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This article analyzes concept formation and its empirical and theoretical implications for the study of subnational undemocratic regimes. The paper argues that extant conceptualizations of subnational political regimes, which generally draw on a strategy of 'conceptual expansion' have important drawbacks for the study of subnational undemocratic regimes (SURs). To overcome these shortcomings, the article claims for a strategy of 'conceptual separation' that disaggregates political regimes into two orthogonal dimensions, i.e., the access to and the exercise of state power. Drawing on original evidence from Argentina and Mexico, the article demonstrates that the strategy of conceptual separation helps researchers to (1) avoid truncation of the universe of cases for analysis, (2) obtain new and more precise information about the actual magnitude of the uneven territorialization of democracy, (3) recognize the existence of two ideal type domains of SURs: patrimonial and bureaucratic, and (4) gain more analytic leverage to identify the causal mechanisms that explain regime continuity within and across SUR types. In-depth case studies of the state of Puebla (Mexico) and the province of San Luis (Argentina) demonstrate empirically the workings of the mechanisms that account for regime continuity in bureaucratic-like SURs. The article also demonstrates the potential of distinguishing between SUR types for the study of SUR origins and SUR change. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In many Third Wave democracies large classes of people experience diminished forms of citizenship. The systematic exclusion from mandated public goods and services significantly injures the citizenship and life chances of entire social groups. In democratic theory civil associations have a fundamental role to play in reversing this reality. One strand of theory, known as civic engagement, suggests that associations empower their members to engage in public politics, hold state officials to account, claim public services, and thereby improve the quality of democracy. Empirical demonstration of the argument is surprisingly rare, however, and limited to affluent democracies. In this article, we use original survey data for two large cities in Third Wave democracies-São Paulo and Mexico City-to explore this argument in a novel way. We focus on the extent to which participation in associations (or associationalism) increases 'active citizenship'-the effort to negotiate directly with state agents access to goods and services legally mandated for public provision, such as healthcare, sanitation, and security-rather than civic engagement, which encompasses any voluntary and public spirited activity. We examine separately associationalism's impact on the quality of citizenship, a dimension that varies independently from the level of active citizenship, by assessing differences in the types of citizenship practices individuals use to obtain access to vital goods and services. To interpret the findings, and identify possible causal pathways, the paper moves back-and-forth between two major research traditions that are rarely brought into dialogue: civic engagement and comparative historical studies of democratization. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Vote-buying is a significant problem in developing democracies. If reports of vote-buying crimes are high, results may be challenged by competing candidates in electoral courts, and violent political confrontation may erupt. Also, if not prosecuted, there is danger of vote-buying becoming a common feature of electoral processes. This study assessed the magnitude and correlates of vote-buying crime reports during the 2006 elections in Mexico. It made use of the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) survey on the Protection of Federal Social Programs of 2006 (ENAPP). Results showed that 8.8% of the survey respondents nationwide who were not beneficiaries of any federal social program reported to have been offered something in exchange of their vote, that is, a vote-buying crime under the legislation of Mexico. Ordinal logistic regression showed five independent correlates of vote-buying crime reports: Years of schooling, Indian language speaking, municipal marginality, population size, and PRD versus PAN governed municipalities. The paper discusses the reasons and consequences by suggesting other aspects to consider for future research. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Can institutions that are designed to improve minority representation also have an effect on electoral competition? We address this question by examining how minority-concentrated districts (MCDs)-designed to empower indigenous populations-affected minority participation and party competition in Mexico. Using an original dataset and a matching design that helps alleviate causal inference problems inherent to observational studies, we find that MCDs had no effect on minority participation but enhanced electoral competition. Field-research reveals that MCDs weakened one-party dominance by assembling minority voting blocs that were amenable to opposition-party appeals. More broadly, our results suggest that the mobilization of minority voting blocs can promote electoral competition in transitional democracies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Much has been said theoretically about whether populism corrects the limitations of democracies, or instead damages their foundations. Yet we still know very little about how populist governments affect democratic policymaking in practice. Taking the classic policy cycle approach as a heuristic device, this article analyzes how populists influence agenda-setting, policy formulation and design, implementation, evaluation, and termination processes. Using a variety of sources, the article provides a qualitative in-depth analysis of the Mexican case during the first half of president Andrés-Manuel López-Obrador administration. The article shows that a populist government may fulfill some of its promises, but it ultimately materializes most of its perils, causing significant policy, institutional, and social damage. Populists introduce important distortions in each one of the policy stages and thus alter considerably the policymaking processes usually associated with democratic regimes. They employ a variety of strategies to limit the number of policy actors taking part in agenda-setting and evaluation exercises; formulate ineffective policy tools based on questionable design assumptions; develop personalistic implementation channels prone to patronage and clientelism; undermine the value of evidence-based analyses and discussions; and terminate institutions and programs on a discretionary basis. By exerting a rhetorical monopoly over the 'will of the people,' populists can follow policymaking patterns that significantly depart from the technical, rational, and pluralistic standards commonly associated with democratic policymaking. The article brings together debates on populism and policymaking, and studies a national case which has received limited scholarly attention, thus adding to both our theoretical and empirical contemporary understanding on this subject. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Zapatista Army of National Liberation (EZLN) has consistently defied popular expectations of guerrilla struggle. On January 1, 1994, EZLN soldiers used armed means to capture temporarily Chiapas major urban centers. Since that initial uprising, the EZLN has not launched any military offensives, and has instead struggled to mobilize civil society Defying expectations of rigidity and violence, the Zapatistas embraced pluralism, eschewed Marxist rhetoric, maintained a relatively horizontal organizational structure, and even introduced a revolutionary law on women. They demanded democracy yet steadfastly refused to turn in their arms. At the same time, FZLN members have not acquired any new weapons since the cease-fire, but have instead used their resources to alleviate poverty in the indigenous communities. The paradox of armed rebels fighting for democracy was exemplified at the National Democratic Convention (CND) that the Zapatisi as hosted in August 1994 in the heart of the Lacandon rainforest.

During the debt crisis of the 1980s, new democratic governments in Argentina and Brazil experimented with heterodox approaches to economic stabilization, whereas Mexico's dominant party regime adopted a far more orthodox line of adjustment. None of these approaches had led to a sustained recovery by the end of the decade. Difference in policy choices are attributable to goals and beliefs of top decision making officials and to the way the institutional features of their respective political regimes structured time horizons and vulnerability to domestic distributive pressures. Converging economic outcomes are attributable to underlying structural problems that cut across these distinctions: political constraints on the management of fiscal deficits, and international power asymmetries impeding significant reductions in the external debt burden. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]