Paper Proposal for the 45th Annual ISA Convention, Montreal, Quebec, Canada, March 17-20, 2004: European Security after September 11 and the Wars in Afghanistan and Iraq Heinz Gärtner Traditional security thinking dominated the Cold War. Reliance on military capabilities was the primary strategy adopted to achieve greater security. In the new post-1989 world, and in particular post- 9/11, a broader and more complex concept of security has emerged. With the end of the Cold War, attention was thus given to building more sophisticated and integrated security concepts and developing frameworks designed to embrace a more comprehensive construct for security. The dramatic shift in threat perceptions brought about by the fall of communism have been confirmed by a wide variety of post-September 11 development: Wars between competing political ideologies and inter-state conflicts are no longer seen as the prime dangers to international security. The real security risks in the near future seem to come not from strong and stable governments but from failed and collapsed states. This paper examines both the impact of the developments before and after September 11 on both NATO and European Security, in particular on the concept of collective and territorial defense. By far the greatest proportions of the operational efforts of NATO and the European Union (EU) have already shifted away from collective defense. Crisis management is the paradigm that forms the cornerstone of the post-Cold War security system. Since the end of the East-West conflict NATO underwent a significant transformation process that has been speeded up by the terror attacks of September 11. Founded as a collective defense organization at the onset of the Cold War, NATO has revised its strategic concept to respond to the broader spectrum of the threats. The invocation of its Art. 5 security commitments for a war that took place not on NATO-territory changed the meaning of this article together with Art. 6 that prescribes this area. With NATO enlargement, a greater role for Moscow, NATO’s small military role in Afghanistan and Iraq, NATO seemed likely to lose military significance in international significance. NATO was at risk of becoming totally irrelevant in a world in which terrorism has become the principal strategic threat. So it had to give up more and more the old NATO, a collective security organization designed to protect Western Europe against Soviet invasion. At the Prague summit the heads of governments approved the formation of a Rapid-Response force of around 20,000 troops that would be deployable within 30 days wherever they are needed. In the framework of the Prague Capabilities Commitment individual countries will also have to commit themselves to provide specific equipment and expertise within set deadlines. In the case of Iraq Germany, France and Belgium blocked the start of NATO military planning to protect Turkey against the threat of an Iraqi missile attack. Subsequently, Turkey has requested consultations under Article 4 of the North Atlantic Treaty, that states that NATO’s members will consult together whenever, in the opinion of any of them, the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any NATO country is threatened. With the post-cold war era NATO’s traditional role as a collective defense organization was coming to a close. NATO together with its PfP could become a military toolbox of allied forces. The European Union launched a 60,000-strong Rapid Reaction Force in 2001, is supposed to be up and running by 2003, but is struggling amid budget restrictions and affected by post-September 11 events, the war in Afghanistan and the pending war against Iraq. After the end of the East-West Conflict European deficiencies of military capabilities became more and more visible, however. One important reason lies in the legacy of the Cold War. During this period the European armies prepared for a confrontation with the major threat from the East in a collective effort to defend their territories. The conflicts and challenges after the end of the military bipolarity do not require massive, heavy-metal European armies, not suited for transport and projections to distant places, but rapid reaction forces with flexible structure and light weapons, deployable over great distances, equipped with modern communication assets to coordinate their actions, surveillance and reconnaissance facilities. A draft report of the Presidium the European Convention provided recommendations and the wording of new articles for the Treaty of The Convention. The report recognizes that the concept of security is very broad, by nature indivisible, and one that goes beyond the purely military aspects covering not only the security of States but also the security of citizens. On the basis of this broad concept of security, the common foreign and security policy and the European Security and Defense Policy. It allows the Union military options over and above the civil instruments of crisis prevention and management. Within this broad concept of security, disarmament occupies an essential place. In the area of crisis management there is the danger of duplication of NATO and EU capabilities and missions. Division of labor and role specialization could avoid it on the one hand, and cooperation in certain areas such as common command structure for crisis management on the other. There must be appropriate division of labour. The wars in Kazoo, Afghanistan and Iraq showed that the overwhelming U.S. contribution is war-fighting capability - what is by comparison a limited European contribution. In this the gap between the military capabilities of the U.S. and the rest of the world is huge and is growing. However, a capability to act does not only imply war fighting. Europeans are more designed for peacekeeping, humanitarian action, disaster relief and post-conflict reconstruction rather than the rapid deployment of larger forces over long distances. The United States will need to continue to project forces in high-intensity conflict. There should be some risk- and responsibility sharing, however. European states should keep a minimum level of participation in all phases of an operation. As Europeans should keep and develop some war fighting capability U.S.-troops also should participate at least at a minimal level in lower end peace support operations. They should not be reduced to war fighting alone but demonstrate that they are able to do humanitarian and rescue and peacekeeping operations. Hence, despite the transatlantic differences, there is clearly consensus among some of the EU Member States and the United States on the need to develop force planning and strategies for ‘ad-hoc’ coalitions of the willing that can have access to NATO and EU economic, military and human assets. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]