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Results of two retrospective studies suggested that romantic betrayal led to the loss of key aspects of social support from partners, most notably attachment, guidance, and reliable alliance with the partner. Furthermore, specific social provision losses were found to reliably predict recalled and current negative psychological states associated with romantic betrayal. Perceived attachment losses predicted postbetrayal anger and disgust, as well as trauma reactions following betrayal. In addition, a decline in reassurance of one's worth following betrayal predicted embarrassment about the event, and the degree to which reliable alliance with the partner was lost predicted anxiety and shame. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Tests the hypothesis that working memory would predict children's performance on the false belief tasks. Extension of Davis & Pratt's (1995) work on the mechanisms underlying children's developing theories of mind; Working memory as one of the factors that underlie the development of children's theories of mind.

Examines the parallelism between children's mastery of the language of mind and thinking about the word. Measurement of children's mastery of verbs; Absence of direct relation between knowledge of cognitive verbs and reading skill; Relationship between reading skill and the tendency to justify answers by appealing to the text.

Focuses on the comprehension of oral and written discourse among the children through memory and inference. Distinction between pragmatic and propositional inferences; Academic ability of the children; Development of literacy.

This article discusses four questions fundamental to understanding metaphor. First, what is the relation between speakers' intentions, their goals, their beliefs, and their utterances? -or, what's a metaphor? Second, do metaphors have to be recognized as metaphors to be metaphors? - or, when's a metaphor? Third, what is the role of literal meaning in the comprehension of a metaphor?-or, what's not a metaphor? And fourth, what is the intellectual function of metaphor?-or, what's a metaphor for? [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Analyzes the concepts for thinking about talk and thought using the speech act theory. Definition of the metalinguistic and metacognitive concepts; Relation between speech acts and mental states; Factors to tbe considered in learning about mental states and speech acts.

Examines mental skills on the instructional objectives in formal schooling. Indication of cognitive theory of learning; Application of the problem-solving approach; Research on teaching methods.

ABSTRACT. Some of the factors that influence our understanding of the nature of names and words were investigated. Participants (from kindergarten, 2nd, 4th, and 6th grades, and a university undergraduate class) were told a series of brief narratives thematizing the relation between objects and names, after which they were asked questions about the origins and changeability of names and words. Responses were coded as either realist (i.e., viewing names as intrinsic properties of objects) or nominalist (i.e., understanding names and words as arbitrary social conventions). By Grade 2, the children showed a significant increase in nominalist thinking, but this was not a universal development among the participants. Many adults expressed views that did not reflect a strictly nominalist understanding of words and names. Furthermore, the use of nominalist and realist models was influenced by various social-discursive factors including the type of object being named, the type of name being asked about, and the participant's prior experience with the name. It is argued that linguistic (especially literate) experiences play a crucial role in developing a nominalist understanding of names and words. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Children's understanding of the role of evidence in the formation of beliefs was examined by having 4- to 8-year-olds judge what another would ‘think’ or ‘know’ when confronted with ambiguous and unambiguous evidence and then asking them to justify their judgements. Whereas younger children's ascriptions tended to be based on their own beliefs about the situation, older children tended to ascribe knowledge to others on the basis of the evidence available to those others. However, even 6- and 7-year-olds had some difficulty grasping the relation between critical or unambiguous evidence and knowledge, and in basing their ascriptions of knowledge exclusively on the availability of such evidence. Two important transitions in epistemological understanding were observed. The first at about 5½ years of age was the transition from ascribing beliefs to others on the basis of one's own beliefs to ascribing them on the basis of the evidence available to that person — a transition that may depend on their understanding of the possibility of someone holding a false belief; the second was the transition from 6 to 7 years of age when they begin W understand the implications of critical evidence. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Children's understanding of the role of evidence in the formation of beliefs was examined by having 4‐ to 8‐year‐olds judge what another would ’think’ or ’know’ when confronted with ambiguous and unambiguous evidence and then asking them to justify their judgements. Whereas younger children's ascriptions tended to be based on their own beliefs about the situation, older children tended to ascribe knowledge to others on the basis of the evidence available to those others. However, even 6‐ and 7‐year‐olds had some difficulty grasping the relation between critical or unambiguous evidence and knowledge, and in basing their ascriptions of knowledge exclusively on the availability of such evidence. Two important transitions in epistemological understanding were observed. The first at about 5#fr1/2> years of age was the transition from ascribing beliefs to others on the basis of one's own beliefs to ascribing them on the basis of the evidence available to that person—a transition that may depend on their understanding of the possibility of someone holding a false belief; the second was the transition from 6 to 7 years of age when they begin to understand the implications of critical evidence. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]