Search

Information on the Heart of Asia conference that was held in Islamabad, Pakistan on December 9, 2015 is presented. Topics discussed in the conference includes peace talks between Afghanistan government and Taliban, economic investments by India and 2008 Mumbai attacks. The event was attended by various people including Sushma Swaraj, foreign minister of India, Afghanistan's former President Hamid Karzai and Rahmatullah Nabeel, head of Afghanistan's National Directorate of Services (NDS).

The article provides an overview of Taliban's internal power struggle. It mentions that that Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar, a co-founder of the Afghan Taliban, had been trying to negotiate a coalition deal with representatives of the old political elite in Kabul, such as former President Hamid Karzai and Abdullah Abdullah, the former head of the National Reconciliation Council. It also informs on its tie up with Pakistan.

The article reports that Afghan President Hamid Karzai made his third 2013 visit to India in December 2013. It informs that the two governments announced they would deepen their defense and security ties by increasing the capabilities of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF). It also speculates that the Afghan-Indian military cooperation will likely increase still further as the U.S. evacuates its remaining forces from Afghanistan.

The article discusses the agenda of the U.S. in Afghanistan and Pakistan, based on the South Asia visit of U.S. Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel, that focused on getting a formal agreement for keeping U.S. forces in Afghanistan after 2014 and an informal accord for continued drone strikes in Pakistan. The author notes that Hagel did not even try meeting with Afghan President Hamid Karzai, who is adding new conditions to renew the Afghan-U.S. status of forces agreement.

The author shares his views on the demands of Hamid Karzai, president of Afghanistan, regarding the bilateral security agreement with the U.S. He believes that if Karzai sticks with his 2013 course, the U.S. will have few other viable options. He explains why he finds Karzai's obstructionism puzzling. He puts forth two theories, involving American interest in Afghanistan and the Taliban, regarding Karzai's strategy which he believes are unrealistic.

The article comments on the visit of Afghanistan's President Hamid Karzai to Qatar in 2013. It mentions that the visit is in line with the efforts of the political leader to create conditions that are favorable for peace talks. According to the author, the meeting also focuses on suggestions related to the establishment of an office of the Afghan Taliban insurgents in Doha.

The author asserts on the need for the U.S. to ensure that the Afghanistan government, headed by President Hamid Karzai, does not undertake policies that damage key U.S. interests. He criticizes the U.S. government for downplaying Karzai's behavior, even after he suggested that the U.S. is colluding with the Taliban in attacks throughout Afghanistan to create a pretext for U.S. combat forces to stay in the country beyond the 2014 deadline for withdrawal.

The article focuses on the U.S.- Afghan strategic agreement signed by U.S. President Barack Obama and Afghanistan President Hamid Karzai. It asserts that U.S. President Barack Obama was able to build trust and rapport with Afghanistan by publicly reaching memorandums of understanding about issues between the two countries. It warns Afghanistan to be careful to prevent and transparently respond to any misconduct during this sensitive transition period.

The article reports that the question of reaching a peace agreement with the Taliban was raised in the Senate and House intelligence committees' hearings on threats to the U.S. In 2011, U.S. officials insisted that the Taliban end its ties with al-Qaida, renounce violence and accept Afghanistan's constitution as a requirement to begin any talks. According to the article, Western governments do not want to grant Afghan president Hamid Karzai veto on the Afghan-led process of reconciliation.

The article discusses the political implications of India's recent partnership agreement with Afghanistan as of October 2011. It states that the leaders of both nations met in New Delhi, India to sign the deal, and that Afghan President Hamid Karzai lambasted Pakistan for what he called their double standards with the Taliban. It reports that while this may seem to be a deliberate slight against Pakistan, the motives of both India and Afghanistan are purely economic.

The article deals with the impact of the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Afghanistan on the American strategic interests in the 21st century. The government of U.S. President Barack Obama is considering both the material costs, and the political and bureaucratic implications of continuing the Afghan War and remaining in Afghanistan. Another key consideration is the impact of such withdrawal on the government of Afghan President Hamid Karzai and its resolve to fight the Taliban.

The article discusses the implications of the two-day stay of Afghan President Hamid Karzai in Moscow, Russia for the growth in formal ties between Afghanistan and Russia from January 20 to 21, 2011. During Karzai's trip, he had a chance to meet Russian President Dmitry Medvedev and Prime Minister Vladimir Putin and talk about issues related to the countries' economy and energy problems. It mentions that the Russian officials decided to offer support for the upgrades in the hydropower plant in Naghlu, Afghanistan.

The author examines the joint Russian-U.S. operation against several narcotics laboratories in Afghanistan, and its implication for cooperation between Russia and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), as well as for possible support to the coalition's efforts in the Afghan War. The commando operation is led by U.S. special forces, Russia's Federal Drug Control Service (FSKN) and the Afghan Interior Ministry. The operation was questioned by Afghan President Hamid Karzai.

The article examines opportunities and challenges to a sort of workable Afghan power-sharing deal between President Hamid Karzai's government and Taliban leaders. The U.S. supports a power-sharing deal that excludes al-Qaida. The two major obstacles include the true attitude of Mullah Omar and his followers and the differences between Karzai and the U.S. over the terms of any power-sharing deal.

The article examines opportunities and challenges to a sort of workable Afghan power-sharing deal between President Hamid Karzai's government and Taliban leaders. The U.S. supports a power-sharing deal that excludes al-Qaida. The two major obstacles include the true attitude of Mullah Omar and his followers and the differences between Karzai and the U.S. over the terms of any power-sharing deal.

The author discusses the 2014 Afghan security plan introduced by President Hamid Karzai at the international conference in Kabul in July 2010. At issue is whether the U.S. and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) are moving towards a 21st century variant of the exit strategy by former Afghan leader Mohamed Najibullah. He compares the Najibullah government with the Karzai administration. He explains that a strategy similar to that of Najibullah would end reform initiatives designed to promote good governance.

The author talks about the 2014 Afghan security plan introduced by President Hamid Karzai at the international conference in Kabul in July 2010. At issue is whether the U.S. and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) are moving towards a 21st century variant of the exit strategy by former Afghan leader Mohamed Najibullah. He compares the Najibullah government with the Karzai administration. He explains that a strategy similar to that of Najibullah would end reform initiatives designed to promote good governance.

The article discusses the formation of community policing units to boost local security in Taliban-plagued areas in Afghanistan. Initiated by U.S. Army General David Petraeus upon assumption of command of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) war effort, the local police units would be formed, paid and uniformed by the government. Afghan President Hamid Karzai has reportedly objected to the initiative, with the three previous endeavors involving militias and local security forces.

The article ponders on the emergence of central governments in Afghanistan and Somalia, and its impact on the U.S. in 2010. Such governments have an impact on the efforts being done by the U.S. to address such issues as extremism and terrorism. Information on the occurrence of corruption under the administration of Afghan President Hamid Karzai is also presented. According to J. Peter Pham, an African observer, a course correction is needed in U.S. policy toward Somalia.

The article focuses on the efforts of Afghanistan president Hamid Karzai to gain U.S. support for a new peace plan and negotiations with the Taliban. The terms of the new peace plan include the Karzai administration demanding Taliban leaders to break with al-Qaida, stop military action and accept the Afghan constitution tenets. Karzai is also proposing the creation of a new High Level Peace Council that will be supervising the process of reintegratiing former fighters. Noted is the hope that reconciliation and reintegration can weaken insurgency.

The author analyzes the purpose of the actions by Afghan President Hamid Karzai which includes his criticism of U.S. policies, a threat to join Taliban resistance and outreach to former domestic enemies. He describes the potential outcomes of a U.S. military surge in Afghanistan from Karzai's perspective. In the author's view, Karzai is playing a dangerous double game wherein he is simultaneously relying on a U.S./North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) success to rid him of his enemies while avoiding the possibility of the U.S. trying to remove him.

The article focuses on the statements of U.S. President Barack Obama during his visit in Kabul, Afghanistan in March 2010. Obama said that he expects President Hamid Karzai to make major changes in his second term such as fighting corruption and drug traffickers. He added that he is willing to extend the troops withdrawal beyond July 2011 until the U.S. and its allies achieve success in the war against the al-Qaida. He also encouraged U.S. soldiers to achieve their goal of building the Afghan capacity to fight terrorism.

The article argues against the characterization of Afghan President Hamid Karzai as corrupt and incompetent. Karzai is described by the author as a well-educated and non-violent dealmaker who uses compromise as his political tool. One indication of his efforts to improve the effectiveness and transparency of his administration is his decision to expel two ministers who received graft allegations. The key role to be played by Karzai in the strategic objectives of the West is stressed.

The article cites some of the impediments to the strategy of U.S. President Barack Obama and his national security team in Afghanistan. The rivalry between Pakistan and India is cited as one of the major hindrances to the strategy. Of concern to the U.S. is the weakness of the government of Afghan President Hamid Karzai. Support from Pakistan and India to address terrorism and reconstruction in Afghanistan, respectively, is said to be a key success factor to the U.S. effort.

This article looks at the goal of U.S. President Barack Obama to formulate a sustainable approach to state-building. It reflects on a mini-summit to be held by Obama with Afghan President Hamid Karzai and Pakistani leader Asif Ali Zardari at the White House in May 2009. It explains the importance of state-building to the mission in Afghanistan and Pakistan. It notes that state-building projects must bridge the sovereignty gap by establishing the legitimacy of the national government.

The article reports that despite little evidence that a massive program of aerial coca crop fumigation has worked in Colombia, and despite serious reservations by the Pentagon and by Afghan president Hamid Karzai, the U.S. State Department, backed by the White House, is mulling the expansion of aerial poppy eradication into Afghanistan as a way to fight the Taliban. Critics say crop spraying in Afghanistan is bound to be counterproductive.

The article reports that U.S. President George W. Bush and Afghanistan President Hamid Karzai showed signs of divergence on major issues relevant to their relationship as they ended their Camp David meeting on August 4, 2008. Because Karzai has no power base of his own, he understands the importance of demonstrating that he enjoys the full support of Bush administration on his country. However, on important issues of policy, rifts between Afghanistan and the U.S. are evident.

The article focuses on the scheduled meeting between U.S. President George W. Bush and Afghan President Hamid Karzai at Camp David to discuss the situation in Afghanistan. The presidents will discuss two important topics, including the death of Afghan civilians from North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) military action and the narcotics problem of Afghanistan. Karzai has called on NATO forces to prevent civilian casualties.

The article presents an update on world politics as of July 31, 2007. According to Afghanistan's first ambassador to the U.S. Ishak Shariar, the U.S. missed an opportunity in opting for Hamid Karzai over Zahir Shah to lead Afghanistan. The Mediterranean's sudden summer storms have claimed the lives of dozens of illegal immigrants. The United Nations abolished the Commission on Human Rights and replaced it with the Human Rights Council.

The article reports on the possible leadership changes in Afghanistan and the World Bank. Afghan expatriates believe that interim president Hamid Karzai will not last a year in his position as the Bush administration loses confidence in him. Former Afghan finance minister Ashraf Ghani has the possibility to replace World Bank president Paul Wolfowitz.

This article reports on the threat posed by the narcotics trade and the terrorism it funds to Afghanistan. According to the author, only the Afghan government appears to be unwilling to admit the link between drugs and insurgency and terrorism. In continuing to do so, Afghanistan will lose the attention of its allies and their much-needed cash, the author says. He contends that Afghanistan can and must crush its drug trade. He points out that Afghan President Hamid Karzai appears to fail the grasp the immediacy of the problem.