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This article examines the role of a subset of European militaries in responding to the Afghan insurgency during their deployment as part of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). While part of a multinational coalition, their heterogeneous military transformation was crucial to fighting the insurrection and confronting American pressure. In comparing the counterinsurgency innovations of Germany, Sweden, and France, we find that Germany acted reluctantly, Sweden largely emulated American doctrine, and France became a counterinsurgency pioneer. We argue that these developments took time and were accompanied by conflicts within ISAF and between the respective national military and political leaderships. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

After regaining independence in 1918, Poland faced many fundamental and strategic challenges. One of them was the issue of border crossings on the German-Polish border in Silesia. It was a region dominated by modern heavy industry, to which both the modern states laid claim. The course of the border was to be decided by a plebiscite, but the parties to the conflict resorted to violence and military means. In a complicated international situation and without the possibility of open military intervention, Poland effectively used the strategic tool of special operations – known more widely today as unconventional warfare. Thanks to their skillful application, the German military advantage was effectively eliminated and strategic goals were achieved. Poles effectively cut lines of communication, making it impossible to support pro-German organizations in Silesia, and successfully organized insurgent forces that achieved the goals important for Poland's development policy. This paper tells the story of a special mission unit called the Destruction Group 'Wawelberg' and its use as a tool for implementing the state policy of unconventional warfare during the Third Silesian Uprising. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Female intelligence refers to a gender-sensitive perspective in collection planning that not only recognizes women as targets of collection but also considers females as operatives. These considerations become especially relevant in paternalistic cultural contexts, such as Afghanistan. Potential obstacles (e.g., myths) for female intelligence as well as past attempts at implementation (e.g., female engagement teams) are reviewed, before four areas of concern are identified that must be addressed in the future. The analysis is expanded by presenting survey and interview data from a sample of Bundeswehr operatives with human intelligence experience in paternalistic countries. We suggest how to address existing concerns and increase the actionability of field human intelligence units by incorporating females as valuable assets on both sides of the military intelligence collection process. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Turkey requested big and influential military advisory missions against the Russian threat both from Germany in 1913 and America in 1947. Although these missions were charged with revitalising an antiquated armed force to fight a modern war as soon as possible, in reality Turkish leaders saw both missions as the first step towards a comprehensive military alliance against the Russians. The outbreak of the First World War in 1914 and the Korean War in 1950 provided chances to induce Germany and America to agree upon Turkish desires for long-term military alliance. The military missions had to transform themselves and assumed duties other than those originally contemplated. In both cases a snowballing process of growth started in a relatively short time. The inflow of thousands of military personnel, most of whom were independent of the mission command and pursued different objectives, resulted in fragmentation and sometimes anarchy. There were many similarities between the experiences of both missions. They both suffered from ignorance, insensitivity, and cultural prejudices due to their poor linguistic and cultural preparation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

On 27 June 1941 Hungary entered the war against the Soviet Union, fielding a 90,000-man strong force (consisting of the 'Carpathian Group' and the 'Rapid Corps') that was attached to Army Group South. This study examines two issues related to the participation of Hungarian troops in 1941. First it establishes how the subordination to Germany determined the use of Hungarian formations. A close Hungarian-German military cooperation developed prior to Operation Barbarossa, especially during the campaign against Yugoslavia in April 1941. The Rapid Corps and the Carpathian Group were placed under German subordination in July-August 1941. It led to friction as Hungary, which in the interwar period had prepared for a war against small and medium-sized neighbouring powers, was pressured to conduct operations against the much more advanced Red Army. Satisfying German demands provoked constant controversy about the extent of the Hungarian involvement in the operations on the Eastern Front, also within the Hungarian military elite. Due to these differences of opinion, the pro-German general Henrik Werth was relieved as the Chief of the General Staff in September 1941, and Lieutenant General Ferenc Szombathelyi was appointed in his place. The study then examines the first months of the Hungarian occupation of Soviet territories. In the summer of 1941, a unique opportunity presented itself to establish an independent Hungarian occupation administration. The Hungarian government tried to use this opportunity to implement its anti-Semitic plans and to enforce its economic interests. However, the Carpathian Group, which from August 1941 was incorporated into the German military command structure, increasingly became the executor of German occupation policy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Yet the fact that the defeat of Nazi Germany could only be achieved at the expense of millions of anonymous workers from east of the Urals has been all but ignored not only by Western audiences but even in the official Soviet (and later Russian) narrative of the war. Operation I Barbarossa i , Nazi Germany's attack on the Soviet Union on 22 June 1941, is without a doubt one of the most momentous events of the 20th century. They considered the war they fought a continuation of the 1939/40 Winter War, rather than a new war that was fully in line with Germany's aims. [Extracted from the article]

As early as 1931, Gustave Bertrand of the French intelligence services received from the traitor Hans Thilo Schmidt documents concerning the Enigma cipher machine. This machine was intended to equip all the German military forces. This is the beginning of an epic that has probably changed the History. The main documents collected by Bertrand have not been destroyed and are available in the archives of the French Army (SHD). This article describes and analyzes each of these documents, including the evolution of the Enigma and its procedures related in these documents. In conclusion, the article lists the findings that come from reading these originals and first and foremost the impact of having a cipher message with its plaintext on the British attempt to recover Enigma rotors wiring. Oddly enough, it seems that this message was not used by the Poles to break the Enigma. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines the capacity of the German Army to establish key conditions for successful tactical- and operational-level adaptation, innovation and emulation. In doing so, it explores the factors which stimulate and block adaptation, innovation and emulation. The article points to the need for accounts of German foreign, defence and security policy to pay greater attention to the intra-organisational barriers to effective policy implementation. Finally, it highlights avenues for future empirical and theoretical research on military change, especially the need for greater understanding of the role of learning processes in linking military adaptation in the field to wider organisational learning. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The following article explores the collective identifications (or self-perceptions) among members of the Danish-speaking minority in the Imperial German Army during the First World War, including views on German conscription and military service. Danish historians have traditionally portrayed the minority as soldiers who only served with reluctance, hoping for German defeat in the war and a 'reunification' between their home-region, North Schleswig, and the State of Denmark. However, the vast majority of Danish-speakers were well integrated in the German army and served as reliable soldiers throughout the course of the war. At first glance, this seems to constitute a contradiction, but this article will illustrate how members of the Danish minority, in order to serve as loyal soldiers, on the one hand reconciled ideas of both Danish and regional affiliation, as well as ancestral loyalty and civic rights, with feelings of coercion, discrimination and German enmity on the other. Furthermore, feelings of obligation, responsibility and civic duty was also connected with German military service. It will be argued that the key to understand the sometimes-contradictory self-perceptions of the Danish minority soldiers lays in how many-sided understandings of community encased or negotiated feelings of reluctance. If the war experiences of the Danish-speaking minority are viewed in a purely national perspective, it become difficult to explain the various forms of self-perception present in the source material: For instance, German military service could be justified as a way to secure Danish interests regionally within the German state, and a way to improve civic rights for the minority group. In this way, the self-perceptions of a minority soldiers could be Danish in terms of national affiliation, but to a high degree collective 'identity' also had the regional community at its centre. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Germany was the first Western nation to formally implement an object designed to assist with the identification of wounded and dead soldiers, introducing theRekognitionmarke in 1869 following the trial of an identity disc system in 1866. A new design, the Erkennungsmarke, was introduced in 1878, shaping the systems utilized in later wars. The German experience of wearing identifying objects would later influence the identification systems of other European armies, including France and Britain; ultimately resulting in the addition of new articles within the 1906 Geneva Convention to reflect changing attitudes and expectations towards those who died fighting for their country. The Erkennungsmarke presented the possibility of identification, even where immediate burial was not possible, thus facilitating the development of German military burial cultures. This paper explores the development and use of Erkennungsmarken between 1866–1918, information which can assist with the identification of German soldiers recovered during archaeological works. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Der vorliegende Beitrag behandelt die aktuelle deutschsprachige Kriegs- und Heimkehrerliteratur, wie sie insbesondere in der Folge des Afghanistan- und Irakkrieges entstanden ist. Der Einsatz der US-Armee (Irakkrieg) und der Bundeswehr (Afghanistankrieg) wird zum neuen Erzählstoff. Deutschsprachige Autoren schreiben nach langer Abwesenheit des Genres in der Literatur erneut Heimkehrromane. Damit bringen sie Irritationen in gesellschaftliche und politische Systeme und hinterfragen verbindliche Toleranzvorstellungen. In den theoretischen Mittelpunkt des Artikels wird die Denkfigur der 'ontologischen Unsicherheit' gestellt. Die Daseinserfahrung der Figuren der analysierten Romane ist durch die Empfindung permanenter Angst und das Gefühl des ständigen Bedrohtseins gekennzeichnet. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Following the end of World War II the U.S. Army Map Service distributed maps captured from the German military to research libraries across the United States, where they have remained largely hidden collections. One focus of the University of California Berkeley's German World War II captured maps digitization project has been the creation of detailed metadata for the German military map series. Data-rich catalog records with information about source maps and the need to do authority work for related corporate bodies provided entry points for exploring issues of provenance. The topographic map series that make up the bulk of this collection reflect the fragmentary nature of German cartographic history, with varying contributing corporate bodies, diverse source material, and a range of sophistication and technique. All of these characteristics evolved between 1936 and 1945 when the Nazi regime ramped up production of military maps. The authors make the case that it is worth the time and effort for libraries to invest in creating rich bibliographic descriptions for these map series. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Which organisational activities promote effective military emulation? Which variables facilitate and impede the emergence of these activities? Drawing upon the academic literatures on military change and management studies, as well as semi-structured interviews within the British and German militaries, this article identifies five key organisational activities which promote effective inter-organisational doctrinal learning. In doing so, the article improves understanding of the contribution that management studies can make to multi-disciplinary scholarship on military learning. The article examines the variables which facilitate the emergence of activities which support effective inter-organisational doctrinal learning through a case study of Bundeswehr doctrinal absorptive capacity during ISAF. It also explores the impact of these activities on doctrine development. The article demonstrates the crucial importance of active and well-informed civilian oversight of the activities which support military learning. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

During World War I, African colonial soldiers (askari) of the Schutztruppe für Deutsch Ostafrika fought a difficult campaign in German East Africa. In November 1918, they surrendered to the British alongside their commander, General Paul von Lettow-Vorbeck. Within a few months, their German officers had left East Africa to return to Germany. Most of the ex-askari found it difficult to make new lives for themselves in Tanganyika, as the former Germany colony came to be known in 1920. In British Mandate Tanganyika, the ex-askari had limited options for making a living commensurate with the status they had occupied before the war. Their paths through British colonial rule from 1918 to 1961, when Tanganyika became independent, took different forms. This article charts some of these paths in order to place the African veterans of the Schutztruppe alongside the experiences of other Black veterans of the First World War, whose responses to postwar indignities led them to radicalize. That African Schutztruppe veterans did not become radicals raises intriguing questions about the factors that shaped military veterans' politics after the First World War, and through the next five decades of the twentieth century. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

'Without doubt, this is the right book at exactly the right time! Despite COVID's media predominance, the dangers to our freedom have not simply faded away; quite the opposite. With their novel analysis piercing through the layers of Germany's strategic wavering, Giegerich and Terhalle demonstrate precisely that. For anyone aiming at taking over executive responsibility for Berlin's foreign and security policy after the federal elections in September 2021, this is a must-read.' Friedrich Merz, Member of the German Bundestag (1994-2009), Chief Whip and Minority Leader (2000-02) and member of the CDU/CSU Government Team for the 2021 federal elections 'This is an in-depth study of a crucial topic. Well-argued and well-researched, this book offers an original take on a timely and important subject with broad implications for the future of European and transatlantic security.' Dr Benedetta Berti, Head of Policy Planning, Office of the Secretary-General, NATO The rise or resurgence of revisionist, repressive and authoritarian powers threatens the Western, US-led international order upon which Germany's post-war security and prosperity were founded. With Washington increasingly focused on China's rise in Asia, Europe must be able to defend itself against Russia, and will depend upon German military capabilities to do so. Years of neglect and structural underfunding, however, have hollowed out Germany's armed forces. Much of the political leadership in Berlin has not yet adjusted to new realities or appreciated the urgency with which it needs to do so. In this Adelphi book, Bastian Giegerich and Maximilian Terhalle argue that Germany's current strategic culture is inadequate. It informs a security policy that fails to meet contemporary strategic challenges, thereby endangering Berlin's European allies, the Western order and Germany itself. They contend that Germany should embrace its historic responsibility to defend Western liberal values and the Western order that upholds them. Rather than dogmatically reject the use of military force, Germany should wed its commitment to liberal values to an understanding of the role of power - including military power - in international affairs. Giegerich and Terhalle show why Germany should seek to foster a strategic culture that would be compatible with those of other leading Western nations and allow Germans to perceive the world through a strategic lens. In doing so, they also outline possible elements of a new security policy. Dr Bastian Giegerich is Director of Defence and Military Analysis at the IISS. He previously worked for the German Federal Ministry of Defence in research and policy roles and is the author and editor of several books on European security and defence matters. Professor Maximilian Terhalle is affiliated with King's College London. Between 2019 and 2020, he served as Senior Adviser to the UK's Ministry of Defence. Previously, he taught at Columbia and Yale universities' security programmes and undertook field work in China and Egypt. His work focuses on hard security, strategy and world order; he has written or edited seven books and published widely in international newspapers and journals. He is a Lieutenant Colonel (res.) in the Bundeswehr. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

'Without doubt, this is the right book at exactly the right time! Despite COVID's media predominance, the dangers to our freedom have not simply faded away; quite the opposite. With their novel analysis piercing through the layers of Germany's strategic wavering, Giegerich and Terhalle demonstrate precisely that. For anyone aiming at taking over executive responsibility for Berlin's foreign and security policy after the federal elections in September 2021, this is a must-read.' Friedrich Merz, Member of the German Bundestag (1994-2009), Chief Whip and Minority Leader (2000-02) and member of the CDU/CSU Government Team for the 2021 federal elections 'This is an in-depth study of a crucial topic. Well-argued and well-researched, this book offers an original take on a timely and important subject with broad implications for the future of European and transatlantic security.' Dr Benedetta Berti, Head of Policy Planning, Office of the Secretary-General, NATO The rise or resurgence of revisionist, repressive and authoritarian powers threatens the Western, US-led international order upon which Germany's post-war security and prosperity were founded. With Washington increasingly focused on China's rise in Asia, Europe must be able to defend itself against Russia, and will depend upon German military capabilities to do so. Years of neglect and structural underfunding, however, have hollowed out Germany's armed forces. Much of the political leadership in Berlin has not yet adjusted to new realities or appreciated the urgency with which it needs to do so. In this Adelphi book, Bastian Giegerich and Maximilian Terhalle argue that Germany's current strategic culture is inadequate. It informs a security policy that fails to meet contemporary strategic challenges, thereby endangering Berlin's European allies, the Western order and Germany itself. They contend that Germany should embrace its historic responsibility to defend Western liberal values and the Western order that upholds them. Rather than dogmatically reject the use of military force, Germany should wed its commitment to liberal values to an understanding of the role of power - including military power - in international affairs. Giegerich and Terhalle show why Germany should seek to foster a strategic culture that would be compatible with those of other leading Western nations and allow Germans to perceive the world through a strategic lens. In doing so, they also outline possible elements of a new security policy. Dr Bastian Giegerich is Director of Defence and Military Analysis at the IISS. He previously worked for the German Federal Ministry of Defence in research and policy roles and is the author and editor of several books on European security and defence matters. Professor Maximilian Terhalle is affiliated with King's College London. Between 2019 and 2020, he served as Senior Adviser to the UK's Ministry of Defence. Previously, he taught at Columbia and Yale universities' security programmes and undertook field work in China and Egypt. His work focuses on hard security, strategy and world order; he has written or edited seven books and published widely in international newspapers and journals. He is a Lieutenant Colonel (res.) in the Bundeswehr. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

'Without doubt, this is the right book at exactly the right time! Despite COVID's media predominance, the dangers to our freedom have not simply faded away; quite the opposite. With their novel analysis piercing through the layers of Germany's strategic wavering, Giegerich and Terhalle demonstrate precisely that. For anyone aiming at taking over executive responsibility for Berlin's foreign and security policy after the federal elections in September 2021, this is a must-read.' Friedrich Merz, Member of the German Bundestag (1994-2009), Chief Whip and Minority Leader (2000-02) and member of the CDU/CSU Government Team for the 2021 federal elections 'This is an in-depth study of a crucial topic. Well-argued and well-researched, this book offers an original take on a timely and important subject with broad implications for the future of European and transatlantic security.' Dr Benedetta Berti, Head of Policy Planning, Office of the Secretary-General, NATO The rise or resurgence of revisionist, repressive and authoritarian powers threatens the Western, US-led international order upon which Germany's post-war security and prosperity were founded. With Washington increasingly focused on China's rise in Asia, Europe must be able to defend itself against Russia, and will depend upon German military capabilities to do so. Years of neglect and structural underfunding, however, have hollowed out Germany's armed forces. Much of the political leadership in Berlin has not yet adjusted to new realities or appreciated the urgency with which it needs to do so. In this Adelphi book, Bastian Giegerich and Maximilian Terhalle argue that Germany's current strategic culture is inadequate. It informs a security policy that fails to meet contemporary strategic challenges, thereby endangering Berlin's European allies, the Western order and Germany itself. They contend that Germany should embrace its historic responsibility to defend Western liberal values and the Western order that upholds them. Rather than dogmatically reject the use of military force, Germany should wed its commitment to liberal values to an understanding of the role of power - including military power - in international affairs. Giegerich and Terhalle show why Germany should seek to foster a strategic culture that would be compatible with those of other leading Western nations and allow Germans to perceive the world through a strategic lens. In doing so, they also outline possible elements of a new security policy. Dr Bastian Giegerich is Director of Defence and Military Analysis at the IISS. He previously worked for the German Federal Ministry of Defence in research and policy roles and is the author and editor of several books on European security and defence matters. Professor Maximilian Terhalle is affiliated with King's College London. Between 2019 and 2020, he served as Senior Adviser to the UK's Ministry of Defence. Previously, he taught at Columbia and Yale universities' security programmes and undertook field work in China and Egypt. His work focuses on hard security, strategy and world order; he has written or edited seven books and published widely in international newspapers and journals. He is a Lieutenant Colonel (res.) in the Bundeswehr. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

'Without doubt, this is the right book at exactly the right time! Despite COVID's media predominance, the dangers to our freedom have not simply faded away; quite the opposite. With their novel analysis piercing through the layers of Germany's strategic wavering, Giegerich and Terhalle demonstrate precisely that. For anyone aiming at taking over executive responsibility for Berlin's foreign and security policy after the federal elections in September 2021, this is a must-read.' Friedrich Merz, Member of the German Bundestag (1994-2009), Chief Whip and Minority Leader (2000-02) and member of the CDU/CSU Government Team for the 2021 federal elections 'This is an in-depth study of a crucial topic. Well-argued and well-researched, this book offers an original take on a timely and important subject with broad implications for the future of European and transatlantic security.' Dr Benedetta Berti, Head of Policy Planning, Office of the Secretary-General, NATO The rise or resurgence of revisionist, repressive and authoritarian powers threatens the Western, US-led international order upon which Germany's post-war security and prosperity were founded. With Washington increasingly focused on China's rise in Asia, Europe must be able to defend itself against Russia, and will depend upon German military capabilities to do so. Years of neglect and structural underfunding, however, have hollowed out Germany's armed forces. Much of the political leadership in Berlin has not yet adjusted to new realities or appreciated the urgency with which it needs to do so. In this Adelphi book, Bastian Giegerich and Maximilian Terhalle argue that Germany's current strategic culture is inadequate. It informs a security policy that fails to meet contemporary strategic challenges, thereby endangering Berlin's European allies, the Western order and Germany itself. They contend that Germany should embrace its historic responsibility to defend Western liberal values and the Western order that upholds them. Rather than dogmatically reject the use of military force, Germany should wed its commitment to liberal values to an understanding of the role of power - including military power - in international affairs. Giegerich and Terhalle show why Germany should seek to foster a strategic culture that would be compatible with those of other leading Western nations and allow Germans to perceive the world through a strategic lens. In doing so, they also outline possible elements of a new security policy. Dr Bastian Giegerich is Director of Defence and Military Analysis at the IISS. He previously worked for the German Federal Ministry of Defence in research and policy roles and is the author and editor of several books on European security and defence matters. Professor Maximilian Terhalle is affiliated with King's College London. Between 2019 and 2020, he served as Senior Adviser to the UK's Ministry of Defence. Previously, he taught at Columbia and Yale universities' security programmes and undertook field work in China and Egypt. His work focuses on hard security, strategy and world order; he has written or edited seven books and published widely in international newspapers and journals. He is a Lieutenant Colonel (res.) in the Bundeswehr. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

'Without doubt, this is the right book at exactly the right time! Despite COVID's media predominance, the dangers to our freedom have not simply faded away; quite the opposite. With their novel analysis piercing through the layers of Germany's strategic wavering, Giegerich and Terhalle demonstrate precisely that. For anyone aiming at taking over executive responsibility for Berlin's foreign and security policy after the federal elections in September 2021, this is a must-read.' Friedrich Merz, Member of the German Bundestag (1994-2009), Chief Whip and Minority Leader (2000-02) and member of the CDU/CSU Government Team for the 2021 federal elections 'This is an in-depth study of a crucial topic. Well-argued and well-researched, this book offers an original take on a timely and important subject with broad implications for the future of European and transatlantic security.' Dr Benedetta Berti, Head of Policy Planning, Office of the Secretary-General, NATO The rise or resurgence of revisionist, repressive and authoritarian powers threatens the Western, US-led international order upon which Germany's post-war security and prosperity were founded. With Washington increasingly focused on China's rise in Asia, Europe must be able to defend itself against Russia, and will depend upon German military capabilities to do so. Years of neglect and structural underfunding, however, have hollowed out Germany's armed forces. Much of the political leadership in Berlin has not yet adjusted to new realities or appreciated the urgency with which it needs to do so. In this Adelphi book, Bastian Giegerich and Maximilian Terhalle argue that Germany's current strategic culture is inadequate. It informs a security policy that fails to meet contemporary strategic challenges, thereby endangering Berlin's European allies, the Western order and Germany itself. They contend that Germany should embrace its historic responsibility to defend Western liberal values and the Western order that upholds them. Rather than dogmatically reject the use of military force, Germany should wed its commitment to liberal values to an understanding of the role of power - including military power - in international affairs. Giegerich and Terhalle show why Germany should seek to foster a strategic culture that would be compatible with those of other leading Western nations and allow Germans to perceive the world through a strategic lens. In doing so, they also outline possible elements of a new security policy. Dr Bastian Giegerich is Director of Defence and Military Analysis at the IISS. He previously worked for the German Federal Ministry of Defence in research and policy roles and is the author and editor of several books on European security and defence matters. Professor Maximilian Terhalle is affiliated with King's College London. Between 2019 and 2020, he served as Senior Adviser to the UK's Ministry of Defence. Previously, he taught at Columbia and Yale universities' security programmes and undertook field work in China and Egypt. His work focuses on hard security, strategy and world order; he has written or edited seven books and published widely in international newspapers and journals. He is a Lieutenant Colonel (res.) in the Bundeswehr. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

'Without doubt, this is the right book at exactly the right time! Despite COVID's media predominance, the dangers to our freedom have not simply faded away; quite the opposite. With their novel analysis piercing through the layers of Germany's strategic wavering, Giegerich and Terhalle demonstrate precisely that. For anyone aiming at taking over executive responsibility for Berlin's foreign and security policy after the federal elections in September 2021, this is a must-read.' Friedrich Merz, Member of the German Bundestag (1994-2009), Chief Whip and Minority Leader (2000-02) and member of the CDU/CSU Government Team for the 2021 federal elections 'This is an in-depth study of a crucial topic. Well-argued and well-researched, this book offers an original take on a timely and important subject with broad implications for the future of European and transatlantic security.' Dr Benedetta Berti, Head of Policy Planning, Office of the Secretary-General, NATO The rise or resurgence of revisionist, repressive and authoritarian powers threatens the Western, US-led international order upon which Germany's post-war security and prosperity were founded. With Washington increasingly focused on China's rise in Asia, Europe must be able to defend itself against Russia, and will depend upon German military capabilities to do so. Years of neglect and structural underfunding, however, have hollowed out Germany's armed forces. Much of the political leadership in Berlin has not yet adjusted to new realities or appreciated the urgency with which it needs to do so. In this Adelphi book, Bastian Giegerich and Maximilian Terhalle argue that Germany's current strategic culture is inadequate. It informs a security policy that fails to meet contemporary strategic challenges, thereby endangering Berlin's European allies, the Western order and Germany itself. They contend that Germany should embrace its historic responsibility to defend Western liberal values and the Western order that upholds them. Rather than dogmatically reject the use of military force, Germany should wed its commitment to liberal values to an understanding of the role of power - including military power - in international affairs. Giegerich and Terhalle show why Germany should seek to foster a strategic culture that would be compatible with those of other leading Western nations and allow Germans to perceive the world through a strategic lens. In doing so, they also outline possible elements of a new security policy. Dr Bastian Giegerich is Director of Defence and Military Analysis at the IISS. He previously worked for the German Federal Ministry of Defence in research and policy roles and is the author and editor of several books on European security and defence matters. Professor Maximilian Terhalle is affiliated with King's College London. Between 2019 and 2020, he served as Senior Adviser to the UK's Ministry of Defence. Previously, he taught at Columbia and Yale universities' security programmes and undertook field work in China and Egypt. His work focuses on hard security, strategy and world order; he has written or edited seven books and published widely in international newspapers and journals. He is a Lieutenant Colonel (res.) in the Bundeswehr. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Between 1914 and 1918, the German army occupied Belgium and large parts of France. One important feature of the occupation was the gender imbalance and, as such, these French and Belgian territories were often the theatre of encounters between the occupation soldiers and local women. Intimate relationships among them were not uncommon: one can find comments about them in two thirds of the diaries kept by people living under the German occupation. This article is based on the analysis of a corpus of 110 such diaries, revealing the way people perceived and judged these relations, but also the variations in this perception, geographical, chronological, social or gendered. Some of these diaries – especially when written by young women – also provide clues about different aspects (like harassment or occupation languor) of the 'psychological soil' in which these relations could emerge. In occupied France and Belgium most people considered these relationships to be appalling from a patriotic and moral point of view, and their sheer number was viewed as a concern, but some diarists tried to understand the origins of the phenomenon. The different interpretations suggested explanations such as gender, class, age, education, the length of the conflict or misery, but rarely demonstrated empathy for those who were called 'femmes à Boches' ('women for the Huns'). Prostitution flourished from the start of the occupation and was completely at odds with the standards emanating from the "occupied war culture". This rise provoked an outcry and disgust among the population: its expansion and its association with the occupier inflamed its visibility in public space, making it partly inhospitable to the occupied people. Weddings, in contrast, were extremely rare, and only reported in a few diaries. This quasi absence of formalized relations did not prevent the birth of numerous children born to a French or Belgian woman and a German soldier. These babies were generally officially recorded as having an 'unknown father' and were not welcome in the community, despite the anxieties generated by a drop in the birth rate during the occupation period. With the rise in sexual encounters between occupation soldiers and local women, venereal diseases became a common concern to both the occupiers and those occupied. During the first winter of the occupation, measures were taken by the German and local authorities to try to stop the spread of sexually transmitted diseases. Centers specialized in the (forced) treatment of women infected by venereal disease were created by the occupying authorities. These centers were sometimes nicknamed 'parc à poules' ('chicken parks') by the occupied population, ashamed of their very existence, but eager to see the 'purification' of the public space through the arrest of prostitutes and infected women. All in all, the various forms of intimate relationships were more often reported in the Operations- und Etappengebiet, close to the front, than on the territory of the general-government, where the density of the German presence was lower. But everywhere, these relationships – generally regarded as venal sexuality – aroused animosity and led to these women being ostracised. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Cossack displaced persons who were re-settled in Australia as part of the post-war International Refugee Organisation scheme had already survived several turbulent eras. Anti-Bolshevik Cossacks refashioned their identities in the post-Civil War period as Russian émigrés and then, during the Second World War, as anti-Soviet collaborators of the Germany Army. At war’s end these Cossacks were rounded up by the British and handed to the Soviets. This paper traces the traumatic (and opportunistic) migration trajectory of one Cossack family, who escaped forced repatriations to become ‘New Australians’. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Cossack displaced persons who were re-settled in Australia as part of the post-war International Refugee Organisation scheme had already survived several turbulent eras. Anti-Bolshevik Cossacks refashioned their identities in the post-Civil War period as Russian émigrés and then, during the Second World War, as anti-Soviet collaborators of the Germany Army. At war’s end these Cossacks were rounded up by the British and handed to the Soviets. This paper traces the traumatic (and opportunistic) migration trajectory of one Cossack family, who escaped forced repatriations to become ‘New Australians’. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

There are still a lot fewer academically sound studies German military leaders in World War I compared to those in World War II. Against this backdrop, the German Army, including the Army Group Crown Prince Rupprecht, maintained flexibility and innovation capacity through a diverse and open exchange of experiences, despite increasing control on all command levels. Jonathan Boff's biography on the Bavarian heir to the throne, Crown Prince Rupprecht, one of the most famous German military leaders in World War I, can thus be regarded as an important contribution closing this research gap. [Extracted from the article]

Humanitarian operations may pose challenges to which armed forces prepared for warfighting seem rather ill-equipped. It is the aim of this article to examine in what way military ethics should be adapted to humanitarian tasks. Two ideal types of military ethics are defined here: warfighting and humanitarian. The warfighting ethic is supposed to maximise the utility of the military in war and combat and to that end utilises the virtues of loyalty and honour. In contrast, humanitarian obligations require to a larger extent the development of personal integrity and an ability to follow one's own conscience. The adaptation of military ethics is demonstrated in the case studies of the UK armed forces and the German Bundeswehr. Whereas the moral code of the UK armed forces remains anchored in the principles of the warfighting ethic, the case of the Bundeswehr presents a military ethic closely approximating the humanitarian ideal type. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The myth of the German mechanical juggernaut crushing a medieval Polish army has been repeatedly deconstructed. Elements of the myth are prima facie false, and others seen at first blush as factual are, with closer reading, products of propaganda, faulty intelligence, or intellectual prejudice. Soldiers rely on the victor’s delusion to keep their morale high, and wartime statesmen use mythos and delusion to shift blame, explain away inaction, and keep the public committed to final victory. Historians have no need of the myth, yet they perpetuate the meme and accept a simplistic version of events over a far more complex actuality. This article reexamines the myth using new research, examines why historians succumb to the romance of the myth, and critiques the implicit ramifications for the historical discipline. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

During the first half of the twentieth century, the river Rhine constituted the key source of insecurity between France and Germany. Contemporary observers have claimed that the river lost this role in the 1950s due to the dynamics of Franco-German rapprochement and the emergence of the European Coal and Steel Community. This article tries to complicate this story in three steps. First, it shifts attention from early European integration to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and its role in the desecuritisation of the Rhine. Subsequently, it discusses the river’s loss of strategic significance in West Germany due to the particularities of post-war statehood and the country’s idiosyncratic geopolitics. Finally, the article argues that it was only the development of an independent French nuclear deterrent capacity between 1966 and 1972 that ultimately took the boundary from France’s geopolitical map. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Russia’s challenge to the post-cold war order, and the rise of Islamic State have resulted in a call for increased military spending among NATO members. Despite the increased demand for UN peace operations, any expansion is unlikely to benefit the world organisation. Instead we see an increasing reliance upon regional organisations like the African Union, European Union and NATO, in particular, for robust peace operations. An analysis of Western states (France, Germany and the USA) suggests that future investments in weaponry, technology and staff will primarily benefit NATO and the EU, but not the United Nations. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This article takes camouflage as an example in considering the First World War as a conflict that fundamentally transformed the conduct and face of the military, ultimately witnessing the breakthrough of modern warfare. The war was shaped by the large-scale implementation of technology and a permanent reassessment of tactics. Already contemporaries shared the view that these developments signified something new that distinguished this war from all other previous wars and thus made it modern. Camouflage tactics are an example of the influence of modernity on the military as they were premised upon scientific principles and were created on the basis of contemporary technology and tactics. Camouflage tactics were an object of continuous reconsideration throughout the conflict. While working on positions, aerial photographs were taken to test the effectiveness of their camouflage. By examining camouflage, the paper argues that the First World War was a caesura, as it saw a large-scale implementation of camouflage which fundamentally changed the appearance of the armies and their tactical layout. The article deals with the three principles of camouflage: to render invisible, to obscure and to feign. The First World War, which can be labelled a scout war, made it necessary to make entire armies and their infrastructure vanish in the field. Due to their inferiority on the Western Front since 1915, the German Army was under intense pressure to quickly develop efficient and innovative camouflage techniques. But it remains clear that perfect camouflage could rarely be realized in the actual conditions of war. Rather than concentrating on soldiers whose trenches already provided adequate cover, camouflage mainly focused on military positions such as artillery emplacements, equipment and infrastructure which were highly immobile and hard to replace if lost. During the war, camouflage featured on an unforeseen scale and became everyday practice on the front line as early as 1916. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The article provides a comparison of the various military commitments, armed forces levels and military defence expenditures of various countries such as the U.S., Germany, and Russia as of February 2015. Selected non-state armed groups are mentioned, including the Kurdistan Regional Government's Peshmerga forces, the Boko Haram militant group, and the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham terrorist organization. Defence spending statistics for Great Britain, Turkey, and Japan are assessed.

The German armed forces are undergoing an unprecedented reform whose revolutionary nature has so far been poorly understood internationally. Bjoern Seibert explains the context, goals and process that led to the reform, analyses the political debate that surrounded it, and lays out the details of what is the most far-reaching reform effort since the end of the Cold War. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Despite several post-Cold War reforms which have promised far-reaching change, the Bundeswehr faces a set of deficits in force structures, capabilities, doctrines and military adaptation, which leave it in danger of slipping permanently behind its European partners. The study examines the extent to which reforms proposed by the Commission on Structural Reform of the Bundeswehr will remedy these deficiencies. It finds that the proposals of the Commission include several important measures which will accelerate German convergence with the reforms of its European partners. However, the Commission fails to address several fundamental problems which impair the Bundeswehr's capacity to adapt to ongoing operations. The article critically engages with the existing theoretical literature on German defence policy and highlights the utility of neoclassical realism in explaining the process and outcome of German defence reform. The study also points to the urgent requirement for further comparative scholarship on post-Cold War European military adaptation and civil–military relations in defence planning. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The article examines the military doctrine and capabilities of the German Armed Forces, known as the Bundeswehr, in the 21st century. The author argues that the lack of autonomy offered to German military officers gives incentive to civilian government officials to interfere with military functions and impedes Germany's ability to launch full-scale military operations and adequately participate in alliances such as the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan. The author also states that the Bundeswehr has asserted greater tactical and operational abilities by emulating the defense reforms initiated by the armed forces of the U.S. and other European countries in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).

The impact of tanks and mechanization on military thought and images of war during the 1920s is generally acknowledged. This article examines the context, both before the Great War and after, of German imagery of battle, and argues that this tended to privilege the moral dimensions of military conduct and behaviour even as commentators grappled with the implications of 'machine age' warfare. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses regional security issues in Europe and surveys the military strategies and capabilities of various European nations including German, France, and Albania. Coverage includes both members and non-members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Discussion is augmented by charts and tabular data that provide the manpower, organization, and equipment for the army, navy, air force, marines, naval aviation, and paramilitary forces of respective nations. Existing deployments of forces are also noted.

The article analyzes the operational conduct of German forces in northern Afghanistan and the making of German strategy in the context of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) since the expansion of the Afghan insurgency to northern Afghanistan in 2007. It is argued that the German contribution to ISAF is characterized by a severe mismatch between politico-strategic planning and decision-making in Berlin on the one hand and operational conduct and requirements on the ground on the other. Since 2007, however, politico-strategic insistence that the German engagement in Afghanistan constitutes a contribution to a post-conflict stabilization and reconstruction effort is steadily eroding. Analysis of German operational conduct in northern Afghanistan makes evident the existing mismatch between strategy and operations, but also reveals that the deterioration of the security situation on the ground has lead to a bottom-up-development of counterinsurgency doctrine, capabilities, institutions, and modus of operandi. Operations have been driving the making of German strategy, not vice-versa, which has severely hampered German efforts to counter insurgents' progress in the north of Afghanistan. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on the recruitment and deployment of colonial troops from Africa and Asia during the first World War. The "Schutztruppen," consisting of German officers such as Paul von Lettow-Vorbeck and African soldiers, used a guerrilla strategy on the east African war front. British African troops fought in Africa and the Middle East. France deployed significant numbers of African troops on the European front line. Transcontinental military migration, the theories of martial races and cannon fodder, the recruitment of troops in British colonial India, French recruitment in West Africa, resistance to recruitment in Africa, racist pre-war imagery concerning African and Asian soldiers, and war propaganda are discussed.

Examines the efforts to reform the German Armed Forces or the Bundeswehr from 1990 to 2003. Need for a fundamental realignment of Germany's military structures and capacities; Endeavors to reform characterized by controversy and hampered by financial uncertainties; Existence of a substantial inconsistency between Germany's stated security policy goals and growing openness to use armed forces on the one hand and the Bundeswehr's actual physical material capabilities on the other.

It is common to attribute the operational difficulties faced by post-Napoleonic armies to an increase in defensive firepower. In fact, the immense 'mass armies' of the day also suffered from problems of command, control and information that ultimately worked to their undoing. The German achievement in the interwar period went beyond tanks and aircraft. It also involved harnessing the radio to the service of the field army. Radio made it possible to coordinate mobile masses of men and equipment and to process the huge amounts of information they generated. The smooth flow of information was key to the Wehrmacht's revival of decisive battlefield victory in 1939-40. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Demonstrates the interdependence between doctrine and equipment based on the experience of the French and German armies in 1940. Characteristics of the French doctrine; Primary aim of the French army; Background on the German doctrine.

Examines the role of the German military police in implementing genocidal practices to eradicate Jews in Belorussia during World War II. Stages of targeting the group; Strategies to resolve conflicting interests for slave labor and extermination; Officials involved in the genocide.

Compares three reports commissioned to examine the proposal to bring the German Bundeswehr into an era of crisis prevention and crisis management. State of the German armed forces; Details of the reform proposals of Defense Minister Rudolf Scharping; Analysis of the points of agreement and contention of the reports; Recommendations of the report by former German President Richard von Weizs aumi cker regarding compulsory military service.

Presents the German system of domestic intelligence gathering and reporting, including the ways the military became involved in domestic surveillance. Overview of the 1918 labor unrest in Germany; Recognition of the importance of workers' production to modern warfare; Interest of the military in domestic intelligence; Militarization of German wartime economics and politics.

Examines the recruitment of non-German `Germanic' volunteers by the Nazi Waffen SS prior to the German invasion of the Soviet Union in the context of long-term SS racial and political ambitions. Recruitment of Germanic volunteers; Berger's Waffen SS recruiters; Disadvantage faced by the recruiters.

Cites the `London Daily Telegraph,' November 22, 1993, which said that while many East German weapons were scrapped following reunification of Germany, the East's MiG-29 fighter-bombers were not among them. The MiG-29s were put into service by the Luftwaffe. Comments from Col. Manfred Menge on the planes.

States that the Soviet Union still owes East Germany about a billion marks' worth of weaponry included in contracts that would be nullified by German unification. The East German armed forces, which are about to be dissolved, are the reluctant recipients of a bonanza of Soviet weaponry, as the Soviet Union rushes to collect the equivalent of a billion marks by fulfilling their side of some defense contracts before the agreements are nullified by German unification. But East Germany has no use for most of the weapons on order. According to the London Financial Times (July 31, 1990), the East Germans are stuck with contracts for a list of weapons that include Soviet antitank defense systems, machine guns, and small, missile-equipped boats. The government is also liable for commercial penalties for cancelling other contracts worth 2.3 billion marks. Matthias Gehler, an East German government spokesman, indicated that the high cost of safe disposal is an important factor in the squabble.

The article discusses several facts provided by some nuclear physicists for the public especially that the German Army plans of acquiring atomic weapons. They declared that tactical atomic bombs which are designed not only for human settlements but also to troops in surface have the same destructive power as normal atomic bombs. They shared that there is no limit known to the possibility of increasing the destructive effect on life and property of strategic atomic weapons of which a tactical atomic bomb can destroy a small city. In addition, these scientists feel they are inadequate to propose for the policies of the great powers.