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I show that stochastic contracts generate powerful incentives when agents suffer from probability distortion. When implementing these contracts, the principal can target probability distortions in order to inflate the agent's perceived benefits of exerting high levels of effort. This novel source of motivation is absent in contracts traditionally regarded as optimal. A theoretical framework and an experiment demonstrate that stochastic contracts implemented with small probabilities, which expose the agent to a high degree of risk, generate higher performance than cost‐equivalent contracts with lower or no risk exposure. I find that probability distortions that result from likelihood insensitivity—cognitive limitations that prevent the accurate evaluation of probabilities—account for this finding. The results highlight the limits of contracts traditionally regarded as optimal. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We experimentally study how people form predictive models of simple data generating processes (DGPs), by showing subjects data sets and asking them to predict future outputs. We find that subjects: (i) often fail to predict in this task, indicating a failure to form a model, (ii) often cannot explicitly describe the model they have formed even when successful, and (iii) tend to be attracted to the same, simple models when multiple models fit the data. Examining a number of formal complexity metrics, we find that all three patterns are well organized by metrics suggested by Lipman (1995) and Gabaix (2014) that describe the information processing required to deploy models in prediction. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We propose a novel way of measuring trust in institutions, which draws on the experimental method used to elicit time preferences. Our measure is provided in the meaningful metric of the subjective probability of trustworthiness of the trustee. In a lab‐in‐the‐field setting in the Philippines, we measure trust in two different financial institutions. Additionally, we exploit exogenous variation in the eligibility for a future payment to examine whether a promise fulfilled by the institution increases trust and changes individual financial behavior. We find that eligible individuals significantly increase savings held with the institution. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Keynes (1921) and Ellsberg (1961) have articulated an aversion toward betting on an urn containing balls of two colors of unknown proportion to one with a 50–50 composition. Keynes views this as reflecting different preferences for bets arising from different sources of uncertainty. Ellsberg describes this as weighting the priors arising from the unknown urn pessimistically. In two experiments, we observe substantial links between attitude toward almost‐objective uncertainty and attitudes toward multiple‐prior uncertainties in terms of ambiguity and its corresponding compound risk. Our findings point to a shared component across domains of uncertainty and motivate the need for further theoretical development. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We report on two novel choice experiments with real goods where subjects in one treatment are forced to choose, as is the norm in economic experiments, while in the other they are not but can instead incur a small cost to defer choice. Using a variety of measures, we find that the active choices (i.e., those that exclude the deferral outside option) of subjects in the nonforced‐choice treatment are generally more consistent. We also find that the combined deferral and active‐choice behavior of subjects in that treatment is explained better by a model of dominant choice with incomplete preferences than it is by rational choice. Our results suggest that nonforced‐choice experiments and models can be helpful in separating people's rational, hesitant/not‐yet‐rational and genuinely irrational behavior, and can potentially offer important new insights in revealed preference analysis. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Using a revealed preference approach, we conduct an experiment where subjects make choices from linear convex budgets in the domain of risk. We find that many individuals prefer mixtures of lotteries in ways that systematically rule out expected utility behavior. We explore the extent to which an individual's preference to choose mixtures is related to a preference for randomization by comparing choices from a convex choice task to the decisions made in a repeated discrete choice task. We find that a preference to mix is positively correlated with behavior from repeated discrete choice tasks. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We investigate if, and why, an initial success can trigger a string of successes. Using random variations in success in a real‐effort laboratory experiment, we cleanly identify the causal effect of an early success in a competition. We confirm that an early success indeed leads to increased chances of a later success. By alternatively eliminating strategic features of the competition, we turn on and off possible mechanisms driving the effect of an early success. Standard models of dynamic contest predict a strategic effect due to asymmetric incentives between initial winners and losers. Surprisingly, we find no evidence that they can explain the positive effect of winning. Instead, we find that the effect of winning seems driven by an information revelation effect, whereby players update their beliefs about their relative strength after experiencing an initial success. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

NGOs often vary in terms of how radical they are. In this paper, we explore the effectiveness of NGO discourses in bringing about social change. We focus on animal advocacy: welfarist NGOs primarily seek to improve the conditions in which animals are raised and reduce meat consumption, whereas abolitionist NGOs categorically reject animal use and call for a vegan society. We design an experiment to study the respective impact of welfarist and abolitionist discourses on participants' beliefs regarding pro‐meat justifications and their actions, namely their propensity to engage in the short run in animal welfare (charity donation, petition against intensive farming) and plant‐based diets (subscription to a newsletter promoting plant‐based diets, petition supporting vegetarian meals). We first show that both welfarist and abolitionist discourses significantly undermine participants' pro‐meat justifications. Second, the welfarist discourse does not significantly affect participants' actions, although we detect a potential backlash effect of the abolitionist discourse. We show that the NGOs' positive standard effect on actions through the change in beliefs is outweighed by a negative behavioral response to the discourses (reactance effect). Last, greater public‐good contributions are associated with greater engagement in animal welfare in the presence of an NGO discourse. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We study games with natural‐language labels (i.e., strategic problems where options are denoted by words), for which we propose and test a measurable characterization of prominence. We assume that—ceteris paribus—players find particularly prominent those strategies that are denoted by words more frequently used in their everyday language. To operationalize this assumption, we suggest that the prominence of a strategy‐label is correlated with its frequency of occurrence in large text corpora, such as the Google Books corpus ("n‐gram" frequency). In testing for the strategic use of word frequency, we consider experimental games with different incentive structures (such as incentives to and not to coordinate), as well as subjects from different cultural/linguistic backgrounds. Our data show that frequently‐mentioned labels are more (less) likely to be selected when there are incentives to match (mismatch) others. Furthermore, varying one's knowledge of the others' country of residence significantly affects one's reliance on word frequency. Overall, the data show that individuals play strategies that fulfill our characterization of prominence in a (boundedly) rational manner. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Choice experiments have been extensively used in many stated preference studies and disciplines. In order to give external validity to stated preferences, participants must behave the same in an experiment setting as they do in reality. The difference between a decision made in a real experiment and a hypothetical experiment is commonly attributed to "hypothetical bias." In this paper, we investigate whether virtual reality can reduce hypothetical bias in choice experiments. We conducted a set of experiments using the Food and Drug Administration's new Nutrition Facts Label for yogurts. Participants were randomly assigned to non‐hypothetical and hypothetical experiments, which differed in terms of visual presentations of the product in question: text, picture, and a virtual grocery store. Given the absence of real markets for the new label at the time of the research, we approximate the real market with a binding choice in our non‐hypothetical experiments. Our results suggest that although the hypothetical bias with virtual reality is not statistically significantly different from those using text or picture, it is the smallest. Among participants who did not exhibit high simulator discomfort, results suggest that virtual reality can significantly reduce hypothetical bias in choice experiments. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Is it possible to guarantee that the mere exposure of a subject to a belief elicitation task will not affect the very same beliefs that we are trying to elicit? In this paper, we introduce mechanisms that make it simultaneously strictly dominant for the subject (a) not to acquire any information that could potentially lead to belief updating as a response to the incentives provided by the mechanism itself, and (b) to report his beliefs truthfully. Such mechanisms are called robust scoring rules. We prove that robust scoring rules always exist under mild assumptions on the subject's costs for acquiring information. Moreover, every scoring rule can become approximately robust, in the sense that if we scale down the incentives sufficiently, we will approximate with arbitrary precision the beliefs that the subject would have held if he had not been confronted with the belief‐elicitation task. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Using an experiment, we test the relation between personality traits and revealed risk and ambiguity preferences, and we consider the effects of personality traits prevalence in a group on the decision making of each group member. In the experiment, subjects reveal their risk and ambiguity preferences through lottery choices. They then participate in an unstructured group chat. Afterwards, they are given the chance to revise their initial lottery choices. Results show that personality traits affect ambiguity but not risk preferences before the chat. Specifically, agreeableness is negatively related to ambiguity aversion. We also show that the probability of changing decisions after the chat is affected by the individual's personality traits but not by the traits of the other group members. The latter only affects the direction and the degree of the change. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We test experimentally whether individuals high in some entrepreneurial characteristics are more likely to engage in destructive behavior than other individuals. In the joy‐of‐destruction game, participants can either preserve or costly burn the endowment of each other. In some treatments they can hide from other participants whether they are responsible for destruction. We found that participants high in some entrepreneurial characteristics are significantly more likely to adopt destructive behaviours. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We use laboratory experiments to examine the impact of appeals to social norms on the compliance decisions of individuals. We test the effects of two main types of social norms: "descriptive norms," or the type of behavior that is typical or most frequently enacted, and "injunctive norms," or the type of behavior that "constitutes morally approved and disapproved conduct". In addition, for injunctive norms, we introduce approval‐framed and disapproval‐framed injunctive norm messages. Our results indicate that normative appeals generally have a modest and positive impact on tax compliance, if not always statistically significant. The magnitude of both approval‐ and disapproval‐framed injunctive norm messages is an increase of around 2% in reported taxes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The use of experimental economics in valuation of market and nonmarket goods has grown over the past few years. The ability of experimental auctions (EUs) to reveal consumer preferences and their malleability has been praised in previous literature. Because of the high cost of conducting EUs, researchers usually present multiple products to participants, determining how many products to present has no clear guideline. The results of this study show that subjects do not value products the same way across different number of options offered to them. The main indicator is the increasing variance in responses for a benchmark product when more products are available. With an econometric specification allowing for heteroscedasticity as a function of the number of product offerings, the results indicate that the number of goods available for bidding is not to be taken as a trivial task in experimental design for value elicitation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The identification of the optimal selling time of stored goods is among the most essential economic decisions on a farm. Beyond monetary aspects, behavioral factors influence farmers' selling decisions. In financial economics, the disposition effect is a commonly observed phenomenon. It describes the fact that investors hold losing stocks too long, while they sell stocks that gained in value too early. In the context of agriculture, this behavioral bias has not been analyzed thoroughly yet. To close this research gap, we conducted an incentivized online experiment with 112 farmers from Germany. The experimental design was based on a well‐proven experiment from financial economics and adapted to an agricultural decision context where stored goods must be sold. Farmers were provided information on the uncertain price developments. In addition, lotteries were conducted to elicit farmers' risk attitude, probability weighting, and loss aversion. Results indicate that there is a robust disposition effect in farmers' selling behavior. Furthermore, more loss‐averse farmers exhibited a higher realization of gains. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We study the effect of embedding pairwise choices between lotteries within a choice list on measured risk attitude. Using an experiment with online workers, we find that subjects choose the risky lottery rather than a sure payment significantly more often when responding to a choice list. This behavior can be rationalized by the interaction between nonexpected utility and the random incentive system, as suggested by Karni and Safra (). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Elicited preference rankings for two lotteries are typically inconsistent across choice and pricing tasks. We test whether pre‐play learning makes preference rankings consistent. Pre‐play learning denotes ex‐ante lottery learning, where subjects observe playing lotteries before making decisions. We find that pre‐play learning makes the average selling prices for the p‐bet, of subjects who choose the p‐bet, higher than their average selling prices for the $‐bet. However, pre‐play learning is not strong enough to equalize the rates of standard and non‐standard reversals, although pre‐play learning reduces the rate of standard reversals. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We report data from a variation of the trust game aimed at determining whether (and how) inequality and random shocks that affect wealth influence the levels of trust and trustworthiness. To tease apart the effect of the shock and the inequality, we compare behavior in a trust game where the inequality is initially given and one where it is the result of a random shock that reduces the second mover's endowment. We find that first‐movers send less to second‐movers but only when the inequality results from a random shock. As for the amount returned, second‐movers return less when they are endowed less than first‐movers, regardless of whether the difference in endowments was initially given or occurred after a random shock. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Ex‐post opportunistic behavior, commonly present in bilateral trade relationships, is a key element of the transaction cost economics. Investment in outside options is a prime example of such opportunism and often leads to inefficiency, for example by exerting effort to search for alternative business partners even if it does not add trade value. We experimentally investigate a bilateral trade relationship in which standard theory assuming self‐regarding preferences predicts that the seller will be better off by investing in the outside option to improve his bargaining position. The seller's investment, however, might negatively affect the buyer's other‐regarding preferences if the investment is viewed as opportunistic. We find overall support for our hypotheses that arise from the link between other‐regarding behavior and opportunism. Our findings suggest that when the transaction cost economics approach is applied to the design of a governance structure, other‐regarding preferences should be taken into account. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Using a laboratory dictator game in Tunisia, we investigate whether the donation level is influenced by the time allotted to take the giving decision. We found that when participants have more time to decide, they give less compared to a situation where they have less time to take their decision. Some policy and managerial implications are drawn. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The study investigates relation between global shapes of utility functions and investor preferences towards particular asset classes for investment decisions. Global shapes that emerge are fully concave, fully convex, Reverse‐S and S‐shaped utility functions, using the certainty equivalence method for eliciting risk preferences. Investor clusters show existence of two types of investors, preference towards financial assets (bank deposits, insurance, pension and provident fund, shares and mutual funds) vs traditional assets (chit funds, gold and precious metals, real estate, postal savings, and government bonds). Investors with reverse‐S and S‐shaped utility functions prefer investment in financial assets, while investors with fully concave and fully convex utility functions prefer traditional assets. Prior studies suggest reverse‐S and S‐shaped category of investors perceive risk in terms of gains and losses, and financial assets with ready price quotes facilitate such buying and selling. In contrast, fully concave and fully convex utility functions prefer investment in traditional assets that requires long term horizon and stable risk preferences. Among demographics, males with reverse‐S shaped utility function are more likely to invest in financial assets, and increase in dependents reduces the possibility to invest in financial assets. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We examine the influence of optimism about local and foreign people on social cooperation using a public goods game. Firstly, we find that optimism fuels social cooperation, and secondly, that this positive effect holds when optimism is focused either jointly or individually. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract: Incentivising the social discounting task impacts the measurement of altruism in a student population. Incentivised subjects are more altruistic at close social distances, especially subjects who are less altruistic, thus providing evidence of reciprocal altruism. There is also some evidence of hypothetical bias among more altruistically inclined subjects. Making payments real also influences the subject's choice of recipient. Paid subjects select more geographically distant, but psychologically closer subjects, because of prospects for increased anonymity and enforced reciprocity, respectively. Further research is required to verify the robustness of these results, in the laboratory and especially in the field. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract: Even after controlling for hypothetical biases, some incentive‐aligned value elicitation methods still produce different willingness‐to‐pay (WTP) estimates. In this study, we compare WTP estimates from three incentive‐aligned value elicitation methods: real choice experiment (RCE), real double‐bounded dichotomous contingent valuation (RCVM), and Becker–DeGroot–Marschak auction (BDM). We find that participants’ aggressiveness in obtaining low prices (i.e., “deal‐proneness”) influences WTP estimates in the BDM auction, but not those elicited from the RCE and RCVM. The participants with higher levels of deal‐proneness tend to submit lower bids in the BDM auction. The discrepancies in WTP estimates between different incentive‐aligned procedures are narrower for participants with lower levels of deal‐proneness. Our results indicate that the bids in BDM auctions may be understated and the auction mechanism may induce the “gambling behavior” of people who are deal‐prone. That is, whether the BDM auction is truly incentive‐aligned is again called into question. We also discuss the practical implications for food retailers. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We reinvestigate the question first posed by Glaeser et al. (2000): Do survey measures about trust predict actual trusting behavior? This important study established that the behavior in an incentivized trust game is not correlated with the responses to the most widely used survey measures of trust. We conduct a replication and a reinvestigation of GLSS. In the replication, we use the GLSS protocol and we reproduce their results. In the reinvestigation, we introduce one major change: We replace their variation of the standard Berg, Dickhaut, and McCabe (1995) investment game with the original unmodified game. The standard game endows both players, while the modified version endows only the first mover. After endowing both movers in the reinvestigation experiment, we find a significant correlation between the two measures, suggesting that trust is a single construct, whether measured by the survey questions or by an incentivized trust game. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

There are many assignment processes in which agents are given the opportunity to unilaterally select a match. Resulting allocations can be inefficient if agents do not internalize the consequences of their choice on others. To test this formally, we study how other‐regarding behaviors vary across two decision contexts: when subjects make a pure allocation decision; and when they select a partner. In both settings each subject's decision is final and it affects their payoff and that of other subjects in the same way. We find that subjects are more likely to sacrifice their own material well‐being to increase that of others when dividing a pie than when selecting a partner in a large anonymous setting—even though the consequences on the material payoffs of others are identical. These findings suggest that in assignment processes with unilateral selection, efficiency can be improved by presenting the selection process as a choice between outcomes involving multiple individuals, instead of simply selecting a match for themselves. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Accounting for sample selection is a challenge not only for empirical researchers, but also for the agents populating our models. Yet most models abstract from these issues and assume that agents successfully tackle selection problems. We design an experiment where a person who understands selection observes all the data required to account for it. Subjects make choices under uncertainty and their choices reveal valuable information that is biased due to the presence of unobservables. We find that almost no subjects optimally account for endogenous selection. On the other hand, behavior is far from random, but actually quite amenable to analysis: Subjects follow simple heuristics that result in a partial accounting of selection and mitigate mistakes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We report the findings of experiments designed to study how people learn in network games. Network games offer new opportunities to identify learning rules, since on networks (compared to, e.g., random matching) more rules differ in terms of their information requirements. Our experimental design enables us to observe both which actions participants choose and which information they consult before making their choices. We use these data to estimate learning types using finite mixture models. Monitoring information requests turns out to be crucial, as estimates based on choices alone show substantial biases. We also find that learning depends on network position. Participants in more complex environments (with more network neighbors) tend to resort to simpler rules compared to those with only one network neighbor. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

ABSTRACT: In his recent paper, Duttle (2016) showed that individuals with higher cognitive abilities show less overconfidence. In these findings, cognitive abilities were equated with an analytic cognitive style (as measured by a cognitive reflection test, or CRT), although recent works in the field of cognitive psychology suggest separating these two constructs. In particular, it is argued that the analytic cognitive style, but not cognitive abilities, decreases susceptibility to cognitive biases. Analyses of data from Duttle's study support this assertion. Implications for cognitive psychology and behavioural economics are discussed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, we suggest that individuals' tax compliance behaviours are affected by the behaviour of their 'neighbours', or those about whom they may have information, whom they may know, or with whom they may interact on a regular basis. Individuals are more likely to file and to report their taxes when they believe that other individuals are also filing and reporting their taxes; conversely, when individuals believe that others are cheating on their taxes, they may well become cheaters themselves. We use experimental methods to test the role of such information about peer effects on compliance behaviour. In one treatment setting, we inform individuals about the frequency that their neighbours submit a tax return. In a second treatment setting, we inform them about the number of their neighbours who are audited, together with the penalties that they pay. In both cases, we examine the impact of information on filing behaviour and also on subsequent reporting behaviour. We find that providing information on whether one's neighbours are filing returns and/or reporting income has a statistically significant and economically large impact on individual filing and reporting decisions. However, this 'neighbour' information does not always improve compliance, depending on the exact content of the information. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We present a simple principal-agent experiment in which the principals are allowed to choose between a revenue-sharing, a bonus, and a trust contract, to offer to an agent. Our findings suggest that a large majority of experimental subjects choose the revenue-sharing contract. This choice turns out to be not only the most efficient but also, at the same time, fair. Overall, the distribution of earnings is only mildly skewed towards the principal. We conclude that, under revenue-sharing contracts, concerns for fairness can be closely associated with the use of monetary incentives. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We examine behavior of subjects in simultaneous and sequential multi-battle contests, where each individual battle is modeled as an all-pay auction with complete information. In simultaneous best-of-three contests, subjects are predicted to make positive bids in all three battles, but we find that subjects often make positive bids in only two battles. In sequential contests, theory predicts sizable bids in the first battle and no bids in the subsequent battles. Contrary to this prediction, subjects significantly underbid in the first battle and overbid in subsequent battles. Consequently, instead of always ending in the second battle, contests often proceed to the third battle. Finally, although the aggregate bid in simultaneous contests is similar to that in sequential contests, in both settings, subjects make higher aggregate bids than predicted. The observed behavior of subjects can be rationalized by a combination of multidimensional iterative reasoning and a nonmonetary utility of winning. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Trophy. Goal. Dominated. Does priming individuals with competitive concepts such as these influence the temptation to cheat? We utilize a standard laboratory cheating task in a tournament setting and test whether nonconscious priming impacts the nature of cheating behavior. The results demonstrate an asymmetry in a winner-take-all setting: a competitive prime does not increase cheating to improve one's own outcome, but does significantly increase the willingness of an individual to sabotage a competitor. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We run between-subject dictator games with exogenously specified 'give' or 'take' frames involving a balanced pool of male and female dictators and constant payoff possibilities. We find the following: Females allocate more under the taking frame than under the giving frame. Males allocate more under the giving frame than under the taking frame. In the taking frame females are more generous than males. But in the giving frame both are equally generous. Finally, when the combined population of males and females is considered, giving is found to be equivalent to 'not taking,' because the opposing gender effects offset each other. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Social information 'nudges' concerning how others perform typically boost individual performances in experiments with one group reference point. However, in many natural settings, sometimes due to policy, there are several such group reference points. We address the complications that such multiple group social information might introduce through an experiment. The boost to average performance is significant and comparable to the one group case. Between-group inequality does not change. Individual inequality falls, however, because the boost is largest among the pre-'nudge' very poor performers. Finally, the boost to average performance is highest when individuals freely choose their group affiliations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In a controlled laboratory experiment, we study the causal effect of alcohol on economic decision making. A treatment group was given a dose of alcohol designed to target a blood alcohol concentration (BAC) of 0.08 while the BAC of those in the control group remained 0.00. We investigate the behavior of control and treatment groups in the following types of tasks: math, uncertainty, overconfidence, strategic games, food choice, anchoring, and altruism. Our results indicate that alcohol consumption has little systematic effect on economic behavior, at least for the BAC level considered. Further, there is little evidence that alcohol differentially impacts the choices of male and female subjects. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this article we use the 'Click' version of the Bomb Risk Elicitation Task to explore preferences for conformism. In the task subjects can infer the behavior of others from the mass of clicks heard. This signal is uninformative about the precise choices of the other participants, and never mentioned in the instructions. We control the exposure of subjects to clicks by implementing treatments with and without earmuffs. We further test the effect of the introduction of a common rather than individual resolution of uncertainty, still keeping individual payoffs independent of other subjects' choices. We find strong evidence of conformist behavior even in such an inhospitable environment. Simply hearing the others clicking marginally affects subjects behavior. Introducing a common random draw results in a dramatic shift of the average choices toward risk loving, in particular by women, which is consistent with social preference considerations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Laboratory experiments are usually done on individuals, but many business decisions involve groups. Therefore, we ran ultimatum games using individuals and two-person teams. We primed business roles with the labels 'labor' and 'management,' or we used the generic labels of 'proposer' and 'responder.' With business labels, individuals offered lower shares at higher stakes with no significant differences in acceptance rates. For teams, business labels had no significant effect on shares offered, with significantly lower acceptance rates at higher stakes. Teams offered less than individuals, along with higher acceptance rates with generic labels, compared to no significant differences with business labels. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

ABSTRACT We test experimentally whether decisions in 2 × 2 games with mixed equilibria depend on the co-player being nature or a human agent. Controlling for social preferences, we find differences in decisions in the chicken game and battle of the sexes but not for stag hunt and matching pennies. We attribute these to subjects' perception of the other's intentionality and disapproval avoidance in particular. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

ABSTRACT This experimental study measures the three major types of judgmental overconfidence in a within-subjects design. Performance-based overestimation and overplacement are elicited in a Raven Progressive Matrices test for general intelligence. Calibration-based overprecision is evaluated in a forecasting by confidence intervals task. This study takes a closer look at the interrelations of these different types. Moreover, as the main focus, it considers the effect of cognitive abilities on overconfidence. These are quantified in a cognitive reflection test. I find that cognitive skills are substantially interrelated with subjects' confidence levels. Although overconfidence in absolute terms (overestimation) is not affected by cognitive abilities, the effect on overconfidence in relative terms (overplacement) is positive and significant. Overprecision, the calibration-based type of overconfidence, is found to be significantly affected by cognitive capacity as well. Interval forecasts of cognitively more able subjects were much better calibrated than those of their peers who displayed substantial overconfidence in the precision of their forecasts. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

ABSTRACT This paper provides an experimental test of the traveller's dilemma. Our investigation aims to address the research hypothesis that introducing a reference point à la Schelling (set equal to the Pareto optimal solution) might drive people away from rationality even when the size of the penalty/reward is high. Experimental findings reported in this paper provide answers to this question showing that the reference point did not encourage coordination around the Pareto optimal choice. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We study the effect of communication in an experimental game where cooperation is consistent with equilibrium play. We examine two methodological questions which affect many studies of communication in games, particularly those studying the relationship between communication and cooperation in supergames. We show that making it easier for subjects to reach an agreement (by allowing more rounds of communication) does not increase cooperation with a limited message space treatment. Thus, limited message space treatments are not a good substitute for the use of chat. Making the game longer, thereby making the connection between the first period and the continuation game more obvious, also has little impact on cooperation. For both the two- and three-period versions of our game we find substantial amounts of contingent play. This implies that use of a finitely repeated game, which has a number of methodological advantages, maintains the main properties of the underlying supergame. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We revisit the effect of traders' experience on price bubbles by introducing either one-third or two-thirds steady inflow of new traders in each of four consecutive experimental asset markets. We find that bubbles are still reduced in the treatments with a steady inflow of new traders, but at a slower pace compared to the baseline treatment in which new traders are only introduced in the last market. Our analysis of individual trading behavior shows that the slower abatement of bubbles in the inflow treatments can be attributed mainly to the inexperienced traders who make more mistakes than experienced traders. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We examine characteristics and correlates of households in the United States that are most likely to have children at risk of inadequate nutrition-those that report very low food security (VLFS) among their children. Using 11 years of the Current Population Survey, plus data from the National Health and Nutrition Examination Survey (NHANES), we describe these households in great detail with the goal of trying to understand how these households differ from households without such severe food insecurity. While household income certainly plays an important role in determining VLFS among children, we find that even after flexibly controlling for income-to-poverty rates some household characteristics and patterns of program participation have important additional explanatory power. Finally, our examination of the NHANES data suggests an important role for both mental and physical health of adults in the household in determining the food security status of children. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

ABSTRACT Using a canonical trust game, we investigate whether the inequality of endowment between trustor and trustee and the acquired versus permanent financial state affect trust and trustworthiness. We found that trust and trustworthiness are reference-dependent and that individuals with permanent financial state receive more trust and are more trustworthy than others. In our experiment, unequal endowments do not significantly affect trust, but trustworthiness increases significantly when the trustor is poorer. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Studies show that identifying contributors increases contributions to public goods. In practice, viewing identifiable information is costly, which may discourage people from accessing it. We design a public goods experiment in which participants can pay to view information about identities and contributions of group members. We compare this to a treatment in which there is no identifiable information, and a treatment in which all contributors are identified. Our main findings are that: (i) contributions in the treatment with costly information are as high as those in the treatment with free information, (ii) participants rarely choose to view the information, and (iii) being a high contributor is correlated with choosing to view information about others. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A majority of purchases that consumers make are classified as repeat purchases. One of the main reasons why consumers make repeat food purchases is the food's taste. Therefore, we examined the importance of including taste testing in nonhypothetical experimental auctions. Specifically, we used two experiments to determine consumers' willingness to pay for soft drinks labeled with different calorie and sweetener information. In Experiment 1, participants tasted the soft drinks prior to the bidding rounds. In Experiment 2, participants did not taste the soft drinks prior to the bidding rounds. Bidding behavior for the soft drinks was significantly different between Experiment 1 and Experiment 2. Results suggest that including taste testing in the design of experimental auctions is important to accurately capture consumers' willingness to pay for foods that are purchased repeatedly. Results also imply that policies aimed at combating obesity by making the calorie content of foods more visible may not produce desired outcomes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We revisit the claims about the biological underpinnings of economic behavior by specifically exploring if observed gender differences in risk/time preferences can be explained by natural fluctuations in progesterone/estradiol levels during the menstrual cycle and by prenatal exposure to testosterone and estrogen levels. We find no effect of the menstrual cycle (and thereby, of associated fluctuations in progesterone and estradiol levels) or of the digit ratio on either risk or time preferences. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]