data. Our conclusion is that, in contexts where there are more candidates than voters, elimination-based rules allow for a very low communication complexity (and especially, avoid asking voters to rank alternatives), and yet can be good approximations of common voting rules, while enjoying a number of good properties.

Published
2017
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4. Further Support for Ranking Candidates in Elections

Author

Dominique Lepelley, William V. Gehrlein, Florenz Plassmann, University of Delaware [Newark], Centre d'Économie et de Management de l'Océan Indien (CEMOI), Université de La Réunion (UR), Binghamton University [SUNY], and State University of New York (SUNY)

Subjects
Ranked pairs, Economics, Strategy and Management, media_common.quotation_subject, 05 social sciences, General Social Sciences, General Decision Sciences, Condorcet method, 16. Peace & justice, [SHS.ECO]Humanities and Social Sciences/Economics and Finance, Voting paradox, Dodgson's method, Arts and Humanities (miscellaneous), Management of Technology and Innovation, Voting, 0502 economics and business, Econometrics, Bullet voting, Kemeny–Young method, Approval voting, 050206 economic theory, 050207 economics, Mathematical economics, media_common, Mathematics
Abstract

International audience; We compare the Condorcet Efficiencies of the plurality rule, the negative plurality rule, and the Borda rule to examine what might be gained by using a voting rule that requires candidate rankings. Previous analyses have considered (1) voting situations for which the three rules determine different candidates as winners (and the Condorcet Efficiencies might actually differ across the three rules) as well as (2) refined measures of Group Mutual Coherence that assess the presence of underlying models of rational behavior that governs voter preferences. In this paper, we present the final step of this particular line of analysis by analyzing (1) and (2) simultaneously. We conclude that there is a considerable benefit on the basis of Condorcet Efficiency from asking voters to submit candidate rankings in three-candidate elections.

Published
2016
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5. Truth-revealing voting rules for large populations *

Author

Marcus Pivato, Matías Núñez, Université Paris Dauphine-PSL, Université Paris sciences et lettres (PSL), Théorie économique, modélisation et applications (THEMA), Université de Cergy Pontoise (UCP), Université Paris-Seine-Université Paris-Seine-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS), and Nunez, Matias

Subjects
Economics and Econometrics, Computer science, media_common.quotation_subject, Large population, ComputingMilieux_LEGALASPECTSOFCOMPUTING, computer.software_genre, Large Elections, Cardinal voting systems, Political science, Voting, 0502 economics and business, Incentives, Bullet voting, 050207 economics, [SHS.ECO] Humanities and Social Sciences/Economics and Finance, 050205 econometrics, media_common, Anti-plurality voting, High probability, Disapproval voting, 05 social sciences, Truth telling, 16. Peace & justice, [SHS.ECO]Humanities and Social Sciences/Economics and Finance, Outcome (probability), [SHS.SCIPO]Humanities and Social Sciences/Political science, Calculus of voting, Incentive, Approval voting, 050206 economic theory, Data mining, computer, Mathematical economics, [SHS.SCIPO] Humanities and Social Sciences/Political science, Finance, Truth-telling, Preferential block voting
Abstract

Deterministic voting rules are notoriously susceptible to strategic voting. We propose a new solution to this problem for large electorates. For any deterministic voting rule, we can design a stochastic rule that asymptotically approximates it in the following sense: for a sufficiently large population of voters, the stochastic voting rule (i) incentivizes every voter to reveal her true preferences and (ii) produces the same outcome as the deterministic rule, with very high probability.

Published
2016

6. Strategic Voting in Multi-Winner Elections with Approval Balloting: A Theory for Large Electorates

Author

Jean-François Laslier, Karine Van der Straeten, Paris-Jourdan Sciences Economiques (PSE), École normale supérieure - Paris (ENS Paris)-Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique (INRA)-École des hautes études en sciences sociales (EHESS)-École des Ponts ParisTech (ENPC)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS), Paris School of Economics (PSE), Toulouse School of Economics (TSE), École des hautes études en sciences sociales (EHESS)-Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique (INRA)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-Université Toulouse 1 Capitole (UT1), Institute advanced for advanced studies in Toulouse, Ce travail a bénéficié d'une aide de l'Etat gérée par l'Agence Nationale de la Recherche au titre du programme « Investissements d'avenir » portant la référence ANR-10-LABX-93-01.This work was supported by the French National Research Agency, through the program Investissements d'Avenir, ANR-10--LABX_93-01., Paris Jourdan Sciences Economiques (PJSE), Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (UP1)-École normale supérieure - Paris (ENS Paris)-Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique (INRA)-École des hautes études en sciences sociales (EHESS)-École des Ponts ParisTech (ENPC)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS), Institute for Advanced Study Toulouse, Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (UP1)-École normale supérieure - Paris (ENS Paris), Université Paris sciences et lettres (PSL)-Université Paris sciences et lettres (PSL)-École des hautes études en sciences sociales (EHESS)-École des Ponts ParisTech (ENPC)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement (INRAE), École des Ponts ParisTech (ENPC)-École normale supérieure - Paris (ENS Paris), Université Paris sciences et lettres (PSL)-Université Paris sciences et lettres (PSL)-Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (UP1)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-École des hautes études en sciences sociales (EHESS)-Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement (INRAE), Institute for Advanced Study in Toulouse (IAST), Université Fédérale Toulouse Midi-Pyrénées-Université Fédérale Toulouse Midi-Pyrénées, Bauer, Caroline, École normale supérieure - Paris (ENS Paris), Université Paris sciences et lettres (PSL)-Université Paris sciences et lettres (PSL)-Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique (INRA)-École des hautes études en sciences sociales (EHESS)-École des Ponts ParisTech (ENPC)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS), Université Toulouse 1 Capitole (UT1), and Université Fédérale Toulouse Midi-Pyrénées-Université Fédérale Toulouse Midi-Pyrénées-Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique (INRA)-École des hautes études en sciences sociales (EHESS)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)

Subjects
Economics and Econometrics, JEL: D - Microeconomics/D.D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making/D.D7.D72 - Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior, media_common.quotation_subject, 02 engineering and technology, Condorcet method, Elections, Cardinal voting systems, Microeconomics, Approval Voting, Straight-ticket voting, Voting, 050602 political science & public administration, 0202 electrical engineering, electronic engineering, information engineering, Bullet voting, Economics, Voting behavior, [SHS.ECO] Humanities and Social Sciences/Economics and Finance, media_common, strategic voting, Public economics, Disapproval voting, 05 social sciences, Ranked voting system, [SHS.ECO]Humanities and Social Sciences/Economics and Finance, 0506 political science, Approval voting, 020201 artificial intelligence & image processing, Social Sciences (miscellaneous)
Abstract

We propose a theory of strategic voting in multi-winner elections with approval balloting: A fixed number M of candidates are to be elected; each voter votes for as many candidates as she wants; the M candidates with the most votes are elected. We assume that voter preferences are separable and that there exists a tiny probability that any vote might be misrecorded.Best responses involve voting by pairwise comparisons. Two candidates play a critical role: the weakest expected winner and the strongest expected loser. Expected winners are approved if and only if they are preferred to the strongest expected loser and expected losers are approved if and only if they are preferred to the weakest expected winner.At equilibrium, if any, a candidate is elected if and only if he is approved by at least half of the voters. With single-peaked preferences, an equilibrium always exists, in which the first M candidates according to the majority tournament relation are elected.The theory is tested on individual data from the 2011 Regional Government election in Zurich.

Published
2016
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7. The Condorcet Efficiency Advantage that Voter Indifference Gives to Approval Voting Over Some Other Voting Rules

Author

Dominique Lepelley, William V. Gehrlein, University of Delaware [Newark], Centre d'Économie et de Management de l'Océan Indien (CEMOI), and Université de La Réunion (UR)

Subjects
Ranked pairs, Strategy and Management, media_common.quotation_subject, General Decision Sciences, Social Sciences, Borda rule, Condorcet efficiency, Condorcet method, Voting paradox, Cardinal voting systems, Arts and Humanities (miscellaneous), Management of Technology and Innovation, Voting, 0502 economics and business, Economics, Bullet voting, Approval voting, Plurality rule, 050207 economics, media_common, Anti-plurality voting, 05 social sciences, General Social Sciences, 16. Peace & justice, [SHS.ECO]Humanities and Social Sciences/Economics and Finance, general, Dichotomous preferences, Operations Research/Decision Theory, 050206 economic theory, Hal à déposer, Mathematical economics
Abstract

International audience; Approval Voting is known to possess many good properties when voters have dichotomous preferences. But, when attention was restricted to the limiting case for large electorates with three candidates in an early study, Approval Voting was found to have the same Condorcet Efficiency as both Plurality Rule and Negative Plurality rule when no voter indifference is allowed in voters’ preferences with the assumption of the impartial culture condition (IC). However, a later study by Diss et al. (Handbook on approval voting, 2010) shows that the introduction of any degree of indifference in an extended impartial culture condition leads to a dominance of Approval Voting over both Plurality Rule and Negative Plurality Rule on the basis of Condorcet Efficiency. Scenarios were also found for which Approval Voting had greater Condorcet Efficiency than Borda Rule. The assumptions of that study are analyzed here, and an arguably more reasonable set of assumptions leads to the conclusion that Borda Rule will dominate Approval Voting on the basis of Condorcet Efficiency for all degrees of voter indifference, except for the case of completely dichotomous preferences. The same outcome is found to result in the current study for an extended version of the Impartial Anonymous Culture Condition.

Published
2014
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8. The geometry of voting power: weighted voting and hyper-ellipsoids

Author

Nicolas Houy, William S. Zwicker, Groupe d'analyse et de théorie économique (GATE Lyon Saint-Étienne), École normale supérieure - Lyon (ENS Lyon)-Université Lumière - Lyon 2 (UL2)-Université Claude Bernard Lyon 1 (UCBL), Université de Lyon-Université de Lyon-Université Jean Monnet [Saint-Étienne] (UJM)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS), Union College, Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-Université de Lyon-Université Jean Monnet [Saint-Étienne] (UJM)-Université Claude Bernard Lyon 1 (UCBL), Université de Lyon-Université Lumière - Lyon 2 (UL2)-École normale supérieure - Lyon (ENS Lyon), Dao, Taï, Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon - Saint-Etienne (GATE Lyon Saint-Étienne), École normale supérieure de Lyon (ENS de Lyon)-Université Lumière - Lyon 2 (UL2)-Université Claude Bernard Lyon 1 (UCBL), and Université de Lyon-Université de Lyon-Université Jean Monnet - Saint-Étienne (UJM)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)

Subjects
weighted voting,voting power,simple games,ellipsoidal separability, Economics and Econometrics, media_common.quotation_subject, voting power, JEL: C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods/C.C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory/C.C7.C71 - Cooperative Games, Weighted voting, ComputingMilieux_LEGALASPECTSOFCOMPUTING, Cardinal voting systems, Voting, 0502 economics and business, Bullet voting, Positional voting system, 050207 economics, [SHS.ECO] Humanities and Social Sciences/Economics and Finance, ComputingMilieux_MISCELLANEOUS, Mathematics, media_common, Discrete mathematics, Anti-plurality voting, 05 social sciences, weighted voting, 16. Peace & justice, [SHS.ECO]Humanities and Social Sciences/Economics and Finance, ellipsoidal separability, simple games, Approval voting, 050206 economic theory, Finance, Preferential block voting
Abstract

International audience; Suppose legislators represent districts of varying population, and their assembly's voting rule is intended to implement the principle of one person, one vote. How should legislators' voting weights appropriately reflect these population differences? An analysis requires an understanding of the relationship between voting weight and some measure of the influence that each legislator has over collective decisions. We provide three new characterizations of weighted voting that embody this relationship. Each is based on the intuition that winning coalitions should be close to one another. The locally minimal and tightly packed characterizations use a weighted Hamming metric. Ellipsoidal separability employs the Euclidean metric: a separating hyper-ellipsoid contains all winning coalitions, and omits losing ones. The ellipsoid's proportions, and the Hamming weights, reflect the ratio of voting weight to influence, measured as Penrose Banzhaf voting power. In particular, the spherically separable rules are those for which voting powers can serve as voting weights.

Published
2014
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9. The Strategic Sincerity of Approval Voting

Author

Matías Núñez, Théorie économique, modélisation et applications (THEMA), Université de Cergy Pontoise (UCP), and Université Paris-Seine-Université Paris-Seine-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)

Subjects
Anti-plurality voting, Economics and Econometrics, JEL: D - Microeconomics/D.D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making/D.D7.D72 - Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior, Disapproval voting, media_common.quotation_subject, 05 social sciences, Sincerity, Advertising, 16. Peace & justice, [SHS.ECO]Humanities and Social Sciences/Economics and Finance, Preference, Cardinal voting systems, Microeconomics, Voting, 0502 economics and business, Economics, Bullet voting, Approval voting, 050207 economics, Sincerity Approval voting Poisson games, 050205 econometrics, media_common
Abstract

International audience; We show that Approval voting need not trigger sincere behavior in equilibrium of Poisson voting games and hence might lead a strategic voter to skip a candidate preferred to his worst preferred approved candidate. We identify two main rationales for these violations of sincerity. First, if a candidate has no votes, a voter might skip him. Notwithstanding, we provide sufficient conditions on the voters' preference intensities to remove this sort of insincerity. On the contrary, if the candidate gets a positive share of the votes, a voter might skip him solely on the basis of his ordinal preferences. This second type of insincerity is a consequence of the correlation of the candidates' scores. The incentives for sincerity of rank scoring rules are also discussed.

Published
2013
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10. A Practical Solution against Corrupted Parties and Coercers in Electronic Voting Protocol over the Network

Author

Tran Khanh Dang, Thi Ai Thao Nguyen, Ho Chi Minh City University of Technology (HCMUT), David Hutchison, Takeo Kanade, Madhu Sudan, Demetri Terzopoulos, Doug Tygar, Moshe Y. Vardi, Gerhard Weikum, Khabib Mustofa, Erich J. Neuhold, A Min Tjoa, Edgar Weippl, Ilsun You, Josef Kittler, Jon M. Kleinberg, Friedemann Mattern, John C. Mitchell, Moni Naor, Oscar Nierstrasz, C. Pandu Rangan, Bernhard Steffen, TC 5, and TC 8

Subjects
Scheme (programming language), receipt-freenesss, Electronic voting, Computer science, business.industry, media_common.quotation_subject, [SHS.INFO]Humanities and Social Sciences/Library and information sciences, Internet privacy, Cryptography, uncoercibility, Computer security, computer.software_genre, blind signature, Voting, Collusion, Bullet voting, Blind signature, dynamic ballot, [INFO]Computer Science [cs], business, Protocol (object-oriented programming), computer, computer.programming_language, media_common
Abstract

Part 1: Information and Communication Technology- Eurasia Conference (ICT-EurAsia); International audience; In this paper, we introduce a novel electronic voting protocol which is resistant to more powerful corrupted parties and coercers than any previous works. They can be the voting authorities inside the system who can steal voters’ information and the content of their votes, or the adversaries outside who try to buy the votes, and force voters to follow their wishes. The worst case is that the adversaries outside collude with all voting authorities inside to destroy the whole system. In previous works, authors suggested many complicated cryptographic techniques for fulfilling all security requirements of electronic voting protocol. However, they cannot avoid the sophisticated inside and outside collusion. Our proposal prevents these threats from happening by the combination of blind signature, dynamic ballots and other techniques. Moreover, the improvement of blind signature scheme together with the elimination of physical assumptions makes the newly proposed protocol faster and more efficient. These enhancements make some progress towards practical security solution for electronic voting system.

Published
2013
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11. Preference Intensity Representation : Strategic Overstating in Large Elections

Author

Jean-François Laslier, Matías Núñez, Théorie économique, modélisation et applications (THEMA), Université de Cergy Pontoise (UCP), Université Paris-Seine-Université Paris-Seine-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS), Département d'Économie de l'École Polytechnique (X-DEP-ECO), and École polytechnique (X)

Subjects
Anti-plurality voting, Economics and Econometrics, JEL: D - Microeconomics/D.D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making/D.D7.D72 - Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior, Disapproval voting, media_common.quotation_subject, 05 social sciences, Ranked voting system, 16. Peace & justice, [SHS.ECO]Humanities and Social Sciences/Economics and Finance, Cardinal voting systems, Microeconomics, Strategic voting Voting equilibria, JEL: D - Microeconomics/D.D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making/D.D7.D70 - General, Voting, 0502 economics and business, Bullet voting, Economics, Approval voting, 050207 economics, Social Sciences (miscellaneous), 050205 econometrics, media_common, Preferential block voting
Abstract

International audience; If voters vote strategically, is it useful to offer them the possibility of expressing nuanced opinions, or would they always overstate the intensity of their preferences? For additive voting rules, say that a ballot is extremal if it is neither abstention-like nor can be expressed as a mixture of the available ballots. We give a sufficient condition for strategic equivalence: if two rules share the same set of extremal ballots (up to an homothetic transformation), they are strategically equivalent in large elections. This condition is also necessary for the strategic equivalence of positional rules. These results do not hold for small electorates.

Published
2013
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12. Gerrymander-proof representative democracies

Author

Sebastian Bervoets, Vincent Merlin, Centre de recherche en économie et management (CREM), Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-Université de Rennes 1 (UR1), Université de Rennes (UNIV-RENNES)-Université de Rennes (UNIV-RENNES)-Université de Caen Normandie (UNICAEN), Normandie Université (NU)-Normandie Université (NU), Groupement de Recherche en Économie Quantitative d'Aix-Marseille (GREQAM), École Centrale de Marseille (ECM)-École des hautes études en sciences sociales (EHESS)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-Aix Marseille Université (AMU), Spanish Ministry of Education and Science grant SEJ2005-01481/ECON PTA-2003-02-00005 Generalitat de Catalunya grant 2005SGR00454, Université de Caen Normandie (UNICAEN), Normandie Université (NU)-Normandie Université (NU)-Université de Rennes (UR)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS), and École des hautes études en sciences sociales (EHESS)-Aix Marseille Université (AMU)-École Centrale de Marseille (ECM)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)

Subjects
Statistics and Probability, Economics and Econometrics, JEL: D - Microeconomics/D.D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making/D.D7.D72 - Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior, Computer science, media_common.quotation_subject, Gerrymandering, Federal voting rules, Public administration, Cardinal voting systems, Mathematics (miscellaneous), Voting, Unanimity, 0502 economics and business, Bullet voting, Manipulation, 050207 economics, 050205 econometrics, media_common, Anti-plurality voting, Disapproval voting, 05 social sciences, 16. Peace & justice, JEL: D - Microeconomics/D.D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making/D.D7.D71 - Social Choice • Clubs • Committees • Associations, [SHS.ECO]Humanities and Social Sciences/Economics and Finance, Approval voting, Statistics, Probability and Uncertainty, Mathematical economics, First-past-the-post voting, Social Sciences (miscellaneous)
Abstract

International audience; This article is devoted to the analysis of electoral systems involving two step procedures. It appears that designers are able to manipulate the result of these type of elections by gerrymandering, except in a very few cases. When imposing an unanimity condition on every jurisdiction's voting rule, it is shown that, for any finite number of candidates, a two step voting rule that is gerrymander-proof necessarily gives every voter the power of overruling the unanimity. A characterization of the set of gerrymander proof rules is provided in the case of two candidates.

Published
2012
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13. Making statements and approval voting

Author

Itzhak Gilboa, Enriqueta Aragones, Andrew Weiss, Groupement de Recherche et d'Etudes en Gestion à HEC (GREGH), Ecole des Hautes Etudes Commerciales (HEC Paris)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS), Department of Economics, and Boston University [Boston] (BU)

Subjects
Computer science, media_common.quotation_subject, General Decision Sciences, ComputingMilieux_LEGALASPECTSOFCOMPUTING, Cardinal voting systems, Arts and Humanities (miscellaneous), [SHS.ECO.ECO]Humanities and Social Sciences/Economics and Finance/domain_shs.eco.eco, Voting, Turnout, Developmental and Educational Psychology, Bullet voting, Approval voting, Approval voting, Abstention, Statements, Applied Psychology, media_common, Anti-plurality voting, Actuarial science, business.industry, Disapproval voting, jel:D72, General Social Sciences, Ranked voting system, Public relations, Computer Science Applications, Calculus of voting, business, General Economics, Econometrics and Finance
Abstract

We assume that people have a need to make statements, and construct a model in which this need is the sole determinant of voting behavior. In this model, an individual selects a ballot that makes as close a statement as possible to her ideal point, where abstaining from voting is a possible (null) statement. We show that in such a model, a political system that adopts approval voting may be expected to enjoy a significantly higher rate of participation in elections than a comparable system with plurality rule.

Published
2011
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14. And the loser is... Plurality Voting

Author

Jean-François Laslier, Département d'Économie de l'École Polytechnique (X-DEP-ECO), École polytechnique (X), and Of Economics, Department

Subjects
JEL: D - Microeconomics/D.D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making/D.D7.D72 - Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior, business.industry, Disapproval voting, media_common.quotation_subject, ComputingMilieux_LEGALASPECTSOFCOMPUTING, Ranked voting system, Public relations, JEL: D - Microeconomics/D.D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making/D.D7.D71 - Social Choice • Clubs • Committees • Associations, [SHS.ECO]Humanities and Social Sciences/Economics and Finance, [SHS.SCIPO]Humanities and Social Sciences/Political science, Cardinal voting systems, Voting, Political science, Bullet voting, Approval voting, business, [SHS.ECO] Humanities and Social Sciences/Economics and Finance, First-past-the-post voting, [SHS.SCIPO] Humanities and Social Sciences/Political science, media_common, Preferential block voting
Abstract

Experts have different opinions as to which is the best voting procedure. The Leverhulme Trust sponsored 2010 Voting Power in Practice workshop, held at the Chateau du Baffy, Normandy, from 30 July to 2 August 2010, was organized for the purpose of discussing this matter. Participants of the workshop were specialists in voting procedures and, during the wrap-up session at the end of the workshop, it was decided to organize a vote among the participants to elect “the best voting procedure”. The present paper reports on this vote. It contains in the Appendix statements by some of the voters/participants about this vote and voting rules in general.

Published
2011

15. On the stability of a triplet of scoring rules

Author

Vincent Merlin, Mostapha Diss, Centre de recherche en économie et management (CREM), Université de Caen Normandie (UNICAEN), Normandie Université (NU)-Normandie Université (NU)-Université de Rennes 1 (UR1), Université de Rennes (UNIV-RENNES)-Université de Rennes (UNIV-RENNES)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS), and Normandie Université (NU)-Normandie Université (NU)-Université de Rennes (UR)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)

Subjects
media_common.quotation_subject, General Decision Sciences, Scoring rules, Condorcet method, Cardinal voting systems, Arts and Humanities (miscellaneous), Voting, 0502 economics and business, Developmental and Educational Psychology, Positional voting system, Bullet voting, Self-selectivity, 050207 economics, Self-selectivity,Stability,Instability,Scoring rules,Impartial Culture assumption, Applied Psychology, Impartial Culture assumption, 050205 econometrics, media_common, Anti-plurality voting, Welfare economics, 05 social sciences, General Social Sciences, Instability, 16. Peace & justice, [SHS.ECO]Humanities and Social Sciences/Economics and Finance, Computer Science Applications, Approval voting, JEL: D - Microeconomics/D.D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making, General Economics, Econometrics and Finance, Mathematical economics, Stability, Preferential block voting
Abstract

International audience; When choosing a voting rule to make subsequent decisions, the members of a committee may wish this rule to be self-selected when it is the object of a choice among a menu of different possible voting rules. Such concepts have recently been explored in Social Choice theory, and a menu of voting rule is said to be stable if it contains at least one self-selective voting rule at each profile of preferences on voting rules. We consider in this article the menu constituted by the three well-known scoring rules {Borda, Plurality, and Antiplurality}. Under the Impartial Culture assumption, which proposes an a priori model to estimate the likelihood of the profiles, we will derive a probability for the stability of this triplet of voting rules.

Published
2010
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16. On the Condorcet efficiency of approval voting and extended scoring rules for three alternatives

Author

Vincent Merlin, Fabrice Valognes, Mostapha Diss, Centre de recherche en économie et management (CREM), Université de Caen Normandie (UNICAEN), Normandie Université (NU)-Normandie Université (NU)-Université de Rennes 1 (UR1), Université de Rennes (UNIV-RENNES)-Université de Rennes (UNIV-RENNES)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS), Laslier Jean-François, Sanver Remzi, Normandie Université (NU)-Normandie Université (NU)-Université de Rennes (UR)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS), and Louise-Rose, Naïla

Subjects
Anti-plurality voting, Ranked pairs, Computer science, Borda count, 05 social sciences, Condorcet, Condorcet method, 16. Peace & justice, [SHS.ECO]Humanities and Social Sciences/Economics and Finance, Cardinal voting systems, voting rules, 0502 economics and business, Positional voting system, Bullet voting, Approval voting, 050207 economics, [SHS.ECO] Humanities and Social Sciences/Economics and Finance, Mathematical economics, ComputingMilieux_MISCELLANEOUS, probalities, 050205 econometrics
Abstract

The results presented in this chapter belong to the long tradition of evaluating the voting rules on their propensity to select the Condorcet winner. This tradition dates back to de Borda (1781), who first noticed that just voting for one name and then selecting as a winner the candidate with more votes, could lead to the selection of an option that is beaten by all the other candidates in pairwise comparisons. In order to replace the rule that is now known as the Plurality rule, he suggested a new voting mechanism, which now bares his name, the Borda Count (BC). When m candidates are in competition, Borda suggested that each voter could give m — 1 points to his first choice, m — 2 points to his second choice, and so on down to one point for his next to the last alternative and zero point for the candidate he ranks last. Next, the candidate who receives the highest number of points is declared as the winner.

Published
2010

17. In Silico Voting Experiments

Author

Jean-François Laslier, Of Economics, Department, Département d'Économie de l'École Polytechnique (X-DEP-ECO), and École polytechnique (X)

Subjects
Anti-plurality voting, Public economics, Disapproval voting, media_common.quotation_subject, Social Choice. Voting Rules. Impartial Culture. Condorcet. Borda, Condorcet method, [SHS.ECO]Humanities and Social Sciences/Economics and Finance, [SHS.SCIPO]Humanities and Social Sciences/Political science, Calculus of voting, Cardinal voting systems, D72, Political science, Voting, Bullet voting, Approval voting, [SHS.ECO] Humanities and Social Sciences/Economics and Finance, Mathematical economics, [SHS.SCIPO] Humanities and Social Sciences/Political science, media_common
Abstract

This paper presents computer simulations of voting rules: Plurality rule, Approval voting and the Copeland and Borda rules, with voters voting sincerly or strategically. Different ways of generating random preference profiles are introduced: Rousseauist cultures are suitable for common interest project assessment; Impartial cultures are standard in Social Choice Theory; Distributive cultures and Spatial Euclidean ones are standard in Political Science.

Published
2009

18. A live experiment on approval voting

Author

Karine Van der Straeten, Jean-François Laslier, Département d'Économie de l'École Polytechnique (X-DEP-ECO), École polytechnique (X), Paris-Jourdan Sciences Economiques (PJSE), École normale supérieure - Paris (ENS Paris), Université Paris sciences et lettres (PSL)-Université Paris sciences et lettres (PSL)-École des hautes études en sciences sociales (EHESS)-École des Ponts ParisTech (ENPC)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS), Paris School of Economics (PSE), École des Ponts ParisTech (ENPC)-École normale supérieure - Paris (ENS Paris), and Université Paris sciences et lettres (PSL)-Université Paris sciences et lettres (PSL)-Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (UP1)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-École des hautes études en sciences sociales (EHESS)-Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement (INRAE)

Subjects
media_common.quotation_subject, Economics, Econometrics and Finance (miscellaneous), Public administration, Cardinal voting systems, Voting, Political science, 0502 economics and business, 050602 political science & public administration, Bullet voting, Approval voting, Instant-runoff voting, Voting rules, 050207 economics, media_common, Disapproval voting, 05 social sciences, C93, D70, D72, 16. Peace & justice, [SHS.SCIPO]Humanities and Social Sciences/Political science, 0506 political science, French politics, Law, [SHS.GESTION]Humanities and Social Sciences/Business administration, Experiments, First-past-the-post voting, Two-round system
Abstract

International audience; This paper presents a large-scale experiment on the Approval Voting rule that took place during the 2002 French presidential election. We describe the experiment and its main results. The findings are as follows: (i) Such an experiment is feasible, and very well accepted by voters. (ii) The principle of approval voting is easily understood and accepted. (iii) Within the observed political context, compared to the official first-round vote, approval voting modifies the overall ranking of candidates. (iv) The candidates Le Pen and Chirac, more than the others, were able to convert approval votes into official first-round votes.

Published
2008
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19. Approval Voting: Three Examples

Author

Jean-François Laslier, Bhaskar Dutta, Francesco De Sinopoli, Department of Economics, University Carlos III de Madrid, University of Warwick [Coventry], Département d'Économie de l'École Polytechnique (X-DEP-ECO), École polytechnique (X), and Hugonnard-Roche, Marie-Hélène

Subjects
Statistics and Probability, [INFO.INFO-CC]Computer Science [cs]/Computational Complexity [cs.CC], Economics and Econometrics, [INFO.INFO-RO] Computer Science [cs]/Operations Research [cs.RO], Computer science, media_common.quotation_subject, ComputingMilieux_LEGALASPECTSOFCOMPUTING, Condorcet method, Preference representation, equilibrium refinements, Cardinal voting systems, Mathematics (miscellaneous), Voting, 0502 economics and business, Bullet voting, logic-based languages, 050207 economics, Approval, media_common, Anti-plurality voting, computational complexity, sincere voting, Public economics, Disapproval voting, 05 social sciences, Sincere voting, [INFO.INFO-RO]Computer Science [cs]/Operations Research [cs.RO], 16. Peace & justice, expressive power comparative succinctness, Approval voting, 050206 economic theory, [INFO.INFO-CC] Computer Science [cs]/Computational Complexity [cs.CC], Statistics, Probability and Uncertainty, Mathematical economics, Social Sciences (miscellaneous)
Abstract

As proposed in various places, a set of propositional formulas, each associated with a numerical weight, can be used to model the preferences of an agent in combinatorial domains. If the range of possible choices can be represented by the set of possible assignments of propositional symbols to truth values, then the utility of an assignment is given by the sum of the weights of the formulas it satisfies. Our aim in this paper is twofold: (1) to establish correspondences between certain types of weighted formulas and well-known classes of utility functions (such as monotonic, concave or k-additive functions); and (2) to obtain results on the comparative succinctness of different types of weighted formulas for representing the same class of utility functions.

Published
2006

20. Assessing success and decisiveness in voting situations

Author

Annick Laruelle, Federico Valenciano, Centre de recherche en économie et management (CREM), Université de Caen Normandie (UNICAEN), Normandie Université (NU)-Normandie Université (NU)-Université de Rennes 1 (UR1), Université de Rennes (UNIV-RENNES)-Université de Rennes (UNIV-RENNES)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS), Normandie Université (NU)-Normandie Université (NU)-Université de Rennes (UR)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS), and Louise-Rose, Naïla

Subjects
Economics and Econometrics, voting situations, Computer science, media_common.quotation_subject, ComputingMilieux_LEGALASPECTSOFCOMPUTING, Cardinal voting systems, Voting, 0502 economics and business, 050602 political science & public administration, Bullet voting, 050207 economics, [SHS.ECO] Humanities and Social Sciences/Economics and Finance, ComputingMilieux_MISCELLANEOUS, media_common, Anti-plurality voting, Disapproval voting, 05 social sciences, 16. Peace & justice, [SHS.ECO]Humanities and Social Sciences/Economics and Finance, 0506 political science, Calculus of voting, Approval voting, Mathematical economics, Social psychology, Social Sciences (miscellaneous), Preferential block voting
Abstract

In this paper we propose a simple model for measuring ‘success’ or ‘decisiveness’ in voting situations. For an assessment of these features two inputs are claimed to be necessary: the voting rule and the voters’ behavior. The voting rule specifies when a proposal is to be accepted or rejected depending on the resulting vote configuration. Voting behavior is summarized by a distribution of probability over the vote configurations. This basic model provides a clear common conceptual basis for reinterpreting different power indices and some related game theoretic notions coherently from a unified point of view.

Published
2005

21. Borda rule, Copeland method and strategic manipulation

Author

Jérôme Serais, Pierre Favardin, Dominique Lepelley, Centre de recherche en économie et management (CREM), Université de Caen Normandie (UNICAEN), Normandie Université (NU)-Normandie Université (NU)-Université de Rennes 1 (UR1), Université de Rennes (UNIV-RENNES)-Université de Rennes (UNIV-RENNES)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS), Normandie Université (NU)-Normandie Université (NU)-Université de Rennes (UR)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS), and Louise-Rose, Naïla

Subjects
media_common.quotation_subject, 05 social sciences, Copeland method, Vulnerability, Borda rule, strategic manipulation, Voting theory, [SHS.ECO]Humanities and Social Sciences/Economics and Finance, Misrepresentation, Voting, 0502 economics and business, Bullet voting, Economics, 050206 economic theory, 050207 economics, [SHS.ECO] Humanities and Social Sciences/Economics and Finance, General Economics, Econometrics and Finance, Mathematical economics, ComputingMilieux_MISCELLANEOUS, media_common
Abstract

The voting situations at which the Borda rule or the Copeland method can be manipulated by a single voter or a coalition of voters in three-alternative elections are characterized. From these characterizations, we derive (when possible) some analytical representations measuring the vulnerability of these rules to strategic misrepresentation of preferences. Our results suggest that the Borda rule is significantly more vulnerable to strategic manipulation than the Copeland method.

Published
2002

22. The stability set as a social choice correspondence

Author

Vincent Merlin, Mathieu Martin, Louise-Rose, Naïla, Centre de recherche en économie et management (CREM), Université de Caen Normandie (UNICAEN), Normandie Université (NU)-Normandie Université (NU)-Université de Rennes 1 (UR1), Université de Rennes (UNIV-RENNES)-Université de Rennes (UNIV-RENNES)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS), and Normandie Université (NU)-Normandie Université (NU)-Université de Rennes (UR)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)

Subjects
Sociology and Political Science, Computer science, media_common.quotation_subject, Condorcet method, Cardinal voting systems, Voting, 0502 economics and business, Bullet voting, social choice correspondence, [SHS.ECO] Humanities and Social Sciences/Economics and Finance, General Psychology, ComputingMilieux_MISCELLANEOUS, 050205 econometrics, media_common, Anti-plurality voting, Public economics, Disapproval voting, 05 social sciences, General Social Sciences, stability, 16. Peace & justice, [SHS.ECO]Humanities and Social Sciences/Economics and Finance, May's theorem, 050206 economic theory, Statistics, Probability and Uncertainty, Social choice theory, Mathematical economics
Abstract

The stability set has been introduced in the game theory and social choice literature by Rubinstein [J. Econ. Theory 23 (1980) 150], as a possible resolution of the problem of the emptiness of the core of voting games. In this context, it models the idea that individuals may be, in some sense, prudent: a voter i will never vote for candidate a against candidate b in a pairwise comparison if a is afterwards beaten by a candidate c that is worse than a and b in her preference ordering. Most of the literature on the stability set focused on its non-existence, but almost nothing is said on its relationships with other social choice correspondences and its normative properties. This is what we intend to do here in a rather extensive study. We first prove that the stability set offers a specific way to select the best alternatives, different from many other voting rules. Secondly, we show that this prudent behavior, in the context of voting, may lead to the selection of undesired alternatives.

Published
2002

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