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This paper examines the Chinese government's response to four epidemic crises, including COVID-19, and analyzes the similarities and differences in these responses. It argues that while the Chinese government learned from previous epidemics and improved its handling of subsequent outbreaks, a significant variation occurred during the COVID-19 pandemic, which had a detrimental impact globally. Existing scholarly research on China's epidemic responses has often been limited in scope, focusing on individual crises and neglecting the central-local government relationship in crisis decision-making. By adopting a comprehensive approach, this paper delves into the nuanced dynamics of China's responses to these epidemics. It highlights the variations in responses, attributing them to the Chinese government's fear of undermined legitimacy and its consideration of its international image. The government's recognition of the importance of public perception and trust, both domestically and globally, has shaped its crisis management strategies. Through a detailed analysis of these factors, this paper contributes to a deeper understanding of the variations observed in China's epidemic responses. It emphasizes the significance of the central-local government relationship and the government's international image in determining its actions during epidemics. Recognizing these factors can provide policymakers and researchers with insights to shape future epidemic response strategies and foster effective global health governance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

China has initiated a series of "economic sanctions" against South Korea, affecting Korean pop stars visiting China and Korean investments in China. Sanctions were imposed on South Korea in response to the decision of South Korea to deploy Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) in 2016. Furthermore, the Global Daily assembled local population to boycott Korean products and investments in China. However, the Chinese Foreign Ministry has never positively confirmed these activities as economic sanctions to South Korea related to the THAAD installation. In other words, the Chinese government singled a relatively weak message via these sanctions to South Korea. As a result, the THADD implementation continued in South Korea. In the paper, I interpret China's rationale to impost puzzling economic sanctions, which have a weak resolution, to South Korea and Taiwan. As signaling theory argues, economic sanctions with insufficient resolution, which are more likely to fail, is a more provocative foreign policy. By reviewing China's sanctions usage to South Korea and Taiwan, I propose arguments of bureaucratic competition to answer why China launched such sanctions to other countries: those are caused by domestic institutions who are seeking reward from the Communist Party of China. By comparing shifts of leadership between domestic agencies, the paper provides evidence to support the proposed argument. I also include two alternative explanations to strengthen the proposed argument, albeit connecting the paper with other two larger streams of research, which address analyses of China's aggressive foreign policies as well as the domestic politics of economic sanctions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The COVID-19 pandemic has highlighted the risks of an over-concentration of supply chains in one country. It has motivated stakeholders to pursue diversification strategies. However, a paradox exists. Stakeholders have shied away from a complete decoupling and preferring to selectively enhance economic ties with China. This article explores this paradox by examining supply chain concentration in China as a form of asymmetric interdependence and the countermeasures from the U.S., Japan, Australia, and India to minimize vulnerabilities. It argues that while the COVID-19 disruptions have brought to light the risk of supply chain overconcentration in China, countermeasures are also driven by coercive diplomacy and the deepening U.S.-China rivalry. The paper also examines the feasibility of diversification efforts by focusing on the capacity and capabilities of alternative supply chain hubs. It finds that while states are actively seeking ways to prevent China from using asymmetric interdependence of supply chains and trade to gain political leverage, there are structural limits to the degree of diversification in the short to mid-term. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Even though Sino-American relations of the Donald Trump era were perceived as predominately confrontational, with a symbolic trade war between the two, the scale of economic interdependencies between the United States and China results in either a need for collaboration or in serious losses on both sides in the case of lack of cooperation. The paper aims at analyzing economic relations between the United States of America and the People's Republic of China at the time of the Trump presidency. Analysis is based on the complex interdependence theory of Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye. The main hypothesis analyzed in the paper states: Asymmetric interdependence between the People's Republic of China and the United States of America limits the scope, intensity and length of a trade war. For the sake of the paper, economic interdependence will be analyzed. Apart from the reference to the state of the art, the document analysis and descriptive statistics are to be applied in the paper. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the transition to a multipolar international system, the literature has focused on great power competition while little attention has been given to the strategic possibilities of smaller states. However, as a result of globalization, states are so closely interconnected that the primary strategies of even major powers are not to achieve zero-sum solutions but to create asymmetric dependency through which they can influence the behavior of other states and non-state actors. States are assisted in this effort by a variety of tools, including setting up institutions, direct economic influence and through building different forms of infrastructure connectivity networks. By discussing asymmetric dependency situations from the perspective of the great powers, the literature presents smaller states primarily as passive actors, paralyzed by their dependence on great powers. Our paper argues that interdependence allows smaller states to effectively influence larger actors and examines strategies from which smaller states can choose in order to influence the behavior of larger states. Despite an extremely asymmetric relationship between Myanmar and China, actors in Myanmar have sought to influence China's Myanmar policy. We examine a case study of the Myitsone Dam, including Myanmar's strategic aims, chosen strategy and limitations in maneuvering space. Semi-structured interviews with local decision-makers and stakeholders are conducted in order to portray the full picture. Our study concludes that further research on the influencing strategies of small states in response to asymmetric dependence can contribute to a better understanding of the interdependence of states. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

China's cultural diplomacy is mostly understood as an endeavour to build and project soft power, which draws on three sources of 'culture, political values and foreign policy' according to Nye. This paper focuses on the debates about the vehicle and agents of China's cultural diplomacy. It starts with a theoretical discussion of the competing views in the Chinese context, and develops an argument that the vehicle of China's cultural diplomacy tries to project soft power on two wheels of culture and political values, to serve the purpose of reshaping China's image away from being the 'cultural other' and 'ideological other' respectively. However, the state-led approach to driving this vehicle is generating some side effects with its sponsorship, censorship and presence in the driver's seat. Then the paper analyses the inherent tensions existing in practice both between the two sources of building soft power and between the two means of doing so, attraction and persuasion, with empirical evidence through a comparative case study of the Confucius Institutes in the US and South Korea. The finding shows that China's attempt at reshaping its image as an Eastern cultural contestant is often disrupted by its authoritarian political values, and the stateled persuasion is often reducing China's cultural attraction. Following this, the paper finishes with some recommendations regarding evolving the cultural diplomacy approach from a vertical one that is government-centred to a horizontal one that is network-based with multiple agents, and localising its practice by engaging the target audiences as stakeholders. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Social credit rating in China (SCRC) has been criticized as "dystopian" and "Orwellian," an attempt by the Communist Party to hold onto power by exerting ever greater control over its citizens. To explain such measures, value differences are often invoked, that Chinese value stability and cooperation over privacy and freedom. However, these explanations are oversimplifications that result in ethical impasses. This article argues social credit rating should be understood in terms of the commonly human problem of large-scale cooperation. To do so, this paper relies on a cultural evolutionary framework and is an exercise in interpretive pros hen ethical pluralism, attempting to understand how apparently irresolvable cultural differences stem from common human concerns. Wholesale condemnation of SCRC fails to acknowledge the serious, intractable nature of problems resulting from a lack of trust in China. They take for granted the existence of institutions ensuring largescale, anonymous cooperation characteristic of - but somewhat unique to - Western Educated Industrialized Rich and Democratic (WEIRD) cultures. Because of its history and rapid development, China lacks the institutions necessary to ensure such cooperation, and because of anti-social punishment, social credit rating might be one of the few ways to ensure cooperation at this scale. The point is not to defend social credit rating in general, but to raise the possibility of its defense in China and show one way this would be done. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper explores the influences of the traditional Chinese culture on social relations in China. It provides an introduction to the concept of Guanxi, the notion that social connections are based on socially situated reciprocity. This is different from social interaction in Western society that is based on self-interest and equity. Guanxi represents the foundation of social networks in many Eastern countries. As such, the study of social networks in China requires scholars to examine Guanxi networks. The paper demonstrates how a Guanxi perspective might be added to the ex-amination of various theories that comprise structural (network) theory, including social capital theory, social exchange theory, cognitive and contagion theories, and the role of homophily for the study of Chinese society and its social organizations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Under authoritarian regimes, citizen-led NGOs such as environmental NGOs (ENGOs) often operate under close scrutiny of the government. While this presents a challenge to a single ENGO, we propose here - in line with existing research on network effects - that there are opportunities for multiple ENGOs to coordinate and thus work in ways that supersede government controls, affect public opinion, and contribute to policy revision and/or creation. In this paper, we specifically examine the possibility that the gamut of citizen-based ENGOs in China are coordinating. Based on network analysis of ENGOs web pages as well as interviews with more than a dozen ENGO leaders between 2014 and 2016, we find that ENGOs have few direct and public connections to each other, but social media sites and personal connections offline provide a crucial function in creating bridges. A closer examination of these bridges reveals, however, that they can be substantive to the environmental discussion or functional to the dissemination of web page information but typically not both. In short, ENGOs in China are not directly connected but rather are connected in a way that responds to the available social media and the government's censorship practices. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Under authoritarian regimes, citizen-led NGOs such as environmental NGOs (ENGOs) often operate under close scrutiny of the government. While this presents a challenge to a single ENGO, we propose here - in line with existing research on network effects - that there are opportunities for multiple ENGOs to coordinate and thus work in ways that supersede government controls, affect public opinion, and contribute to policy revision and/or creation. In this paper, we specifically examine the possibility that the gamut of citizen-based ENGOs in China are coordinating. Based on network analysis of ENGOs web pages as well as interviews with more than a dozen ENGO leaders between 2014 and 2016, we find that ENGOs have few direct and public connections to each other, but social media sites and personal connections offline provide a crucial function in creating bridges. A closer examination of these bridges reveals, however, that they can be substantive to the environmental discussion or functional to the dissemination of web page information but typically not both. In short, ENGOs in China are not directly connected but rather are connected in a way that responds to the available social media and the government's censorship practices. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Unlike most languages, written Chinese has no spaces between words. Word segmentation must be performed before semantic network analysis can be conducted. This paper describes how to perform Chinese word segmentation using the Stanford Natural Language Processing group's Stanford Word Segmenter v. 3.8.0, released in June 2017. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Scholars have long debated the factors that drive political participation and have recently applied theories, developed from analyses of citizens from Europe and the United States, to respondents in the democratizing countries of Asia. In both Hong Kong and Singapore, however, citizens attend rallies and contact officials -- yet do so under authoritarian governance. Are the causes of political participation in these cities similar to what is observed in other groups of respondents across Asia? Or, do institutions influence whether individuals participate? In this paper, I evaluate the development of liberal norms of engagement in both cities as a function of traditional models of participation. As citizens in these cities possess some of the highest standards of living in the region, they should also face frustrations with the limited democratic accountability of their leaders. Ultimately, individuals in each city have developed support for democracy but, given the differing goals of each regime, the nature of democratic engagement differs considerably. In Singapore, citizens are mobilized to engage and participate but support the status quo. By contrast, engaged Hong Kong residents participate out of a frustration with the government, a function of their high levels of internal efficacy and institutional detachment. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

China's Belt and Road Initiative infrastructure connectivity and other projects are presented in much of the discourse as a grand strategy to trap developing nations in debt, to exert asymmetric power and construct a new world economic order. The asymmetric relationship between China and Myanmar might therefore be expected to generate a range of political risks for stakeholders. Myanmar itself presents a "perfect storm" of problems, with dysfunctional governance, civil conflict, under-development and growing economic dependence on China. The Kyaukphyu port project and associated Special Economic Zone in Myanmar's troubled Rakhine state is investigated as a case study of risks on the Belt and Road. While worst case fears China might seize military control of the port appear unlikely, at least in current conditions, empirical observation indicates the complexity on the ground generates an array of other risks - as well as opportunities, should conditions allow. Further, despite challenges and constrained capacity, Myanmar governments have demonstrated agency, including by re-negotiating control and costs of the Kyaukphyu project. The case underlines that conditions are more complicated than simply China's asymmetric power. A sceptical approach is taken to normative discourses in order to build inductive understanding of how stakeholders and local experts perceive dynamics underway. A political risk approach is deployed to develop a framework to identify, analyse and assess risks for actors in relation to the Kyaukphyu project. The research findings are presented on an interim basis, given current constraints on field interviews due to the current crisis. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article investigates the geopolitics of the energy transition era, concentrating on China's solar photovoltaic (PV) industry. Authors have noted that the rise of renewables is changing the geopolitical landscape of world energy systems, but these new energy sources carry their own technical characteristics and geopolitical implications. Bearing this in mind, this research answers the questions: What are the structural factors that facilitate China's use of renewable energy to achieve political goals, and what are their implications? In order to analyze the data, I devise an analytical framework based on the energy statecraft literature and contrast rival explanations, particularly the "prosumer theory" and the premise of less geopolitical interdependence in a renewable-centered world. I show that asymmetric interdependence in the solar PV sector is already a reality. China's solar PV industry is a case that suffices all conditions (centrality in industrial capacity, market share, and companies' compliance, but to a lesser extent in critical materials and technological endowments) in the solar PV sector to devise effective strategies aimed at reaping benefits out of its asymmetric interdependence with the rest of the world. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article deals with the asymmetrical relations between Australia and China and explores their interdependence, tensions, and societal outlooks. Both countries are dependent on one another for trade to different degrees but attempt to diversify their supply chains. While there is no united position on China in Australia, there has been a bipartisan support for the counterinterference legislation there. The newly established security pact of the United States (US), the United Kingdom (UK) and Australia - 'AUKUS' - has brought a new dimension into these tensions and will most likely lead to an arms race. The author explores how a so-called middle power such as Australia balances the related economic and strategic interests and priorities. Although Australia has been vulnerable in its asymmetric relationship with China, it has shown that it is not a passive and helpless actor when facing an economic coercion. The interdependence has become a moderating factor in this strategic stand-off. Additionally, Australia demonstrates its tendency to reinforce its traditional reliance on its previous more powerful allies, the UK and the US. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

With regard to the recent developments in public diplomacy, the increasing fusion of strategic communication appears necessary. China engages in public diplomacy with a strategic purpose to shape its national image abroad. Hosting diplomatic advocacy event is regarded as an instrument with expectations to present reliable and responsible image and promote international collaborations. The present research focuses on the Belt and Road Forum (BRF) in May 2017 with the objective to analyze its outcomes and influence on the international news agenda, news frames, and foreign citizens' comments online. The quantitative content analyses are used to compare the media reports (N=364) and Facebook users' comments on the selected news (N=957) between the US and Pakistan. Results reveal that Pakistani media provided more diverse frames and attributed more positive evaluations to the BRF than the US media. However, Facebook comments expressed more unfavorable opinions toward the BRF and China's image with rare differences between two countries. In conclusion, the BRF has served as an eyecatching advocacy of Chinese foreign policy, as it influenced the news agenda in two selected countries. However, news frames vary due to the differences in media system and the involvement in the BRF. China's public diplomacy practices follow a traditional top-down communication which needs meticulous subdivision of target stakeholders, delicate messaging strategies, and integrated tactics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In April, 2020, amid widespread fear of a second wave of infections of the novel coronavirus in China, local authorities in Guangzhou cracked down on the city's black population, resulting in mass evictions of Africans. The incident raises several questions about racism in China. How should we interpret this heavy-handed treatment of black people? Was this an isolated incident? What motivated such operations? In this article, I explain social control of Guangzhou's African communities as a problem of municipal politics. What underlies the government's heavy handed approach, I argue, are those communities' ties to rurality, which constitute a roadblock in the city's urban upgrade. Using Dengfeng Village, one of the best known African communities in China, as a case study, I show that efforts to upgrade the area by the local state and the real estate industry were frustrated by the community's status as an urban village. Africans, whom Chinese have historically associated with rurality, are seen as contributing to a space that has long been stigmatized as a spatial manifestation of rural people's lack of self-discipline. To better reveal the interconnection between social control and urban politics, I place official action in context of the history of the community's formation and the lived experience. This analysis of Dengfeng applies to various extents to other major African communities in Guangzhou. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

On the World Refugee Day in 2017, Yao Chen, a Chinese actress, philanthropist, and social media influencer, posted messages in her Weibo in support of the United Nations Refugee Agency (UNHCR). Yet, social media users quickly interpreted this supportive message of the refugee program as encouraging people to "accept and receive refugees" (jieshou nanmin) into China. Particularly, the category of Middle Eastern refugees elicited most criticism in China's cyberspace. As the inclusion of refugees is an integral part of immigrant multiculturalism, this article examines the limits of multicultural imagination of refugees--particularly those from the Middle Eastern and North Africa--in contemporary China. I argue that the limits of multicultural imagination in contemporary China is profoundly shaped by an intricate interweaving of domestic policies and global imaginaries toward refugees. By deploying a mixed methodology, such limits are examined from legal-institutional, ideological, and sociocultural perspectives. More specifically, three interrelated aspects will be highlighted in the article: (1) the global circulation of right-wing populism imaginaries, and their entanglements with the anti-Muslim sentiments in contemporary China; (2) the current insufficiency of the legal-institutional framework regarding refugees and asylum-seekers, which needs to be contextualized in China's modern history of dealing with refugee issues; (3) population politics, the rise of Han-centric nationalism, and their constraining impact on the interpretation of historical events related to cultural diversity. In conclusion, this article also offers potential implications for further examining the different yet potentially intersected genealogies of multicultural imaginaries beyond the Middle Eastern and North African refugees in Asia. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Most literature on the "comfort women" social movement focuses on the case of Korea. These works tend to transpose the meanings generated by South Korean organizations onto the transnational network, assuming certain homogeneity of repertoires and identities among the different social actors that comprise this network. Even though there is some degree of consensus about demands, repertoires, and advocacy strategies at the international level, does this same uniformity exist at the national level? In each country, what similarities and differences are present in the laboratories of ideas, relationships, and identities of social actors in the network? Symbolically and politically, do they challenge their respective societies in the same way? This article compares this social movement in South Korea, China, and Taiwan. My main argument is that the constitutive base for this transnational network is the domestic actions of these organizations. It is in the domestic sphere that these social actors reinforce their agendas, reinvent their repertoires, transform their identities, and expand their submerged networks, allowing national movements to retain their latency and autonomy. Following Melucci's relational approach to the study of social movements, this research is based on a qualitative analysis of institutional documents, participant observation, and open-ended interviews with members of the main social actors. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Many people criticized how the Chinese government responded to the Wenchuan Earthquake. They focused on how it failed to address the psychological needs of the survivors. The study presented here approached this issue from a human resources perspective. It was determined that the Chinese government approached the situation in a bureaucratic way that limited the government's capacity and barred non-profit organizations and community groups from participating. It was alsofound that survivors could not contact these organizations for psychological support. This study concludes that the situation called for a more flexible and improvised institution that would respond to the emerging needs of survivors. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]