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Cloud storage attracts a lot of clients to join the paradise. For a high data availability, some clients require their files to be replicated and stored on multiple servers. Because clients are generally charged based on the redundancy level required by them, it is critical for clients to obtain convincing evidence that all replicas are stored correctly and are updated to the up-to-date version. In this paper, we propose a dynamic proof of data possession and replication (DPDPR) scheme, which is proved to be secure in the defined security model. Our scheme shares a single authenticated tree across multiple replicas, which reduces the tree's storage cost significantly. Our scheme allows for batch verification for multiple challenged leaves and can verify multiple replicas in a single batch way, which considerably save bandwidth and computation resources during audit process. We also evaluate the DPDPR's performance and compare it with the most related scheme. The evaluation results show that our scheme saves almost 66% tree's storage cost for three replicas, and obtains almost 60% and 80% efficiency improvements in terms of the overall bandwidth and computation costs, respectively, when three replicas are checked and each challenged with 460 blocks.

Self-testing refers to a device-independent way to uniquely identify an unknown quantum device based only on the observed statistics. Earlier results on self-testing of multipartite state were restricted either to Dicke states or Graph states. In this paper, we propose self-testing schemes for a large family of symmetric three-qubit states, namely the superposition of $W$ state and $GHZ$ state. We first propose and analytically prove a self-testing criterion for the special symmetric state with equal coefficients of the canonical bases, by designing subsystem self-testing of partially and maximally entangled state simultaneously. Then we demonstrate for the general case, the states can be self-tested numerically by the swap method combining semidefinite programming (SDP) in high precision.

Most existing quantum private query (QPQ) protocols can hardly work in the presence of noise. The user Alice may obtain a false database item in noisy environments and both participants may cheat under the disguise of noise, so dealing with the noise needs an overall consideration of error correction, user privacy and database security. However, the only two existing protocols aiming to correct errors in QPQ lack such an overall consideration (at least one party’s privacy can be revealed), and they did not estimate what extent of errors can be tolerated (actually, noise is seldom discussed in quantum two-party secure computations, and to the best of our knowledge, relevant bounds on tolerable errors remain unattainable so far). To solve this problem, we first exemplify how one participant reveals the other party’s privacy in the existing QPQ protocols aiming to correct errors. Then we propose a practical protocol which can really work via noisy channel, that is, the error rate of the retrieved database item is reduced significantly and both parties’ privacy are well protected. Besides, we deduce that the final error rate, user privacy and database security are pairwise in a “trade-off” relationship. By balancing them according to the required level of security and reliability, we obtain an upper bound on tolerable errors.

Replication is a fundamental solution for the cloud service provider (CSP) to guarantee data availability. To provide users with convincing evidence that the copies required by them are all stored correctly, a number of multi-copy integrity auditing schemes were presented. Recently, Barsoum and Hasan proposed a map-based provable multi-copy dynamic data possession scheme (IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security, vol. 10, no. 3, pp. 485–497, 2015), which was claimed to be secure and can ensure that the CSP possesses all copies required by the contract. However, in this letter, we show that the scheme is easily subject to a copy-summation attack and a single-copy attack, by which a cheating CSP only needs to invest a storage cost of a single copy—while can still pass the verifier’s challenge at all times. Therefore, the scheme is no longer secure in this case. Furthermore, we propose some simple but effective countermeasures and give a repaired scheme which is free from the above two attacks.

Cryptanalysis is an important branch in the study of cryptography, including both the classical cryptography and the quantum one. In this paper we analyze the security of two three-party quantum key distribution protocols (QKDPs) proposed recently, and point out that they are susceptible to a simple and effective attack, i.e. the dense-coding attack. It is shown that the eavesdropper Eve can totally obtain the session key by sending entangled qubits as the fake signal to Alice and performing collective measurements after Alice's encoding. The attack process is just like a dense-coding communication between Eve and Alice, where a special measurement basis is employed. Furthermore, this attack does not introduce any errors to the transmitted information and consequently will not be discovered by Alice and Bob. The attack strategy is described in detail and a proof for its correctness is given. At last, the root of this insecurity and a possible way to improve these protocols are discussed., 6 pages, 3 figures