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The paper connects sociological theories of world risk society to current IR research on global governance. New global risks such as climate change, international terrorism and international financial crises, are confronting global politics with a new quality of challenges. As we argue in this paper, these global risks require new forms of preventive governance which transcend the functional limitations and territorial boundaries of both nation-states and existing international organizations. Therefore, these new forms of preventive governance must neither be equated nor confused with existing concepts of risk management and the 'prevention state' nor with concepts of 'global governance'. By distinguishing between regulatory and assertive governance, the paper identifies four varieties of global risk governance ranging from unilateral regulative governance to new forms of multilateral assertive governance. The normative ideal of 'global governance' integrating public and private actors in symmetrical forms of cooperation represents only one of these types. The paper concludes that these varieties of global risk governance are likely to stay and that global risk governance might be characterized by the combination of different types of governance even within specific issue areas. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Within an altered economic environment, companies are trying to survive. To do so, companies will use 'Business Diplomacy' (BD) which comprise representation, communication and negotiation towards other stakeholders to defend company interests. Managing these relations is seen as useful because it enables the chance to avoid unnecessary and unwanted conflicts. Also, the external environment wherein a company acts is made more susceptible to their specific interests'. This paper shows why BD is different from interest representation of pressure groups which are mainly studied by political scientists. Also, acknowledging the fact that companies use 'diplomacy' is by no means shared by all scholars. Therefore, the concept of BD is defined and positioned within the body of diplomatic studies. Through the introduction of 'Corporate Political Activity' (CPA) as a part of this relatively new concept of BD, this paper aims to expand the understanding about the prerequisites stimulating the use of BD. Also, it deepens the insights on how BD functions and how it can be organized, both internal and external, by companies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Methods of assessing political leadership are often used independent of each other. This paper illustrates the gains of bridging two at-a-distance assessment of political personality in explaining foreign policy behavior. Leadership traits and operational code measure different idiosyncratic characteristics of political leaders. Utilizing both in a discussion of Turkey's foreign policy towards the United States in the post-Cold War era, I argue that together leadership traits and operational code analyses can offer more insight to understanding patterns in leaders' foreign policy choices. This paper employs two automated content analysis programs, TABARI and Profiler Plus. TABARI generates event data from newswire stories to assess foreign policy behavior, and Profiler Plus analyzes speeches, interviews of political leaders to profile their operational codes and/or personality traits. I show that Turkish prime ministers differ not only in terms of their leadership styles but also in terms of their beliefs about the United States. The paper illustrates that these differences make a better tool when they are taken together in explaining Turkey's foreign policy behavior towards the United States in the post-Cold War era. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In recent decades, Postinternationalism has developed into an influential perspective in International Relations (IR). Core concepts such as the "sphere of authority" (Rosenau) or "polity" (Ferguson) have been applied to analyze transformative developments in global politics with regard to diverse actors and issues as well as system structure and interaction processes. This paper suggests that a postinternational approach can also provide helpful insights into the field of International Political Economy (IPE) by examining Multinational Corporations (MNCs) and their role in and impact on technological evolution. As a complex polity, MNCs have to accommodate various socio-political stakeholders, technological evolution, markets and national / global as well as public / private governance frameworks. The paper develops an integrative framework to critically investigate the challenges that MNCs face in managing the interconnected issues of technology, markets, regulatory governance and corporate identity in a rapidly changing global environment. It focuses on a case study of the German Siemens AG, one of the oldest and largest MNCs in the world and a leader in the information and communication technology (ICT) sectors of the 20th and 21st centuries. By analyzing Siemens' struggles to adapt to rapidly changing technology, new public policies (liberalization) and new corporate governance models during the 1990s and 2000s, the paper highlights the complex interconnectedness of technology, economics, politics and identity that make up the study of MNCs. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the political dimensions of trauma surrounding U.S. wounded soldiers returning from Iraq and Afghanistan since the events of 9/11. Given that more U.S. soldiers survive the "shock and awe" effects of postmodern war assemblages and are returning to the homefront with serious injuries and traumatic combat--related experiences, it is increasingly important to identify how wounded soldiers and their families are embedded within, and politically challenge, military institutions of bureaucratic control, violence, and gendered inequalities. In order to map these relationships of power, I suggest that Annie Proulx's short story "Tits--Up In a Ditch" is an exemplary text for exploring these macro- and micropolitical dimensions of trauma surrounding wounded soldiers since the event-space of 9/11. By taking heed to Michael J. Shapiro's concepts of "national times" and "other times" (Shapiro: 2001), this paper illustrates how Proulx's short story maps the politics of "rural time," "women's time," and "military time" that inform how many wounded soldiers experience the traumatic effects of the war in everyday life, both at home and abroad. By doing so, this paper contributes to a broader political knowledge that is attentive to the temporal structures of power and gendered inequalities underpinning the U.S. wounded soldier as a subject of contemporary war trauma since the events of 9/11. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

"Weak states", "fragile states", "collapsed states", "fragmented states", not to speak of "rouge states": the problem of state disintegration has received considerable attention over the past few years, and numerous are the concepts put forward to try and describe the phenomenon. The various qualifications of states' internal problems have generally been accompanied by different "solutions" the international community should apply. Indeed, it can be argued that the different narratives on state failure have also had as a function to justify international interventions to try and solve the problems. As internal problems resulting of state failure, and especially armed conflicts threatening to destabilize entire regions, have increasingly come to be seen as international problems, the question of the international community's responsibilities has been posed in different forms (the principle of the "responsibility to protect" being one part of the proposed answers). The notion of "global governance", emerging along with an increased awareness on the relations of interdependence in today's globalized world, has been put forward as the overarching response to internal threats that may become international. This paper proposes to look closer at the relationship between state fragility and global governance through the study of the international efforts to put an end to the conflict in Darfur. The war in the Western province of Sudan broke out in 2003, and has for a long time been on the top of international agendas and to the highest degree been seen as an international affair. The Sudanese state is not a weak state however, on the contrary, it is best characterized as authoritarian. It's fragility stems rather from the turbulence at the centre, where constant power struggles have lead to shifting alliances, which in turn determine the conduct of state affairs. However, the Sudanese state has since the outbreak of the war in Darfur incessantly been portrayed as incapable to solve its internal problems, a framing that has justified international interventions on different levels (security level with an international peacekeeping mission, justice level through the prosecution by the International Criminal Court). This paper will explore how the internal conflict in Darfur became an international affair, in other words, how the political authority was transferred from an internal Sudanese level to an international level. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In May 1999, the bombing of the Chinese embassy by NATO during the war in Serbia sparks off a controversy; two years later, in April 2001, in South China, an aerial collision between a US reconnaissance aircraft and a Chinese jet fighter harms once again U.S.-China relations. These two events have many similarities, notably they both ended with regrets/apologies by the US to China (Gries 2004) (Dahl 2004) (Negash 2006). This paper analyzes apologies in U.S.- China diplomacy using Sil and Katzenstein?s analytic eclecticism (2005; 2008; 2010). Indeed, to understand them more than one approach is necessary: Putnam?s two-level games theory (1988), Bull?s (1977) and Constantinou?s (1996) analysis of diplomacy all provide some complementary pieces of information. This paper aims at a better understanding of apologies in U.S.-China diplomacy. It will also show the potentialities of an eclectic analysis to make sense of complex events in international life. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

My paper addresses the issue of "multilateral talks" or "forum" and tries to explain "why states often decide to create the talks for dealing with a security problem instead of resolving it through bilateral diplomacy or international regime?" Built upon the most recent experience of the Six-Party talks, the paper explores the effect of multilateralizing the dispute within a border context of regime theory in IR. My central claim is that the members of the talks decided to commit themselves to the talks since they have an unambiguous preference, i.e., the denuclearization in the Korea peninsular by coordinating their behaviors. Having realized that the second Korean War is a common aversion that they have to avoid, the members of the talks coordinated a variety of conflicting interests through the multilateral forum. The 2005 Joint Statement is the product of such coordination. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines how the philosophical tenets of neoliberalism have altered the spatial structures of the international system over the last four decades. Drawing upon the work of Henri Lefebvre, the paper brings out the relationship between neoliberal political philosophy and its spatial expression. Lefebvre argued that every historical period has its own 'spatial code', and that every successful social ideology produces a new form of space. This paper argues that neoliberalism's spatial code has generated a set of spatial structures that are in conflict with the bounded territorial spaces of the international system of modernity. It examines new forms of social spatial arrangements emerging in this period, such as global city networks and trans-territorial diasporas. It asks what the implications of this spatial legacy may be for the territorial nation-state and for the wider international system. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper gives the outline of an ongoing dissertation project dealing with urban public policymaking in the face of global challenges. In contemporary studies on urban politics and globalization, there has been a bias towards studying economic logics and dimensions of global transformations, and very little attention has been paid to urban public policymaking in relation to the more negative forces unleashed by globalization, such as environmental degradation, climate change, diseases, trafficking of goods, people and weapons, transnational organized crime and global terrorism. What passes as urban policies today are often suffused with issues that are also in some sense global and every so often even touch upon „high politics?. Issues that are being defined in terms of global security challenges are increasingly enduring on local scales and local governments and city administrations around the world are becoming increasingly engaged in obtaining and institutionalizing their own competence and capacity on issue-areas relating to foreign affairs and international politics as well as developing local and transnational policy programmes to manage and mitigate various global challenges. Yet, this curios case of „mission creep? is one of which we so far have unsatisfying theoretical understanding. This dissertation project sets out to explore the ways in which the "darker sides" of globalization come to inform contemporary urban public policymaking and how this might play into the restructuring of global-local political orders. The project includes a case study of New York City and its local strategies on climate change and counterterrorism and in this paper theoretical points of departures and methodological considerations are being discussed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The main argument of this paper is that the so-called 'Paris School' of security studies cannot account for practices of resistance because of the way it conceptualizes the 'everyday' as the arena of un-intentional actions. After briefly reviewing some of the main arguments of the 'Paris School', the paper engages in a discussion about oppositional agency to security practices. I suggest that resistance to security has a specificity of its own when compared to general practices of resistance. Further on, the paper traces the main theoretical 'roots' of the 'Paris School', analysing how Michel Foucault, Pierre Bourdieu, Michel de Certeau and James Scott conceptualize the 'everyday', and how this is translated into a vision about agency that leaves out intentionality. Such a vision, I argue, is bound to remain incomplete, and is unable to constitute a coherent theoretical vision about resistance. As a substitute, I suggest the critique of the everyday as developed by Henri Lefebvre, with its emphasis on the transformation of everyday life and its focus on the festival. For Lefebvre, the festival is the ultimate expression of oppositional agency, since it is able to substitute for the alienation of everyday life. I contribute to this theoretical discussion by bringing two examples of such transformations of everyday life: tactical frivolity and 'temporary autonomous zones'. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The objective of the present paper is to analyze if policies of the Initiative for the Integration of Regional Infrastructure in South America (IIRSA) - applied to the borderline region between Brazil/Bolivia - include social participation in the decisions about environmental resources exploitation. It was used the followed methods: textual analysis of public policies of IIRSA, photography, maps and interview analysis with experts in the subject of regional integration. The research is based mainly in the theories of David Harvey, Neil Smith, David Held and Bertha Becker. The current paper discusses about: 1) how policies have a "lacunar discurse2" conduced by Brazil. 2) how laws are planed exclusively by the decision makers, often without the vote of the citizens. Consequently, there is a loss of autonomy in the management of natural resources done by the people, and decisions are taken according to the international economic demands. The physical consequence of the policies on the environment is an increase of fragmentation not only ecological but also cultural, both reflecting negatively on the economy of the region involved in integrative policies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the final years of the Brazilian dictatorship, the Sarney administration adopted a nationalist position towards the protection of the Amazon. This position was taken in response to the perceived threat of a US directed intervention to protect biodiversity and limit CO2 production attributed to deforestation within Brazil's border. This nationalist position strongly asserted the sovereign right to exploit the natural resources within Brazil's borders in order to expand its economy and improve its relative position in the international sphere. By the end of the Sarney administration, decision makers had adopted a more 'internationalist' approach to dealing with environmental issues in order to preempt 'environmental conditionality' by US influenced international lending institutions. By the early 1990s, Brazil had become a leading advocate for an international regime on the environment. This paper argues that the international diplomatic community and Brazilian decision makers mutually constituted an identity shift that integrated Brazil into global norms and institutions through a combination of transnational activism, coercion, and social interaction. In contrast with orthodox theoretical explanations that posit causal powers to deep structures of the international system, this paper traces the processes that form the causal mechanisms behind an identity shift in an empirical case study. These causal processes are inherently reductionist, as change in the international system is produced by the embodied actions of the representatives of different institutions. It uses Foucault's theorization of governmentality to explain how environmental conditionality was used to introduce environmentalism into Brazil's foreign policy, and Checkel's theorization of social interaction to explain how environmental regulation was introduced into Brazilian governance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Pakistan's nuclear weapons program generates intense concern in Washington and among its allies for a variety of reasons. To name only a few, there are concerns about the potential of nuclear war with India, about proliferation, about Pakistan's impact on the global arms control regime (most recently illustrated by its stance on the Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty), about an arms race in SW Asia, about state failure, about military control over its nuclear weapons, and about acquisition of the weapons (or fissile material) by Islamist militants. These concerns are legitimate to be sure. But a closer examination of the program itself and the environment in which that program nests raises a larger concern: the likelihood of synergistic interactions among these variables leading to even greater danger to US security. This manifestation of unintended outcomes cannot be predicted, but the way in which these dangers arise can be better understood. To this end, this paper examines the environment in which Pakistan's program nests, what sorts of dangers may arise in this environment, and how these dangers might interact synergistically, leading to even greater peril. The resulting hazards are more difficult to understand, less predictable, and thus pose an even greater threat to US security than generally acknowledged. Because the threats generated are more likely to have unintended consequences, it is more important than ever to plan for coherent, interconnected responses. This paper examines the environment in which Pakistan's nuclear weapons program exists, key elements of the program itself, and then discusses several forecasting tools that are available to help understand the interaction of the various variables, synergistic outcomes, and the implications of these outcomes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Even as the Bush administration has adopted a distinctly unilateral and realpolitik approach to foreign policy, it has defended its actions on grounds of restoring democracy and respect for human rights in the states where it intervenes, going so far as to incorporate the language of political liberty into the title of the Iraqi invasion operation, Operation Iraqi Freedom. But what do we know more generally about the actual role of human rights and democracy in nations? foreign policies? In particular, under what conditions does the status of human rights in one state affect other states? policies toward it? And to what extent, if any, do aid donors take human rights into account in aid decisions relative to other criteria?Inconsistencies are often noted between public commitment to aid policy based on good governance and the often-made criticism that foreign assistance often seems to follow trade rather than democracy. My research demonstrates that under certain conditions, this inconsistency is not due to intentional prevarication at the level of public statements, but rather due to two key factors. First, a substantial gulf exists between the goals and perceptions of those who make foreign aid policy at the highest levels and those responsible for executing its disbursement. Second, in some conditions a sort of reverse logic exists that results in states with lower levels of democracy intentionally recieving more aid.Decisions about aid are fundamentally governed by a calculus on the part of states who want to maximize gains from trade with recipient states when there are sufficient gains to be had, but may nod to principle when there are not. In fact, there is a tipping point at which we can expect recipient democracy to come into play. These hypotheses are empirically assessed through detailed content analysis of correspondence surrounding aid decisions in both the UK and Canada over the past twenty-five years. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In recent years, aggrieved groups around the world have portrayed their problems as human rights issues. The physically and mentally disabled, Third World slum-dwellers, South Asian Dalits (Untouchables), indigenous peoples, AIDS patients, and victims of corporate malfeasance -- these and other groups have advanced new human rights norms before the United Nations and other international bodies. Often, these claims have met strong resistance from governments, cultural majorities, and private interests. More surprisingly, even presumptive allies such as Amnesty International and other nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) have voiced misgivings, arguing that rights “proliferation” will “cheapen” their traditional concerns, civil and political rights. Why are certain problems recognized as international human rights issues, while others are not? How do historically marginalized groups transform long standing domestic grievances into widely-recognized human rights claims? When and why do states and interstate organizations endorse new human rights? What are the consequences for victim groups and the rights movement? Do new rights lead to greater justice? Rights on the Rise: How and Why New Human Rights Develop will be the first work to address these important issues. The book defines “new” rights as those omitted from major human rights conventions, as well as rights mentioned but given few resources and little attention until recently. “Development” or “emergence,” therefore, means that rights and rights proponents receive significant new resources, support, and attention from key international actors. The book proposes and analyzes a three-part model for new rights development. The empirical chapters probe and evaluate the model in four contexts that cover much of the ferment in current human rights practice. Part 1 discusses the rights of stigmatized minority groups, with chapters examining attempts by lesbians/gays, Dalits (Untouchables), and children of wartime rape to have their human rights recognized at the international level. Part 2 analyzes economic and social rights. Although these rights have been long neglected, since the 1990s a number of major NGOs have begun devoting unprecedented resources to them. Here we examine both the broad set of rights enshrined in the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) and the right to water, which has won significant attention in recent years. Part 3 turns to disability rights, examining claims made by mentally and physically disabled people in international venues in recent years. Finally Part 4 examines health rights, including the emergence of patients’ rights generally and the development of rights of AIDS patients more specifically. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Challenges and trade-offs occur in the initial development of a Peace and Justice Master's program, as well as for an undergraduate minor in the field. Decisions about the roles of internships, the coordination of multidiscliplinary programming, and student diversity issues will be addressed. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Although violent threats are progressively more sophisticated, frequent, and deadly, this paper will argue that the root causes are not new. Ralph Bunche posited that to ensure peace, the principles and practice of true justice, equality, human rights, and democracy must be secured. However, instead of creating the foundation for enduring peace, we are witnessing the rise of inequality within and between nations. Indeed, even as the number of political regimes classified as ?democracies? increases, economic rights are deteriorating and social cleavages are growing within the current hegemonic order. Following Bunche?s intellectual tradition, which I argue is part of the historical materialist one, and using a critical realist method of analysis, I contend that the neo-liberal paradigm, now directing global transformation, is generating a complex supranational structure that compels states, competing in the global arena, to serve as conduit of global capital. States within this emergent global order move towards a common model, which consists of three mutually reinforcing elements. These are: a neoliberal economy, which aims at the ascendancy of market forces; a Weberian bureaucracy, reflecting processes of rationalization; and ?low-intensity democracy,? which focuses on formal electoral rights, with little consideration for the wider socioeconomic power structure. To elaborate, today?s global liberal market sustains a new strain of capitalism, one that concentrates an inordinate amount of power in the hands of corporations at the expense of ?democracy.? Contrary to what the neo-Marxist literature argues, the paper maintains that even though we will continue to witness opposition against this process, through different means, this will not result in the ?ultimate class struggle.? Instead we will see ?consensual? forms of social control with their mechanisms of ideological hegemony, and worldwide ?class warfare? among the poor, and between the poor and the middle class, whose members witness a decline in their standard of living. I argue that global capitalism, then, simultaneously creates integration at the structural level and fragmentation at the microlevel. Indeed, it exacerbates national, class, racial, and cultural disparities, interdicting the development of class solidarity. This study focuses on the emerging ?low-intensity democracy.? The research, through cross-sectional and longitudinal analyses, which employ both quantitative and qualitative methods, will examine the level of democracy in ?developing? (Bolivia and Uganda) and ?developed? states (Germany and Britain). Each states? level of democracy is then compared to the relative condition to one another and against itself over the previous decade. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In recent years, it has become common for scholars in the field of comparative revolution to use the term Mafiocracy when describing governments which may collapse at a moments notice (Wickham-Crowley, 1992). When faced with cross class alliances, mafiocratic regimes are swept away opening the door for revolution which can destabilize international politics (Walt, 1996). In this case the language of crime permeates the reality of regime change and domestic and international instability. From anarchic images in realist theory to envisioning Saddam Hussein as a mafia Don, crime and politics have been linked. This paper examines important films about organized crime and their implications for international political theory. The Godfather trilogy with its complex mixture of cultures of violence rooted in Sicily and political realism in New York, Goodfellas which explores organized violence vs. random violence in mafia organizations, and Reservoir Dogs with its dark visions of distrust in criminal enterprise, form the heart of this paper. A final section deals with the Sopranos emphasizing the evolution of violence as it intersects with the therapeutic, family values, and a functioning legal system. The paper is designed for both scholars and teachers. Understanding crime films offer interesting perspectives on the nature of international politics. Crime films also are an interesting and creative way to introduce students to a wide variety of international political theories. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

As China faces a rising tide of separatist movements and terrorist activities within its own borders, Beijing has sought closer cooperation with the governments of the Central Asian republics. In June 2001, China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan declared the establishment of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) with anti-terrorism, extremism, and separatism being its central task. The September 11 terrorist attacks against the US further enhance the need for close collaboration among these countries. Indeed, the SCO will a critical part of Chinese efforts to stem and eradicate external links to domestic separatist and terrorist cells. While the immediate focus of the SCO would be to fight terrorism, the larger issue for the longer term would whether the organization could evolve into a sub-regional arrangement that would contribute to peace, stability, and prosperity. Beijing has already suggested the organization’s uniqueness in promoting common goals and indeed has great interest in seeing it succeed as a counter model to US-led military alliances. However, the path to success may not be smooth and problem-free as is hoped. This paper will seek to examine both the prospects for and the potential obstacles in achieving key objectives sought by SCO member states: management of ethnic and religious unrest, including the fight against terrorism and separatism; maintenance of stable borders; development of energy resources; nuclear nonproliferation; and promotion of economic prosperity. Within this broader context, the paper will examine whether or not China can extend its influence to Central Asia using SCO as a vehicle and the implications for US interests in the region. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Much of the quantitative conflict literature employs data sets that draw a large portion of their cases from 1945-1990. This historical period coincides with the U.S.-Soviet bipolar competition and security arrangements associated with that competition. A debate within the democratic peace literature has emerged between those who view the democratic peace as a general phenomenon, and those who see democracy?s effect on international conflict as largely a function of the particular circumstances of the Cold War alignment. The critics of a general relationship between democracy and war focus specifically on the role of the United States as a leader of one of the bi-polar alliance blocks The possibility that observed relationships between democracy and war could be dependent on the particular historical circumstances of the Cold War raises the question: To what extent are other empirical findings about international conflict also a function of the hegemonic influence exercised by the superpowers during period? Using ordinal logistic regression to examine the pattern of third party joining this paper re-examines the extent to which the relationship between democracy and intervention as well as the relationships between variables commonly used to explain third party interventions in the conflict literature, such as proximity, power status, democracy, trade and alliances, are a function of the intervention choices of the United States during the Cold War. The paper finds that the intervention choice of the United States is by far the most important predictor of the intervention choices of other third parties to interstate wars. And that accounting for the intervention choices of the United States ?explains? away much of the general relationships observed in earlier studies. Interestingly enough though reduced in substantive importance, a statistical the relationship between shared democracy and joining remains even after accounting for U.S. intervention choice in this period. This finding suggests that the relationship between shared democracy and third party joining is not entirely dependent upon the exercise of American leadership during the Cold War. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines writings on the subjects of international relations and lasting peace published by American, British and French citizens from the beginning of World War I through the foundation and reinforcement of the League of Nations (1914-1924). International relations is a relatively young academic discipline. It’s emergence coincides with the beginning of our short twentieth century and can be understood as one of the key consequences World War I’s impact on Western societies. The creation of international frameworks supposed to ensure a peaceful evolution of inter-state relations is a well-known subject. On the other hand, historians and international relations specialists have barely begun to study how citizens envisioned the forging of a new world order. Yet, citizens believed that both the tremendous human losses suffered during the war and the evolution of democracy in Western societies validated their participation in international affairs, traditionally the private domain of a small elite. From 1914 to 1924 hundreds of texts, pamphlets and academic monographs expressed such non-official views on international relations. These writings are surprisingly diverse in their interpretation of lasting peace and international relations. Beyond the conventional labels of idealist or utopian which are commonly used by their opponents to marginalize a discourse generally critical of the mainstream view, one discovers that the citizens who wrote on these topics were neither dreamers nor unaware of the realities of international affairs. Some points of view are based on religious or moral convictions, while others illustrate conservative, progressive or revolutionary political opinions. These authors are often defined as pacifists, although this qualification seems simplistic. For instance, several authors do not condemn war and recognize power politics as a fact. Most of them supported the Allied victory over Germany as a basis for redefining the international relations. Within the context of the ISA Conference on Hegemony and its Discontents, this paper will analyse the first major expressions of non-state actors aiming to challenge the established order of international relations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper I seek to answer some basic questions about the process of globalization in the defense industry and the security considerations that result from it. I concentrate on two major groups of players; states and firms. In the first section I briefly lay out the definition of globalization that is commonly used in analyzing defense issues and then look at what the phrase really means in terms of the defense trade. The following section examines the manifestations of globalization in the defense trade, which are many and profound. There is a particular focus in this section on the effects of globalization on defense production, but there is also some discussion of the effects of globalization on the defense trade; the ?sharp end? of the issue. The next section examines the effects of globalization on security for the state and the firm Throughout this paper the phrase ?defense trade? is used rather than ?arms trade? this reflects the fact that much of what is now traded does not look like a defense good; it is a component, a software code, a training package or simulator, even a computer. Today?s trade is less in finished defense goods than in the components of a system. The phrase ?defense trade? captures this dynamic. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)’s Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery (BCPR)was created to facilitate and expedite assistance in the areas of emergency assistance, disarmament and demobilization, de-mining, conflict prevention, and post-conflict reconstruction. These responsibilities reflect a reinforcement of the United Nations Development Programme’s traditional mandate of fostering long-term economic development and stability through capacity-building, as well as an expansion of that mandate in response to the nature of many of the violent conflicts of the post-Cold War era. This paper examines organizational learning by UNDP in creating the BCPR. Utilizing a framework for learning that considers the influence of norms in the organizational learning process, the paper argues that the BCPR is the product of an organizational learning process that is driven largely by international norms, and thus challenges the limits of state sovereignty. At the same time, however, the prevalence of normative influences, so critical in creating the BCPR, can obscure organizational learning with respect to understanding the specific dynamics of a society emerging from internal conflict in which civilians have been targets of violence. Moreover, norms that drive an organization to expand its mandate often confront obstacles in relations with other agencies. Thus what is identified in this paper as relational learning lags behind the normative learning that guides the creation of a new institution. To illustrate this argument that organizational learning takes place at different levels and at different rates that are related to each other, the paper presents examples of the BCPR work in the Great Lakes region of Africa and in Bosnia-Herzegovina. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Migration has become a central issue for global social movements seeking alternatives to neoliberal globalization. Many critics of globalization argue that neoliberal capitalist relations contribute to the displacement of millions of people, especially in the Global South. At the same time, Western states have opted to securitize migration, implementing risk profiling technologies in order to further exclude and marginalize migrants. It is not surprising, therefore, to find that many campaigns on behalf of migrants subsume the experience of migration within a discourse of victimage, and fail to take into account migrants’ agency in the migration process. Recent developments, ranging from the refugee protests in Australia to the Migrants Assembly at the European Social Forum in Florence, suggest the emergence of a complex politics where migrants are positioning themselves as key players in global/local political activism. By challenging the state’s prerogative to distinguish between insiders and outsiders, political movements by and in support of undocumented migrants force the matter of sovereignty to the forefront of their political strategy. This paper examines the activism of politicized migrants and their relationship with the sovereign state system. Focusing in particular on the emerging movement of undocumented migrants in Canada, this paper assesses the implications of this activism in terms of how it is reshaping the possibilities for global political identity and practice today. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Mozambique, one of the world’s poorest countries in the early 1990s, was to become one of the international donors’ favored recipients in the following years. An explicit aim of international aid was to direct sufficient funds to post-conflict processes to avoid the mistakes of Angola. With the signing of the Mozambican peace accords, funds, projects and programs followed swiftly, packaged by international experts in consultation with the local ministries. Post-war recovery meant physical reconstruction and the reshaping of the State and its relationship to the Mozambican people, often contained in programs to decentralize development activities. It is how this tension ? between the essentially political task of forging new forms of governance and the supposedly technical tasks of physical reconstruction - played out in a specific place that is the focus of this paper. The paper examines these processes of international prescriptions, national initiatives and local projects by responding to three sets of questions: * How do the new forms of governance emerging in rural localities correspond to those recommended by international advisors or outlined in national policies? How do international constructions of decentralization and good governance compare with local versions? * How can an examination of formal politics and local power dynamics help account for similarities and differences between these constructions, and between the plans and their implementation? Whose interests are served? What power relations are reinforced? * What are the effects of the emerging forms of governance for local communities, including patterns of poverty, development opportunities, peace and conflict? To what extent are local processes challenging or moderating the impact of the international knowledge regime? To what extent does that regime reinforce patterns of political and economic exclusion? Information is drawn from policy analyses, interviews with government officials and aid agency representatives, and in-depth field work in five communities in rural Mozambique. The paper argues that the version of peace and development as constructed by international advisors and national ministries differs from those formulated and expressed at the level of rural localities in central Mozambique. Unsurprisingly, construction of peace has proceeded much more slowly in the areas under study than formal peace processes. There are, however, as many new sources as conflict as old ones. As development processes, including those introduced by development agencies, and new forms of governance extend to rural districts in Mozambique, a series of tensions emerge that local institutions are poorly equipped to address. Policy founders on ? among other issues ? a neglect of efforts by local and national elites to establish political power and exploit economic opportunities, and a disdain for the knowledge and rights of local people. Indeed, in the stories that people tell about selected development processes and conflicts, we can distinguish efforts to make claims to the legitimacy of processes of political exclusion and resource control, and counter-claims to contest such processes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper offers a theoretical understanding of Israeli Settlement activity in the Occupied Territories in light of the centrality of the issue in the current conflict as well as any effort to achieve peace. By using a path dependent lens, the paper analyzes how the settlement project was launched, nurtured, and promoted by various Israeli governments since the late 1960’s. The paper explores the expansion of the settlements despite the international and domestic costs incurred by various Israeli governments. The paper is based in part on original research, and concludes that three path dependent processes lay at the heart of the exponential increase in the number of settlements - from a handful in 1968 to over 220,000 in 2002. In all three processes, the analysis points to institutional and cultural factors (that assumed new modes over time) as a significant cause in settlement expansion. While the paper accepts the traditional ideological and strategic explanations for settlement activity, it offers a more intricate view by exploring path dependent and institutional mechanisms for the increase in the number of settlements. Dismantling Israeli settlements is going to be a key issue in any future peace negotiations, and might serve as a model in other conflicts. It I therefore important that we develop a clear conceptual understanding of how they came to be in the first place. In the last part, the paper highlights the theoretical implications of the settlements’ case for path dependency. More specifically, the paper explores the various roles that path dependency plays in inhibiting opposition to certain policies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The increasing American dominance and power in the world has frustrated various countries, societies, and individuals, and some have argued that this anger at American hegemony was the cause of September 11th. These people, such as Benjamin Barber, argue that Western cultural and economic imperialism are reshaping the world at the expense of various other cultures. As the American empire grows, it spreads its culture throughout the world, creating a more homogeneous world. This paper will focus on the growth of the American empire by examining American foreign policy and the use of force during the Clinton administration. From 1993 to 2000, the U.S. intervened or initiated the use of force in several places, including the Former Republic of Yugoslavia, Somalia, Iraq, and Haiti. Why did the Clinton administration make these foreign policy decisions? Was it part of an attempt to spread American hegemony throughout the world or not? Or, as many have argued, were Clinton’s foreign policy decisions a result of his domestic problems and his own personal ambitions and goals? This paper will seek to understand what motivated President Clinton’s foreign policy decisions to initiate the use of force or to intervene in the intrastate conflicts of other countries from 1993 to 2000. In order to answer this question this paper will focus on one possible theory?diversionary war theory. Diversionary war theory is based on the idea that leaders of nation-states will use foreign conflict involvement to divert domestic attention away from internal problems. Many have criticized this theory, including Blainey 1998 and Levy 1989, but others have found evidence of a moderate link between variables like leader popularity and the diversionary use of force, such as Ostrom and Job 1986, James and Oneal 1991, and Morgan and Bickers 1992. Clinton faced a number of domestic distractions during his Presidency, most significantly his ongoing difficulties involving his alleged affair, and he may have felt the need to use foreign policy to divert attention away from these problems. Clinton has also has been quoted a number of times as saying that domestic politics is more important to him than international politics, and he may have used foreign policy to divert attention away from his domestic problems. This paper will focus on three specific independent variables: presidential approval, economic measures, and the media focus during the six months prior to the decision to use force or intervene. As the U.S. continues its dominance in the world, it is important to understand the motivations behind American foreign policy. Many people in the world today are less than satisfied with the U.S. hegemonic role in the world, because some of them believe that the U.S. is acting only in its own self-interest with no regard for how their actions affect the rest of the world. It is important to understand the reasons behind American foreign policy in order to determine whether the U.S. is a selfish and self-interested nation. This is a small step towards that goal. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

To what extent non-state or non-governmental actors (NGOs) can lay legitimate claim to represent and articulate interests within domestic civil society is a widely discussed theoretical and empirical question in political science. Similar questions have started to be raised within International Relations, in particular with respect to international advocacy by transnational NGOs and issue-networks, often driven by the same imperatives of funding and recognition as their domestic counterparts. The literature on global governance does not, however, yet have a well-developed body of empirical research on which to base any judgements, and the research agenda is in its infancy. This paper will contribute to this debate through a focused examination of one set of non-governmental actors, those associated with the nascent International Action Network on Small Arms. After first developing a robust social map of the network’s participants, the paper will examine how the activities of network members can be understood against the broader backdrop of activities by states and international organizations in this issue area. Ultimately, the goal will be to analyze how transnational NGO activities shape and frame, or are shaped and framed by, the distribution of political and economic power in world politics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper focuses on the question of how the dominant free-market model of globalization-a model I call globalism-has been impacted by 9/11 and the war on terrorism. Can globalism survive in our post-9/11 world? The paper makes the case that it cannot--at least not in its pre-9/11 form. In order to save at least some of its original agenda, free-market globalization is currently being transformed into a globalism with an American face-a much more imperialistic and militaristic variant than its more economistic predecessor. Military operations and ideological propaganda maneuvers have become as important-or even more important-than global trade initiatives. The paper examines and analyzes some of these ideological maneuvers. Undermining the establishment of a multilateral global community, the new globalism with an American face is instead raising the specter of an American global empire unilaterally imposed on the world. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

My paper discusses the international efforts to restore order to Somalia in 1992. It examines how intra-state conflict and state collapse complicate international conflict resolution and peacebuilding strategies. In Somalia, peacekeeping peacemaking was followed by peace enforcement. The paper’s key arguement is that this assertiveness undermined the slow progress being made in diplomatic peacemaking.The nature of hegemony is also important to this inquiry. My paper examines the way the international community, led by the west, sought to establish order in Somalia, and the local responses to these efforts. Related issues include the effectiveness and relevance in so-called failed states of UN and non-UN peace operations. In Somalia, civil society had disintegrated, and I will discuss how this slowed the process of ending the still-simmering conflict. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper will address the issue of change in international institutions and governance brought about by the global war on terrorism. It will apply the concept of new multilateralism as an analytical tool in order to map out an emerging qualitatively different approach to international organization. New multilateralism is most obvious and pronounced in Europe whose regional order traditionally has been highly institutionalized. European regional integration unfolding within the institutional domain of EU Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) will serve as a critical case study of the trend towards the establishment of new patterns of governance in the international system. The argument will proceed in the following way. First, the concept of new multilateralism will be discussed in reference to John Ruggie’s original definition of multilateralism as a generic principled institutional form in international life. Second, the paper will explore recent developments in the foreign policy domain of the European Union as an institutionalized intergovernmental political process. It will address the trend towards flexible forms of commitment and participation under the CFSP mechanism as an instance of the new multilateralism in international relations. The new multilateralism of the post-9/11 period, this paper will argue, continues the historical tradition of classical multilateralism by reflecting (in Ruggie’s words) American hegemony rather than American hegemony and by revealing the adaptive and reproductive capacities of international institutions. Similarly to classical multilateralism, it does not necessarily generate formal organizations but continues to respond to a demand for institutionalization of relations in the international system. In contrast to classical multilateralism, new multilateralism is based on a network of bilateral arrangements. In the spirit of multilateralism, it evokes a principled code of conduct, however, outside existing international institutions: it creates coalitions of the willing. New multilateralism is bilateral in approach and multilateral in cooperative action and outcomes. Thus, it accelerates transformation rather than stabilize international relations (which classical multilateralism did). It substitutes governance outcomes resulting from the existing universalist multi-purpose international institutions by single-purpose short-term arrangements in a variable geometry of participating countries. Without substantively changing the standards of international organization, new multilateralism reverses the attained level and patterns of complicated multilateral diplomacy. It is based on straightforward means-ends bilateral relationships resulting in flexible multilateral coalitions. Coalitions of the willing are increasingly being established as a multilateral response to international threats. They have become a source of governance in the international system. From the perspective of European regional integration, the continued institutionalization of a possibility for enhanced foreign policy and defense cooperation under CFSP, in parallel to the consolidation of strategic bilateral relationships and participation in ad hoc international coalitions, exemplifies a new pattern of regional relations produced by new multilateralism. The Convention on the Future of Europe reflects and reinforces that trend by creating new opportunities for variable-geometry coalitions within an otherwise highly structured institutional mechanism. This example indicates that the nature of European and with it, international, governance is changing. Regions no longer represent a formally institutionalized geopolitical environment. They are becoming increasingly defined in terms of threats, vulnerabilities, and capacities for response by flexible ad hoc security arrangements. The paper will conclude that the coalitions of the willing have emerged as a new multilateral source of authority and legitimacy in the international system beyond international organizations. Arguably, this change in the pattern of international governance is essentially deeper than the nature and scope of institutional change brought about by the end of the Cold War. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper studies George W. Bush?s narrative; the relationship between U.S. national security and information technology after the painful experience of 9/11. Bush?s phrases of national security and information technology are in the nucleus of international and national political challenges, yet they are in many ways problematic and controversial. I am asking if they even are a central part of the problem of global war on terror itself. Nevertheless my intention is rather to try to understand what I suggest as Bush?s narrative of ?nightmare? by generating questions from political philosophy that challenge and open up these fundamental phrases. As President Bush is boldly able to simplify the complex phenomenon of terrorism, his acts will raise a question more fundamental in the West: how far he can go with the phrases. Colonizing a cyberspace with totalitarian surveillance activities maintains a paradoxical silence; a vast amount of information without knowledge. In this sense, President Bush has taken in his ?ride? American national security culture to the new frontiers. This has a potential to lead to the deterritorialization of national security. Using Lyotard?s thoughts, the paper discovers questions of putting the phrase ?take the battle to the enemy? into practice. On an information technology level of analysis this can be seen as total accident, in Paul Virilio?s terms, with the pragmatism of permanent cybersurveillance (Patriot Act) of the Americans and not just terrorists. It is a logical step for modernity to define information technology as a tool in this battle in which ?freedom does not come free?. On a narrative level of analysis, I suggest that phrases of information technology should be turned into recognizing a differend. These phrases put forward the unpresentable which, even though it opens up a question of the concept of ?enemy?, reveals how the United States in its travel is struggling not with the enemy but with itself. Bush?s disputable phrases of information technology occupy an important place in U.S. national security culture because of their contradictory relation between state and individual to western expansion of freedom. This is enabled in Bush?s narrative which is legitimated by a possible ?nightmare?. By ?discovering? this ?frontier? in Bush?s universe, we can better understand the modern project grounding its legitimacy in the imaginable future ? and not in 9/11. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Unlike other forms of violence mobilized by non-state actors, terrorism has drawn a response from states that is remarkable in its scope. To begin with, responses have utilised all of the tools of statecraft, deploying both ?hard power? (military, intelligence, police and law enforcement actions) and ?soft power? (i.e. governance measures recast as ?counter-terrorism? initiatives, including border security, arms control and counter-terrorist financing initiatives, etc.). Further, these tools have been exercised across levels of state interaction, such that multilateral, regional, sub-regional and bilateral contacts have impacted domestic polities. Finally, these interactions often involve the provision of material assistance or expertise from one state to another. In sum, as terrorist violence has been perceived to be a byproduct of state failure, there has been an effort to build the state, to enable it to do what it must in order to suppress terrorism. While there is much variation in the way that this ?state-building? is proceeding, we may paraphrase Tilly: the ?war on terror? is making states, as states are making the ?war on terror.? In a way, this is good news for human rights, as it offers the promise of protecting citizens from non-state violence of a particularly brutal kind. But this view may be (at best) optimistic and (at worst) naïve, given the record of human rights abuses perpetrated by states. With this concern in mind, I pose the question: what kind of states might emerge out of this process of ?state building through counter-terrorism? and what are the human rights implications of these developments? The first part of the paper describes the extent to which the ?war on terror? has been conceived and prosecuted as a ?state-building? exercise. I argue that, through the elaboration of counter-terrorism regimes in areas such as border security and finance, we are seeing the emergence of global standards against which to assess state capability to suppress terrorism. Beyond the articulation of such standards, I illustrate their implementation across the states of South and South-East Asia. The second part of the paper identifies the human rights concerns that arise from this process. Implementing counter-terrorism policies has long been acknowledged to pose challenges to democratic countries, but further concerns arise from the globalization of counter-terrorism standards. In evaluating these, I survey the ways in which an appropriate balance between human rights and counter-terrorism imperatives can be built into processes of state-building. Again, I illustrate my argument with examples from the states of South and South-East Asia. In concluding, I offer some observations about the impact of global counter-terrorism initiatives for containing other forms of non-state violence. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Donna Haraway’s Cyborg Manifesto presents a productive line of inquiry into the ‘potential’ for oppositional politics immanent to contemporary biopolitical production or Empire. Hardt and Negri recognize the global operations of a different paradigm of power that has become immanent to the social field in its entirety through the intensification and generalization of apparatuses of disciplinarity. The concept of Empire or biopolitical production describes a modality of subsumption where power invests in the very (re-)production of life itself by entirely permeating consciousness and corporeality of individuals-agentic subjectivities with needs, minds, bodies and relations that allow the ‘imperial machine’ to develop more intensively and extensively throughout the latticework of social structures. Hardt and Negri suggest that the critical strategies that informed oppositional politics under the regime of modern sovereignty such as place-based politics, politics of use-value, politics of the Signifier, politics of identity/hybridity/difference (implicitly or explicitly relying on some form of externality/outside from which to make or challenge ontological claims), are not only ineffective but are indeed the very strategies and procedures that are captured and deployed to intensify the affects of the imperial economy of command. Instead, they demand that we attend to the itinerant dimension of desire and productivity of the ‘multitude’ (a non-localizable common name), its infinite capacity for deterritorialization and miscegenation, in any endeavor to resist or counter-actualize the tendencies of Empire. They argue that the question of oppositional politics cannot begin by taking recourse to a unified, whole(-some) subjectivity or identity, since these are transpersonal effects of interpellation by the imperial machine, but needs to pursue the nomadism of multiple becomings or metamorphoses that constitute new terrains of possibility and the invent new democratic forms that take us beyond the Empire. Haraway’s cyborg manifesto, which provides us with a post-gender, post-human fable of becoming, can be read as a call for a continuous constituent project of radical metamorphoses that allows this multitude to actualize its potentialities. However, this paper will depart from the dominant feminist interpretation of the cyborg as a figure of representation-a metaphor, and as the quintessential postmodern icon, because the logic of metaphoricity operates by establishing equivalences between relatively distinct things whereas becoming bears primarily on potentiality, in terms of what may or may not come to pass. What is crucial about cyborg politics isn’t simply the hybridity of machine/organism and fable/social reality, whereby technology emancipates the woman from her corporeal body. Neither is the cyborg a general model that stands out and above the bodies that will subsequently come to occupy it with `better or worse fitting. Haraway posits the cyborg figure precisely to confront matrices of codes, or a semiology of command that unfolds within contemporary social relations of science and technology which has systematically produced gender domination, and ‘woman’ as difference. The cyborg figure comes together (it has no birth or an innocent origin) and inhabits the Empire, but in a modality that is always partial (thus constantly open to connection and thus mutation) as well as transgressive. It is temporality is not developmental but pertains to condensation, implosion and fusion that allows the proliferation of selves that are impossible to be captured within any grid of redundant boundaries. In this paper, I will examine the cyborg as a modality of becoming by reading the cyborg manifesto, employing Deleuze and Guattari’s conceptualizations of machine, desire and becoming-woman, to sketch the contours of oppositional politics within Empire. References Deleuze, Gilles and Felix Guattari Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Scizophrenia (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1972) -A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1987). Haraway, Donna, A Cyborg Manifesto: Science, Technology, and Socialist-Feminism in the Late Twentieth Century in Simians, Cyborgs, and Women: The Reinvention of Nature (New York: Routledge, 1991). -Modest_Witness@Second Millennium.FemaleMan_Meets_OncoMouse: Feminism and Technoscience (New York: Routledge, 1997). Hardt, Michael and Antonio Negri Empire (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2000). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The name of the 45th Annual ISA Convention reminds of Joseph Stiglitz’s well-known book Globalization and its Discontents and makes one wonder whether globalization is synonymous, or is leading to, hegemony - of who, over whom, of what kind? The ongoing debates in the Russian social sciences are focusing on these issues, but the discourses they produce remain cloaked largely in mystery for much of the scientific maintream. This paper, based on the results of several large-scale research projects conducted at the initiative of Mikhail S. Gorbachev and his Foundation for Socio-Economic, International and Political Studies and carried out by a prominent group of Russian scholars, analyses the responses Russian political sociology and sociology of international relations provide to the challenges of globalization considered in the context of the New World Order, the transformation of power relations in world politics, and the emergence of new centers of hegemony in global governance. The paper demonstrates that the main thematic lines of analysis of the complexities of globalization in Russia are influenced by the need for the country which used to be a former world superpower to reassess its current position and role and to adjust to the drastic global transformations of which it has been one of the major causes. It provides evidence in support of the claim that the concepts of national sovereignty, self-determination, and political self-determination in particular, are the key instruments in the analysis of Russia’s role and place in the globalizing world. Drawing parallels between the Russian globalization studies and the seminal writings produced by Western authors, it addresses the issues of academic preponderance and diversity, domination and exclusion in the currents of international political sociology, considering the ways in which relations of ruling shape scholarly discourses. The three parts of the paper outline the major questions, or thematic blocks, connected to the study of globalization in Russia. The first part presents how globalization is defined, how it is linked to the issues of power and hegemony in global governance, and what are its main characteristics and contradictions as perceived in Russian contemporary social thought. The second part reveals the theoretical reaction to the globalization challenges resulting in the development of the concept of Russia’s political and economic self-determination, which is applied to the analysis of the country’s behavior in the globalizing world. The third part presents the critical analysis of Russia’s role and place in globalization. It elaborates on the theoretical debates about the forced integration into the international economic, political and informational structures, making an enormous effort and jumping into the wagon of the current winners, versus a messianic attitude declaring Russia’s necessity to take the lead of the losers of globalization, the discontents opposing the trends of global hegemony. Stressing the increasingly significant role of corporations and corporatism, which in Russia takes the form of oligarchic rule, it considers the impacts of Russia’s choice of authoritarianism or democracy on the future world order according to various scenarios developed by the Russian scholars. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Relations between the European Union and Romania have recently deteriorated, posing serious risks for Romania?s aim of obtaining membership in 2007. This paper proposes five partly linked and complementary explanations for this crisis. Each explanation is briefly presented and preliminarily assessed in this draft paper. The intention is to improve our understanding of the current crisis in the larger context of the EU enlargement project and the difficulties of post-communist transition. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The abrupt switch from the Japanese economic miracle to the acute Bubble of 1985-1990 and to a deep financial crisis in the 1990s remains puzzling. This paper offers a novel interpretation for the end of the Japanese Miracle. It focuses on key political decisions taken before and during the Bubble regarding financial deregulation. It argues that the Japanese political economic system fell into a dysfunctioning state as a result of a process of financial deregulation without regulatory institutions beginning in the early 1980s. The Japanese government viewed financial deregulation as a solution of least domestic resistance to the US-Japan trade conflict. It was also driven by the new incentives of financial globalization. As in Korea in 1993-1996, linkages between vested interest groups and political parties precluded the parallel establishment of robust regulatory institutions. The paper presents a typology of financial deregulation outcomes in relation to the interaction between global pressures and the voice of vested interest groups in the political system. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Does unipolarity select for unilateralism? Theories that derive the behavior of a hegemonic state -and particularly with respect to unilateralism - exclusively from the distribution of relative power are notoriously underdetermined; neorealism suggests that leading states use asymmetries in power to their unilateral advantage, whereas the hegemony literature suggests that leading states leverage potentiall temporary advantage into locking in a favorable institutionalized status quo. This paper argues that the current American response these competing international logics is mediated by political-intellectual traditions about American power. The paper will address why certain unilateral/multilateralist foreign policy traditions are priveleged at certain times, and how these traditions determine - or provide a casual condition for - how the United States responds to structural pressures towards international institutions and cooperation [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) stood steadfast with the United States in the wake of the September 11 terrorist attacks. On 12 September 2001, less than 24 hours after the terrorist attacks against the United States, the alliance invoked Article 5 of the Washington Treaty for the first time in its history. Since then, NATO has taken a variety of steps to engage more fully in the global war on terrorism, including a declaration that tacking terrorism was NATO’s new mission. On a more concrete level, alliance members adopted a package of measures during the Prague Summit in November 2002 that are designed to strengthen NATO’s preparedness and ability to take on the challenges associated with terrorism. But beyond the rhetoric and posturing, is the alliance really ready?in terms of having the appropriate command and force structure?to tackle this new threat? If the last major alliance effort to address a change in the threat environment is any indicator, NATO may not be ready to decisively face down terrorism for quite some time. In the 1991 Strategic Concept, NATO recognized the significant changes in the threat environment brought about by the end of the Cold War. New threats, ethnic and religious strife chief among them, were noted by the alliance in public documents and pronouncements. Accordingly, the alliance recognized that new command and force structures would be necessary to meet the new threats. Nevertheless, it took the alliance another 12 years before it had those command and force structures?centered on NATO Rapid Deployment Corps (NRDCs)?in place to deal with new post-Cold War security challenges. Why did this change in command and force structures take so long after the alliance recognized the changed security environment? My paper will argue that although external threat factors initiate reviews of NATO doctrine and force structure, the outcomes of those reviews are delayed and decisively shaped by organizational behavior and bureaucratic politics factors. By extending this model to the current focus on the terrorism?arguably as great a watershed in the threat environment as the end of the Cold War?the clearest implication is that NATO may not be prepared to respond to this new security challenge in the short run because it may lack appropriate processes, structures, and forces even though it recognizes the inadequacy of its existing security tools. Extending the model further, the paper will argue that NATO is likely to stumble through the short term, employing ad hoc or stopgap tactics and solutions as was seen in the alliance’s response to Balkans crises in the 1990s. Like state actors in the international environment, NATO seems ready and able to fight the last war, but not necessarily the next one. The paper will argue that if NATO wishes to remain relevant to security in the twenty-first century and provide for European security?particularly in the war on terrorism?it will have to develop more effective means for evolving its doctrine and its force structure. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper investigates why autonomy is not always an effective tool of conflict resolution. While some scholars argue that autonomy impairs stability by creating further incentives for separatist mobilization, it can also impair stability by not reducing existing incentives for state centralization. Autonomous institutions--by preserving a center-periphery hierarchy--simply do not serve as an adequate guarantee that states will refrain from seeking to centralize power. Where regional-based groups have entered into conflict precisely in order to prevent this centralization of power, attempts to impose autonomy are likely to fail. In such cases, models of state building that institutionalize the equality of political units, rather than restore the center-periphery status quo, offer improved prospects for lasting peace. On this basis, the paper offers proposals for resolving existing conflicts in the Caucasus (Georgia/Abkhazia/South Ossetia, Azerbaijan/Mountainous Karabagh). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Do human rights scholarship, activism and advocacy perpetuate a hegemonic discourse regarding the individual, the state, and civil society which?were they taken to a logical end?might actually frustrate the realization of human rights? This paper will explore this question with specific reference to the internationally recognized principle that all human rights are indivisible, interdependent, and interrelated. As an adjunct to the equally central principle of universality, the indivisibility of human rights is meant to overcome or ameliorate the divisions resulting from the codification of two categories of human rights?politic and civil; and economic, social and cultural?into two distinct international treaties. The blame for this division is often?and incorrectly?dumped on the doorstep of Cold War politics. In recent years, a growing number of human rights scholars, activists and advocates have bolstered the treatment of positive economic and social rights as real human rights. The very act of contending that economic and social rights share the same stage of legitimacy with political and civil rights makes us keenly aware of the extent to which negative civil and political rights remain at the heart of the discursive environment of international human rights. A real problem this paper will examine is a tendency among human rights scholars, activists and advocates to deploy rhetorically the principle of indivisibility in such a manner that it prevents us from unpacking the concept in any meaningful way. The unreflective treatment of such an important and central concept creates a great deal of confusion with regard to who holds rights, and what institutions are capable of instantiating rights in the modern world. In their efforts to counter the hegemony of political and civil rights, advocates of economic and social rights are forced to reproduce the dichotomies so prevalent in human rights discourses (e.g., negative vs. positive rights). An unresolved tension between the positive and negative nature of different kinds of rights?as most human rights advocates see them?centers around what role the state should play in the realization of rights. Because this tension is either used to in a Cranston-esque rejection of economic or social rights that brings all discussion to a halt, or treated as if the differences between rights were not important, our ability to see the state as anything other than the enemy of rights is significantly compromised. A contemporary approach to human rights that is willing to seriously consider a non-reactionary approach to the state as an institution of positive freedom is necessary to overcome these tensions and divides. And the good news is that the genealogy of human rights reveals sufficient support for a comprehensive theory of the state that is compatible with a robust vision of the indivisibility of human rights. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The United States embarks on the 21st century committed to retaining a large arsenal of nuclear weapons, deploying sophisticated missile defenses, and developing new (and more usable) battlefield nuclear warheads. This stance - combined with the Bush administration’s enshrinement of pre-emptive military action as a keystone of American policy after the September 11th attacks - is puzzling and worrisome for much of the international community. An analysis of contemporary U.S. nuclear weapons policy thus fits well with both elements of the 2004 conference theme of Hegemony and its Discontents. My paper will develop a new explanation for contemporary U.S. behavior through a comparison with American nuclear policy during the Cold War. Then, as with now, many scholars and policy analysts were puzzled by U.S. behavior because they viewed large and threatening nuclear forces as not only unnecessary for preserving American security, but also upsetting to international peace and stability. However, I will show that U.S. nuclear policy during the Cold War and today is understandable through the lens of a theory I call technological opportunism. The core argument is that states rarely view new technological developments - such as missile defense and warhead technology - as a means to preserve the status quo or signal benign intentions; instead, even purportedly defensive technologies are most often seized upon by states and their leaders as potential opportunities to gain military and political advantage over their rivals. My approach to understanding this topic is largely positivist and material, but I am sympathetic to ways in which a more reflectivist - or, specifically, a constructivist - approach can shed light on U.S. behavior in this case. In particular, the ways in which American policymakers have typically conceptualized their country’s identity as a nuclear superpower and assigned meaning to concepts such as security and technology have clearly shaped and been shaped by nuclear policy decisions. In sum, I believe my paper will deal with key themes raised by the 2004 Call for Proposals, including the nature of U.S. hegemony and power in world politics and the relationship between ideas and political practice. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The creation of the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) could be seen as an assertion and reinforcement of the hegemony of the United States over the Internet. By United States I mean not just the US Government, but also its industry, its technology and in many respects the values associated with a liberal democratic order in communications. The paper will describe and investigate the nature of his hegemonic system, making it clear that simplistic notions of US dominance imposed on an unwilling world don’t get one very far. What we see instead are several self-reinforcing cycles of the sort that made Silicon Valley the world capital of IT innovation and Hollywood the world capital for filmmaking: network effects and agglomeration economies and first-mover advantages. The hegemonic system did not follow traditional national lines. The Internet protocols were victorious in a standards war that pitted TCP/IP against protocols (OSI) that were backed not only by European governments and European telecommunications operators, but also by the US Department of Commerce and many US telephone companies. The early Internet community was international in scope; although it was centered in and mostly populated by US computer scientists, it embraced several European and Asian institutes. These non-US technologists were outside the mainstream in their own countries and both the US and the non-US technologists often showed more allegiance to their own epistemic community than to their governments. Nevertheless, when it came time to privatize and commercialize the Internet the US government did retain the ability to control the terms of the governance transition because US military and civilian contractors were operating the centralized naming and numbering spaces. More significantly, despite its initial promise that it would fully privatize ICANN, the US reneged and retained indefinitely an unusual form of unilateral contractual control over what is ostensibly an international organization. Not much later, concerns about security and terrorism post 9-11 reinforced the decision to keep a US grip on the root of the Internet, making the relationship between ICANN and the USG a delicate matter. In addition to clarifying the historical emergence of US dominance of the Internet this paper will have three parts: * First, by way of factual background, it will analyze the institutional relationships between ICANN and the US government. * Second, it will explore and describe the ways in which assertions of the identity of a distinct Internet community interact with regional/cultural and national identities in the politics of ICANN. In developing this analysis, a critique of academically romantic notions of diversity and difference will emerge. * Third, it will explore the extent to which ICANN’s creation was a direct challenge to the hegemony of traditional intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), especially the International Telecommunication Union (ITU). It will pay particular attention to the efforts of the ITU to undermine ICANN’s legitimacy and assert a role for traditional IGOs in Internet governance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Paper Proposal for the 45th Annual ISA Convention, Montreal, Quebec, Canada, March 17-20, 2004: European Security after September 11 and the Wars in Afghanistan and Iraq Heinz Gärtner Traditional security thinking dominated the Cold War. Reliance on military capabilities was the primary strategy adopted to achieve greater security. In the new post-1989 world, and in particular post- 9/11, a broader and more complex concept of security has emerged. With the end of the Cold War, attention was thus given to building more sophisticated and integrated security concepts and developing frameworks designed to embrace a more comprehensive construct for security. The dramatic shift in threat perceptions brought about by the fall of communism have been confirmed by a wide variety of post-September 11 development: Wars between competing political ideologies and inter-state conflicts are no longer seen as the prime dangers to international security. The real security risks in the near future seem to come not from strong and stable governments but from failed and collapsed states. This paper examines both the impact of the developments before and after September 11 on both NATO and European Security, in particular on the concept of collective and territorial defense. By far the greatest proportions of the operational efforts of NATO and the European Union (EU) have already shifted away from collective defense. Crisis management is the paradigm that forms the cornerstone of the post-Cold War security system. Since the end of the East-West conflict NATO underwent a significant transformation process that has been speeded up by the terror attacks of September 11. Founded as a collective defense organization at the onset of the Cold War, NATO has revised its strategic concept to respond to the broader spectrum of the threats. The invocation of its Art. 5 security commitments for a war that took place not on NATO-territory changed the meaning of this article together with Art. 6 that prescribes this area. With NATO enlargement, a greater role for Moscow, NATO’s small military role in Afghanistan and Iraq, NATO seemed likely to lose military significance in international significance. NATO was at risk of becoming totally irrelevant in a world in which terrorism has become the principal strategic threat. So it had to give up more and more the old NATO, a collective security organization designed to protect Western Europe against Soviet invasion. At the Prague summit the heads of governments approved the formation of a Rapid-Response force of around 20,000 troops that would be deployable within 30 days wherever they are needed. In the framework of the Prague Capabilities Commitment individual countries will also have to commit themselves to provide specific equipment and expertise within set deadlines. In the case of Iraq Germany, France and Belgium blocked the start of NATO military planning to protect Turkey against the threat of an Iraqi missile attack. Subsequently, Turkey has requested consultations under Article 4 of the North Atlantic Treaty, that states that NATO’s members will consult together whenever, in the opinion of any of them, the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any NATO country is threatened. With the post-cold war era NATO’s traditional role as a collective defense organization was coming to a close. NATO together with its PfP could become a military toolbox of allied forces. The European Union launched a 60,000-strong Rapid Reaction Force in 2001, is supposed to be up and running by 2003, but is struggling amid budget restrictions and affected by post-September 11 events, the war in Afghanistan and the pending war against Iraq. After the end of the East-West Conflict European deficiencies of military capabilities became more and more visible, however. One important reason lies in the legacy of the Cold War. During this period the European armies prepared for a confrontation with the major threat from the East in a collective effort to defend their territories. The conflicts and challenges after the end of the military bipolarity do not require massive, heavy-metal European armies, not suited for transport and projections to distant places, but rapid reaction forces with flexible structure and light weapons, deployable over great distances, equipped with modern communication assets to coordinate their actions, surveillance and reconnaissance facilities. A draft report of the Presidium the European Convention provided recommendations and the wording of new articles for the Treaty of The Convention. The report recognizes that the concept of security is very broad, by nature indivisible, and one that goes beyond the purely military aspects covering not only the security of States but also the security of citizens. On the basis of this broad concept of security, the common foreign and security policy and the European Security and Defense Policy. It allows the Union military options over and above the civil instruments of crisis prevention and management. Within this broad concept of security, disarmament occupies an essential place. In the area of crisis management there is the danger of duplication of NATO and EU capabilities and missions. Division of labor and role specialization could avoid it on the one hand, and cooperation in certain areas such as common command structure for crisis management on the other. There must be appropriate division of labour. The wars in Kazoo, Afghanistan and Iraq showed that the overwhelming U.S. contribution is war-fighting capability - what is by comparison a limited European contribution. In this the gap between the military capabilities of the U.S. and the rest of the world is huge and is growing. However, a capability to act does not only imply war fighting. Europeans are more designed for peacekeeping, humanitarian action, disaster relief and post-conflict reconstruction rather than the rapid deployment of larger forces over long distances. The United States will need to continue to project forces in high-intensity conflict. There should be some risk- and responsibility sharing, however. European states should keep a minimum level of participation in all phases of an operation. As Europeans should keep and develop some war fighting capability U.S.-troops also should participate at least at a minimal level in lower end peace support operations. They should not be reduced to war fighting alone but demonstrate that they are able to do humanitarian and rescue and peacekeeping operations. Hence, despite the transatlantic differences, there is clearly consensus among some of the EU Member States and the United States on the need to develop force planning and strategies for ‘ad-hoc’ coalitions of the willing that can have access to NATO and EU economic, military and human assets. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The aim of this paper is to analyse military practices in contemporary external operations involving post-conflict reconstruction. Indeed, increasingly the role of the military is not only to wage war, and thus to destroy (totally or partially) states, but also to participate in the political, social and economic reconstruction of states. These social practices, that can be traced back to the counter-insurgency doctrine of the cold war (and beyond), are since the 1990s embedded in strategic discourses focusing on the supposed threats to the international system represented by weak or failed states. However, by analysing them through the lenses of the simplistic distinction between weak and strong states, these readings fail to understand the social dynamics of conflictual societies. However weak themselves, these analyses have lead to the development of civil-military practices in which the military is involved in activities traditionally considered civilian (restoration of public services, humanitarian assistance, civil administration... ) along with very diverse actors (international organizations, NGO’s, local communities, governmental agencies...) in order to rebuild states, judicial systems and economic infrastructures of war-torn societies. Since the events of 9/11 these practices have been adapted to new readings focusing on the war against terrorism and the war against states accused of sponsoring terrorism. The focus in this paper will be put on the interaction between the local social systems and the external military forces involved in these civil-military practices. Three situations involving different types of interaction with the local environment will be analysed here. The case of Iraq in which a government considered as hostile was destroyed and replaced by an American civil administration; the case of Afghanistan, in which the pre-existing authority was chased and replaced by a government of local extraction but highly controlled by the American government; finally, The case of Kosovo in which the reconstruction effort was prompted by the eviction of the Serb government and the creation of an international administration after massive air raids. When pertinent, the case of Sierra Leone might also be analysed. For every case study, the social practices of the British and the American military forces will be looked at and compared. One important question will be how the transition from an analysis in terms of failed states to a discourse on the war against terrorism has impacted on the way the military interacts with local social systems in external operations. In this respect, the justification of the intervention in Afghanistan is interesting because it combines both discourses. Three separate but highly interlinked issues will be addressed: - the issue of hegemony: whereas traditional military operations aim at imposing a political will upon another through coercion, civil-military practices aim at transforming the preferences of the potential adversary by acting upon his social and political environment. Thus, by participating in the external government of local societies, these social practices are sometimes accused of being a factor of hegemony on specific societies. To what extent can post-conflict reconstruction in the name of democracy, the restoration of state sovereignty or the war against terrorism be considered a tool of hegemony? - the issue of political violence: since one of the justification of these civil-military practices are to be found in the proclaimed need to control and reduce the level of political violence by acting upon its causes (whereas traditional military practices focus on eradicating it through a force to force logic), they cannot be understood without referring to the underlying analysis of the causes of political violence. The question is thus in how far these practices manage to grasp the social dynamics underlying political violence in war-torn societies. Indeed if they are founded upon false assumptions, they are very likely to become counterproductive. - the issue of security practices: the civilian and sometimes even humanitarian nature of these military practices raises the question of the extent to which they can still be understood as security management practices as defined by the military itself. How do these practices relate to the field of international security? How do they impact on military identity as an identity historically linked to the notion of security ? [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Development research has undergone a profound change over the last two decades, witnessing a major shift in its focus, goals, and priorities. The emerging new realization that development cannot be equated with economic growth and that development is not a one-way traffic has prompted the need for donor countries and lending agencies to adopt a participatory approach to development. What is unique about such a new approach is that it creates a space, at least theoretically, for beneficiaries to influence the planning, implementing, and monitoring processes. Most plans are now done in consultation with stakeholders simply to ensure the effectiveness of development intervention. More important perhaps is that this changing development discourse is beginning to offer academic researchers and practitioners a wonderful opportunity to establish a much closer tie among themselves to achieve the goals of sustainable human development in the twenty-first century. Given such a dramatically changed context of international development, this paper examines the nature of relationship between the Canadian academia and practitioners, including the policy-makers. In particular, it explores the ways in which development scholars and practitioners work together to improve the performance of Canada’s development cooperation. The paper is comprised of three main sections. It first looks at the international context of development to explain how the focus of development research has shifted from transferring knowledge from the North to the South to the exploration of a mutually beneficial relationship between the industrialized and developing worlds. Section two examines two somewhat different models of development research that evolved over the last decade or so. The third section analyzes the current state of relationship between the Canadian academia and the policy world. The last section offers some concluding remarks based on the findings of this rather brief study. This paper finds that, while the new context of international development has created a space for development researchers and educators, both Northern and Southern, to work more closely with policy-makers and practitioners, Canadian academia and practitioners are still searching for a way of redefining their traditional territories. Given the lack of funding support, development research in Canada aims primarily at providing a critical analysis of development theories, approaches, and strategies. By contrast, the practitioners, including policy-makers, tend to work in relative isolation in the management of international development. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper sets out to explore the role of private authority in global networks currently involved in the emerging issue area known as ‘ICT for Development’, with a specific view to disentangling how private authority shapes policy configuration in this particular issue area. Drawing on theories of global governance and governmentality, the paper highlights the historical formation of the ICT for Development agenda, the role of knowledge management and modernization ideals in the framing of the agenda, and, not least, the rise of global networks taking the shape of partnerships which specifically address the ICT for Development problematique in global and local settings [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Guatemala has been faced with a daunting set of issues since the signing of the country’s historical peace accords in December 1996. The prospects for consolidating peace and democracy have depended on the successful reform of political, legal, and military institutions as well as the re-negotiation of political participation, in particular equal and meaningful participation for historically marginalized groups. The hemisphere’s multilateral forum, the Organization of American States (OAS) has been supporting these reform efforts through various peacebuilding initiatives. Particularly relevant to the Guatemalan context is the fact that the OAS has recently expanded its peacebuilding and democracy strengthening agenda to include conflict prevention programs.  It is during the phase following the signing of peace accords that activities aimed at preventing a renewed outbreak of violent conflict are considered especially valuable. With this in mind, the Organization established a program to help Guatemalans address ongoing tensions and political disputes, particularly related to the implementation of the accords, before they spiral into destructive violence.  The program entitled Culture of Dialogue: Development of Resources for Peacebuilding in Guatemala (OAS-PROPAZ)  has focussed on strengthening the capacities of governmental, civic, and community institutions to manage and resolve disputes in collaborative ways. My paper argues that the PROPAZ programme represents an innovative and commendable initiative who’s achievements can be attributed to a confluence of factors: the right moment in time, the right staff, its fluid and adaptable nature. However, I conclude that it is unlikely that such a program can be easily replicated for a number of reasons which I outline in the last section of the paper. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper compares the cases of the European Union (EU) and NAFTA and examines how integration has affected politics, economic structures and economic performance in three countries: Mexico, Portugal and Spain. The paper reviews the relationships between regional integration, economic growth, and democratic consolidation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]