Search

I submitted this as a paper proposal for the 2008 San Francisco ISA conference. I also was required to submit the paper to the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) for its. CIA did not approve because I was employed at the time by CIA. While CIA did not co ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

After the terrorist attack on the United States on September 11, 2001, interest has exploded in developing more effective counterterrorist measures. Most of the thinking on this issue has focused exclusively on government responses to this threat. By contrast, this paper explores the potential of using non-state groups to combat terrorism. Specifically, it discusses the limitations that the anarchic international system imposes upon existing counterterrorist strategies, and suggests the possibility of employing transnational criminal organizations to gather intelligence on terrorists, and using private military forces to undertake coercive action against them. In both cases, it explicitly identifies specific conditions when these unorthodox strategies would have the greatest potential for success, along with full discussion of the dangers of over reliance on such non-state groups. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Intelligence analysts are constantly faced with labels throughout their daily work. In the national security realm, labels, such as terrorist, rebel, militia, and insurgent, are given to groups and are continually labels of interest to analysts and their decision makers. These particular labels have significant meaning, and many individuals have a preconceived idea, or cognitive biases, for what actions each of these particular groups conduct. The examination of the terms we use to label is significant, particularly in light of the US global war on terrorism and for national security interests. My thesis, upon which this paper is based, will shed light on whether cognitive biases exist when analysts receive reports concerning these particular labels. In addition, my thesis will attempt to place a quantitative measure to these biases by using the online experiment. By using the same information and only switching which label (terrorist, rebel, militia, insurgent, or group) is used, I will attempt to determine how much impact, if any, each label has on analysis. This research is important because the use, or misuse, of particular labels can directly affect US government action or inaction. Because intelligence analysis assists in policy decisions, it is important to be precise and cautious in our use of such labeling terms, and this is the purpose and significance of my research into this topic. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper will analyse the lessons learned during the creation of the intelligence interface between the military and Private Security Companies (PSCs) in Iraq, under the auspices of the Department of Defense (DoD), and suggest a template for future co-operation based on these lessons. It will fill a gap in the current literature regarding PSCs in modern warfare, which tends to focus on the moral or ethical implications of the physical security aspect of their work and ignores their intelligence capability, which is a major part of the services they provide and a key facet of their relationship with the military in Iraq. The war in Iraq has seen an unprecedented number of PSCs working in support of military operations, all of which need access to timely and accurate intelligence to carry out their mission safely. The DoD established civil-military operations centres to co-ordinate the activities of the PSCs supporting the reconstruction effort throughout Iraq and provide them with intelligence. The military was expected to pass unclassified information to the civilian intelligence staff at the operations centres, who were contractors working for a British PSC, to analyse and disseminate to the wider PSC community. However there was no uniform system in place for the military to provide this information and co-operation was largely based on personal relationships between the intelligence analysts at the operations centres and their military counterparts, which often had to be rebuilt when units changed over. As time passed more formal guidelines were produced but not uniformly applied. The military intelligence staffs were also faced with problems regarding security clearances and declassification of information for which they were often unprepared. Local ‘ad hoc’ solutions were used to resolve many issues. The relationship was, however, usually found to be mutually beneficial as the military found their situational awareness enhanced through contact with PSCs operating on the ground and the civilian analysts often provided useful insight into the current situation. Since PSCs are likely to be present in many future conflicts, the problems encountered in Iraq will recur unless there is a sound framework for intelligence co-operation with the military based on mutual understanding and recognition of common aims. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Intelligence studies is, relatively speaking, a new discipline that has sprung up a bit like an English gardenâ€"unkempt, haphazard, but vital and thriving. Sometimes for the instructor, it is hard to know what is a rose, even with its thorns, and what is a dandelion. For instructors, finding the right balance between the history of intelligence, which has rich lessons to serve up, and the craft of intelligence, which has rich lessons to apply, is often a challenge. As Christopher Andrew, a renowned expert on the history of intelligence has observed, the further you look into the past, the further you can see into the future. We need to start by looking at how we have done intelligence studies until recently to see a way ahead.My experience in teaching intelligence studiesâ€"which is of recent vintage--suggests that a blend of both approaches can provide a powerful base to ground students in the discipline. Intelligence has a very insular culture and connecting with its history provides a sort of entrée into a secret world. But knowing the history and culture of anything, does not fully equip a student to practice the craft; most intelligence studies students are eager to be practitioners, not just theoreticians. My paper would suggest a way to balance the two elements.I plan to draw heavily on lessons learned from an over 25 year career at CIA, which I have captured in a draft article for CIA’s Studies in Intelligence. How do you avoid error by applying historic awareness but also avoiding mistaken historic analogies? What role can analytic method play in grounding intelligence analysis? How can instructors engage students in an exploration of the field, keeping it interesting, relevant, and real-world? The panel would look at this and other issues that would help the new discipline find its voice and answer the demands of clamoring students and critical administrators who do not want a flash in the pan quasi-discipline that will fade as terrorism threats transform or possibly recede. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A response to the attacks of September 11, 2001 presents both a political and legal problem for the United States government. It is a political problem because people demand protection, preparedness, and prevention of such attacks. These functions and activities are performed by the security forces of the countryâ€"the military for fighting war, and state and local civilian officials for fighting crime. These security forces develop and rely upon intelligence. Today, there is a global insurgency, one of whose tactics is terrorism and whose major target is the USA. A response, a counterinsurgency operation, requires a political-military strategy integrating civilian and military activities in a unity of effort through sharing of intelligence. If this strategy were available in the US, it would enable the security forces to identify support in the USA for the insurgency. Yet, the military and state and local civilian officials of the USA rarely interact within the USA. I intend to show that a unified military and civilian response would be a legal problem because this situationâ€"separation of effortsâ€"exists because of the US constitutional system. Its featuresâ€"separation of powers, federalism, and separation of the civilian sector from the military sectorâ€"preclude such a political-military strategy and unity of efforts through intelligence integration. This paper seeks to understand the consequences of the US system of government on the effectiveness of a domestic response in the US and on how that response affects the global counterinsurgency effort. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This work analyzes the critical role of intelligence in foreign policy. The case study focuses on one of the most significant intelligence failures for the U.S. in the Middle East, the failure to predict the Iranian revolution of 1978-1979. This paper discusses the failure to foresee the growing domestic crisis in Iran which led to the toppling of the pro-American monarchy and its replacement by an Islamic Republic hostile to U.S. interests. This was the result of the blinding of American intelligence for strategic, economic, and domestic political reasons. Second, the paper discusses the delicate politics of trying to gain intelligence on an ally. This leads to a discussion on the significance of alliances and the problems in particular of great powers gathering intelligence on regional allies. This paper utilizes secondary as well as primary U.S. government documents. The paper also discusses the structure and institutional norms of American intelligence and how these problems continue to manifest themselves today. This paper would fit well on panels focusing on intelligence studies, American foreign policy in general, as well as Middle East politics. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In spite of widespread agreement among observers both inside and outside of government circles that information sharing is critical to homeland security, U.S. counter-terrorism agencies, including the CIA, the FBI, and the newly created Terrorist Threat Integration Center, continue to experience considerable difficulty sharing tactical and operational intelligence among relevant stakeholders. Drawing on theories of organizational behavior and the author?s interviews with counter-terrorism officials, this paper examines the institutional and individual constraints that continue to hamper information sharing across federal agencies. These limitations include knowledge-based routines that agencies use to control (and hoard) intelligence, such as ?originator control? (or ORCON, as it is widely known in the intelligence community), inter-agency turf battles that remain alive and well since 9/11, and impact of bounded rationality on government officials working in this dynamic, stressful environment. The paper concludes with a discussion of the policy implications of research for homeland security, suggesting that efforts at reforming intelligence agencies should focus less on reorganizing and centralizing existing bureaucracies and more on redesigning incentive structures and knowledge-based routines created during the Cold War. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

"I was shocked to the point that I was blinded by sheer disbelief ? In the end, [the U.S.] completely disregarded the years of sacrifice made by Japan, forcing us to forgo the great nation status that we had striven so hard to establish in the Far East. But to do so for Japan was none other than committing suicide. We now had no choice but to rise." (Jidai no Ichimen [An Aspect of Time], 2 vols, Tokyo: Hara Shobo, 1985.) According to the memoirs of Foreign Minister Shigenori Togo, these were his immediate reactions upon reading the cable that had just arrived from the Japanese Ambassador to the United States, Admiral Kichisaburo Nomura. Included in the cable was a note from Secretary of State Cordell Hull that contained an explicit rejection of Japan's proposal to resolve the current U.S.-Japan crisis. The message of the so-called "Hull Note" was clear: Japan needed to first withdraw from China before the U.S. would consider any Japanese demands. It was the same unequivocal position that the U.S. had maintained since early 1941. Unquestionably, Washington was unwilling to make even the slightest compromise towards Tokyo; appeasement was clearly out of the question.If there ever did exist a point-of-no-return on the road to Pearl Harbor, it was certainly on this day of November 26, 1941, when Togo - the leading advocate for peace in the cabinet - gave away all hope. Of course, Togo was no pacifist. However, he also was cognizant of the fact that war with the U.S. was futile and would only spell disaster for Japan. If so, then what pushed Togo to the brink that he felt Japan had "no choice but to rise"? Was it, as most Japanese historians claim, because the "Hull Note" was so uncompromising in its stance that it basically amounted to an ultimatum? Moreover, why was Togo so utterly dismayed? His emotionally charged words reveal that the foreign minister was so taken aback by the note that he felt a overpowering sense of betrayal. Could it be that Togo had been expecting an altogether different reply from the U.S.? Was he privy to any intelligence that would suggest otherwise? In light of the new evidence on prewar Japanese sigint recently discovered at the National Archives in College Park, Maryland, and the Diplomatic Record Office (DRO) of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Tokyo, Japan, the purpose of this paper will be the following: First, to illuminate the history of the hitherto highly obscure Japanese Black Chamber (Section 18),and two, to set forth a more logical and coherent explanation to Togo's volte-face in his policy towards the United States that ruptured all hope for peace. In conclusion, the paper will incorporate the new knowledge gained concerning Japanese prewar sigint and reveal how intelligence analysis had a detrimental impact on policy decisions a critical juncture. Through this undertaking, this paper will refute the longstanding understanding that the so-called "Hull Note" was the final straw that led to Pearl Harbor. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper presents an empirical analysis, rare in the field, on the pattern of congressional accountability over America's intelligence community. The pattern since 1975, when serious accountability was established over the secret agencies, indicates that robust supervision occurs only after a major intelligence scandal or failure---a "shock." The shock event is treated by lawmakers as do firefighters a significant conflagration. Lawmakers rush to investigate and put out the flames. Here is Congress in its most intense phase of accountability. The firefighting is then followed by a period of fairly intensive "police-patroling," whereby lawmakers pass reforms and other take steps to prevent a similar fire in the future. In a downward slope on the curve of intense accountability, lawmakers subsequently return to a period of low-intensity, routine patroling. A few years later, a new fire breaks out and the cycle begins again. The paper explores the details of the cycle's phases, leading to an analysis of the average time sequences of each phase, the types of oversight activities that occur within each phase, and the specific "shock" triggers that lead to major reform responses. The time period covered is from 1974-2006, including both intelligence oversight committees on Capitol Hill. This will be the first quantitative analysis of intelligence accountability in the United States. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

It is now generally accepted that national security transcends internal and external boundaries. Multiple authorities at the local, state, and national levels have responsibility for national security, and emergency managers are increasingly involved in security planning. The need to co-ordinate across several levels of government and to integrate new actors creates important governance challenges and has led to the creation of novel security governance units. In Canada, for instance, Integrated National Security Enforcement Teams (INSETs) housed in local police departments or RCMP detachments bring together police, military, intelligence, and other agencies to focus on threats to national security. In the United States, "fusion centers" and Joint Terrorism Task Forces serve a similar function. Drawing on theories about multilevel governance and the bureaucratisation of security (Paris School), this paper will seek to answer a number of questions in comparative context: How are these units similar or different? What prompted their creation? What explains their composition? What can their existence tell us about the changing nature of political authority and security governance?. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The United States has made ongoing efforts in establishing a robust legal framework on intelligence and security. This paper addresses the pluses and minuses of the legal basis for the effectiveness in US intelligence. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper addresses one of the major issues in the United States intelligence community--the sharing of information across agencies. Unfortunately, even after the events of 9/11, intelligence analysts within the FBI, CIA and DIA still withold information from each other. This leads us to ask why? Using social identity theory, we explain that in the case of intelligence sharing, each of these groups are engaging in intergroup competition and want to be seen as the best in the business. Therefore, they do not have any incentive to work together toward common goals. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Following recent terrorist attacks, intelligence agencies have been in the limelight. In particular their failings to coordinate efforts and to collaborate with other intelligence services have been subject to criticism. While the US has responded by revamping its intelligence community and creating the new Department of Homeland Security, little seems to have happened at the European level. The paper seeks to explain why some intelligence cooperation takes place within the EU and why some, not to say the bulk, does not. To gain precision, it outlines a model that divides intelligence into different stages, topics and levels. This ‘intelligence cube’ allows for an accurate discussion on cooperation in distinctive areas. Although the study mainly follows a pragmatic functionalist approach, suggesting that collaboration is utility driven rather than an end in itself, it does not argue that an increased Europeanisation is desirable. Rather it suggest that efficiency considerations offer the most convincing explanation why no new European Intelligence Agency has been created and why so little cooperation takes place within EU structures. This explanatory illustration is followed by a normative appreciation of what improvements the Union can and should undertake to advance the intelligence community’s contribution to the fight against terrorism. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In intelligence, a damage assessment is designed to learn if a spy has given away secrets or compromised operations. This damage assessment is more like that done after bombing a target to see if it was destroyed. The Intelligence Reform Act of 2004 hit the US Intelligence Community like a bomb; it was supposed to move the IC away from its Cold War mentality and organization to better fight terrorism. But, the results have been far from devastating. This paper will assess the damage and see what might be saved or fixed. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Colombia has been engaged in internal insurgencies for forty years. Only recently has the government, with the heavy support of the United States, begun to make headway against the three armed groups - FARC, ELN, and AUC. The ability of the intelligence agencies, especially the civilian - led DAS, has generally been found wanting. The intelligence community in Colombia has been undergoing reform for two decades though the pace has increased recently in response to a series of scandals. This paper will analyze the reforms and seek to assess their impact in terms of transparency, democratic control, and effectiveness. The views expressed here are the author's alone and do not necessarily represent those of the Department of Navy or the Department of Defense. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper analyses intelligence cooperation within the European Union and proposes the development of a European Union Intelligence Agency comparable to the CIA of the United States. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Traditionally, the analysis of the military-intelligence applications of space technologies has been cordoned off in the field of security studies from broader questions of lead industries, high technology competition, intra-core rivalry and the North-South divide. Yet, a historical analysis of the interrelationship between high technology development and security military/developments shows the need for an integrated approach, as the U.S example indicates. Since at least the late nineteenth century, U.S. military spending has served as a crucial mechanism for high technology development and in overseas power projection at one and the same time. In the nineteenth century such military spending centered around the steel-naval complex, in the twentieth century around high technology warfare, notably the aerospace, communications and electronics complex, replete with satellites and related technology, as important to the contemporary dominance of Wal-Mart as it is to the U.S. military. Indeed, the so called revolution in military affairs and network centric warfare theorists have delved into many of the interconnections between flexible just-in-time production and distribution and just-in-time warfare. Twenty-first century developments involving the militarization of space similarly serve as a vehicle for high technology development with great commercial applications and in overseas power projection at one and the same time, arguably propping up both profits and power. Crucially, military spending is exempt from restrictions against subsidies in the World Trade Organization. Thus, such military spending by core states â?? both the U.S. and the European Union â?? provide a vehicle for subsidizing high technology industry denied to many Third World countries under W.T.0. rules â?? while arguably increasing the ability of the North to militarily dominate the South. That being said, such public subsidy of private profit via military spending, while helping to give rise to the aerospace, telecommunications and satellite industries and related forms of global military power, has also been plagued by declining competitiveness and increased competition, as in the instance of the U.S./Boeing and its rivalry in the W.T.O. with the EU/Airbus indicates. Furthermore, in a world plagued by increasing poverty and asymmetrical warfare, the utility of such forms of military dominance may be diminishing as well. This paper explores these themes through a theoretical and comparative-historical lens, examining past trajectories to illuminate present choices. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper addresses the current debate whether or not the Bushadministration fixed its intelligence around the purpose of going to war inIraq. After laying out the merits of this debate, parallels are then drawnto US intelligence efforts prior to United Nationâ??s forces entering NorthKorean territory in the fall of 1950. Chinese intervention followed thisadvance and propelled the war on the Korean peninsula in an entirely newdirection.The main finding is that in both cases, the intelligence worked as it was supposed to do. And in both cases, the problems arose in command. As far as Korea is concerned, all partiesâ??military and civilian leadershipâ??wishedto enter North Korean territory; the confusion lay in how far to go. This lack of clarity contributed greatly to Chinese intervention. In Iraq, the US military expressed deep reservations about the need for the attack andits prospects for success after a military victory, but was overruled by the administration.The point is that intelligence is only as useful as the policy makers. Both got it wrong in Korea, only the civilian side in Iraq. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Before the invasion of Iraq in the spring of 2003, the British and American governments each produced estimates of the state of Saddam Hussein's programs to develop weapons of mass destruction. After the invasion, both governments ordered investigations into the prior estimates and their respective intelligence processes. The partial publication of the original estimates on Iraq and the subsequent investigative reports provides a unique comparative opportunity. An examination of these materials provides direct and public evidence for significant differences between British and American concepts, methods, structures, and philosophies of intelligence. Central to several of these differences are the British Joint Intelligence Council and the American system of distributed political power in the national government. The British tendency towards thick description and the American practices of assigning explicit levels of confidence to intelligence findings and of issuing controverted estimates with dissenting opinions included are also documented. This paper adds to the intelligence studies literature by documenting these observations in a replicable way with directly comparable data from two different nations. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Intelligence is considered the first line of defense in U.S. security against foreign and domestic threats. A key intelligence mission is the collection of information that can be handed on to analysts, who in turn assess its value in determining global threats and opportunities. Among the most important methods of information collection is human intelligence, known by the abbreviation "humint." Surveys inside the American intelligence community, as well as interviews with leading intelligence professionals and the top consumers of humint, indicate that this approach to intelligence gathering contributes significantly to the government's understanding of world affairs. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Last year's assessment showed that little had changed in the U.S. Intelligence Community. Now new professional leadership and plans for change have surfaced. Can this make a difference? Or, will bureaucratioc inertia, security concerns, and poor management lead to another gloomy assessment of progress in the increasingly complex Intelligence Community? This assessment will take a hard look at this issue. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Joint Interagency Task Force (JIATF) approach to intelligence collection and fusion can provide unique and significantly enhanced intelligence support to military and civilian decision-makers on terrorism threats. The JIATF approach encompasses the range of highly technical military intelligence practices to civilian law enforcement case building techniques. In the wake of 11 September 2001, the Intelligence Community (IC) continues to struggle with identifying who can provide comprehensive intelligence support to such missions and falls short in approaching this threat with traditional intelligence practices. The inabilities to share information between Law Enforcement Agencies (LEA) and the IC often accounts for this major disconnect. The design and charter of a JIATF allows the agency to bring the best of the IC and pair it with Law Enforcement information to create a complete and timely intelligence picture for decision-makers. Today’s enemy, in the face of overwhelming conventional advantages, seeks to challenge the U.S. through less expensive, more hidden ways that can strike at the heart of the national power. The source of these threats range from states and state-sponsored organizations to criminal groups. The organizations that directly target the United States can cross several intelligence boundaries. Critically, there is no adequate mechanism to fuse all of this vital intelligence and provide that to tactical commanders and the leadership of the United States. This thesis argues that the JIATF concept of conducting intelligence practices can support the war on terror by providing a one-stop shopping capability for fusing and analyzing intelligence information from multiple sources. It illustrates that some modifications must be incorporated into the model while demonstrating its capability to integrate intelligence community and law enforcement information into timely, fused, actionable intelligence. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Key Contacts for ISA-2009 in New York City for an “innovative panel” sponsored jointly by the Intelligence Studies and Peace Studies sections. This will actually be a role-played, crisis management exercise similar to Pentagon war games. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Key Contacts for ISA-2009 in New York City for an “innovative panel” sponsored jointly by the Intelligence Studies and Peace Studies sections. This will actually be a role-played, crisis management exercise similar to Pentagon war games. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Key Contacts for ISA-2009 in New York City for an “innovative panel” sponsored jointly by the Intelligence Studies and Peace Studies sections. This will actually be a role-played, crisis management exercise similar to Pentagon war games. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Key Contacts for ISA-2009 in New York City for an “innovative panel” sponsored jointly by the Intelligence Studies and Peace Studies sections. This will actually be a role-played, crisis management exercise similar to Pentagon war games. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Key Contacts for ISA-2009 in New York City for an “innovative panel” sponsored jointly by the Intelligence Studies and Peace Studies sections. This will actually be a role-played, crisis management exercise similar to Pentagon war games. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Key Contacts for ISA-2009 in New York City for an “innovative panel” sponsored jointly by the Intelligence Studies and Peace Studies sections. This will actually be a role-played, crisis management exercise similar to Pentagon war games. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

I have taught a graduate survey course in intelligence policy for the last several years. The course describes the history and organization of the U.S. intelligence community (IC); discusses intelligence reforms following the 9/11 attacks and the Iraqi w ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Discussions of cultural problems raised in 9/11 report, WMD commission and frequent editorial comments all stress the problems of culture within the Intelligence Community. A few comments selected from recent commentary:? Information sharing is blocked by culture. ? The culture of the Directorate of Operations impedes cooperation with law enforcement organization.? There is a general conflict between civilian and military cultures within the Intelligence Community. ? The Director of the Intelligence Community lacks the authority to direct the community.Sociology and organizational theory dominate the discussion of Intelligence Community reform but the tools of anthropology ? especially those from political and cultural anthropology ? may help us see more clearly the problems that impede effective integration of Community. Among the tools we might take from our anthropologist tool kit are linguistic analysis, organization and concepts of primordial identity, study of status, authority and hierarchy, boundary maintenance and exclusivity of belonging, group responsiveness to external changes, the role of shamans and soothsayers, etc. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Policymakers, scholars, and analysts are increasingly concerned about nuclear fission terrorism, but relatively little attention has been devoted to the circumstances likely to face the United States following a successful or failed nuclear terrorism attack. The most important post-attack responsibility will be preventing further attacks; also important will be retaliation, both to shape the precedent set by the attack and in deference to U.S. public opinion. Both depend on attributing materials or weapons using nuclear forensics in concert with other intelligence-gathering and analytic tools. While much can be done to improve these capabilities unilaterally, high confidence attribution is likely to depend on the pre- and post-attack cooperation of potential source countries, both to identify source countries and to rule others out. States face powerful incentives driving them towards both transparency and obfuscation. The United States can use incentives and disincentives to shift states towards the transparency end of the spectrum. Two plausible models for an attribution regime, both with strengths and shortcomings, are a "coalition of the willing" and a multilateral institutional approach. An attribution regime, however implemented, also has potential downsides, although it can be implemented to minimize if not negate these. Finally, an attribution regime has the potential to serve as the core of a global anti-nuclear terrorism effort, or even more broadly, as a central component of strengthened efforts to combat both state and non-state proliferation. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

There is less untruth in saying that much of what intelligence agencies submit or prohibit is to suit the establishment plans which have already been made. Similarly there is more truth in the statement that most of what they provide and mark secret ?For Your Eyes Only? is already available with experts or open media and all of this is free. In the times of internet, access to such information has become much more easier. John F Kennedy once said ?There are no secrets except a few things I need to know.?The matters on which intelligence reports would be seriously considered are the intentions of the adversary. As per John F Gailbraith, ? You can not tell anything useful about the intentions of the govt that it does not know itself.? He called it as the Gailbraith?s First Law of Intelligence. He amplified that this is a normal situation of governments in conflict. As a general rule in modern times debates and discussions on all great decisions continue up to the moment of final decision and its implementation.. No one could have collected information of time , date and place of Normandy landings as the decision was not finalised till last couple of hours. There is another reason. Very often rapidly evolving military or political developments lead to particular situations which no one had intended earlier. Intelligence agencies could not be faulted for failing to predict the same. Was breakup of Pakistan in 1971 war between India and Pakistan intended as such.? One of the greatest fiasco for which CIA is blamed is failure to predict break up of USSR.The important and more possible task for all intelligence agencies is to provide what is called ?Essential Elements of Information (EEI). The synthesis is interpreting various pieces of information (EEI) to appreciate enemy capability and vulnerability. The synthesis can facilitate decision making and its protection safeguards national security. The purpose of this presentation is to analyze the synthesis submitted by intelligence, how much is real and how much to suit a particular political decision which has already been made. History has number of instances where ?manipulated? intelligence synthesis has brought misery and failure without giving any benefits to the aggressor. A study in Oct 04 by a British Medical Journal shows more than 1,00,000 Iraqi civilians have died. It is not failure of intelligence machinery as it is misuse of the same to justify a particular course of action .The key aspect of American case for year 2002 war was intelligence assessments to support the war on Iraq.s WMD programme. It is true that the CIA ethic is to ? call them as they see them.? It is also a fact that the agency works for the White House and that its Director serves at the pleasure of the President. During the constitutionally mandated State of the Union Address on 28 Jan 03 President Bush had stated, ? Our intelligence officials estimate that Saddam Hussain had the material to produce as much as 500 tons of sarin, mustard and VX nerve agent.? British Prime Minister told the MPs that according to intelligence reports Saddam Hussain had the capability to deploy his weapons of mass destruction in ?45 minutes? . This ?45 minutes? was crucial and it persuaded many MPs who were until then opposed to Britain involvement in any military on Iraq, to change their mind. A comprehensive 15 month search for WMD by Iraq Survey group (of USA) has concluded in Sep 04 ?no signs of illegal stockpiles that US and Britain presented as the justification for going to war nor did it find any evidence of efforts to reconstitute Iraq nuclear weapon programme?... ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A number of recent national and congressional commissions (such as, Jeremiah, Rumsfeld, 9/11, and the Iraqi WMD) have identified, among other issues, a number of serious deficiencies within the analytical capability of the U.S. Intelligence Community (IC). These inadequacies, therefore, raise significant concerns about the capability of the IC to fully support the U.S. national and international security efforts. Moreover, deficiencies in the education and training programs for analysts have also been highlighted. This presentation explores these identified issues regarding instructional programs for intelligence analysts and provides a prescriptive resolution with recommendations to address these concerns. This solution, in the form of a concrete case study, bridges the theoretical problems with the practical application. The following questions, as well as others, will be addressed. What are the identified problems and associated remedies? How can these factors be translated and operationalized into a functional education and training program? What are the necessary core curriculum courses, as well as, the optimum programmatic macro-design? How can the curriculum, instruction, and assessment aspects be best served? What are the projected requirements for further development of educational and training programs to invigorate and strengthen instructional program for intelligence analysts, and thereby, the IC analytical capability? Specifically, this session will present an actual, practical example of an established curriculum program addressing these issues. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the wake of 9/11, intelligence reforms have sought to resolve problems of stovepiping, intelligence sharing, and program management in Washington. The result has been the increase in centralized bureaucracy. However, analysis of the future challenges to national security have highlighted the importance of improved policies and practices related to collection and joint operations far away from Washington, in very dynamic operating environments. Advocates of recent proposals for reform argue that greater authorities at the top of the intelligence establishment will aid operations in the field; others say they will confuse and frustrate long standing relationships among the military, law enforcement, diplomatic and intelligence officers, leading to losses in capabilities that may last for years. In addition, critics of aggressive cooperation among these officers within the US, point to civil liberties issues that have yet to be resolved. Five years after 9-11, what does the record show and how do we measure success and failure? ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]